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Chapter 1 Introduction 
European Broadcasting Visions
In 1944 the British, Belgian and Polish engineers Peter Pendleton Eckersley, Auguste 
Hubert and B. Tenenbaum together sought to re-design the existing but by then 
paralyzed organization of broadcasting in Europe.1 The world was at war and the 
Allied and Axis powers had been fighting one another with the help of modern 
technologies like radio broadcasting, wireless telephony, and telegraphy. Eckersley, 
Hubert, and Tenenbaum proposed a ready-made plan for a new start for broadcast-
ing directly after the end of the war. Their “European Broadcasting Alliance” plan 
described in detail a broadcasting infrastructure that assured free expression to the 
various rival groups in Europe.2 The three men chose the name of their plan with 
care. It expressed their belief in a diversity of opinions, cultures, and peoples, while 
pushing for an alliance between Allied and Axis powers that were using broadcast-
ing to attack each other. The combination of diversity and alliance formed the core 
of the European Broadcasting Alliance plan.
The plan claimed that diversity is served and alliance is built “…if every European 
could be made conscious of his status as a European – a member of a nation within 
a wider group of nations.”3 This suggests that Eckersley, Hubert, and Tenenbaum 
considered it important that radio listeners in Europe were already aware, or would 
become aware, of their participation and inclusion in European society. In their eyes, 
broadcasting had an important and powerful role to play in creating this awareness. 
They therefore designed an internationally owned and operated broadcasting infra-
structure that covered all corners of Europe.4 
1 The designers of the plan had impressive international curricula vitae. Between 1919 and 1923 Eckersley 
was head of the experimental section of the design department at the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, 
and from 1923 to 1929 the first Chief Engineer of the BBC. Both at the BBC and internationally he widely 
influenced technological broadcasting developments. Hubert was a Belgian broadcasting pioneer and admin-
istrator of Radio-Belgique S.A. He was associated with SAIT (a Belgian Operating Company), was President 
of the International Radio Maritime Committee, and honorary member of the International Broadcasting 
Union. Tenenbaum was a Polish radio engineer, of whom little is known. S.n., “Mr. P. P. Eckersley: First Chief 
Engineer of the B.B.C.,” The Times, March 15, 1963; Asa Briggs, “Peter Pendleton Eckersley,” Oxford Diction-
ary of National Biographies, 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37385; S.n., “Real International 
Broadcasting: Proposals for a European Alliance,” Wireless World 50, no. 8 (1944): 234-235.
2 ITU, “Un réseau international de radiodiffusion en Europe,” Journal des Télécommunications 12, no. 5 
(1945): 62. 
3 S.n., “Real International Broadcasting,” 234.
4 ITU, “Un réseau international de radiodiffusion en Europe”; S.n., “Real International Broadcasting.”
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The European Broadcasting Alliance plan was for an international European 
broadcasting network parallel to and explicitly separate from the national broad-
casting systems already in place by the 1940s (Figure 1.1). The proposed interna-
tional network consisted of a web of interconnected landlines, with Bern, Brussels, 
and Vienna as the main so-called International Radio Centers. Via these interna-
tional landlines, broadcasters could easily exchange programs that at their destina-
tion would be broadcast to listeners by means of a coupling with the wireless na-
tional networks. Such a network enabled listeners everywhere in Europe to follow 
international events live via their radio sets. An immense short wave connection at 
Tangiers in Africa would in turn link the European network, which included Soviet 
Russia and Turkey, with the rest of the world, assuring the global diffusion of se-
lected European programs. In the eyes of Eckersley, Hubert, and Tenenbaum, the 
international service should have precedence at all times over the national wireless 
services. They thus consciously foregrounded the international part of their plan, 
and their ideas of a European consciousness, above the national part.
The European Broadcasting Alliance plan circulated among governments and 
the international telecommunication community, but eventually failed. When the 
British government officially turned down the plan, British manufacturers had 
already proposed another plan.5 In this – “Post War European Broadcasting” – 
the manufacturers emphasized the inaccuracy of the pre-war broadcasting system 
that in their eyes had been heavily influenced by political considerations.6 The 
allocation of frequencies on technical grounds should make it possible to avoid 
quarrelling over “national” channels. Frequencies should be allocated to stations 
on the basis of their fading radius, irrespective of nation-state boundaries. The 
power of the existing stations and the way their signals faded away as a result of 
geophysical circumstances, would then define the borders of Europe’s nations.7 In 
such a way, technology rather than political, ideological, or cultural visions de-
fined the boundaries of European countries.
5 It remains unclear why the 1944 plan failed, and was turned down by the British government. There 
is reason to believe that Eckersley’s reputation had become or had already been dubious for a while. In 
1931 he and his new wife Frances Dorothy joined Oswald’s Mosley’s party. From 1935 onwards they spent 
their holidays in Germany “where they admired the progress that Germany was making under national 
socialism.” His wife stayed in Germany after the outbreak of war and would be put on trial in Britain after 
the war for her international radio activities for Germany. ITU, “Un réseau international de radiodiffusion 
en Europe”; Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III: The War of Words 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 127n. Quoted from Briggs, “Peter Pendleton Eckersley.”
6 S.n., “Monthly Commentary: The Industry’s Plan for Broadcasting,” Wireless World 51, no. 9 (1945): 257.
7 S.n., “Plan for Europe: Broadcasting Allocations on Engineering Principles,” Wireless World 51, no. 9 
(1945): 258.
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Figure 1.1 – The 1944 European Broadcasting Alliance proposal 
Source: “Un réseau international de radiodiffusion en Europe,” Journal des Télécommunications 
12, no. 5 (1945), 63.
Figure 1.2 – Post War European Broadcasting Proposal of 1945
Source: S.n., “Plan for Europe: Broadcasting Allocations on Engineering Principles,’’ Wireless 
World 51, 9 (1945), 261.
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The manufacturers’ approach to broadcasting was technical, bearing in mind 
their economic motivation. The war was having a considerable impact on their 
activities. They not only experienced a shortage of labor and materials, but also “a 
lack of detailed knowledge on conditions of use for which their productions must 
be designed.”8 A sub-committee of the British Radio Equipment Manufacturers’ 
Association designed a plan to solve these war-driven problems. The Radio 
Industry Council, who finally issued the plan, was trying to avoid large discrepan-
cies between post-war developments and pre-war technology. It wanted to guaran-
tee the accuracy of the existing radio sets which had already been sold.9 The plan 
encouraged re-allocating the infrastructure of wireless long and medium wave 
broadcasting which had been disturbed by the war. This infrastructure was already 
in place in Europe, but would be modified via a different approach to that used in 
the interwar years (Figure 1.2). The plan tried to resolve in the best possible way 
the economic slump, warranting the production and market share of the British 
radio industry.
The 1945 plan took no consideration of European unification. It favored the 
national above the European despite focusing on all of Europe geographically. 
Every country would have to be provided with “two ‘national’ programmes, as well 
as a system of localised transmissions to suit the special needs of any important 
regions or language groups in each country.”10 The manufacturers thus stressed the 
need to concentrate on the national as well as the regional and local communities 
within nation-states. Furthermore, a focus on the technical principles of broad-
casting would enhance the quality of reception, provide a solution to interference, 
and would assure reception of foreign stations for each listener. Therefore listeners 
could only receive national programs from those foreign stations whose signals 
they managed to receive. The plan thus did not stipulate the need for reception of 
a station from each country in Europe, which also included Soviet Russia, Turkey, 
and all countries bordering the Mediterranean. The British manufacturers’ plan 
made the national and local significantly more important than international re-
ception or a European broadcasting service. The 1944 and 1945 plans thus pro-
posed a European agenda of a very different nature, making choices that related 
the creation of broadcasting to European unification efforts in a different way. 
8 S.n., “Monthly Commentary,” 257.
9 Briggs shows how the Radio Industry Council in the area of television informed the Television Ad-
visory Committee directly after the war “that it did not favour even minor changes in frequencies if they 
would mean that tuning changes had to be made to existing sets.” Briggs, The War of Words, quote 181, 
169, 173-174.
10 S.n,. “Plan for Europe,” 258.
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The 1944 and 1945 plans were the only two which spread to all corners of 
Europe with the aim of resolving the stalemate in broadcasting caused by the 
Second World War. Like the 1944 plan, for unknown reasons the 1945 plan failed 
as well. After the war, broadcasting organizations chose a third option, namely 
the establishment of two international non-governmental organizations who co-
ordinated an international collaboration of national broadcasters. The Eastern 
European Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion (OIR, later to become 
OIRT when it started covering television as well) and the Western European 
Broadcasting Union continued the pre-war broadcasting of international collab-
oration coordinated by the International Broadcasting Union (IBU), albeit with 
some modifications.11 After the war, the EBU and the OIRT and their international 
networks, Intervision and Eurovision, divided the European landscape into an 
eastern and a western European bloc.12 On January 1, 1993, this bloc was dissolved 
when the OIRT merged into the EBU, maintaining the name of the EBU and the 
Eurovision network.13
Like the 1944 and 1945 plans for post-war broadcasting, the EBU initiative 
made specific choices. These were stressed on the occasion of its twenty-fifth an-
niversary. The EBU projected its work as a simple programming and engineering 
job taking place in an environment of pragmatism. According to EBU president 
Sir Charles Curran, it was “by the scrupulous avoidance of ideologies that we have 
managed to build a cohesive organization in which the common interest serves to 
promote mutual tolerance and differences.”14 His note should be seen within the 
context of the War of the Black Heavens that was the Cold War.15 Curran suggests 
that the EBU tried to stay outside this war by using a non-political and non-ide-
ological approach but his remark nevertheless was political and ideological. The 
EBU saw itself as an expert organization that connected national differences to 
11 For a discussion on the whereabouts of the development of the OIRT and EBU see: Andreas Fickers 
and Suzanne Lommers, “Eventing Europe: Broadcasting and the Mediated Performances of Europe,” in 
Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Andreas Fickers and 
Alexander Badenoch (London: Palgrave, 2010), 236-237; Léo Wallenborn, “From IBU to EBU: The Great 
European Broadcasting Crisis (Part I),” EBU-Review 29 (January 1978): 25-34; Léo Wallenborn, “From 
IBU to EBU: The Great European Broadcasting Crisis (Part II),” EBU-Review 29 (March 1978): 22-30; 
Charles E. Sherman, “Turmoil and Transition in International Broadcasting Organizations, 1938-50,” 
Journal of Broadcasting 15, no. 3 (1971): 265-273. 
12 Rüdiger Zeller, Die EBU – Union Européene de Radio-Télévision (UER) – European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU): Internationale Rundfunkkooperation im Wandel (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
1999), 38.
13 S.n., “Merger: 1 January 1993: A New Era for Eurovision,” EBU Dossiers: 50 Years of Eurovision, no. 1 
(2004): 30-33.
14 EBU, 25 Years European Broadcasting Union (Geneva: EBU, 1974), 3.
15 Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Lon-
don; Washington: Brassey’s, 1997).
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common interests. It fostered the idea of a Europe of peacefully co-existing nation-
states with differing traditions, political systems, and economic structures.16 The 
EBU combined the focus on building Europe through broadcasting as contained 
in the Broadcasting Alliance plan, emphasizing the technical aspects in the British 
manufacturers plan. 
The intriguing question is why the two failed plans and the EBU related broad-
casting initiative refer so explicitly to European unification and to the importance 
of a technical approach? The answer is that they were building on a rich interwar 
legacy in which both aspects were central. After all, the EBU took over the activi-
ties of the IBU created in 1925. This book can be read as a history of the IBU, but 
it is more than that. It focuses on initiatives to develop European broadcasting 
infrastructures. Infrastructure initiatives, not only for broadcasting but also for 
transport, energy and other communication technologies, are routinely ignored 
in economic, political and cultural histories of Europe.17 In many of these studies, 
infrastructures are assumed to be there, reducing distance in time and space.18 
Historians often perceive infrastructures as background factors. Thomas Misa and 
Johan Schot have argued that they should be foregrounded, and studied as vectors 
for a process they call “the hidden integration of Europe.” In this process, techni-
cal organizations such as the IBU explicitly try to contribute to the construction 
of Europe through the development of European standards and networks. In this 
process they follow a strategy of technification or depolitization.19 
The central question in Europe – On Air is how and why those involved in 
transnational broadcasting tried to contribute to European unification in the in-
terwar years. European unification can refer to any project or process, whether 
social, cultural, political, and/or economic, which actors articulated in European 
16 EBU, 25 Years European Broadcasting Union, 4.
17 Some examples of histories that focus on other areas are: Eric Bussière, La France, la Belgique et 
l’organisation économique de l’Europe, 1918-1935 (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière 
de la France, 1992); Patricia Clavin, The Great Depression in Europe, 1929-1939 (New York, N.Y.: St. Mar-
tin’s Press, 2000); Norman Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997); Paul Dukes, ed., Frontiers of 
European culture (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1996); David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, 
America and Postwar Reconstruction (London; New York: Longman, 1992); Mary Fulbrook, ed., Europe 
since 1945 (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Heikki Mikkeli, Europe as an Idea and an 
Identity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Aviel Roshwald and Richard Stites, eds., European Culture in 
the Great War: The Arts, Entertainment, and Propaganda, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
18 A noteworthy early exception is Albert Carreras, Andrea Giuntini, and Michèle Merger, eds., 
European Networks, 19th – 20th Centuries: New Approaches to the Formation of a Transnational Transport 
and Communications System, B8 Proceedings Eleventh International Economic History Congres Milan, 
September 1994 (Milan: Università Bocconi, 1994).
19 Thomas Misa and Johan Schot, “Inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe. 
Introduction,” History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 1-22.
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terms. I will investigate the main question by focusing on five aspects: building 
new institutions such as the IBU; the creation of networks and standards; the ri-
valry amongst various broadcasting organizations in Europe; the attempt to save 
civilization by means of broadcasting; and finally the making and distribution of 
specific international programs. These five aspects represent the key areas where 
broadcasters and other interest groups made crucial choices that shaped the re-
lationship between broadcasting and the process of European unification during 
the interwar years. The question remains, how do we research such a relationship? 
Unraveling European Broadcasting
By following various broadcasting planners, this study examines broadcasting as 
an infrastructure. At first glance, people often relate broadcasting to entertain-
ment and programs rather than to questions of infrastructure.20 The Palgrave 
Dictionary of Transnational History however defines broadcasting as a “means to 
send out sound and/or (motion) pictures by means of radio waves through space 
for reception by the general public.”21 Broadcasting serves as a point-to-mass me-
dium connecting one point to a large mass of people within a circular area like the 
wireless connection of stations to home sets via long, medium and short waves. 
On occasion, broadcasting also connects point A to point B via a network such 
as Eurovision. Europe – On Air therefore regards broadcasting as a spatial and 
connective technology which joins up various places in Europe and by doing so 
20 For a historical evolution of the concept of infrastructures see: Dirk van Laak, “Infra-Strukturge-
schichte,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 27 (2001): 367-393; Dirk van Laak, “Der Begriff ,,Infrastruktur” 
und was er vor seiner Erfindung besagte,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 41 (1999): 280-294; Dirk van Laak, 
“Technological Infrastructure, Concepts and Consequences,” ICON Journal of the International Committee 
for the History of Technology 10 (2004): 53-64.
21 Andreas Fickers, “Broadcasting,” in The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, ed. Pierre-Yves 
Saunier and Akira Iriye (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 106. Initially radio referred to 
wireless point-to-point communication, like wireless telegraphy, also known as radiotelegraphy or radio-
telephony. Later radio became a means of point-to-mass communication, connecting one point to a mass 
of people. For a historical development of the definition of “radio” see: Susan Douglas, Inventing American 
Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), viii-xix. As the definition in 
the Palgrave dictionary shows broadcasting nowadays includes television as well. Television developed 
in a number of countries during the interwar years and provisions were made internationally to create 
standards that would facilitate cross-border experimentation. The main cross-border experiments with 
television would take place after the Second World War and thus falls outside the scope of this research. 
For the first multi-national cross-border experiments with television see: Andreas Fickers and Suzanne 
Lommers, “Eventing Europe: Broadcasting and the Mediated Performances of Europe,” in Materializing 
Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Andreas Fickers and Alexander Bad-
enoch (London: Palgrave, 2010), 225-251.
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creates a specific European geography of connected and not-connected places.22
In order to unravel the relationship between infrastructures and European 
unification efforts further, Europe – On Air follows Thomas Hughes, and defines 
infrastructures as socio-technical systems.23 Socio-technical systems are mixed 
systems. They consist among other things of technological and institutional, or-
ganizational, and legislative components.24 Constructing a European broadcasting 
infrastructure implies, therefore, creating European institutions and regulations 
which match. All these components influence relationships between people. The 
actors involved in the project to construct a European broadcasting infrastructure 
were thus also engaged in unifying people in Europe, and they knew it. How the 
various components should fit, however, was not always clear from the start. 
As the introductory plans show, infrastructure construction is an actor-driven 
process with competing designs.25 Actors have to negotiate their designs and 
so the way they construct Europe. Hughes calls these actors system builders.26 
Organizations like the IBU and the EBU are such system builders. Individuals 
like the engineers Eckersley and Hubert or other interest groups like the British 
radio industry who designed the 1944 and 1945 plans are also such system build-
ers. This study departs from the idea that organizations such as the International 
Broadcasting Union were Europe’s system builders. They set up and formed are-
nas where various actors negotiated the future of transnational broadcasting and 
Europe simultaneously.27 For this reason the IBU is an excellent site for answering 
my research question. 
22 Michael G. Müller and Cornelius Torp, “Conceptualising Transnational Spaces in History,” European 
Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 16, no. 5 (2009): 613-614.
23 Hughes examined electricity networks as socio-technical systems. His Networks of Power resulted in a 
new field of study that focused on Large Technical Systems (LTS) that not only concentrated on electric-
ity, but on a wide variety of historical developments. For further reading see: Thomas Hughes, Networks 
of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); 
Renate Mayntz and Thomas Hughes, The Development of Large Technical Systems (Frankfurt am Main: 
Campus, 1988); Erik van der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal Change: A View from the Large Tech-
nical System Field,” Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 16, no. 3 (2004): 395-414; Erik van der 
Vleuten, “Understanding Network Societies: Two Decades of Large Technical System Studies,” in Network-
ing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Erik van der Vleuten 
and Arne Kaijser (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications/USA, 2006), 279-314.
24 Thomas Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technical Systems,” in The Social Construction of Technolog-
ical Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, 
and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 51-82.
25 Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser, “Prologue and Introduction: Transnational Networks and the 
Shaping of Contemporary Europe,” in Networking Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of 
Europe, 1850-2000, ed. Erik van der Vleuten and Arne Kaijser (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publica-
tions/USA, 2006), 1-22; Van der Vleuten, “Understanding Network Societies,” 308-309.
26 Hughes, “The Evolution of Large Technical Systems,” 25-26.
27 Erik van der Vleuten et al., “Europe’s System Builders: The Contested Shaping of Transnational Road, 
Electricity and Rail Networks,” Contemporary European History 16, no. 3 (2007): 328.
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It is important to emphasize one important characteristic of these system build-
ers. They have not only been set up by experts, they also bring together experts and 
help to develop expert communities. Experts are professionals with a recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
knowledge relevant for governments that want to regulate this domain.28 They at-
tend conferences and meetings of various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations that include social events. During these meetings they often devel-
oped strong informal and personal relationships that surpass national and institu-
tional boundaries, and create what Christian Henrich Franke calls “a transnational 
culture” amongst experts.29 The concept of expert communities therefore not only 
emphasizes the formal, but also the personal and informal aspect of these arenas. 
Europe – On Air is a transnational history of broadcasting in a two-fold sense.30 
Firstly, it replaces state-centered history with one that includes state and non-
state actors, such as “multinational corporations, religious organizations, regional 
communities, transnational private organizations, and even stateless persons.”31 
Secondly the benefit of a transnational approach is that it does not privilege a spe-
cific spatial frame. It brings together in one setting the global, European, national, 
and local. This allows us to explore the relationships between these levels and their 
mutual entwinements. Such an approach implies that creating a European broad-
casting space will be put in the context of the simultaneously constructed local, 
national and global spaces. Europe then becomes a constructive place for “a more 
precise interrogation of other, more essentialized, scales of the ‘national’ and the 
‘global.’”32
In summary: by examining the efforts of the actors involved in transnational 
broadcasting in their aim to achieve European unification, Europe – On Air 
28 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” Inter-
national Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35. See also: Katrin Steffen and Martin Kohlrausch, “The Limits 
and Merits of Internationalism: Experts, the State and the International Community in Poland in the First 
Half of the Twentieth Century,” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire 16, no. 5 (2009): 
716.
29 Christian Henrich-Franke, “Cookies for ITU: The Role of Social Networks in Standardization 
Processes,” in Bargaining Norms – Arguing Standards: Negotiating Technical Standards, ed. Judith Schueler, 
Andreas Fickers, and Anique Hommels (The Hague: Stichting Toekomstbeeld der Techniek, 2008), 89.
30 Two articles that critically discuss and further explore the history of transnationalism are: Pierre-
Yves Saunier, “Learning by Doing: Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational 
History,” Journal of Modern Economic History 6, no. 2 (2008): 159-179; Erik van der Vleuten, “Toward 
a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls,” Technology and Culture 49, no. 4 
(2008): 974-994.
31 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contem-
porary World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), vii-viii.
32 Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers, “Introduction: Europe Materializing? Toward a Transna-
tional History of European Infrastructures,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the 
Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (London: Palgrave, 2010), 9.
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studies transnational broadcasting as a socio-technical system with a specific ne-
gotiated spatial reach, and organizational structure. It perceives the International 
Broadcasting Union as one of the main international system builders of the time. 
The organization provided an arena and formed part of an expert community that 
negotiated spatial and functional relationships between broadcasting and various 
forms of European unification. This research strategy implies that alongside ne-
gotiations and relationships between actors, my book should also examine their 
motivations and visions. Ideas, visions and motivations were significant aspects 
of infrastructure design and unification efforts. Eckersley was aware of this aspect 
of his work. In his memoires he describes himself as “an inventor of mechanisms 
to serve ideas.”33 Both the mechanisms and ideas receive ample attention as build-
ing blocks for a “hidden” creation of European unification via broadcasting infra-
structure development. 
Transnational Infrastructures in Europe
This book is one of the products of the research program Transnational Infra-
structures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe (TIE). The program began in 
2002. It was adopted by the Tensions of Europe scholarly network as part of its 
research programs to examine the “hidden integration of Europe.” The TIE project 
examined transnational infrastructures such as railroads, highways, air traffic, tun-
nels, electricity lines and communication networks as arenas that shaped, negoti-
ated, and contested Europe in the twentieth century.34 Europe – On Air squarely 
follows this tradition. In this section I summarize the findings that are relevant to 
my research. On top of that, I explore the history of broadcasting, albeit in a lim-
ited sense. I concentrate on studies which address the theme of my book directly.
TIE has approached infrastructure construction as non-linear and transna-
tional processes with a special focus on human agency, on system builders.35 The 
construction and use of infrastructures went hand in hand with the creation of a 
host of new international actors and institutions. In the course of the nineteenth 
33 Peter P. Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone (London: J. Cape, 1941), 21.
34 The Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe project has been funded by 
the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in September 2002, Dossier number: 2777-
53-001. For further information see: www.tie-project.nl where you can find a summary of the project: 
Johan Schot, “Transnational Infrastructures and the Rise of Contemporary Europe” (Working document 
no. 1, www.tie-project.nl, 2003). For details on Tensions of Europe see: www.tensionsofeurope.eu. 
35 Van der Vleuten and Kaijser, “Prologue and Introduction”; Van der Vleuten, “Understanding Network 
Societies,” 308-309.
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and twentieth centuries, a wide variety of people, international governmental as 
well as non-governmental organizations have worked on infrastructure projects.36 
A wide number of international expert and often non-governmental interna-
tional agencies were established to deal with infrastructure related problems that 
could not be resolved at the national level. In addition, TIE finds a broad involve-
ment of international governmental organizations. In the course of the interwar 
years in particular, the technical committees of the League of Nations, like the 
Organization for Communications & Transit, focused on infrastructure develop-
ment.37 These international organizations were Europe’s system builders, setting 
up arenas where infrastructures were negotiated in relation to Europe.38
The construction and use of these transnational infrastructures have created 
a specific philosophy on how to work together internationally in Europe. Johan 
Schot and Vincent Lagendijk label this philosophy technocratic international-
ism.39 At its basis lies first of all the idea that once they had established a connec-
tion, experts thought that their technical links would automatically create feelings 
of peace and understanding. They would serve public aims. In this tradition the 
League of Nations aimed to establish Radio Nations in the 1930s.40 Experts be-
lieved in the myth of the network. Secondly, such network construction should 
preferably happen outside the sphere of nation-oriented state power politics. Only 
by “technifying” their discussions would experts be able to shape these peace-
pursuing networks internationally in a way they considered suitable. Thirdly and 
finally, experts “worked in a range of competing and collaborating settings.”41 They 
36 TIE has resulted in a number of detailed European transnational infrastructure histories: Irene 
Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe. Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the 
Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008); Frank Schipper, Driving Europe: Build-
ing Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008); Judith Schueler, Materialising 
Identity: The Co-Construction of the Gotthard Railway and Swiss National Identity (Amsterdam: Aksant, 
2008); Waqar Zaidi, “Technology and the Reconstruction of International Relations: Liberal International-
ist Proposals for the Internationalisaton of Aviation and the International Control of Atomic Energy in 
Britain, USA and France, 1920-1950” (Ph.D. diss., University of London (Imperial College), 2008).
37 Frank Schipper, Vincent Lagendijk, and Irene Anastasiadou, “New Connections for an Old Conti-
nent: Rail, Road and Electricity in the League of Nations Organisation for Communications and Transit,” 
in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch 
and Andreas Fickers (London: Palgrave, 2010), 113-143.
38 Van der Vleuten et al., “Europe’s System Builders.”
39 Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Build-
ing Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 
196-217.
40 Antoine Fleury, “La Suisse et Radio Nations,” in The League of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the 
Symposium (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 196-220.
41 Johan Schot and Frank Schipper, “Experts and European Transport Integration, 1945-1958,” Journal 
of European Public Policy 18, no. 2 (March 1, 2011): 289; Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and the 
Idea of European Unity,” International Affairs 68, no. 1 (1992): 57.
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could have national and international roles at one and the same time. Following 
their multiple roles, they could fine-tune their national and international activities 
and interests when working on transnational infrastructure projects.42 Over the 
years the philosophy of technocratic internationalism inspired the emergence of 
specific kinds of European governance structures, European markets, and a host 
of European visions, symbols, and images. Jean Monnet’s idea of a “gradualist and 
sector-specific approach towards general European unification” for instance, con-
tributed to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and is 
just one of many examples.43
The TIE results contradict the dominant viewpoint that infrastructures were 
built chiefly to serve the national, political, and economic agendas of the system 
builders. Armand Mattelart for instance finds that the great power of unifying 
peoples should not be attributed to communication and broadcasting technolo-
gies. They were used as instruments of national power during the two world 
wars.44 The idea of technocratic internationalism, however, is that the motivations 
for national power politics and international peace efforts do not necessarily ex-
clude one another. They could co-exist and perhaps even become interrelated in 
the material construction of the infrastructure.45
The philosophy of technocratic internationalism has contributed considerably 
to the kind of network created by societal cohesion. Over time, choices for net-
work construction have influenced the linking, non-linking, as well as de-link-
ing of Europe or parts of Europe.46 TIE finds that international networks have 
mostly been constructed by linking national and local systems. In turn, these 
infrastructures also created an interrelation of identities. A local project like the 
Swiss Gotthard Tunnel, for instance, has been a transnational construct. Local, na-
tional, and international factors have been fine-tuned and intertwined, recreating 
Swiss identity in an international world.47 These findings show that infrastructure 
42 Schot and Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” 198-199; Johan Schot, 
“Transnational Infrastructures and the Origins of European Integration,” in Materializing Europe: Trans-
national Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (London: 
Palgrave, 2010), 98-99.
43 Monnet argued that one should strive after integration in specific sectors. These integration efforts 
would then automatically spill over into other sectors. Ole Waever, “Europe Since 1945: Crisis to Renewal,” 
in The History of the Idea of Europe, ed. Jan van der Dussen and Kevin Wilson (London: Routledge, 1993), 
167.
44 Armand Mattelart, Networking the World, 1794-2000 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000); Nelson, War of the Black Heavens.
45 Van der Vleuten, “Infrastructures and Societal Change: A View from the Large Technical System 
Field,” 395-398.
46 Van der Vleuten, “Toward a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, Promises, Pitfalls.”
47 Schueler, Materialising Identity.
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construction can fine-tune and link a variety of spaces, ideas, goals, and identities 
simultaneously. 
In the same way, we have to transcend some simplistic notions of Europe. Many 
European integration studies have a more restricted sense of space when it comes 
to Europe. They consider Europe to be a synonym for the European Union.48 The 
TIE program concludes that engineers have often viewed Europe as a natural unit 
of infrastructure connection, even though at times they had the intention to focus 
on the global ultimately.49 The examination of the shaping of Europe, implicitly as 
well as explicitly, always integrates other spaces such as the global, the national, 
and the local.50 The task therefore is to inquire what Europe meant to different 
people at different points in time. 
TIE shows that Europe has always been more than a geographical area. In 
line with histories of plans for Europe, it finds that Europe itself has also been an 
idea or a project.51 Europe-oriented infrastructure plans similar to the 1944 and 
1945 ones for post-war broadcasting often served as important guiding principles 
in the course of infrastructure projects. These maps even discursively commu-
nicate an image of Europe.52 Ideas for global infrastructure projects have often 
been developed in relation to visions of European civilization and European cul-
ture.53 According to Michael Wintle, such European cultural identities will never 
48 For instance see: Chris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration (London; 
New York: Routledge, 2000); Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, eds., European Integration Theory (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
49 Schot and Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years,” 199-200; Schot, “Trans-
national Infrastructures and the Origins of European Integration,” 99.
50 Badenoch and Fickers, “Introduction,” 9.
51 According to Davies, geographically one could speak of a “tidal Europe” with boundaries subject to 
change over time. Davies, Europe: A History, 9. A wide variety of literature discusses Europe as an idea or a 
project including Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, eds., The History of the Idea of Europe (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1993); Anthony Pagden, ed., The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Carl Pegg, Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, 
Reality (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Derek Heater, The Idea of European Unity (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1992); Denis De Rougemont, The Idea of Europe (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Menno 
Spiering and Michael Wintle, eds., Ideas of Europe since 1914: The legacy of the First World War (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002). 
52 Alexander Badenoch, “Touring between War and Peace: Imagining the ‘Transcontinental Motorway,’ 
1930-1950,” Journal of Transport History 28, no. 2 (2007); Alexander Badenoch, “Myths of the European 
Network: Constructions of Cohesion in Infrastructure Maps,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational 
Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (London: Palgrave, 
2010), 47-77; Schipper, Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century, 21.
53 For a fine study of European ideas in infrastructure development see: Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe; 
Vincent Lagendijk, “‘To Consolidate Peace’? The International Electro-Technical Community and the Grid 
for a United States of Europe, 1929-1937,” Journal of Contemporary History (forthcoming 2012). For histo-
ries of ideas of Europe amongst others see: Pim den Boer, “Europe to 1914: The Making of an Idea,” in The 
History of the Idea of Europe, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge, 1993), 13-82; 
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be anything but a set of aspirations and images.54 TIE also finds that Europe has 
always been contested and contradictory. It agrees with John Borneman and Nick 
Fowler’s argument that Europe exists solely within its historical context.55 
The media are important for building feelings of unity and would therefore be 
a crucial research site to examine European unification. Nowadays we consider 
the media to be the first means of simply diffusing visions, sentiments, informa-
tion and the like among large groups of people. Broadcasting technology is easily 
available for a variety of social, cultural and political ideologies, and can easily 
influence feelings of unity or disunity. Broadcasting infrastructures are subject to 
the same dynamics as other infrastructures. Their overtly cultural content and the 
different ways this can be molded, nevertheless raise the question whether or not 
the creation of broadcasting infrastructures adheres to the philosophy of techno-
cratic internationalism. 
In the course of the twentieth century, various system builders constructed 
a number of broadcasting infrastructures with a number of purposes in mind. 
In Europe the Roman Catholic Church for instance established Vatican Radio to 
spread the faith; French investors established Radio Luxembourg for commercial 
purposes; and the IBU created an international network for public broadcasters. 
These different networks and different ideologies had to be negotiated and fine-
tuned to make broadcasting in Europe effective. Moreover, system builders also 
negotiated these different purposes into programs and suitable musical constructs. 
The large differences in systems and ideologies initially suggest that broadcasting 
construction and the creation of European unity via broadcasting do not necessar-
ily need to go hand in hand with technocratic internationalism.
Europe – On Air will follow the TIE tradition in shedding light on the relation-
ship between transnational broadcasting infrastructure construction and Europe. 
Unlike most infrastructures, broadcasting has an artistic side to it which, as we 
shall see later, involved huge debates about what kinds of music served what pur-
poses. The potential to create specific feelings of unity was an important element 
of these debates. Europe – On Air seeks to include this artistic side, which may add 
new or additional insights to the TIE program.
Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).
54 Fickers and Lommers, “Eventing Europe,” 236-237; EBU, 25 Years European Broadcasting Union, 4; 
Léo Wallenborn, “From IBU to EBU: The Great European Broadcasting Crisis (Part I),” EBU-Review 29, 
no. 1 (January 1978): 25-34; Léo Wallenborn, “From IBU to EBU: The Great European Broadcasting Crisis 
(Part II),” EBU-Review 29, no. 2 (March 1978): 22-30; Charles E. Sherman, “The International Broadcast-
ing Union: A Study in Practical Internationalism,” EBU-Review 25, no. 3 (1974): 32-36.
55 John Borneman and Nick Fowler, “Europeanization,” Annual Review of Anthropology 26 (1997): 49; 
Bo Stråth, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse,” in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, ed. Bo 
Stråth (Brussels; New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2000), 10. 
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Broadcasting and Society-Building
Unlike the TIE literature, broadcasting histories give valuable information on na-
tional, international, and transnational broadcasting activities. Broadcasting his-
tories above all tend to focus on national histories and national activities. Although 
Europe – On Air concentrates on transnational efforts, these national histories pro-
vide important points for reflection. 
First of all, in line with broadcasting histories, this study considers programming 
efforts to be an important part of transnational broadcasting construction. One of 
the most marked differences between the two plans for post-war broadcasting dis-
cussed earlier in the chapter, lies in the way these plans deal with programming ef-
forts. The 1944 plan openly underlines the importance of creating unity in Europe 
via programs. It suggests a program exchange between European broadcasters as 
well as live broadcasts from one point in Europe across the entire continent. In con-
trast, the British radio industry’s 1945 plan largely ignores the programming side. 
This only states that a national broadcasting service should cover the entire nation 
by making space for two national channels to cover localities. According to Paddy 
Scannell and David Cardiff, the history of broadcasting was a history of discovery 
rather than a history of a priori knowledge of what broadcasting actually was.56 It 
was one thing to discover you could send a signal. It was another thing to discover 
“what” programs to broadcast and how to realize that. Program construction efforts 
therefore are an important place to examine “hidden” European unification efforts. 
Secondly, ever since the 1980s, these national broadcasting histories have related 
culture and societal cohesion to broadcasting development. Susan Douglas argues 
that the establishment of nation-wide broadcasting in the United States increased 
interconnections and a sense of belonging between U.S. inhabitants. It drew the 
countryside, the poor, the uneducated, and the housebound closer into the heart of 
U.S. society.57 Additionally, international broadcasting stations like the first empire 
stations that linked colonies to their mother lands, as well as war-related stations like 
Radio Free Europe created a globally further interconnected world.58 Broadcasting 
56 Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff, “Serving the Nation: Public Service Broadcasting before the War,” 
in Popular Culture: Past and Present, ed. Bernard Waites, Tony Bennett, and Graham Martin (London: 
Croom Helm London, 1982), 161-188.
57 Douglas, Inventory American Broadcasting, 306. For extensive national histories of broadcasting see: 
Scannell and Cardiff, “Serving the Nation”; Heinz Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik: Zur Ge-
schichte des Deutschen Rundfunk von 1923/38. (Hamburg: Verlag Hans Bredow-Institut, 1955); Alexander 
Badenoch, Voices in Ruins: West German Radio Across the 1945 Divide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008).  
58 David M. Abshire, International Broadcasting: A New Dimension of Western Diplomacy, The Washing-
ton Papers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting 
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connected people in different places and of different social classes to one another by 
addressing them in their homes.59 People within the nation were bonded spatially. 
Thirdly, as have histories of infrastructures in Europe, national broadcasting 
histories have found that these processes were not uncontested. Although sev-
eral early histories assumed that broadcasting developed linearly, research dur-
ing the 1990s proves otherwise.60 Europe has a long tradition of state intervention 
in nation building, whereas the United States has a long tradition of commercial 
broadcasting. Both traditions were contested. In the United States commercial ad-
vertising sponsored broadcasting would win over public and education oriented 
broadcasting after no less than fifteen years of contestations. Developments in 
Europe were not uniform either. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
commercial broadcasting would not stand a chance against public broadcasting in 
the long run.61 In France, however, public broadcasting activities would gradually 
suppress commercial broadcasting, although never entirely.62 Different structures 
co-existed and changed in importance over time.63 The choices made in the course 
of these processes often provoked heated debates among government officials, 
broadcasting and wireless radio telegraphy engineers, and societal interest groups.
While discussing these choices, broadcasting communities negotiated visions 
of their nation-state. Radio only “appears…to be basically empty and disinterested 
(New York: Praeger, 1982); Nelson, War of the Black Heavens; Ana Paula Silva, “Shaping the Portuguese 
Empire in the Twentieth Century: The Telegraph and the Radio,” ICON Journal of the International Com-
mittee for the History of Technology 7 (2001): 106-122; James Wood, History of International Broadcasting 
(London: Peregrinus, 1992).
59 Susan Douglas, Listening in: Radio and the American Imagination (Minneapolis, Minn.; London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Michele Hilmes, Only Connect: A Cultural History of Broadcasting in 
the United States (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002); Shaun Moores, “‘The Box on the 
Dresser’: Memories of Early Radio and Everyday Life,” Media, Culture and Society 10 (1988): 23-40.
60 See for instance: Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United States: Vol. I-III (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970); Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik. 
61 For the contested U.S. negotiations see: Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting; Robert W. 
McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for the Control of U.S. Broadcast-
ing, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Susan Smulyan, Selling Radio: The Commer-
cialization of American Broadcasting, 1920-1934 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994). For 
the contested process of British broadcasting see: Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United 
Kingdom, Volume I-V (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Scannell and Cardiff, “Serving the Nation”; 
Seán Street, Crossing the Ether: British Public Service Radio and Commercial Competition, 1922-1945 (East-
leigh: John Libbey Publishing, 2006). For the Netherlands see: Onno de Wit, “Radio tussen Verzuiling en 
Individualisering,” in Techniek in Nederland in de Twintigste Eeuw: Deel V Transport en Communicatie, ed. 
Johan Schot and Onno de Wit (Eindhoven: Stichting Historie der Techniek, 2002), 208-211. 
62 Christian Brochand, Histoire générale de la radio et de la télévision en France (Paris: La Documenta-
tion française, 1994); Cécile Méadel, Histoire de la radio des années trente: Du sans-filiste à l’auditeur (Paris: 
Anthropos; Diffusion Economica, 1994).
63 Richard McMahon, “Cultures of Communication: New Historical Perspectives,” European Review of 
History: Revue européenne d’histoire 16, no. 1 (2009): 11.
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[italics – s.l.],” Alexander Badenoch argues.64 Radio is not a neutral medium and 
can be given any kind of meaning. According to these national histories, broadcast-
ing focused on building national broadcasting and national societies. Apparently 
broadcasters not only specifically opted to design their broadcasts around the na-
tion state, they also made explicit decisions about the form and shape these national 
societies would have in their programs. These choices impacted on that music and 
those groups that were united or disunited via programs. The acknowledgement 
that choices have formed the basis of broadcasting places national broadcasting 
history in a different perspective. Broadcasters actively tried to shape society by 
constructing programs, and chose to create national feelings of belonging. 
Several national histories question the actual term “national.” Some German 
histories conclude that local and regional broadcasting activities in Germany often 
rather identified their programming activities with regional instead of German 
identity.65 Michele Hilmes not only addresses the mutual construction of U.S. 
and British broadcasting, but also examines transnational processes in national 
spheres.66 She finds that in the United States, black bands often received no spon-
sorship, which hindered their performing in broadcast programs. As such, in the 
interwar years, broadcast programs expressed an American culture that made little 
or no reference to American black band music. Furthermore, where some groups 
took no part in such American broadcasts, others “were spoken for” without hav-
ing their own voice, and could be marked as being different from the mainstream.67 
By building programs, broadcasters at the same time actively built a united as well 
as a disunited nation-state. By regarding national programs as transnational con-
structs, Hilmes thus finds that broadcasters created a kind of unity resulting from 
the negotiation of the local and the national.
From the 1970s onwards, the international dimension of radio and television 
broadcasting has increasingly caught the attention of broadcasting historians. 
Several institutional histories give an indication of those international system 
builders who were active in broadcasting. They describe the rise of international 
governmental organizations like the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), the representative of national PTT Administrations, as well as international 
64 Alexander Badenoch, Voices in Ruins, 224.
65 For an example of such developments in German broadcasting see: Badenoch, Voices in Ruins; Brian 
Currid, A National Acoustics: Music and Mass Publicity in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Winfried B. Lerg, Rundfunkpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, Band 1 
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980).
66 Michele Hilmes, Network Nations: A Transnational History of British and American Broadcasting 
(New York: Routledge, 2011); Hilmes, Only Connect.
67 Hilmes, Only Connect, 78, 93, 97.
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non-governmental organizations like the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), 
or the International Broadcasting Union (IBU), as the representatives of public 
broadcasters. These institutional histories discuss their organizational structure 
and their main activities. They find that such international organizations merely 
coordinate, fine-tune, and advise rather than construct and produce programs 
themselves.68 
Other histories examine the television network and cross-border programming 
activities of these institutions from an international relations perspective. They find 
that in particular the EBU and the OIRT created exchange networks, which on oc-
casion could be connected. The EBU and OIRT then applied these networks for 
the exchange of national programs mostly, reducing production costs considerably.69 
These histories nonetheless tend to examine the contested nature of the construction 
and interconnection processes only to a limited degree. These decisions and negotia-
tions nonetheless are central to understanding the transnational relations between 
broadcasters, organizations, nations, and regions. 
The late 1990s and 2000s marked a new era in broadcasting history. The ap-
proach towards these histories shifted in the direction of a European perspective. 
The European Television History Network established in 2004, for instance, pro-
motes comparative historical research on television from a European perspective.70 
Over the years, the Network has re-evaluated television history in many European 
countries, identifying similarities, differences, “gaps and missing links in the re-
search landscape” in Europe.71 During these years, similar questions have been 
posed regarding other technologies like wireless telegraphy, telephony, and radio 
broadcasting. 
Some of these studies address the negotiation of infrastructure developments 
and standards. They focus on aspects of network construction like the allocation of 
frequencies or television line standards, the way these were negotiated internation-
ally, and why. These studies argue that those who negotiated such standards favored 
their nation building activities over the building of international relations.72 National 
68 Harold A. Fisher, The EBU: Model for Regional Cooperation in Broadcasting (Lexington, Ky.: Associa-
tion for Education in Journalism, 1980), 5.
69 Burton Paulu, Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 1974), 244; Ernest Eugster, Television Programming Across National Boundaries: The EBU and 
OIRT Experience (Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1983).
70 The European Television History Network has been established to connect scholars, archivists and 
institutions that work on television history. For more information see: http://cms.let.uu.nl/ethn/ 
71 Andreas Fickers and Catherine Johnson, “Transnational Television History: A Comparative Ap-
proach,” Media History 16, no. 1 (2010): 5.
72 Andreas Fickers, “National Barriers for an Imag(e)ined European Community: The Technopolitical 
Frames of Postwar Television Development in Europe,” in Northern Lights: Film and Media Studies Year-
book 2005, vol. 4, 2006, 15-35; Christian Henrich-Franke, Globale Regulierungsproblematiken in historisch-
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interests often impeded smooth fine-tuning of international television line-stan-
dards or international frequency plans for wireless and wired communication and 
broadcasting. Sometimes specific parties could even be excluded from standards de-
liberately, as was the case with Radio Luxembourg and frequency plans for wireless 
broadcasting.73 International standardization attempts highlight the fragmentation 
of the international in favor of national interests. 
Research focusing on the development of the Eurovision programming net-
work after World War II draws similar conclusions.74 These studies show that the 
Eurovision network, which nowadays organizes the Eurovision Song Contest, mostly 
transmitted national broadcasting programs across borders. In 1967 already, the co-
ordinator of this network, the EBU, organized the worldwide live broadcasting of the 
television program notre monde, Our World. For one moment Our World materially 
connected the whole world, a true watershed in international television. Ever since, 
the network has relayed and exchanged national music, programs or news across the 
continent. These mostly highlighted national feelings of belonging. 
Building on these insights, in 2007 the European Television History Network 
rethought television history by coming up with the idea of “going transnational.” 
Andreas Fickers and Catherine Johnson created a special issue on transnational 
television history. The initiative questions the national positioning of television de-
velopments and unravels new interrelations and entwinements. The volume reveals 
the diversity in transnational flows and transfers “not only across institutions and 
through the movement of people and programmes, but also within the production 
and aesthetics of programmes themselves.”75 What is more, the approach creates a 
refinement of prior research, for instance with respect to the Eurovision program 
exchange. The majority of the programs traded via the EBU Screening Sessions or 
diffused via the Eurovision network in reality shared a kind of commonness because 
of their low degree of national and cultural specificity.76 These transnational televi-
sion histories thus provide valuable new insights on prior approaches. 
er Perspektive: Der Fall des Funkfrequenzspektrums 1945-1988 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2006); Wormbs, “Standardising Early Broadcasting in Europe.”
73 Jennifer Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves: Radio Luxembourg and the Origins of European National 
Broadcasting, 1929-1950” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008).
74 Wolfgang Degenhardt and Elisabeth Strautz, Auf der Suche nach dem europäischen Programm: Die 
Eurovision 1954-1970 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999); Wolfgang Degenhardt, Die 
Entstehung und Entwicklung der europäischen Partnerschaft im Fernsehbereich 1950-1970: Zur historischen 
Betrachtung eines komplexen Sensemaking-Prozesses (Siegen: Universität Siegen, 2002); Christian Henrich-
Franke, “Die «EBU Screening Sessions»: Wandlungen des europäischen Markts für Fernsehprogramme 
1963-1985,” Rundfunk und Geschichte 31, no. 1 (2005): 17-25.
75 Fickers and Johnson, “Transnational Television History,” 5-6.
76 Christian Henrich-Franke, “Creating Transnationality through an International Organization?,” 
Media History 16, no. 1 (2010): 67-81.
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Broadcasting has captured the attention of researchers from within the Tensions 
of Europe network as well. Along with broadcasting historians they form the 
Transmitting and Receiving Europe project (TRANS). TRANS seeks to provide 
a thorough history of transnational broadcasting technology and programming 
within Europe.77 The project focuses on a broad ensemble of radio and televi-
sion technologies, which it places at the forefront of East-West relations during 
the Cold War era. The methodological approach consists of a combined focus on 
horizontal and vertical dynamics that together define a European communication 
space. Particularly valuable is the focus on both the transmission and reception 
side of the medium that together make up the horizontal dimension. Vertically, 
the processes are characterized by multi-level negotiations in the material, institu-
tional, and symbolic dimension which interact with one another. Thanks to such 
a dynamic approach, TRANS fills an important gap in Cold War and European 
broadcasting infrastructure history. It promises a broad and encompassing ap-
proach.
Following the TRANS tradition, Europe – On Air mostly covers the transmis-
sion side of broadcasting. First of all, the book contributes to the material dimen-
sion by examining the interactive development of a multitude of broadcasting 
network technologies, such as the long waves, medium waves, and short waves, 
as well as the relaying of music via cable and wire. Secondly, the book’s institu-
tional dimension lays bare the formal and informal expert networks that devel-
oped within and beyond the institutional boundaries of international governmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations. Thirdly, the book provides a symbolic 
dimension by examining how stakeholders negotiated visions and constructed a 
European culture and civilization via their material and institutional standards as 
well as their cultural programming and music activities. Europe – On Air examines 
these dimensions for a period which is not the main focus of the volume currently 
being prepared by TRANS: the interwar years. TRANS, however, strongly suggests 
that these years are a key part of the story. Since recently, several TRANS research-
ers have been performing new studies which particularly address the interwar 
years, above all with a view to technical questions.78 
77 Transmitting and Receiving Europe (EUROTRANS) is a project within the ESF Inventing Europe 
program. Currently, TRANS is completing a book project “Airy Curtains in the European Ether: Broad-
casting and the Cold War” edited by Christian Henrich Franke, Alexander Badenoch, and Andreas Fickers 
that will be forthcoming with Nomos Verlaggesellschaft. 
78 See the work of Nina Wormbs and Andreas Fickers. Nina Wormbs, “Standardising Early Broadcast-
ing in Europe: A Form of Regulation,” in Bargaining Norms – Arguing Standards: Negotiating Technical 
Standards, ed. Judith Schueler, Andreas Fickers, and Anique Hommels (The Hague: Stichting Toekomst-
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Europe – On Air aims to give an integrated history of transnational broadcasting 
and European unification efforts for the interwar period. It will contribute to broad-
casting histories by taking a transnational approach to broadcasting construction as 
well as the plans for European civilization and culture. The most important contri-
bution to broadcasting history perhaps lies in examining the negotiation of interna-
tional standards related to the programming side. What is more, it examines what a 
veritable international program similar to Our World looked like, how it came about 
and why. In particular the musical component of these programs has long been rec-
ognized as a universal language. The universal understanding of music could be em-
ployed for unification efforts beyond national boundaries. At the same time, it could 
also be employed for disunity, as the example of the rejection of American black 
band music shows. Unification attempts with their inherent elements of disunity 
define the relationship between broadcasting and Europe.
Methodology and Outline
To realize a transnational perspective on broadcasting and on Europe, the research 
for Europe – On Air can best be viewed as a journey through sources that have 
received little attention from historians. When travelling, one comes across great 
sights, possibilities, new insights, and rewarding hikes. Nonetheless, no journey is 
without pitfalls, drawbacks, or sites one would have loved to visit, but never man-
aged to. These sites might have turned the journey into an all-time and entirely com-
plete travel experience. Such has been the journey of Europe – On Air: adventurous, 
full of rewards, but not without its pitfalls, and unvisited sites.
Starting out from the concept of a relationship between transnational broad-
casting and Europe, this study began by consulting contemporary journals. On the 
one hand, elites established “Europe” oriented journals such as the Pan-European 
Movement journal Paneuropa (1924-1938), l’Européen (1929-1940), and L’Europe 
Nouvelle (1918-1940) to discuss the future of Europe. With the exception of 
L’Européen, these journals hardly consider technology matters. They focus on 
economic and political questions instead. The financer and leader of L’Européen, 
Lyonnais parliamentarian and industrialist Étienne Fougère, had a personal interest 
in broadcasting. He regularly frequented and sponsored the IBU.79 His L’Européen 
beeld der Techniek, 2008), 112-120; Andreas Fickers, “In Search of the ‘Greenwich of the Air’: Techno-
Political Diplomacy in European Frequency Allocation and Control (1925-1952),” History and Technology 
(forthcoming).
79 Etienne Deschamps, “L’Européen (1929-1940): A Cultural Review at the Heart of the Debate on Euro-
pean Identity,” European Review of History 9, no. 1 (2002): 85, 89.
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approaches Europe through a cultural lens, providing detailed program schedules 
from various stations in Europe, sometimes with additional discussions. In contrast, 
there are journals for broadcasting experts, like Wireless World (1913-1945). They 
discuss developments in all aspects of broadcasting with a preference for the tech-
nology and the organization of broadcasting itself. These journals however give 
little information about their broader international context. Both types of journals 
provide important information, but few detail on the nature of the relationship 
between broadcasting and Europe.
So where should one look? In the view of Jérôme Bourdon, the national cen-
tral organization of archives and the organization of political science foster “la 
prison mentale de la nation.”80 In these archives, Europe often appears as a di-
mension of national identity rather than as a possibility for cross-border unifica-
tion. Examining visions of Europe from the perspective of national archives alone 
would therefore cause a teleological domination of the national in the European. 
It would immediately push all local or foreign initiatives to the background. Many 
broadcasting and European histories base their research on national archives. A 
conversation on writing transnational history urges more and ample research in 
the archives of both intergovernmental and international non-governmental or-
ganizations.81
In recent years, research in archives of intergovernmental organizations like 
those of the League of Nations have developed fresh and rewarding new view-
points on European history. Comparative research on Europe-related questions 
in general requires insurmountable sums of money, access to archives in all cor-
ners of Europe, as well as knowledge of northern, western, southern, and eastern 
European languages. In the archives of intergovernmental and international non-
governmental organizations, every European country, their polities, arguments, 
and doubts come together in one place. Comparative and national histories mostly 
stress the pre-World War I European balance-of-power system, finding that espe-
cially the north and east of Europe formed the periphery areas.82 Recent consulta-
tion of the archives of the League of Nations reveals that in reality, the smaller and 
often eastern European countries actively participated in the work and policy of 
80 Jérôme Bourdon, “Comment écrire une histoire transnationale des médias? L’exemple de la télévision 
en Europe,” Les Temps des Médias. Dossier: Espaces européens et transferts culturels 11, no. 2 (2008): 165.
81 Christopher Allan Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” The American History 
Review 111, no. 5 (2006): 1461.
82 Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth, “Introduction: The National Meanings of Europe,” in The Mean-
ing of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations, ed. Mikael af Malmborg and Bo Stråth 
(Oxford; New York: Berg, 2002), 13.
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the League.83 Archives of international organizations therefore form an excellent 
research site. They give new perspectives on the many national broadcasting his-
tories and histories of Europe.
This study takes the largely unexplored archives of the non-governmen-
tal International Broadcasting Union, Geneva (IBU, 1925-1950), and parts of 
the archives of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU, 1950-present) as its 
points of departure. Additionally, the study explores the archives of the inter-
governmental League of Nations, Geneva (LoN, 1919-1940), and International 
Telecommunication Union, Geneva (ITU, 1919-1940). Complementary to pri-
mary sources like meeting minutes and proceedings, these archives contain so-
called “self-congratulatory” material. Via brochures, memorial booklets, and 
leaflets these organizations positively communicate their achievements, visions, 
and activities. Furthermore, their libraries contain series of their own journals, 
like the Journal télégraphique published by the ITU, the Radiodiffusion as well as 
the Bulletin mensuel issued by the IBU, and the EBU-Review issued by the EBU. 
These journals provide inside information on work-related topics. They are ei-
ther written to inform members and other interested parties, or by the members 
themselves to give local, or bottom-up insights. These journals thus open up two-
directional provision of information. Since little secondary literature exists deal-
ing with transnational broadcasting in the interwar years, Europe – On Air relies 
mainly on these archives.
International archives have remained relatively untouched when it comes to 
broadcasting questions. They therefore provide valuable new perspectives in ad-
dition to the many national broadcasting histories. Experience with these interna-
tional archives over the past years, nevertheless, reveals that the best transnational 
histories should be based on information retrieved from personal, company, na-
tional, as well as international state and non-state archives. Archivists at interna-
tional organizations are often selective in the type of documents they decide to 
store. Working notes, minutes from sub-, sub- sub-committees, or personal notes 
from employees often do not make it into storage. The archives often show traces 
of communication and collaborative lines with other interest groups like the ra-
dio industry, but give no detail on the nature of and content of these contacts.84 
83 Schipper, Lagendijk, and Anastasiadou, “New Connections for an Old Continent.”
84 For an in-depth discussion of radio industry in Europe see: Pascal Griset, “Innovation and Radio 
Industry in Europe during the Interwar Period,” in Innovations in the European Economy between the Wars, 
ed. François Caron, Paul Erker, and Wolfram Fischer (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 37-63; 
Andreas Fickers, “Sichtbar hörbar! Radioapparat und Stadt: Knoten im vernetzten Kommunikationsraum,” 
in Zentralität und Raumgefüge der Grossstadte im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Clemens Zimmermann (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlang Stuttgart, 2006), 83-103; Keith Geddes and Gordon Bussey, The Setmakers: A History 
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Moreover, many important discussions, especially those on ideas, frequently hap-
pened over lunch, dinner, or during coffee breaks, and can be traced in these inter-
national archives only to a limited degree.85 At times, parts of practical discussions, 
exchanges of views, specific actors as well as reasons behind construction efforts 
remain unnoticed or unclear when examining these international archives. 
Europe – On Air studies these international archives to examine new perspectives 
that may crop up on the relationship between broadcasting and European unifica-
tion. The liabilities of this approach do not greatly affect the conclusions of this study. 
These conclusions stand, but might have been contextualized even more broadly if 
it had been possible to consult other archives as well. The presence of radio industry 
or radio amateurs might have been communicated more pronouncedly, for instance. 
Whereas initially the broadcasting organizations were established by and composed 
of members of the radio industry, in the course of the interwar years, these actors 
became inherently different. Direct links continued to exist and collaboration re-
mained. Whereas the nature of the collaboration disappears from this transnational 
history as an effect of the archives, the results of their collaborations remain the same 
and so have their place in this history. 
Interviews and informal talks conducted over the past four years with employees 
in all layers of the EBU have brought the archive documents to life. They give a vivid 
impression of the dynamic world of transnational broadcasting in Europe. There ap-
pears to be a considerable degree of continuity in company culture between the EBU 
and its predecessor the IBU. The interviews and talks give personal accounts of na-
tional and transnational experiences. They give insight into the relationship between 
organizations, between various parts of such organizations, and the way employees 
were involved in shaping a European and global society. Those people who work 
mainly on technical or practical questions, like the filling of time slots, laugh at the 
idea that the EBU is trying to create a particular kind of European society. Higher 
up in the organization or committees, more people consider that the discussion of 
Europe should be part of their daily tasks. The internal dynamics of transnational ex-
pert communities seem to matter and the interviews shed light on ways to interpret 
the IBU and EBU archives.
Europe – On Air embarked on its journey in the archives of an international 
organization that took on the activity of broadcasting in 1925: the International 
Broadcasting Union. IBU archives reveal other important international organiza-
tions and influential experts who negotiated broadcasting in the interwar years. 
of the Radio and Television Industry (London: BREMA, 1991).
85 Frank Schipper encountered similar problems in his research on road transport in Europe. Schipper, 
Driving Europe: Building Europe on Roads in the Twentieth Century, 34.
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Europe – On Air has also studied these organizations’ archives and they shed light 
on the five main broadcasting problems identified by the IBU. These have been 
the institutionalization of broadcasting, the materialization of networks, the in-
teractions with other socio-technical systems, politico-ideological problems re-
lated to war and peace, and international program construction. Like the trip that 
Europe – On Air has made through these sources, the construction of broadcast-
ing and the shaping of Europe have been a travel experience for contemporaries. 
This study follows their journey by devoting a chapter to each one of these five 
main broadcasting problems as sites where experts constructed broadcasting and 
shaped Europe. 
Chapter 2 begins by examining “the birth of an idea.” It looks at the earliest 
interwar broadcasting developments in Europe in the direct aftermath of the 
First World War. We are introduced to the main players, their activities, and the 
problems they faced. This reveals how a new idea was born and negotiated by 
actors with different motivations and backgrounds. The resulting International 
Broadcasting Union would become the main arena for negotiating broadcasting 
problems in Europe. The chapter unravels how this new idea evolved within spe-
cific European intellectual and business contexts. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the material and organizational realization of broad-
casting infrastructures in Europe. They above all examine how the relationship 
between broadcasting and Europe materialized into standards in frequency al-
locations as well as the construction of international relay networks. Chapter 3 
concentrates on the efforts by the IBU that through time increasingly represented 
public broadcasting organizations. Chapter 4 reflects on the disputes the IBU en-
countered due to the growing diversity of broadcasting systems in Europe. We fol-
low the route the IBU and systems like Radio Luxembourg, Radio Nations, Vatican 
Radio, and Radio Moscow took to negotiate the unity and disunity of “Europe,” 
how they fine-tuned their activities, and henceforth their visions of Europe. 
Programming issues are the subject of Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 examines 
how the IBU and the League of Nations tried to resolve the problem of illicit propa-
ganda broadcasting. Programs crossed borders and could be heard by neighboring 
countries. With newly defined boundaries in Europe after the war, these programs 
regularly disturbed international relations as well as efficient international broad-
casting systems. Broadcasting communities therefore continuously reconsidered 
their programming plans in the light of war-peace related sentiments, which flour-
ished on a continent with so many nation-states and cultures. In their eyes, the 
unity of Europe was at stake. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on how the IBU in collaboration with the League of 
Nations and the European music elites attempted to create international broad-
casting programs. We examine especially the construction of international live 
programs and cross-border program exchange. These programs and exchanges 
were meant to increase understanding amongst listeners across as well as within 
borders. They would represent and diffuse a specific kind of European culture. The 
effort proved harder than it first appeared. There was no easy way to determine 
those characteristics that defined the ultimate European program with the best 
expression of “European” culture.
It remains rather difficult to determine the impact of all these efforts to build 
European unification via transnational broadcasting. Studying interwar listeners 
would be a different research project altogether. It would require labor-intensive 
research, ample knowledge of all European languages, and anthropological skills. 
Chapter 6 makes a very brief exploratory attempt. It gives an impression of the 
way and extent to which visions of Europe negotiated by the broadcasters trickled 
down into Dutch program guides which were used by Dutch listeners to deter-
mine their listening behavior. These guides contain domestic and international 
program schedules. Their lay-out and in-depth articles communicate visions on 
broadcasting and music to the listener.86 Although these guides do not reveal the 
radio audiences’ interpretation, they certainly show us how transnational activi-
ties and visions of Europe actually found their way into peoples’ homes. The ef-
forts that paved the way for these program guides began immediately after the 
First World War, when a number of inventors developed crucial technology for 
the transmission of sound. Marconi was one such man. Therefore the next chapter 
starts with him.
86 Since the broadcasting situation in the Netherlands during the interwar period formed quite an 
exception for the co-existence of five different public broadcasters, Europe – On Air explores two out of 
five program guides: De Radiogids of the socialist Vereeniging van Arbeiders Radio Amateurs (VARA), 
and De Radiobode of the Algemeene Vereeniging Radio Omroep (AVRO). Both the VARA and the AVRO 
concentrated on international collaborative affairs to a larger degree than the program guides of the other 
three organizations De Omroepgids of the Nederlandsche Christelijke Radio-Vereeniging (NCRV), de Katho-
lieke Radio Gids of the Catholic Katholieke Radio Omroep (KRO), and Vrije Geluiden of the latitudinarian 
protestant Vrijzinnig Protestantse Radio Omroep (VPRO) suggest.
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Chapter 2  
Elites on the Barricades for Broadcasting
[I believe] that broadcasting, properly handled, will make a material contribution towards greater under-
standing and amity between Nations, the cementing of home life and happiness of the individual.
Guglielmo Marconi, London 19241
Guglielmo Marconi (1874-1937) was a European and truly internationally ori-
ented personality. He was born in Italy but lived in Great Britain for most of his 
adult life. Already during his lifetime the world celebrated his achievements, as 
an inventor and entrepreneur in long distance wireless telegraphy, telephony, 
and broadcasting.2 Marconi is often quoted as being the first to transmit an ac-
tual signal – the letter “S” – over long distances across the ocean from Europe to 
the United States.3 As a boy he was fascinated by the idea of transmitting signals 
through the air from point A to B. He created his own lab at his parents’ home and 
began experimenting with wireless.
In the course of his career, he extended his engineering activities to business 
by establishing the globally targeted British Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company 
as well as a subsidiary in the United States. The American Marconi Company 
sold Marconi transmission and reception apparatus on a global scale.4 His market 
1 Arthur R. Burrows, The History of Broadcasting (London: Cassell, 1924), foreword.
2 For information on his life and work see: Bernard Louis Jacot and D.M.B. Collier, Marconi – Master 
of Space: An Authorised Biography of the Marchese Marconi (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1935); Giuseppe 
Pession, Guglielmo Marconi con figure nel testo e 16 tavole in rotocalco, I Grandi italiani: Collana di bio-
grafie diretta da Luigi Federzoni 15 (Torino: Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1941); Orrin E. Dunlap, 
Marconi, the Man and his Wireless (New York: Arno Press, 1971).
3 The invention of telegraphy, telephony, and broadcasting was not down to one single genius. It was 
“the result of numerous parallel inventions based both on a common ground of shared scientific and 
on individually acquired tacit knowledge.” Marconi’s work would not have been possible if a number of 
physicists like the British James Clerk Maxwell, the German Heinrich Hertz, the British Sir Oliver Lodge, 
and the Russian Alexander Popov had not also contributed to its development. Andreas Fickers and Pascal 
Griset, eds., Eventing Europe: Electronic Information and Communication Spaces in Europe (forthcoming 
with Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
4 Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 180-187.
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expanded vastly to remote corners of the United States and Europe. The Marconi 
Company followed a developing European tradition of cartel capitalism, where 
means of production were privately owned and governments followed a laissez-
faire policy.5 Marconi collaborated in an international cartel with other leading 
wireless companies. Together with the French Compagnie Générale de Télégrafie 
sans filistres (CSF), the German Telefunken, and the American Radio Corporation 
of America (RCA), he agreed to supply goods and services only with uniform 
conditions of sale, prices, marketing, and production.6 This European tradition of 
cartel capitalism made Marconi one of the most influential entrepreneurial and 
engineering wireless mentors of his age operating outside governments. His life-
long friend and RCA director David Sarnoff even became known as “Marconi’s 
American apprentice.”7 When one remembers Marconi, one remembers his engi-
neering and entrepreneurial achievements. 
But there was more to the man. Marconi is a text book example of an engineer 
with what Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk call “a technocratic international-
ist ideology.”8 Marconi believed that his invention would lead to peace, mutual 
understanding, and to the creation of societies. Such societies could encompass 
the nation, but also the home life, and the happiness of the individual listener. 
He did not see a dichotomy between the national and the international, adopt-
ing what one nowadays would call a transnational approach. According to Schot 
and Lagendijk, theories on society flourished widely in transnational engineer-
ing circles. Moreover, Craig Murphy finds that similar theories underlined the 
development of a European tradition of international organizations during the 
second half of the nineteenth century.9 He suggests that this tradition built on 
5 The United States employed a system of competitive capitalism. Its antitrust legislation outlawed the 
formation of cartels on U.S. territory. Europe on the contrary used cooperative capitalism, a system of cartel 
capitalism. While such a system is usually known as “international cartel capitalism” it is an example of a very 
European rather than American way of implementing capitalism. However, American companies could join 
such cartels on European territory. Harm Schröter, Americanization of the European Economy: A Compact 
Survey of American Economic Influence in Europe since the 1880s (Boston, MA: Springer, 2005), 32. 
6 Pascal Griset, “Innovation and Radio Industry in Europe during the Interwar Period,” in Innovations 
in the European Economy between the Wars, ed. François Caron, Paul Erker, and Wolfram Fischer (Berlin; 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995), 37-63.
7 Kenneth Bilby, The General: David Sarnoff and the Rise of the Communications Industry, 1st ed. (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1986), 6, 21, 25.
8 Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Build-
ing Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 
196-217.
9 Craig Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 48-49. For an example see the opening speech of the in 1865 estab-
lished International Telegraph Union. Armand Mattelart, Networking the World, 1794-2000 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 20; Harold R.G. Greaves, The League Committees and World Order: 
A Study of the Permanent Expert Committees of the League of Nations as an Instrument of International 
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Enlightenment values, values based on reason, because the position and wealth 
of the aristocrats who developed the activities of these organizations were a direct 
continuation of the European ancien régime. Discussions on his life and work of-
ten overlook Marconi’s connection with these European elites and his concepts of 
European society. 
Marconi reached adolescence in an elite milieu where ideas celebrating 
Europe’s supremacy and the grandeur of its civilization and culture circulated 
widely in a variety of forms.10 He grew up as the son of a well-known Italian 
businessman and an Irish noblewoman, the granddaughter of whisky distiller 
John Jameson, and descendant of the Scottish Earl Haig.11 Consequently, he lived 
his life as much among wireless experts as British and Italian elites. Marconi felt 
closely involved with international peace and collaboration. The Italian govern-
ment appointed “senatore” Marconi to represent Italy during the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919.12 He was there when the Conference established the League 
of Nations, an organization designed to improve international understanding, 
peace, and welfare on a global scale. Marconi believed that the unifying activities 
of the League might well be the last hope for the salvation of Europe’s civiliza-
tion, one that had fallen into disarray during the Great War. He hoped his inven-
tion would improve understanding as he believed that “Communications be-
tween peoples widely separated in space and thought is undoubtedly the greatest 
weapon against the evils of misunderstanding and jealousy…”13 
During the conference, Marconi did not spend all his time advocating inter-
national peace and understanding based on thoughts about Europe’s civilization. 
He also used the opportunity to promote the medium of broadcasting in order to 
pursue these ends. Throughout his life, Marconi sought to achieve international 
peace wearing “multiple hats.” He seems to have become a mentor for many 
broadcasters trying to relate their broadcasting projects to projects for Europe. 
Marconi is a fine example of someone who worked on the hidden integra-
tion of Europe. Historians of European ideas, as well as social historians like Bo 
Stråth, argue that such debate remained restricted to the political and intellectual 
Government (London: Oxford University Press; H. Milford, 1931).
10 Pim den Boer, “Europe to 1914: The Making of an Idea,” in The History of the Idea of Europe, eds. 
Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge, 1993), 62-78.
11 Jacot and Collier, Marconi – Master of Space, 18-19.
12 The Italian government had given Marconi the honorary title for life “senatore” for his engineering 
and entrepreneurial achievements. With this title Marconi became a member of the Italian Upper Legisla-
tive Chamber. Dunlap, Marconi, the Man and his Wireless, 235-236.
13 Ibid., 251; Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume I: The Birth of 
Broadcasting (Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press, 1961), 282. Originally the quote comes from The 
Popular Wireless Weekly (January 1924).
TEHS7_handels.indd   43 5/9/2012   3:41:07 PM
44 Europe – On Air
arenas. A contemporary professor of history, however, found that these elites con-
sisted of politicians, intellectuals, economists, industrialists and bankers.14 Marconi 
was such an industrialist. Nevertheless, he was also a respected member of the in-
ternational European elites, a diplomat, and an engineer. His hybrid background 
facilitated collaboration with people and organizations working under the banner 
of international peace. You could say that Marconi was one of those people who 
worked on the unity of Europe. He connected cross-border technological projects to 
visions of transnational societies.
This chapter examines the early development of transnational radio broadcast-
ing by focusing on the broadcasters. It begins by showing how during the turbulent 
post-war years people like Marconi designed, contested, and imagined early radio 
broadcasting developments. The fact that these activities took place in a tradition 
of European cartel capitalism outside the sphere of governments initially conflicted 
with the interests of European governments and international governmental orga-
nizations. We will show how broadcasting pioneers explored transnational institu-
tional possibilities to fill the regulatory gap left by their governments and existing 
international organizations. They continued in a tradition of what Craig Murphy 
calls a European conference system.15 The first pioneers established a transnational 
community of broadcasters and international non-governmental organizations 
from scratch. They departed from the European traditions of both cartel capitalism 
and international organizations. 
Pioneering in the Private Sector
At first, broadcasting enthusiasts pioneered in the private sector. Post-war circum-
stances did not favor the development of broadcasting in Europe. While the radio 
industry in Europe and the United States focused on the development of wireless 
telephony, radio amateurs in the United States discovered its application for diffus-
ing music from one point to a mass of people.16 Marconi and others in companies 
similar to his, quickly adopted the idea of broadcasting, with the prospect of new 
markets. Enterprises like CSF, the Marconi Company and Telefunken immediately 
14 Bo Stråth, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse,” in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, 
ed. Bo Stråth (Brussels; New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2000), 20; Andrew W. Cordier, “European Union and the 
League of Nations,” Geneva Special Studies 2, no. 6 (1931): 4.
15 Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change, 48-49, 52, 56.
16 Radio broadcasting, or point-to-mass communication, is a social and cultural construct serving a 
different purpose than point-to-point communication, which is based on the same technology. Griset, “In-
novation and Radio Industry in Europe during the Interwar Period,” 40-41, 47.
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experienced hindrance from already firmly established customs in wireless com-
munications. 
Most European governments had drawn up regulations for using the airwaves. 
They ruled the airwaves and indirectly maintained control over the development 
of wireless services. During the war, wireless radio-telephony had been used for 
espionage, and governments were eager to maintain this control. In their eyes, 
free experimentation with this means of communication was a liability for post-
war peace negotiations, for national defense, and nation-building practices. They 
felt “...uneasy concerning the general political situation and the idea of private 
individuals ‘listening in’ to whatever might be radiated through the ether.”17 They 
believed that wireless technology was an instrument of national power politics and 
should remain out of the hands of public or private organizations. In particular, the 
technical logic of broadcasting made it a concern for governments. Broadcasting 
transmissions could interfere with other applications of wireless technology and 
thus were placed under the authority of national post and telegraph administra-
tions. 
The control of telecommunications had been contested since the establishment 
of the first telegraph networks in Europe.18 Although the control of telegraphy de-
veloped unequally in different countries, telegraphy started off as a private affair. 
Railway companies developed the first lines, opening up communications to a select 
group of private parties like the police and the press. Over the years, parliamentary 
decisions put an end to such practices. In Europe, a predominant system developed 
whereby governments came to own the telegraph network that would be open to 
private users. The telephone developed similarly. Initially private companies had 
room to maneuver but by the early 1920s, governments directly or indirectly con-
trolled the telephone networks in Europe. Private companies wanting to develop 
and exploit wireless radio generally depended on the goodwill of the national PTTs.
When radio industry and amateurs began experimenting with broadcasting, 
they needed a concession from the PTTs to use certain frequencies. The PTTs 
acted reluctantly and blocked a large number of private activities. Initially, govern-
ments in Europe even forbade enthusiasts from carrying out private experiments 
with wireless radio communications.19 The international climate was too fragile to 
17 Arthur R. Burrows, “Broadcasting outside the United States,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 177 (1935): 30.
18 For an elaborative examination of the negotiation of private versus public control of developing tele-
communications ever since the start of postal services in Europe since the late twelfth century see the first 
chapter of: Fickers and Griset, Eventing Europe.
19 Burrows, The History of Broadcasting, 46; IBU, Twenty Years of Activity of the International Broadcast-
ing Union (Geneva: IBU, 1945), 7.
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be threatened by experiments with wireless technology that might hinder govern-
ment employment of wireless telegraphy and telephony for national defense.20 The 
war had damaged international relations considerably, and now government offi-
cials and international elites wanted to improve the political and economic climate. 
Another such war simply had to be avoided.
Although intended to create stability, the renegotiation of power relations during 
and after the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919 led instead to an unstable political 
situation.21 Britain’s influence had diminished slightly, France wished to bend inter-
national politics along French lines, the Allies forced full reparations payments on 
Germany, and the creation of a belt of new states between Russia and Germany, the 
so-called cordon sanitaire or Shatter Zone, led to several upheavals in the eastern 
parts of Europe.22 Furthermore, international commercial activities between na-
tions only developed slowly. At this time “to say that Europe was at peace...was an 
exaggeration.”23
Governments therefore ordered their PTTs to keep a close watch on activities 
by third parties which might encourage war. The PTTs granted the mushroom-
ing and highly controlled, licensed radio amateur clubs certain liberties to expand. 
Moreover, the well-established international cartel of Marconi, Telefunken, RCA and 
CSF could also experiment with wireless within certain limits.24 Other groups were 
shut out. Governments remained reluctant and with the exception of Germany and 
Russia, regularly blocked experiments. In 1920 the British government for instance 
temporarily banned Marconi from broadcasting experiments in favor of telephonic 
interest and those of the armed forces.25 In France, the French PTT only reluctantly 
granted a concession to CSF more than a year after successful experiments.26 Some 
20 Andrew Crisell, An Introductory History of British Broadcasting, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Rout-
ledge, 2002), 17.
21 Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to End War (Lon-
don: John Murray, 2001).
22 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained independence in 1918, whereas Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Hungary were created one year later. Norman Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 
1997), 921, 926; Peter Bugge, “‘Shatter Zones’: The Creation and Re-Creation of Europe’s East,” in Ideas of 
Europe Since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War, ed. Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), 47-68. 
23 Davies, Europe: A History, 926.
24 For a discussion on the role of amateurs in Great Britain and Germany see: Briggs, The Birth of 
Broadcasting, 46-53; Heinz Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik: Zur Geschichte des deutschen 
Rundfunk von 1923/38 (Hamburg: Verlag Hans Bredow-Institut, 1955), 25. For a discussion on the role of 
radio industry see: Griset, “Innovation and Radio Industry in Europe during the Interwar Period,” 37-63; 
Christian Brochand, Histoire générale de la radio et de la télévision en France (Paris: La Documentation 
française, 1994), 621; Léonard Laborie, “La France, L’Europe et l’ordre international des communications 
(1865-1959)” (Ph.D. diss., Université Paris IV – Sorbonne, 2006), 568.
25 Crisell, An Introductory History of British Broadcasting, 17.
26 For a discussion of the diversity in developments in Europe see: chapter 1 of Fickers and Griset, 
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countries had no legislation to regulate the airwaves. The Luxembourg govern-
ment for instance considered the air something it could not possess and the Polish 
government had never made legislation about granting concessions for wireless 
broadcasting.27 European governments consequently hindered the opening up 
of a national broadcasting space, in some instances leaving a national legislative 
vacuum.
Radio amateur clubs and industry lobbied along with their PTTs and per-
formed numerous experiments for four years. Only in 1922 did the PTTs grant 
their first broadcasting concessions, with varying degrees of provision. In Western 
Europe, the radio industry was responsible for the first broadcasting organiza-
tions. The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) was a consortium of manufac-
turers which had to comply with a License and General Agreement between the 
Corporation and the Postmaster General. In practice, the Postmaster seldom used 
his power.28 The BBC worked with Marconi apparatus and employed Marconi em-
ployees like Peter Eckersley and Arthur Burrows. It aimed to educate its audi-
ences via high culture programs.29 In France, CSF established the private station 
Radio Paris while smaller radio set manufacturers created commercial stations 
like Poste Parisien, Radio Côte d’Azur, and Radio Lyon to increase the sale of their 
sets.30 Only the German government was quick to take control of broadcast-
ing. Though Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft mbH maintained an unofficial link with 
Telefunken from the start, its government prevented private parties from creat-
ing broadcasting stations.31 Thus in Western Europe the international radio cartels 
Eventing Europe.
27 Jennifer Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves: Radio Luxembourg and the Origins of European National 
Broadcasting, 1929-1950” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008), 27-28; Ryszard Miazek, Przeminelo 
z radiem: opowiesc o Zygmuncie Chamcu – zalozycielu i pierwszym dyrektorze Polskiego Radia (Rzeszów; 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wyzszej Szkoly Informatyki i Zarzadzania; Polskie Radio, 2005), 66.
28 The License stated that the BBC had to comply with the Post Office’s technical conditions for the use 
of wavelengths as well as the barring of broadcasting advertisement or any other sponsored material. The 
British government centralized broadcasting and turned the BBC into a government regulated organiza-
tion in 1927. Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff, “Serving the Nation: Public Service Broadcasting before 
the War,” in Popular Culture: Past and Present, ed. Bernard Waites, Tony Bennett, and Graham Martin 
(London: Croom Helm London, 1982), 162-163.
29 Griset, “Innovation and Radio Industry in Europe during the Interwar Period,” 37.
30 Brochand, Histoire générale de la radio et de la télévision en France; Seán Street, Crossing the Ether: 
British Public Service Radio and Commercial Competition, 1922-1945 (Eastleigh: John Libbey Publishing, 
2006), 234-253.
31 Though broadcasting in Germany also originated via the efforts of the private GmbH, a station that 
informed and educated laborers, the German government very quickly controlled radio broadcasting 
nationally. It appointed the experienced and soon to be postmaster Hans Bredow, director of the German 
radio company Telefunken as Director of the new Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft. He collaborated closely 
with his managing directors Kurt Magnus and Heinrich Giesecke, the latter directly representing the Ger-
man Reichspostministerium within the RRG. Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik, 24; Winfried 
B. Lerg, Rundfunkpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, Band 1 (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
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were operators of stations as well as manufacturers of radio sets. A patchwork of 
different systems evolved, some related to governments and varying from stations 
that served commercial purposes only to ones that pursued nation-building via 
high culture programs.
Initially Eastern Europe appeared to lack expertise in broadcasting and set 
manufacturing. Its broadcasting industry, seemingly small or non-existent, mostly 
developed on the initiative of well-established individuals with personal and eco-
nomic interests. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, Ladislav Sourek had long been a 
wireless enthusiast, held a degree both in law and finance, and was the director of 
Radioslavia, a company that dealt in the construction and sale of wireless telegra-
phy and telephony apparatus.32 With two others, Sourek established the first Czech 
broadcasting organization Radiojournal soon after the establishment of the BBC 
in Great Britain.33 Responsible for the organizational side, Sourek visited the BBC 
in 1922. After his return he decided to organize Radiojournal following the British 
example.34 Furthermore, he collaborated with the Marconi Company, Telefunken, 
and CSF to facilitate a swift import into Czechoslovakia of receiver sets that 
would secure a nation-wide radio audience. In contrast to the west of Europe, 
the international cartel in the east acted as producers of receiver sets, whereas 
influential people apparently established the broadcasting organizations that 
acted as operators. The BBC model and the international radio industry cartel 
appeared to have considerable influence on the development of East European 
broadcasting. 
The underlying personal networks became an important prerequisite for the 
diffusion of broadcasting across Europe. Frequent international exchange of 
knowledge strengthened several pioneering broadcasting efforts, as happened 
in Poland.35 When Marconi visited the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he met 
Zygmunt Chamiec, a member of the Polish delegation. Chamiec belonged to an 
important Polish noble family, was a nationally well-known banker, and had a 
diverse education ranging from medicine, treasury, and finance to musicology. 
He had lived in various European countries, and was fluent in French, German, 
Russian, and Italian. In addition to official duties, informally Chamiec and 
1980), 154, 201, 253.
32 My thanks go to Jiří Janáč who provided and translated this entry for me. J. Tomeš a kolektiv, Český 
biografický slovník XX. století, vol. 3 (Praha: Litomyšl; Paseka; P. Meissner, 1999). Entry: Sourek, Ladislav.
33 Miroslav Krupicka, Czech Radio History (Radio Prague, 1996), http://www.radio.cz/en/article/49702. 
Accessed July 21, 2008.
34 Eckhard Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowakischen Republik: Eine Bestandsaufnah-
me (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2005), 35-36.
35 Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem, 59, 310. My warm thanks go to Dagmara Jajesniak-Quast who found 
this very well-written and documented biography, as well as to Pavel Bernat who translated the Polish. 
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Marconi discussed the latest wireless broadcasting developments. Marconi invited 
Chamiec to Britain to study his work. 
After some months in the Marconi laboratories, Chamiec returned to Poland 
where he lobbied for a concession that would allow him to establish a broadcasting 
station. He encountered severe difficulties and called for the help of the interna-
tional cartel of CSF, Telefunken, and Marconi to put pressure on the Polish PTT. 
Having been taught by Marconi, Chamiec’s experience of broadcasting was not 
only the result of Marconi’s personal expertise, but also became intertwined with 
Marconi’s visions of community building via broadcasting that exceeded national 
boundaries. Several years after Polskie Radjo was established, in 1928 Chamiec 
even received the French Order of the Legion of Honor for his “remarkable 
achievements in promoting peaceful cooperation across the airwaves.”36 
Chamiec and Marconi believed that broadcasting could facilitate international 
peace and understanding. Both belonged to the European noble elites and tried 
to forge direct links between their activities and ideological debates on the future 
of an international society.37 They combined their economic interests and nation-
building ideals. But others broadcasters were part of the European noble elites 
as well. Men like Maurice Rambert, director of Swiss broadcasting, and Marquis 
Solari, vice-president of Italian broadcasting not only had an economic interest 
in broadcasting, but wanted to achieve peace and understanding via broadcasting 
as well.38 Moreover, important men like Sourek in Czechoslovakia were pursuing 
similar routes. By 1925 several socio-technical systems for broadcasting co-existed 
in Europe. In addition to various private stations in France, the Netherlands, and 
Yugoslavia, which operated for commercial purposes only, that is for the sale of 
36 Ibid., 311.
37 These men were not always driven by the same motives or visions. Nevertheless, because of their 
work and their connections with the European elites, they frequently travelled abroad for politics, meet-
ings, education, etc. A selection of biographies: H.S. von Heister, “Heinrich Giesecke und Kurt Magnus,” in 
Funkköpfe: 46 Literarische Porträts, ed. Karl Wilczynski (Berlin: Verl. Funk-Dienst, 1927), 8-10; Reinhard 
Schlögl, Oskar Czeija: Radio- und Fernsehpionier, Unternehmer, Abenteurer (Wien: Böhlau, 2005); IBU, 
Maurice Rambert, 1866-1941 (Geneva: IBU, 1941); Dunlap, Marconi, the Man and his Wireless; Bilby, The 
General; Tomeš a kolektiv, Český biografický slovník XX. století, 3; Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem.
38 Sourek and Chamiec were not the only ones who met Marconi and became influenced by his work 
and thoughts on the role of broadcasting in society. Marconi also maintained long lasting personal con-
nections with the Italian broadcasting organization. Its Vice President, the Italian nobleman Marquis 
Solari, worked with Marconi for over 26 years. When broadcasters started to collaborate internationally, 
Solari referred to his connection with Marconi that “gives me a certain right to express to you my views, 
hoping that the decisions you are going to take will have the best effects on the relations and the good 
understanding between different countries.” “…me donnent un certain droit pour vous exprimer mes vues, 
en espérant que les décisions que vous aller prendre auront le meilleur effet sur les relations et la bonne 
entente entre différentes pays.” “Conférence européenne d’ingénieurs en radiophonie, tenue au siège de la 
Société des Nations, Séance 6 juillet 1925,” 3, P.V. et documents complémentaires Commission Technique, 
1925-1930 [hereafter: IBU].
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receiver sets, many private broadcasters had an interest in society building activi-
ties. Consequently, private broadcasting initiatives within Europe paved the way 
for what we nowadays call public broadcasting.
U.S. broadcasters created a different broadcasting system. They constructed a na-
tional broadcasting infrastructure that valued commerce above cultural education 
and unity. Although they shared the unifying prospects of broadcasting with their 
European colleagues, they made different choices in the process. Most U.S. broad-
casters agreed that broadcasting reduced class-differences, allowing for the develop-
ment of a stronger and better integrated population. Farmers, the poor, the house-
bound, and the uneducated were likely to profit the most as they were drawn into 
society. To supporters of commercial broadcasting, such unity emerged thanks to 
the simple material linking of listeners across the country tuning in to the same pro-
grams. Even though the educated community shared these beliefs, they approached 
the medium from a more high-culture perspective. In their eyes, broadcasting pro-
vided an opportunity “to exert social control through culture,” by affirming and ex-
tending “cultural tastes and norms of the upper ties of the middle class.”39 Though 
these two groups agreed on the unifying character of broadcasting, they disagreed 
on how to achieve it and on the kind of unity they should create.
At first, private U.S. broadcasters developed both viewpoints freely. While 
industry focused on wireless telephony only, radio amateurs established the ap-
plication of wireless for broadcasting. They discovered point-to-mass commu-
nication while experimenting with point-to-point communications. By the time 
industry anticipated these developments around 1920, U.S. wireless broadcasting 
infrastructures were already well established.40 Department stores, newspapers, 
churches, universities as well as the major radio-telecommunication companies 
AT&T, Westinghouse, and General Electric all established radio stations. Soon, 
the congestion of the air forced these groups to share their wavelengths. The U.S. 
government took a laissez-faire approach, paving the way for creating a radio trust 
of the private corporations RCA, AT&T, Westinghouse, and General Electric. This 
trust aimed to control U.S. broadcasting where the government did not interfere.41 
It “had the technical, financial, and organizational resources to shape program-
ming content, to influence public policy, and to determine how broadcasting 
39 Susan Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1988), 314.
40 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 299-300. 
41 Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for the Control 
of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 262-263.
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would maximize profits,” Susan Douglas shows.42 Government took upon itself the 
right to only intervene in affairs on behalf of American citizens, assigning wave-
lengths if required.43 Consequently this radio trust of private corporations quickly 
gained power in most areas of broadcasting. 
The radio trust would influence the expansion of broadcasting in the years 
to come. Already in 1926, RCA established the first nation-wide network, the 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC), followed by a second one in 1927, the 
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). These networks connected many already 
existing local radio stations via telephone cable, allowing for the simultaneous 
broadcasting of one radio program across the continent. Furthermore, industry 
began regular sponsorship of programs, an idea heavily promoted by radio ad-
vertising boosters. These public relations advocates “actively marketed the idea to 
advertisers, advertising agents and broadcasters” and developed “a form of radio 
advertising that they argued listeners would tolerate and even enjoy.”44 Slowly the 
initially free expansion of broadcasting by ideologically different groups narrowed 
down to an industry-dominated and commercially-based radio broadcasting cul-
ture that ignored the ideas of the American educated and cultural elites.
These developments did not come about without resistance. As soon as people 
became aware of the contours of the new system “Americans, from a variety of 
backgrounds, reacted with utter disgust.”45 They developed public campaigns to 
make room for non-profit and noncommercial elements in broadcasting. This re-
form movement consisted of a colorful group of people from the American bour-
geoisie, intellectuals, civic activists, to elements of the labor movement and of the 
press. Together they fought the 1927 Radio Act, generally considered to be the 
first provisional statute for the “regulation” of U.S. airwaves. The Radio Act left 
little ground for society related projects by the non-profit sector or the American 
elite community. When the newly established Federal Radio Committee (FRC) 
built on the Radio Act and reallocated the frequencies, it downplayed the num-
ber of stations operated by non-profit parties by nearly one hundred. The FRC 
stressed “that Congress had given no indication as how to determine the meaning 
of public interest, convenience, or necessity.”46 Consequently, it had decided in 
42 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 316.
43 Ibid., 315.
44 The most extensive study on this topic is: Susan Smulyan, Selling Radio: The Commercialization of 
American Broadcasting, 1920-1934 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 72-86; Quoted 
from Jennifer Spohrer, “Paradise or Perdition? European Commercial Broadcasters and American Radio, 
1920-1960” (presented at the ESF Inventing Europe Conference: Appropriating America, Making Europe, 
Amsterdam, 2009), 5.
45 McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy, 252.
46 These decisions came to be known as General Order 40. It assigned 40 clear channels, 34 regional 
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favor of stations with the best possible technical equipment. Without doubt, its 
decision to hear commercial stations with few non-profit exceptions influenced 
their choice substantially. The FRC clearly had been either incapable or unwilling 
to make room for the non-profit sector. In the end, the reform movement only 
managed to delay the domination of commercial broadcasting. After this defeat, 
commercial corporations could determine the course of American broadcasting 
as they pleased.
In the United States and in Europe the course of broadcasting settled down in 
the 1930s. In spite of personal overseas networks between American and European 
broadcasters, different dominating systems emerged.47 This mainly appeared to 
be due to the role of European governments and elites. Governments in Europe 
exerted more control over granting concessions. In several instances they issued 
only one concession, limiting the number of stations that could be created within 
their country.48 Furthermore, the European elites involved in the establishment 
of many broadcasting organizations actually had a greater influence than in the 
United States. Their drive to create a sense of national belonging via educational 
and cultural programs was strong. This caused the development of the medium 
to take a different course in the United States and Europe in spite of occasional 
contacts.
Practical problems hampered efficient national broadcasting in Europe. An explo-
sion of new broadcasting organizations across the continent was causing technical 
and ideological difficulties. The growing number of transmissions created a vast 
increase in signal interference. “Reception became torture; the listener suffering 
constant interference between stations of different countries was the pitiable vic-
tim of these profligate signals in the form of whistling, grinding, cracking, groan-
ing, which he remembers with horror to this day!”49 Signals crossed borders and 
therefore the interference problems could not be resolved at national level. They 
required international solutions.
channels, “with the remaining frequencies to be low-power local channels that would accommodate thirty 
broadcasters in each zone [for convenience sake FRC had divided the country into five geographical 
zones].” Ibid., 25.
47 Marconi and David Sarnoff, director of RCA, were personal friends, and several Marconi employ-
ees as well as internationally active European broadcasters had occasionally traveled to or studied in the 
United States as well. “L’U.I.R. rend visite à la N.B.C.,” 1936, box 58 Photographies, IBU; Bilby, The General.
48 The British Post Office, pushed several set manufacturers to collaborate and establish one broadcast-
ing station together. 
49 “La réception devient un martyre, l’auditeur souffrant des interférences constantes entre les stations 
des différents pays, est la pitoyable victime de ces émissions prodigues en sifflements, grincements, 
craquements, gémissements, dont il conserve, aujourd’hui encore, un souvenir horrifié!” Arno Huth, La 
radiodiffusion: Puissance mondiale (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1937), 46.
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Ideologically, the post-war renegotiations of power relations and the redefin-
ing of national boundaries were the main grounds for debate. These could be is-
sues about the material network, the broadcasting of “harmful” internationally 
sensitive propaganda to neighboring countries, or suitable standards for domestic 
day-to-day program content. In a complex post-war international climate, con-
structing a broadcasting medium to promote national community proved a dif-
ficult task. 
Such a complex climate forced governments to also focus actively on nation-
building. New countries like Czechoslovakia or countries whose borders had been 
redefined like Germany and Poland prioritized creating domestic unity in order 
to adapt to the new situation. Redrawing their boundaries had torn nations apart, 
separating groups from their compatriots. Consequently, many East European 
states had developed a “plural” ethnic character. Whereas in Western Europe the 
concept of a nation coincided with the boundaries of the nation-state, those in the 
east had a historical sense of belonging to a nation, to maintaining cultural family 
ties. These ties did not necessarily correspond with state boundaries. Nations in-
creasingly crossed boundaries, signifying that domestically a nation-state included 
more nations than before. In this new situation, state leaders not only tried to create 
domestic cohesion, but also struggled to maintain peace with their neighbors.50 
According to the broadcasters, their medium could serve as an educative and 
cultural instrument to pursue such national unity. In Western Europe all the early 
broadcasting stations primarily tried to employ their medium as an instrument to 
educate their listeners. They aimed to uplift and revive Europe’s civilization and 
culture which had been shattered by the destruction of the Great War. Broadcasters 
in Central and Eastern Europe like the Czech Radiojournal or Polskie Radjo tended 
to address questions of national unity more directly in light of their national po-
litical situation.51 They considered it their personal duty to employ their medium 
to help develop unity and consensus, even though they initially held little or no 
formal ties to governments.52 
The attempt to employ broadcasting for the creation of unity in Eastern Europe 
was a struggle and problematic.53 In Poland, new communities now had to be 
welcomed. In the meantime, outside its borders lived large communities of Poles 
50 Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 510-533; Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and the Idea of European 
Unity,” International Affairs 68, no. 1 (1992): 61-62. 
51 Scannell and Cardiff, “Serving the Nation”; Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowaki-
schen Republik; Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem. 
52 Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowakischen Republik.
53 Burrows, “Broadcasting outside the United States,” 39.
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whom Polish broadcasters considered part of their nation as well. The latter in par-
ticular caused problems. Director of Polskie Radjo, Chamiec found that broadcast-
ing could establish a daily link with fellow Poles now living abroad in the newly 
defined German areas. Broadcasting across borders by newly established frontier 
stations enabled these groups to stay in touch with their language by listening in 
to daily domestic Polish broadcasts.54 Such programs could easily lead to interna-
tional tension if the other country felt offended by “harmful” broadcasting con-
tent. Such disputes over unintentional versus intentional “harmful” propaganda 
could not be resolved at national level. Broadcasters felt the need to address these 
ideological problems internationally.
Broadcasters also experienced difficulties in finding appropriate standards for 
the society-building content of their national daily broadcasts. First of all, they real-
ized that broadcasting required an entirely different way of communicating with 
audiences than any other form of cultural arts or technology. Previously, people had 
always gone out to listen to music together. They could go to the theater to hear live 
music or listen to gramophone records at home.55 Listening to music was a social 
experience. Early radio sets did not enable such mutual listening activities, nor did 
they provide the opportunity of direct contact between audience and performers. 
Initially, people could listen individually via a headphone, or together alone when 
it became possible to connect multiple headphones to one receiving set. Such early 
listening behavior brought all conversation and social activities to a halt. Only in the 
early 1930s did the first receiver sets appear with loudspeakers, enabling audiences 
to experience broadcasting as a truly social small-scale event within the walls of their 
own homes.56 Broadcasters sought suitable and effective ways of communicating 
their message of national unity to their audiences via broadcasting programs which 
complied in the best possible way with the new technology. 
54 Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem, 122. Note that broadcasting organizations did not necessarily have to 
construct stations near their frontiers to facilitate broadcasting to compatriots living near their borders. 
Country capitals or important centers for cultural development also lay in such border regions. Limit-
ing the power of these frontier stations or not placing a station in such regions “would be to curtail the 
development of national broadcasting, which would no longer be an adequate service.” LoN, Broadcasting 
and Peace: Studies and Projects in the Matter of International Agreements (Paris: International Institute of 
Intellectual Co-Operation, 1933), 216.
55 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Philipp Ther, Europe and Beyond: Transfers, Networks and Markets for 
Musical Theatre in Modern Europe, 1740-1960, Project proposal (Florence: European University Institute, 
2008); Sophie Maisonneuve, “Le disque et la musique classique en Europe, 1877-1949: L’invention d’un 
médium musical, entre mutations d’écoute et formation d’un patrimoine” (Ph.D. diss., European Univer-
sity Institute, Department of History & Civilization, 2002).
56 Shaun Moores, “‘The Box on the Dresser’: Memories of Early Radio and Everyday Life,” Media, 
Culture and Society 10 (1988): 23-40.
TEHS7_handels.indd   54 5/9/2012   3:41:07 PM
 Elites on the Barricades for Broadcasting 55
Figure 2.1 – Preparations for the Belgian radio news
Source: IBU, “La salle de rédaction du journal-parlé de l’INR, 1 feb 1935,” box 58 Photographies, 
IBU. With special thanks for the European Broadcasting Union, Geneva, who allowed me the 
usage of their picture archive.
The rapidly growing and changing radio audience did not make matters any 
easier. With the diffusion of affordable receiver sets as well as the introduction of 
the loudspeaker, audiences started to develop their own program preferences.57 
Before regular broadcasting services began, radio amateurs had enjoyed “listening 
in the ether,” enjoying the search for signals from far-away places. Consequently, 
the first radio station in the Netherlands oriented its “programs” towards a rela-
tively technical listening audience.58 By the time organizations began regular 
broadcasting, listeners increasingly cared about the content of the signals they re-
ceived, giving broadcasting a place in their daily lives. They demanded more pro-
grams that reflected their personal preferences rather than those ordained by their 
57 Brian Currid, A National Acoustics: Music and Mass Publicity in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowakischen 
Republik; Scannell and Cardiff, “Serving the Nation.”
58 Onno de Wit, “Radio tussen Verzuiling en Individualisering,” in Techniek in Nederland in de Twin-
tigste Eeuw: Deel V Transport en Communicatie, ed. Johan Schot and Onno de Wit (Eindhoven: Stichting 
Historie der Techniek, 2002), 208-211.
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stations’ high culture and educative cultural policies.59 Audiences complained and 
pleaded for more low key and popular entertainment. 
Though broadcasting employees also argued for a diversification of broadcast 
contents, the European broadcasting stations did not relent.60 John Reith, direc-
tor of the BBC in 1924 remarked when people complained: “we are apparently 
setting out to give the public what we think they need, and not what they want, 
but few know what they want, and very few know what they need.”61 The Czech 
Radiojournal compared so-called Unterhaltungsmusik with U.S. entertainment 
music. It would be “…tantamount to desertion.”62 Though reluctant to give in to 
their audiences, broadcasters still thought of suitable standards for program con-
tent that upheld their idea of high culture nation-building without losing their au-
diences. They felt that live broadcasts alone could achieve such results.63 However, 
the costs of such educative and live programs were high. It was not easy to create a 
radio schedule that contained a considerable percentage of live programs.
Broadcasters thought that creating international standards could solve practi-
cal, technological, ideological, and programming issues. Negotiating such stan-
dards would enhance collaboration and resolve these problems to everyone’s satis-
faction. In the United States, broadcasters could organize their networks in relative 
uniformity. Europe’s distinctive systems of administration and control prevented 
an easy resolution of such international questions.64 European broadcasters agreed 
that only a coupling and adaptation of their systems via international agreements 
and coordination could settle these issues. 
Lack of International Regulation
International broadcasting regulation was non-existent. International organi-
zations dealing with communications or infrastructure projects in Europe had 
59 Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowakischen Republik, 40.
60 BBC chief engineer Eckersley, who himself had featured in BBC programs for years, reflects on 
program policies in Europe in his memoires. He argues that improved reception of a plurality of waves 
would encourage specialization of genres on air with special jazz or classical music channels for instance, 
that would increase and diversify the supply of music. Peter P. Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone 
(London: J. Cape, 1941), 21.
61 Scannell and Cardiff, “Serving the Nation,” 163. Quoted from John Reith, Broadcast over Britain (Lon-
don: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1924), 37.
62 “…einer Desertation gleich.” Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowakischen Republik, 
40-41.
63 Michele Hilmes, Only Connect: A Cultural History of Broadcasting in the United States (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 43.
64 IBU, The Problems of Broadcasting (Geneva: IBU, 1930), 105.
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decided not to take on the emerging activity of broadcasting after the war. The 
International Telegraph Union (ITU) focused on wireless communications and 
technical committees of the new League of Nations dealt with infrastructure de-
velopment. Neither wanted to develop or take the lead in the international devel-
opment of broadcasting.
The ITU had been dealing with problems in point-to-point communications 
for over half a century. Since its establishment in 1865, it had sought to reach 
uniformity in the international telegraph systems. It coordinated the operation 
of telegraph networks and services and advanced the development of telegraph 
technologies. To these activities it added telephony in 1903 and radiotelephony 
in 1906.65 The inclusion of radio-telephony went hand in hand with the unof-
ficial establishment of the International Radiotelegraph Union (IRU) in 1906. 
Supervised by the ITU Bureau, the IRU focused on wireless radiotelegraph related 
questions.66 Consequently, by 1922 the ITU possessed substantial knowledge on 
wireless communications and the accompanying international bottlenecks.
Nonetheless, ITU did not take up the new development of radio broadcast-
ing. As international governmental organization, ITU represented national post 
and telegraph administrations all over the world. For its day-to-day activities it 
depended on the expertise of radio-electricity engineers in government employ-
ment. Though their transnational activities at ITU gave these engineers a certain 
amount of freedom to pursue their personal interests, government decrees re-
stricted their ability to maneuver. Consequently, when European governments de-
cided to restrict and hamper broadcasting experiments, these radio telegraphy and 
telephony engineers could not but ignore early international broadcasting prob-
lems. ITU had organized the previous World Conference of Telecommunications 
in Washington in 1920. This dealt with all aspects of wireless, but had no con-
sequences for broadcasting.67 Moreover, the one country that did pursue broad-
casting freely, the United States, did not become an ITU member until 1932. 
Conversely, broadcasting in Europe was still in an experimental phase and not 
expected to proliferate for another three to four years. There seemed to be no sense 
of urgency in dealing with broadcasting related problems. 
65 George A. Codding, The International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International 
Cooperation (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 32. 
66 Though the ITU never established an actual Radiotelegraph Union, the term generally referred to 
“the group of countries signatory, or adherent, to the various Radiotelegraph Conventions.” Codding, The 
International Telecommunication Union, 81. 
67 The Washington Conference held in November 1920 drew up a draft Convention and a set of Regu-
lations regarding telegraphy, telephony, cable, and radio-communications. These concerned point-to-point 
communications rather than point-to-mass communication media like wireless broadcasting. Ibid., 110.
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Although the League of Nations had no international experience with wireless 
communication policies, since its foundation it had been seeking ways to con-
tribute to international developments. In 1922 the League established a variety of 
“technical committees” designed to assure its expertise in Health Organization, 
Economic and Financial Organization, and an Organization for Communications 
and Transit (OCT).68 With the acceptance of the League, participants at the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference had opted for “a universal body of dialogue, of consen-
sus, and arbitration, capable of avoiding conflict that peoples feared.”69 The League 
would be a “new path in international co-operation,” not so much to avert war, but 
by being “an instrument to achieve a ‘constructive peace’ through building a ‘new 
world order’...”70 The organization built on the prevailing idea among the loosely 
coupled international elites that dialogue, joint efforts, and interests would pro-
mote peace, understanding, and international security. The technical committees 
would pursue these goals in a practical manner. OCT focused on infrastructure 
and quickly established sub-committees in the areas of rail, electricity and roads. 
However, it never created a permanent committee for broadcasting, telegraphy or 
telephony.
During the mid-1920s, the League’s OCT performed an exploratory study of 
wireless communications. It established the temporary Special Committee on 
Enquiry of Telegraphic Questions, and invited several ITU experts to sit on the 
Committee.71 On the basis of these exploratory studies, the Special Committee 
68 For some early studies on the League of Nations see: Greaves, The League Committees and World Order; 
League of Nations, Ten Years of World Co-Operation (London: Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1930). 
For two recent and excellent studies see: Patricia Clavin and Jens-Wilhelm Wessel, “Transnationalism and 
the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of its Economic and Financial Organisation,” Contempo-
rary European History 14 (2005): 465-492; Frank Schipper, Vincent Lagendijk, and Irene Anastasiadou, 
“New Connections for an Old Continent: Rail, Road and Electricity in the League of Nations Organisation 
for Communications and Transit,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of 
Europe, ed. Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers (London: Palgrave, 2010), 113-143.
69 “l’organe universel de dialogue, de consensus et d’arbitrage capable d’éviter le conflit que redoutaient 
les populations.” Franck Théry, Construire l’Europe dans les années vingt: L’action de l’Union paneuropéenne 
sur la scène franco-allemande, 1924-1932, Euryopa (Genève: Institut européen de l’Université de Genève, 
1998), 8.
70 Sir Arthur Salter, Director of the League’s Economic and Financial Section, during the Economic 
Conference of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies in 1928. Jo-Anne Pemberton, 
“New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity,” Review of International Studies 28, 
no. 2 (2002): 314.
71 League of Nations (hereafter: LoN), Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and 
Transit, Procès-Verbal of the Fourth Session, held at Geneva, April 23-30, 1923, LoN document series, 
C.486.M.202.1923.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1923); LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communica-
tions and Transit, Procès-Verbal of the Fifth Session, held at Geneva, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, 1923, LoN doc. ser., 
C.667.M.267.1923.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1923); LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communica-
tions and Transit, Procès-Verbal of the Sixth Session, held at Geneva, March 12-14,1924, LoN doc. ser., 
C.196.M.61.1924.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1924); LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communica-
tions and Transit, Procès-Verbal of the Seventh Session, held at Geneva, Nov. 26-29, 1924, LoN doc. ser., 
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proposed organizing a world radio-telegraphic conference in 1924. Such a confer-
ence would require continuous collaboration between the League OCT and ITU.72 
To the dismay of several Assembly delegates, the League decided not to follow the 
Committee’s advice. The delegates considered such a conference “absolutely neces-
sary,” and the League of Nations “the body best qualified to carry this through.”73 
Nonethless, the League considered such a conference too premature. By late 1923, 
several issues on telegraphy had still not been resolved. Moreover, organizing such 
a conference now would disturb other international actions outside the sphere of 
the League concerning the revision of the 1920 Washington Telegraphy regula-
tions, activities in which ITU was heavily involved. 
In the meantime, the League explored the options for using the new medium 
for its own public relations. In the first half of the 1920s, the League established 
close contact with several broadcasting pioneers, and agreed to join in various 
cross-border radio broadcasting experiments. As a result, already on December 
13, 1920 “some hundreds waited intently for the first sounds which would come 
from the gigantic loud speaker which had been set up” in the hall of the League 
of Nations in Geneva. Marconi performed an experimental relay of speech all the 
way from London. Though reception was poor, in between the shrill shrieking, the 
listeners could clearly hear a voice saying “Hello, Geneva!”74 People were amazed. 
In the ensuing years, a considerable number of experiments followed that cen-
tralized the relaying of important League events across Europe. Several times the 
League collaborated in relaying a presidential address, followed by the historical 
speeches by Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann in 1926 on the occasion of 
Germany’s admission to the League of Nations.75 In 1926 European broadcast-
ers even managed to realize a live overseas connection with the United States, 
C.72.M.36.1925.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1925); LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communica-
tions and Transit, Procès-Verbal of the Eighth Session, held at Geneva, July 24-30, 1925, LoN doc. ser., 
C.621.M.203.1925.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1925).
72 LoN doc. ser., C.196.M.61.1924.VIII, 3. Initially the CCIF had been set up as a Comité préliminaire 
pour la téléphonie à grande distance en Europe in 1924, but became a permanent advisory body of the ITU 
in 1925.
73 Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting, 283.
74 Jacot and Collier, Marconi – Master of Space, 170.
75 Broadcasters relayed the historical speech by Briand and Stresemann via cable to French, Swiss, 
and German stations. The Danish Copenhagen and Soroe stations in turn captured the signal from the 
German station in Köningswusterhausen, and relayed the speech all across Denmark. These wireless relay 
experiments had been complemented by more regional efforts as well. In June 1926, for instance, the 
Scandinavian countries, under the auspices of the Ligue des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberté relayed a 
program of discourse and music. Though the factual relay from Copenhagen suffered from distortions due 
to submarine cables crossing the Sund, the relay from Stockholm was an excellent result. “Relais Interna-
tionaux, Résume de la situation présenté par le Secrétaire Général,” Série 563, 15 juin 1927, 2, box 85, file 
Relais Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU.
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enabling League Secretary-General Eric Drummond to address U.S. audiences 
directly. Drummond drew a direct link between radio and the League of Nations. 
Radio and the League of Nations are both in their youth. They were born 
at approximately the same time, and are growing and developing on some-
what the same lines. Assuredly their fruitful co-operation will make for 
the peace of the world. How rapidly civilization has travelled!…It is not 
easy, even for those who serve the cause of peace, to realize the enormous 
new force…distance and time almost cease to have importance. …The full 
development of radio must render international co-operation, and there-
fore the task of the League, infinitely easier.76
The League showed an interest in broadcasting from the very first. As a result, it 
not only participated in international relay experiments, but also showed its belief 
that broadcasting could be used for diffusing its aims and ideology. The League 
was in touch with early European broadcasters and acquainted itself with their 
activities. 
Nonetheless, the League OCT did not take any concrete steps towards creat-
ing an international policy for broadcasting. By 1926 its originally intended as 
temporary Special Committee of Enquiry on Telegraphic Questions functioned 
as a semi-permanent body. On the basis of its relations with ITU and established 
contacts with the European broadcasters, the Special Committee decided to step 
down. A permanent committee on radio telephony within OCT was unnecessary, 
the Committee concluded. ITU had expertise for a long time in wireless com-
munications. New, potentially interesting developments in radio broadcasting de-
served space to expand. OCT decided to stay informed of further developments 
and reserved the right to study communication related questions of any nature if 
desired.77 The Special Committee, OCT and ITU decided not to create interna-
tional broadcasting regulations as the technology was too “young” and changing 
too quickly. The decision left room for international efforts that were not driven 
by governments. 
76 “Radio speech by Eric Drummond to U.S. Audiences,” 20 January 1925, catalogued as 14.48542X, 
28231 X, 1-2, box 14, R-1140, file 48542/28231, LoN.
77 LoN, Commission Consultative et Technique des Communications et du Transit, Procès-Verbal de la 
9ième session, tenue à Genève, 12 au 17 juillet 1926, LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 
1926), 28-30.
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Establishing International Broadcasting Union
European broadcasters took the initiative. At the same time that broadcasting was 
developing in their countries, they began discussing how to deal with the associ-
ated international problems. These discussions were in keeping with their own 
tradition of cartel capitalism and also with another European tradition, that of 
international organizations. 
Craig Murphy argues that in the second half of the nineteenth century, many 
international organizations were established in a European tradition of confer-
ence systems. Conference attendees were a mix of what Murphy calls “experienced 
commoners” and members of the European ancien régime. They believed in en-
couraging peace and understanding via practical projects, and also organized these 
events and projects in an atmosphere that breathed nineteenth century European 
civilized values. Murphy finds that these conferences led to the establishment of 
international organizations such as the International Telegraph Union in a process 
of four steps: First of all, conference participants desiring to create an international 
organization would propose a design. They reached agreement on the design, in 
other words the nature of the collaboration. Secondly, a powerful individual had to 
take on the responsibility of the project. The project for a new international orga-
nization would have to obtain the support of powerful individuals and/or an indi-
vidual state. A final conference would then make the new international organiza-
tion reality by creating a constituency. In Murphy’s view, this European tradition 
of conference systems created an international organization with a very precise 
ideological discourse, and long-established sets of civilized behavior.78 
Though European broadcasters agreed on the need for international collabora-
tion, initially they encountered disagreement on the nature of such cooperation. 
Should the private companies seek government regulation or establish their own 
international organization of broadcasters working outside governments? The 
BBC supported the first idea, arguing that “wavelengths are matters for govern-
ment sanctions” only.79 Other parties pleaded in favor of a non-political organiza-
tion, and proposed arranging a conference to address the issue. For its stance in fa-
vor of a political route, the BBC argued that such a conference would then have an 
unofficial character and only be able to make recommendations.80 Private broad-
casters were the wrong public to deal with such issues, it argued. Consequently, the 
BBC refused to attend such a gathering. Thus the disagreements proved no simple 
78 Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change, 52, 71.
79 Briggs, The Birth of Broadcasting, 284.
80 Ibid.
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matter to overcome, especially when the biggest and most influential broadcasting 
organization in Europe, a role model for many, refused to join in. 
In 1924 a powerful Swiss individual by the name of Maurice Rambert came for-
ward to overcome these design problems. He took steps to organize a Preliminary 
Conference for an International Agreement on Wireless Telephony in Geneva on 
April 22-23, 1924. Rambert was director of the Société Suisse de Radiodiffusion 
(SSR) and owner of Radio-Electrique S.A., the first Swiss organization to build and 
sell radio-electric apparatus. He was from a noble Swiss family, a passionate violin 
player and music composer, with a background in banking and engineering. He 
had received the first concession in Switzerland allowing him to pursue public 
radiotelephonic emissions.81 By bringing together state administrations, private 
associations, radio-clubs, radio industry and the wireless press, Rambert hoped 
the conference would find a solution to the issue of wavelengths, filling the regula-
tory gap left by national governments and existing international organizations.82 
Rambert managed to follow through with the conference, and as such, achieved 
the first steps towards establishing an organization outside the governmental 
sphere. Though such an organization could make recommendations rather than 
binding decisions, these would suffice for the time being, the conference partici-
pants argued. In time, they would be adopted by national governments and inter-
national organizations to become legally binding. 
Rambert’s idea for a non-governmental international organization obtained 
the support of the League of Nations, the third stage pointed out by Murphy. Not 
only did the League of Nations kindly host these broadcaster meetings, a member 
of the League’s Transit Section Robert Haas also attended. Though the conference 
ultimately achieved few practical results, it did lay the basis for an International 
Union of Broadcasters. The League’s OCT seems to have supported this idea. Haas 
even pledged that if “necessary at a later stage, the League might be able to help 
the Union to endeavour to obtain action through Governments.”83 In addition 
to Haas, other participants were important international players. Mr. Boisnier 
of the International Labor Organization attended along with Mr. Calame of the 
Swiss PTT administration, an engineer of the Bell Telephone Manufacturing 
Mr. Insbruck, Mr. Pitlik of the Czech Ministry of Trade, and Mr. Edwards of the 
British periodical “The Wireless World.”84 Consequently, the idea for an interna-
tional non-governmental broadcasting organization gained the support of a wide 
81 IBU, Maurice Rambert, 1866-1941, 6-8.
82 IBU, L’Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion: Son histoire – son activité (Geneva: IBU, 1944), 7-14.
83 “European Conference of Broadcasting Engineers, July 6, 1925,” 1, P.V. Commission Technique, IBU.
84 IBU, Twenty Years, 9-10.
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variety of influential members of society and state. Thus there was also a sub-
stantial constituency for an international organization for broadcasting, the fourth 
stage pointed out by Murphy.
As a result of these preparatory meetings, European broadcasters together 
managed to give the constituency a firm basis. Lengthy negotiations between 
the various private broadcasters, especially between Rambert and BBC director 
John Reith who managed to settle their differences, followed in London on March 
18-19, 1925.85 On April 3-4, 1925, ten European broadcasters established the non-
governmental Union Internationale de Radiophonie (UIR). The Union, also known 
by its English name International Broadcasting Union (IBU), had its headquarters 
in Geneva.86 The route that led to the establishment of IBU seems to have fol-
lowed the four preconditions described by Murphy. Its emergence suggests that 
the non-governmental IBU was established in a European tradition of interna-
tional organizations, where according to Murphy, the ideology of the European 
ancien régime persisted in an adapted form. This ideology combined late nine-
teenth century nationalism, “the glue that would hold society together,” with the 
international behavior of the noblesse oblige.87 Such orientation seemed to match 
the personal backgrounds and ideological beliefs of broadcasters like Marconi, 
Rambert, Chamiec, and Solari, who had also established the first broadcasting or-
ganizations on the European continent. 
Figure 2.2 – International Broadcasting Union logos in the interwar years 
Source: IBU, Radiodiffusion (Geneva: IBU, 1935-1939); IBU, L’activité de l’Union Internationale 
de Radiodiffusion de 1939 à 1946 (Genève: IBU, 1946). Used by the courtesy of the European 
Broadcasting Union.
85 For the complex and tense negotiations between BBC director John Reith and Rambert see: Briggs, 
The Birth of Broadcasting, 310-315.
86 The organizations that founded IBU were from Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. IBU, Twenty Years, 12, 65-72.
87 Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change, 52-53.
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The IBU aimed to resolve the international problems of broadcasting in a 
practical manner. In 1926 it explained that broadcasting “is a form of applied sci-
ence which compels international collaboration for its successful development.”88 It 
aimed to deal with the given that wireless waves knew no frontiers, that stations 
everywhere in Europe were growing in power and number, and that broadcasting 
programs were a matter of private property only. Such diverse and complex problems 
required an encompassing international organization that accounted for all sorts of 
broadcasting related issues. As a result, the IBU founders quickly formed a complex 
group of broadcasting experts with astoundingly hybrid and diverse backgrounds 
such as law, finance, engineering, journalism, and musicology. These experts priori-
tized the coordination of broadcasting developments in general, the centralization of 
the study of all issues from a technical, legal, and social point-of-view, and the pro-
tection of the interests of broadcasting in relation to other means of wireless media.89 
These activities would not only resolve practical problems, but also facilitate the 
economic interests of these broadcasters. The international centralization of research 
and development in quality of production, transmission, program content, and re-
ception would facilitate the rationalization of production substantially. Moreover, 
the experts argued that their efforts would improve the quality of broadcasting to 
such a degree that the medium would attract a wider radio audience. With a grow-
ing demand for radio sets in Europe, the radio industry would receive an impressive 
return on investment. Since these early broadcasters often represented or had direct 
connections to the radio industry, they would also benefit from such return on in-
vestment. Their line of reasoning proved correct. In 1920 only a few thousand homes 
in Europe had receiver sets, in 1926 this number had grown to 5.8 million and to 
16 million sets in 1931.90 Not surprisingly, their economic interests recurred on the 
agenda of the Administrative Council at regular intervals in spite of its Statutes that 
made clear the public non-commercial character of the organization.91
The practical and businesslike approach went hand in hand with the idea of creat-
ing a social community as these broadcasters saw fit. According to Akira Iriye, “cul-
ture was being ‘produced,’ not automatically but through the medium of forces that 
were eager to re-establish some sort of order in…society. That these forces…were 
fundamentally business-oriented, stressing themes like prosperity, productivity, and 
88 Stress is the original. IBU, International Union of Broadcasting Organisations – Union Internationale 
de Radiophonie (Geneva: IBU, 1926), 11.
89 Ibid.
90 The IBU assumed 3.8 persons per home of seven years and older listening to the radio. The number 
could even be 4 if guests were also listening in. IBU, The Importance of Broadcasting (Geneva: IBU, 1932), 
6. Found in registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN. 
91 UIR, “Statuts,” Série 176, 23 mars 1926, 1, box 33 l’Histoire de l’UIR – statuts, IBU.
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efficiency, is clear.”92 The broadcasters combined their European tradition of cartel 
capitalism and the European tradition of international organizations within one in-
stitutional structure. 
European governments created turmoil when they nationalized broadcasting. For 
the second time, they hindered broadcasting development and went against the 
grain of the cartel capitalist tradition. Initially, they had forbidden granting con-
cessions for broadcasting in favor of national defense right after the war. Now they 
increasingly nationalized broadcasting domestically based on the same argument. 
With nationalization, governments increased their influence over the medium, 
not only by obtaining an official stake in the organization, but also by centralizing 
control over the medium. Various governments merged the existing stations in 
their countries which were “operated by amateur clubs, newspapers, radio manu-
facturers, and the state, into a single national broadcasting monopoly.”93 
Organizations other than those nationalized could only continue to a limited 
degree. Amateurs were only permitted to use the radio waves if they were mem-
bers of the highly controlled radio amateur clubs. These could join the International 
Amateur Radio Union (IARU) established in 1925. For reasons of transparency, lists 
of these members circulated widely between national PTTs, governments, broad-
casting organizations, and the International Telegraph Union. Registered amateurs 
had the right to broadcast under certain conditions, though in some countries their 
governments forbade them to broadcast at all, making them focus on wireless te-
legraphy alone.94 Broadcasting operations in Europe increasingly belonged to the 
fortunate few.
Not all governments nationalized the medium in the same manner. Some placed 
it in the hands of one or more government departments, whereas others turned it 
into a public utility, obtaining a seat on the public company board. With the latter 
construction, broadcasting organizations often maintained a high degree of freedom 
in their cultural and programming activities. Commercial broadcasting by means 
of private ownership decreased, and by the late 1930s only existed in Europe to a 
92 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997), 84.
93 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 12. Extracted from: Radiofonica Zagreb, “Organisation de la radio-
diffusion en Europe, document revise,” June 13, 1935, box 53, Organisation de la radiodiffusion, IBU.
94 Box 94bis, Stations d’amateurs, privées et clandestines, 1924-1949, IBU. In the course of the interwar 
years, several amateur clubs requested admission to the IBU. It always refused these requests for legally 
it agreed to only represent official broadcasting organizations with nationwide coverage. For an example 
from Germany see: “Letter from the German Verband der RadioHörer to the International Broadcasting 
Union,” May 17, 1946; “Letter from the International Broadcasting Union to the German Verband der 
RadioHörer,” June 14, 1946, box 2, Adhésions – recrutements, Démissions – Radiations, IBU.
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limited extent. By 1937, public and private broadcasting continued to co-exist only 
in France, Spain, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia.95 
The nationalization of most European broadcasting stations posed institutional 
tensions internationally. Immediately after its establishment, the IBU encountered 
the situation that many but not all of its members changed from being a private en-
terprise to a public organization. Institutionally, the IBU community tried to fine-
tune its private origins with the newly acquired and increasing influence of the 
state. Whereas governments wanted to construct broadcasting for nation-building 
and national defense, IBU broadcasters also wanted to help resolve international 
problems and encourage increased collaboration. Consequently, the IBU sought 
an institutional construction that made room for the national without interfering 
with their international goals. 
Over the years, the IBU’s institutional structure began to reflect these stronger 
national ties, while broadly maintaining its private origins (Figure 2.3). The IBU’s 
highest organ, the General Assembly, consisted of representatives from each IBU 
member organization. Once many member organizations centralized, these repre-
sentations increasingly denoted the nation-state. By allowing each member the right 
to vote, the General Assembly approved all decisions taken by the Administrative 
Council. Accordingly, institutionally the nation-state always had the final say. 
Figure 2.3 – Organizational structure of the International Broadcasting Union
Source: IBU, Twenty Years of Activity of the International Broadcasting Union (Geneva: IBU, 
1945). Interpretation of the author.
95 Huth, La radiodiffusion, 37-38, 52-53.
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All other IBU positions tended to reflect the private origins of the IBU. The 
Administrative Council, the IBU Bureau, and the executive committees reserved 
posts for individuals who represented all IBU members collectively. These people 
were supposed to be acting on their own behalf rather than as representatives of 
their organizations. Although we can question whether they placed their national 
interests first, their behavior probably differed with the occasion and per representa-
tive. The Administrative Council consisted of eleven people who represented all IBU 
members. Not surprisingly, the first Council was made up of many who had estab-
lished a broadcasting station in their own country and co-established the IBU in the 
course of preparatory conference meetings. They were Vice-Admiral Carpendale 
from the United Kingdom, Heinrich Giesecke from Germany, Robert Tabouis from 
France, Rambert from Switzerland, Antoine Dubois from the Netherlands, Auguste 
Hubert from Belgium, Svoboda from Czechoslovakia, Skottun from Norway, and 
García from Spain.96 They decided which studies the various committees were to 
perform. They defined the agenda of the IBU. The Council thus had a high degree of 
decision-making power, especially since they met twice a year whereas the Assembly 
met only once. 
The IBU Secretariat or Bureau consisted of the Secretary General, the Presidency, 
and the délégué-conseil who not only maintained contact with other international 
organizations like the League of Nations, but also acted as “a permanent intermedi-
ary between the Council and the Director of the Office.”97 The day-to-day IBU staff 
was small. In 1925 it consisted of four people, and grew to a mere fourteen regular 
staff members in 1937. With the outbreak of World War II, the number of staff fell 
to four again.98 Arthur Burrows, long-time colleague of Marconi and Eckersley as 
well as BBC program director, became the Union’s Secretary General. He moved to 
Geneva to coordinate the IBU’s daily activities. His colleague Vice-Admiral Charles 
Carpendale, BBC controller, became IBU President. Radio Paris representative 
Robert Tabouis and German RRG representative Heinrich Giesecke obtained the 
Vice-Presidency, a position they continued to hold until 1935. Maurice Rambert 
became the délégué-conseil. With the exception of Burrows, these men did not have 
to move to Geneva. They traveled back and forth. The Bureau performed the admin-
istration for both the Administrative Council and General Assembly, managing the 
Union’s day-to-day activities and supporting IBU committees. 
96 IBU, Twenty Years, 13-14.
97 “Statutes of the International Broadcasting Union, Adopted by an Extraordinary General Assembly 
of the International Broadcasting Union, Budapest in October 1930,” 127, box 33 l’Histoire de l’UIR – 
statuts, IBU.
98 Ernest Eugster, Television Programming Across National Boundaries: The EBU and OIRT Experience 
(Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1983), 32.
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The executive committees brought together experts in the various fields of 
broadcasting. The Technical Committee focused on coordinating cross-bor-
der infrastructures, electrical interference, or wave propagation issues. In 1927 
the Director of the Technical Committee also became head of the new Brussels 
Checking Center. In Brussels, engineers performed practical tests with frequency 
allocations, surveying long waveband, as well as transmission stability. In March 
1926 the Legal Committee took up all issues concerning illicit propaganda, copy-
right, and authors’ rights. In July the Committee for Intellectual, Social, and 
Artistic Rapprochement began examining program exchange, for which it estab-
lished a sub-committee to deal with international relaying over long distances. 
In principle it aimed to facilitate and develop the use of radio to encourage rap-
prochement between peoples. In 1928 its sub-committee became an independent 
body called the Committee on International Relays, but in 1936 merged into the 
Program Committee.99 The Budget Committee took care of the Union’s financial 
affairs.100 These committees provided the IBU with specialized expertise in every 
area of broadcasting. 
The executive committees were primarily responsible to the Administrative 
Council who determined most studies these committees were to carry out. In be-
tween Council meetings, the committees studied the issues then communicated 
their results to the Council. The committees met at regular intervals in Geneva 
or elsewhere depending on their workload. There seemed to be no exact rules for 
the frequency of meetings, which varied from five to twelve times a year. Having 
discussed and approved the studies, the Administrative Council would submit the 
results to the General Assembly for official approval and implementation. Though 
the nation-state always had the final word via the General Assembly, the major part 
of the IBU’s work seems to have been conducted in accordance with the initial col-
laboration defined by the private broadcasters at the start of European broadcast-
ing. The IBU thus created an institutional standard with a firm basis for national 
interests. The various broadcasting experts appear to have been able to negoti-
ate amicably their national priorities alongside international needs. This followed 
their European tradition of cartel capitalism and international organizations. 
The private traditions of early broadcasting organizations in Europe could con-
tinue because a very small group of broadcasters occupied the most important 
positions nationally and in the IBU. At first glance they remind us of the pre-war 
European balance-of-power situation. The BBC obtained IBU Presidency as well 
99 IBU, Twenty Years, 16-17.
100 The Budget Committee had a minor role. It mostly seems to have managed the IBU membership 
fees as well as yearly expenditure.
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as the position of Secretary-General, whereas France and Germany obtained Vice-
Presidency. Several leading members were from countries other than the big three. 
The directors of the executive committees were from central and eastern Europe. 
Although it was a Frenchman, Raymond Braillard, who became director of the 
Technical Committee and Brussels Checking Center, the Czech Ladislav Sourek 
became director of the Legal Committee, the Austrian Oscar Czeija became direc-
tor of the Rapprochement Committee, and Zygmunt Chamiec was Director of the 
International Relay Committee. Thus West and East European members occupied 
the key roles. In later years, North European members would also hold these posts 
in rotation. With the exception of southern Europe, over the years the important 
positions therefore reflected a relatively equal division of power between European 
members of the Union. 
While creating institutional standards, these broadcasters fine-tuned the increas-
ing national impact on their international activities, taking into account a European 
versus global sphere of influence. One might suggest that statutorily the IBU saw 
itself as an “international” organization representing the interests of European 
broadcasting organizations. In this sense “international” should equal “Europe.” 
Nonetheless, in 1926 already, the IBU communicated that “As the majority of these 
problems, whether technical, legal or artistic, are of a worldwide character, it is felt 
that the time has come when the benefits arriving from this Union of broadcast-
ers should be extended to broadcasters in all countries.”101 The IBU clearly defined 
broadcasting as a global issue without boundaries that required global collaboration. 
In 1927 the IBU finally set its institutional membership standards. These confirmed 
a very Eurocentric kind of globalism with a central position for European members 
and affairs. The so-called “active members” were from Europe, and “associate mem-
bers” came from what the statutes called Extra-European countries. The former had 
the right to vote, the latter did not.102 Institutionally Europe acquired a central posi-
tion in relation to the rest of the world, not only as initial focus for activities, but also 
regarding membership. 
Over the years the IBU became the main transnational hub for broadcasting re-
lated issues. Between March 1925 and 1938-1939 the IBU grew from ten founding 
European organizations to fifty-nine active and associate members.103 Initially, the 
IBU had been “a pioneer in a new field,” but soon encountered competition from 
newly established, more specialized international organizations.104 For example the 
101 IBU, International Union of Broadcasting Organisations, 11.
102 IBU, Twenty Years, 16.
103 Eugster, Television Programming Across National Boundaries, 32.
104 Ibid.
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Comité International de la T.S.F, also known as Comité International Radioélectricité 
(CIR), established in 1922, focused on economic and legal issues. Bureau Catholique 
International de la Radiodiffusion (BCIR) was established in 1929 as the Catholic 
center for efforts relating to radio. BCIR had over thirty member nations. And fi-
nally in 1936, specialists in agriculture and rural radio initiated Centre International 
de Radiophonie Rurale (CIRR). CIRR aimed to facilitate the creation of rural broad-
casting services in countries where no such service existed, using expertise already 
acquired in other countries.105 The IBU met these other organizations at conferences 
and followed their activities with interest. Nevertheless, IBU’s ambition to deal with 
the entire set of broadcasting issues continued to ensure its status as the premier 
transnational organization in broadcasting, a position it was keen to uphold.
Conclusion
Early European broadcasting took place locally, nationally as well as internation-
ally. At first, broadcasting was a private activity typically outside the governmen-
tal sphere. National post and telegraph administrations granted the broadcasting 
concessions, and private broadcasting organizations then exploited and sometimes 
built the stations. This construction created mutual interdependencies between 
PTTs and broadcasting organizations that varied from country to country. Over 
the years, a wave of nationalization swept through Europe, which, with some ex-
ceptions, linked broadcasting more closely to national state policies. Broadcasting 
in Europe developed into different non-aligned systems. 
The moment broadcasters began to shape broadcasting, they came across is-
sues like cross-border electromagnetic interference, interactions with other sys-
tems, disturbed international relations as a result of illicit propaganda broadcasts, 
and defining the “right” international program. They recognized these issues could 
best be resolved internationally. National governments and international organi-
zations like the League of Nations and the International Telegraph Union did not 
respond adequately to the need to regulate the new medium at international level. 
They left a legislative gap. For this reason, various broadcasting organizations es-
tablished the International Broadcasting Union (IBU), which became the main 
transnational hub for broadcasting problems in Europe. 
At the outset the organization was inherently European, with only European 
members. Over the years, it extended its services beyond European confines in 
105 Huth, La radiodiffusion, 336-337.
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line with its initial desire to be a global organization. The organization pursued a 
Eurocentric type of globalism which had two-fold forms. First, the IBU’s policies 
suited a commercial European tradition of cartel capitalism based on collaboration 
and consensus seeking. Second, the broadcasting elites who established the IBU, 
believed in the European civilizing mission based on European Enlightenment 
values. 
Both forms of Eurocentrism were deeply ingrained in the IBU’s institutional 
structure and its activities. They continued to influence the practices of the IBU 
community of experts, despite substantial changes in broadcasting technology and 
organization. For example, the nationalization of broadcasting did not change the 
nature and commitment to seeking collaboration across borders. This was thanks 
to a shared tradition among experts and the fact that a very small group of broad-
casting experts occupied the key positions nationally as well as internationally. 
They defined themselves as problem solving experts who did not see any discrep-
ancy between their commercial and civilizing mission. Their position allowed 
them to negotiate decision-making procedures in the IBU with a minimum of 
nation-state interference in day-to-day affairs. 
The first issue the IBU addressed after its formation was the urgent problem of 
electromagnetic interference beyond borders. This was a sensitive topic among the 
governments of various nation-states. Very soon the experts would find they could 
not resolve this on their own. They needed the collaboration of other international 
organizations.
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Chapter 3  
Europe in the Making
Europe is crowded with neighbours 
In the world of broadcasting we are all neighbours.
 Arthur Burrows1
With the above words Arthur Burrows ended his speech before the Committee 
for Moral Disarmament during the Disarmament Conference in 1933, organized 
by the League of Nations. Burrows was Secretary General of the International 
Broadcasting Union (IBU). He addressed a committee that considered the issue 
of moral disarmament its most important task. Above all, the committee aimed 
to change what it considered a dominant mindset amongst peoples across the 
world. This was based on nationalist thinking linked to warfare and the committee 
wanted to move towards a more “internationalist” mindset that would enhance 
peace and mutual understanding. Such a change would be a necessary precon-
dition for any material disarmament leading to international peace. At commit-
tee meetings, broadcasting had come to the fore as an important instrument to 
achieve these aims. 
Burrows had been invited by the International Students Association and he 
addressed these students directly at the end of his speech. In his opinion, their 
internationally oriented training qualified them to provide a critical note to the 
broadcasting organizations in their home countries. These critical notes would 
guarantee a just use of broadcasting to achieve international rapprochement. “You 
[international students],” Burrows stated, “in time may appear before the micro-
phone in your own country and help your own people to realise the highest that 
patriotism extends beyond the State to which you are a loyal citizen, to the whole 
world to which you have been called to spend a life.”2 According to Burrows, 
1 “Address (by Secretary-General A.R. Burrows) before the Conference on ‘Moral Disarmament’ ar-
ranged by the International Students’ Associations, Geneva, April 1 1933,” 8, box 74, file Propagande de 
l’Union où des Membres, Général II, 1932/1936, IBU.
2 “Address (by Secretary-General A.R. Burrows),” 8, box 74, file Propagande, Général II, IBU.
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states were an integral part of the international world, but loyalty towards them 
also went beyond the borders of each state. “Europe is crowded with neighbours. 
In the world of broadcasting we are all neighbours,” he concluded. 
Burrows was conjuring up a Europe and a world of brotherhood between na-
tion states. This was precisely the vision the IBU had in mind for its broadcasting 
infrastructure within and beyond Europe’s borders. Although the IBU efforts to 
build such a system would dominate European broadcasting for most of the inter-
war years, other broadcasting organizations designed different systems. Stations 
like Radio Luxembourg and Radio Moscow were owned by a company and state 
respectively and specifically intended to transmit to audiences beyond their na-
tional boundaries. Chapters 3 and 4 examine how broadcasters negotiated the 
material and related organizational side of their infrastructures with their visions 
of Europe. We will explore how and why European broadcasting organizations 
fine-tuned their interests in an attempt to guarantee well-functioning broadcast-
ing. While Chapter 3 focuses on the influential broadcasting system created by the 
IBU, Chapter 4 examines the battles that arose over Europe’s borders. Other sys-
tems like Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, Vatican Radio, and Radio Luxembourg 
would challenge the standards developed by the IBU.
The present chapter focuses on the IBU efforts that initially imagine broadcast-
ing in Europe relatively freely. The process turned out to be more difficult. Not 
only did IBU members have to agree on the kind of network to build, they also had 
to find their place as newcomers in a world of established organizations like the 
International Telegraph Union (ITU) and the League of Nations. This chapter con-
centrates on IBU’s standardization efforts in wireless frequency allocation and its 
international relay activities. In the eyes of the IBU, these Europe-oriented efforts 
were two sides of the same coin. In the early 1930s, the development of short waves 
allowed for global coverage of broadcasts. The new opportunities challenged the 
European standards finding their way into the technology of broadcasting infra-
structures in Europe. Technological developments made the IBU constantly re-
think its broadcasting projects.
Invisible Interconnection 
Wireless broadcasting activities interconnected Europe invisibly. Already during 
the early years of broadcasting, the number of radio stations had grown expo-
nentially. This created considerable challenges for the slowly emerging European 
broadcasting community. In 1925 already, 87 European stations were operating 
TEHS7_handels.indd   74 5/9/2012   3:41:09 PM
 Europe in the Making 75
in the available medium waveband for broadcasting, while no fewer than 37 new 
stations were poised to start in the short run.3 As a result, broadcasters encoun-
tered increasing difficulties due to interference to their signals. Signals could be 
transmitted through the air via frequencies.4 When two radio stations transmit-
ted a signal over the same frequency, the signals clashed, and they interfered 
with each other. Audiences then heard “noise” rather than the actual broadcast. 
Moreover, if radio stations transmitted broadcasts over frequencies that lay (too) 
closely together, these broadcasts also caused interference, an electromagnetic 
disturbance of the other signal.5 Consequently, only a limited number of signals 
could be transmitted through the airwaves at any one time. Frequencies were a 
scarce resource. The new IBU members considered it their primary task to find 
a way to regulate frequencies between broadcasting stations. 
The way such frequencies were designed and allocated determined how the 
invisible side of broadcasting infrastructure projects would be achieved. Slightly 
simplified, the act of wireless broadcasting consisted of transmitting invisible elec-
tronic signals from radio stations possibly via relay stations, all the way to the re-
ceiver sets in people’s homes. Decisions about the nature of this process could not 
be made without some understanding of the way one would like to link, de-link or 
non-link society. Visions of what society should look like thus found their way into 
agreements on frequency allocation processes. 
To allocate frequencies effectively, broadcasters focused on a wide range of is-
sues. Frequency standards in particular aimed to deal with interference by ap-
pointing specific frequencies to different stations with additional strict instruc-
tions. These additional standards could entail requirements about the kind of wave, 
the power of the station, the use of (non)directional antennas, the separation in 
Herzian kilocycles per second (kc/sec) between appointed frequencies, as well as 
the number of stations in operation. Such standards determined the overall geo-
graphical reach as well as the specifics of the network. They influenced the radius 
and density of the network. For example, as a rule, music and speech transmitted 
3 The band between 550 and 270 meters. IBU, Twenty Years of Activity of the International Broadcast-
ing Union (Geneva: IBU, 1945), 17.
4 A small explanatory note on frequencies: “Waves can be described in terms of wavelength (the 
distance from peak to peak) or frequency (how many peaks move through a particular point in a given 
amount of time; 1 Hertz (Hz) = 1 cycle per second). Wavelength was most commonly used in the earliest 
days of radio. After World War I, technical experts began using frequency rather than wavelength when 
discussing official matters, since frequency could be measured more accurately.” Jennifer Spohrer, “Ruling 
the Airwaves: Radio Luxembourg and the Origins of European National Broadcasting, 1929-1950” (Ph.D. 
diss., Columbia University, 2008), 99. Though experts increasingly spoke of frequencies, they continued to 
refer to wavelength in terms of long, medium or short wave in addition to frequencies.
5 This means something else than “electrical interference”, another issue the interwar broadcasting engi-
neers discussed. Electrical interference was caused by electricity networks or railways etc. 
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over long waves could travel longer distances than over medium waves. As such, 
a long or medium wave reached listeners within a wider or narrower radius. Such 
factors enabled people deliberating frequency standards to design their broadcast-
ing infrastructure projects as they pleased and to fulfill their vision of neighbor-
hood in a variety of ways. Not surprisingly, such decisions could trigger heated 
debates on a continent with as many countries as Europe. 
Over the years, the broadcasting expert community was continually re-ne-
gotiating broadcasting projects because of the exponential growth of stations in 
Europe and the rapid developments in technology. These encouraged the various 
parties to revise their projects at regular intervals. The IBU designed so-called 
“frequency plans” that were recommendations rather than legally binding agree-
ments. In order to increase the effect of these plans and as newcomer in the inter-
national scene, the IBU sought the support of other international organizations 
like the League’s Organization for Communications and Transit (OCT) and the 
ITU. The IBU hoped that collaboration with these governmental organizations 
would facilitate the implementation of IBU recommendations into international 
agreements and national law. Only then would its frequency standards and ideas 
about European broadcasting become legally binding for all states. This section 
of Chapter 3 focuses on the negotiation of standards for allocating frequencies. 
Discussions on technical standards like the power of stations, interference, or test-
ing merely provide contextualization where necessary, for reasons of clarity. 
The IBU prioritized creating a frequency allocation agreement. To deal with the 
problem of interference, the IBU organized a European Conference of Wireless 
Engineers in Geneva in July 1925. Radio engineers and broadcasting lawyers from 
around thirteen broadcasting organizations representing some 50 stations at-
tended. These participants not only represented organizations that were already 
IBU members but also organizations that had been established shortly before, and 
would become IBU members in the future, like Polskie Radjo.6 Resolving the prob-
lems proved no easy task for the participants. They had to reorganize 87 existing 
stations and include another 37 stations in the short term within the available 
wavebands consisting of so-called medium waves between 550 and 270 meters 
and long waves between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. They soon decided to focus on 
medium waves alone for the time being. 
6 Ryszard Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem: opowiesc o Zygmuncie Chamcu – zalozycielu i pierwszym 
dyrektorze Polskiego Radia (Rzeszów; Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wyzszej Szkoly Informatyki i Zarzadzania; 
Polskie Radio, 2005), 122.
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To deal with the vast growth of stations, the IBU foresaw that it could only 
solve the problems by encouraging a spirit of cooperation among the conference 
participants. To achieve this, the opening session hosted by the League of Nations 
engendered an air of fellowship, stressing mutual European benefits above per-
sonal gain or national interests. IBU President Sir Charles Carpendale opened the 
conference. In his opening speech, he eloquently explained why there was a need 
for interactions and interrelationships between broadcasters in Europe, referring 
to the idyllic panoramic view from the League of Nations building.7 
An emission post which wishes to function in Europe as an isolated ele-
ment will be in as dangerous a situation as a person without experience 
who attempts to pass through the eternal snow on the mountains that 
surround us. Such a post would risk complete failure, diverting millions 
of people from radiotelephony and the pleasures it brings.8
Everyone needed to understand that their interests did not stop at individual ac-
tivities. BBC chief engineer Peter Eckersley who chaired the meeting, argued that 
such a plan would create “the greatest good for the greatest number of European 
listeners rather than for listeners of any particular country...”9 It would create 
peace and understanding. These agreements in turn would feed in positively to the 
various personal interests. 
The positive words during the opening session could not prevent tough ne-
gotiations over the drafted frequency plan. The engineers debated every aspect 
of the plan and did not agree on all points. Vice President of Italian broadcasting 
Marquis Solari for instance questioned why the draft plan favored large national 
broadcasting stations with a certain international standing over small broadcast-
ing stations of national importance. He submitted an alternative plan.10 While the 
7 Vice-Admiral Sir Charles D. Carpendale (1874-1968) was a minister’s son. He served in the British 
navy, becoming Rear Admiral. When he came in contact with BBC Director Sir John Reid after retiring 
from the navy in 1923, Reid offered him his deputy post of controller, a position which Carpendale filled 
until his retirement in 1938. In 1925 he became the IBU’s first President, and thanks to his friendliness, 
genius and wisdom, was reelected annually until the position was finally passed on to the Swiss Maurice 
Rambert on 26 June 1935. http://www.ocotilloroad.com/geneal/carpendale1.html. Accessed January 20, 
2009. 
8 “Un poste émetteur qui voudrait fonctionner en Europe comme élément isolé serait dans une 
situation aussi dangereuse qu’une personne sans expérience qui tenterait de franchir les neiges éternelles 
des montagnes qui nous entourent. Tel poste risquerait d’échouer complètement et de détourner des 
milliers de personnes de la radiophonie et des plaisirs qu’elle procure.” “Conférence Européenne d’ingé-
nieurs en radiophonie, Séance 6 juillet 1925,” 1, P.V. et documents complémentaires Commission Tech-
nique, 1925-1930, IBU.
9 Peter P. Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone (London: J. Cape, 1941), 87.
10 IBU archives contain no further information or discussion on this alternative plan. “International 
Union of Broadcasting Engineers: European Conference of Broadcasting Engineers, held at Geneva, First 
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Figure 3.1 – The first European Conference of Radiotelephony Engineers, July 1925
Source: “Première Conférence Européenne d’Ingénieurs en Radiophonie, juillet 1925,” box 58 
Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
documents on the Geneva Plan focus to some extent on discussions between the 
engineers, these same documents pay barely any attention to the discussions be-
tween the engineers and participating lawyers. Fifteen years later, in his memoirs, 
Eckersley remembers the fierce discussions between engineers seeking practical 
international solutions and lawyers who had to account for their national laws. 
The PTT administrations which granted broadcasting concessions depended on 
national laws and often granted the concessions with additional strict conditions 
for use. Thus these national laws could not be ignored. Eckersley recalls regularly 
losing his patience, at which moments the French engineer Raymond Braillard 
proved to be a veritable diplomat. 
Braillard’s background was electric engineering and he worked on long dis-
tance wireless telegraphy at first in France, then in Belgium. For Belgium, he de-
signed a wireless telegraph infrastructure for the Belgian Congo and created a na-
tional broadcasting service. In December 1925 he became head of the provisional 
IBU Technical Committee.11 Braillard organized the establishment of the Brussels 
Sitting,” July 6, 1925, 3, P.V. et documents complémentaires Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU.
11 Asa Briggs, “Peter Pendleton Eckersley,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biographies, 2008, http://
www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37385. Accessed November 4, 2008; Léonard Laborie, “La France, 
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Checking Center that performed day-to-day testing and control of broadcasting 
across the European continent. The center began in 1927, directed by Braillard 
himself. He continued in both these roles until the outbreak of war in 1940. 
According to Eckersley, Braillard managed to account for political implications 
underpinning technical proposals, translating “technical fact into the language of 
juridical compromise.”12 Braillard seemed to possess both the technical and diplo-
matic skills to point all concerned in the same direction, finding a balance between 
international benefits and national laws.
In between meetings in July, September and December, the draft plan was re-
worked into a “logical” formula, from which an “equal” allocation of frequencies 
could take place.13 The formula allotted the common frequencies on the basis of 
the long existence of stations and by accounting for the population of a coun-
try, its geographical area as well as the necessity to duplicate broadcasts because 
of domestic language difficulties.14 According to the plan, each country had the 
right to one exclusive wave and perhaps one or more commonly used waves. The 
plan further suggested that regrouping the stations with a separation of 20 kc/
sec would reduce interference considerably, taking care of any accidental inter-
ference.15 These decisions necessitated regular testing and evaluation of ideas. 
Consequently, each country should have a calibrated wave-meter and that country 
should transmit calibrated signals in order to “establish a standard measure for 
broadcasting.”16 Such technical, logical, and thus “honest” formulas in combina-
tion with these corresponding international standards for wireless broadcasting 
would enable an “equal” allocation of frequencies, something that the lawyers, as 
Eckersley recalled fifteen years later, could accept. 
L’Europe et l’ordre international des communications (1865-1959)” (Ph.D. diss., Université Paris IV – 
Sorbonne, 2006), 572-573.
12 Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone, 88-89.
13 “Compte rendu de la réunion tenue à Bruxelles, le 16 décembre 1925,” P.V. et documents complé-
mentaires Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU.
14 For an extensive study on the 1926 formula see the work of Nina Wormbs: Nina Wormbs, “Stan-
dardizing Early Broadcasting in Europe: A Form of Regulation,” in Bargaining Norms – Arguing Standards: 
Negotiating Technical Standards, ed. Judith Schueler, Andreas Fickers, and Anique Hommels (The Hague: 
Stichting Toekomstbeeld der Techniek, 2008), 112-120; Nina Wormbs, “‘A Simple Arithmetic Task’: 
Technopolitics in Early Frequency Planning for Broadcasting in Europe” (presented at the The NordMedia 
Conference, Karlstad, 2009); Nina Wormbs, “Invisible with Global Reach: Radio Spectrum for Broad-
casting in Europe” (presented at the the Fourth Tensions of Europe Conference, Sofia, Bulgaria, 2010). 
“Compte rendu de la réunion, 16 décembre 1925, “ 2, P.V. Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU.
15 IBU, Twenty Years, 17; Andreas Fickers, “Broadcasting as Critical Infrastructure: A Story of Euro-
pean Fine-Tuning and Techno-Political References” (presented at the Eurocrit International Workshop 
“Transnational Infrastructures: Coping with Scarcity and Vulnerability,” Stockholm, 2008), 5-7.
16 Wormbs, “Standardising Early Broadcasting in Europe,” 116.
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Both in the initial proposal and its reworked logical formula, the engineers pro-
posed to regulate the air by assigning wave lengths to European countries rather 
than broadcasting organizations. At first glance this choice might seem strange, 
because at the time, most IBU members were still private individuals with little or 
no ties to governments. Though the Geneva Plan documents give no indication, 
it is highly likely that such nation-state orientation was based on two factors. First 
of all, the concessions to broadcasting stations had been granted by their national 
PTT Administrations and were thus based on different national laws. Secondly, 
the formula simply seemed to reflect a dominant political idea of a Europe of na-
tion-states that had been developing along with the rise of nationalism during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. People thought of Europe in terms of na-
tion-states and national laws, with national administrations and forms of control. 
Thus a Geneva formula based on nation-states emerged, satisfying both political 
and technological contingencies. 
The outcome of the formula, and thus the kind of neighborhood created via 
wireless, could be influenced considerably. One could, for instance, give extra 
weight to specific variables in the formula. Such weighting would affect the num-
ber of frequencies assigned to different countries. Ideally such an option would 
give those working on the formula room to maneuver, employing the formula 
as a guideline rather than as a given. Agreement was reached that the coefficient 
in the formula relating to the economic development of countries “calculated as 
the telegraphic and telephonic traffic of the country, as shown in international 
statistics,” should for the moment have the extra weight, favoring the long exist-
ing stations as in the initial plan.17 The decision to account for the weighting in 
favor of long existing stations enabled Eckersley and Braillard to use the formula 
to their advantage. The BBC received two wavelengths more than it deserved while 
Belgium received two rather than the one wavelength it was allowed to have.18 The 
question remains to what extent the formula truly led to an unequal distribution 
of wavelengths. 
Another discussion, on what Nina Wormbs calls “the drawing of Europe’s bor-
ders” suggests a far more equal distribution of wavelengths. The conference partic-
ipants debated heatedly whether frequencies should be reserved for countries that 
still had no stations in operation. Channels for these European countries could ei-
ther be left blank for the moment, or allocated to countries with relatively well es-
tablished broadcasting stations. Eckersley reflects: “Were we to deny ourselves the 
17 Ibid., 116; “Conférence Européenne d’ingénieurs en radiophonie,” 1925-1926, P.V. et documents 
complémentaires Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU. 
18 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 119.
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use of precious wavelengths because they might be wanted in a year or ten years’ 
time? Not-very-likely.”19 There is, however, reason to believe that the Geneva Plan 
did in fact make provision for countries with no operating broadcasting station or 
who were not yet members of the IBU. Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and Turkey were such countries.20 
Moreover, the Plan included the western part of Russia that would never enter the 
IBU. The final Plan made provision for 83 exclusive wavelengths and 16 common 
wavelengths between 200 and 580 meters, on the medium waveband.21 The final 
plan therefore paid relatively equal attention to the various countries in Europe. 
Not surprisingly, given the fact that the July conference had stressed the impor-
tance of allocating frequencies in Europe, the participants decided to design the 
Geneva Plan for what they called “the European zone.” What such a zone entailed 
was far from clear in July. The initial plan accounted for the British Isles and the 
entire European continent west of Russia, even though many countries still had no 
broadcasting organization. Some months later, in December 1925, the engineers 
discussed the project for L’Europe occidentale (western Europe), wondering how 
they could account for interference from existing or projected stations in nearby 
countries or continents. The engineers suggested distinguishing between Europe, 
Asia, a northern Asia zone, a southern Asia zone, as well as an African zone, con-
tending that each zone should be divided by meridians. The chairman of the meet-
ing argued that he preferred to speak of continental zones defined by longitude 
and latitude rather than zones mondiales.22 Discussions about the exact definition 
of Europe’s boundaries became synonymous with a debate about meridians.
In the build-up to the December conference, participants and country rep-
resentatives made proposals about Europe’s boundaries. In November 1925, a 
Belgian representative proposed only integrating those European states situated 
between 10˚ West and 23˚ East of Greenwich. The European zone would then 
consist of 25 European countries excluding Russia.23 At the start of the conference, 
various proposals were circulating on the definition of longitude and latitude. 
Another proposed a European zone with boundaries extending further to the 
west and east than the Belgian proposal. This definition suggested the meridian 
19 Eckersley, The Power Behind the Microphone, 85.
20 Wormbs, “‘A Simple Arithmetic Task’: Technopolitics in Early Frequency Planning for Broadcasting 
in Europe.”
21 IBU, Twenty Years, 18.
22 “Compte rendu de la réunion, 16 décembre 1925,” 1, 3, P.V. Comité Technique, 1925-1930, IBU. 
23 “Propositions de la délégation belge concernant la répartition des stations de radiodiffusion euro-
péennes opérant sur les longueurs d’ondes de 200 à 600 m,” 9.11.25, 2, box 94 Stations à ondes longues – 
moyennes – intermédiaires, file Général, IBU. My thanks go to Nina Wormbs for making me aware of this 
document.
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7.5˚ West and 37.5˚ East of Greenwich, with an intentional exclusion of European 
Turkey.24 Such a definition would account for far more than 25 “European” coun-
tries. Whereas the proposals apparently disagreed on the western and eastern 
borders of the European zones, they agreed on Europe’s northern and southern 
borders. Everyone clearly agreed these stopped at the glaciers in the north, and 
the countries bordering the Mediterranean like Italy, Spain or Greece in the south. 
Such boundary work contained decisive implications for the number of countries 
that would fall within the European zone.
The final Geneva Plan defined the European zone as that part of Europe lying 
between meridians 7˚30 West of Greenwich and 32˚30 East of Greenwich.25 The 
definition cut off the most western parts of Ireland and Portugal, but integrated 
the most western parts of Russia as well as European Turkey. Russia formed part 
of the definition as far as its border regions were concerned. Interference could 
exist at Russia’s borders between her transmissions and those elsewhere in Europe. 
The southern border is an interesting point to consider. Whereas the definitions 
agreed to accept a meridian continuing into northern Africa, the Geneva partici-
pants regarded North African territory as some kind of empty land. Spain and 
Italy formed the veritable southern borders of Europe in 1926. The Geneva Plan 
agreed on a somewhat technically defined boundary, while their actual southern 
boundary related more to those countries that states considered part of Europe. 
In contrast to the previous definitions of Europe, the final Geneva Plan definition 
included no fewer than 29 countries. 
In order to reduce interference between stations in these 29 European coun-
tries, the drafters of the final plan approached the allocation procedure practi-
cally. Stations close in wavelength would have to lie further apart geographically. 
Stations with longer waves that traveled shorter distances and that were separated 
by some 10Khz would have to be situated at least 1000 meters apart. In contrast, 
the distance between stations with shorter wavelengths would have to be larger as 
such waves traveled further. In line with these rules, the 
actual plan was then made with a map, a thread and a box of pins. The 
thread was attached to the first pin, placed in a corner of Europe and with 
the appropriate length. It would then describe an arc on which the next 
24 “Recommendations relatives au plan de répartition des stations européennes de radio-diffusion 
fonctionnant sur des longueurs d’ondes de 200 à 600 METRES (Ondes extrèmes exclues); présenté par la 
conférence d’ingénieurs, réunie à Bruxelles a la demande de l’Union Internationale de Radiophonie,” Dec. 
1925, 1, box 94 Stations à ondes longues – moyennes – intermédiaires, file Général, IBU.
25 “Note on the proposed plan for the allocation of wavelengths between the European Broadcasting 
Stations working on waves between 200m. and 600m,” 12.12.25, 4, box 94 Stations à ondes longues – moy-
ennes – intermédiaires, file Général, IBU. 
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Figure 3.2 – The European wireless network, 200-600m, March 1, 1926 
Source: Box 94, Stations à ondes longues-moyennes-intermédiaires, IBU. Used by the courtesy of 
the European Broadcasting Union.
wavelength could be placed. The procedure would then be repeated from 
there until all pins, representing radio stations, had been placed on the 
map.26 
After submitting the Geneva Plan to the various PTT administrations, these then 
put it into force in November 1926. In spite of the nonbinding character of the 
plan, most broadcasting organizations and PTT administrations accepted it with 
its inherent projection of Europe.
Within months the IBU came up with the idea for an international broadcast-
ing statute. Such statute would provide an international legislative basis for its re-
cent work on frequency allocations. The League’s OCT had followed closely the 
European conference of broadcasting engineers and attended several sessions. It 
26 Nina Wormbs, “Technology-Dependent Commons: The Example of Frequency Spectrum for Broad-
casting in Europe in the 1920s,” International Journal of the Commons (submitted): 5.
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became clear that the IBU and the League, as IBU President Carpendale put it, 
“are directly related by their mutual interests.”27 OCT member Robert Haas argued 
similarly that the main difference was that the IBU pursued the same ideas of 
cooperation and solidarity but mainly within the technical domain.28 The League 
was delighted to see the work of the Union progressing and Haas pronounced 
that “in every way that we can, and without interfering with your strict and nec-
essary independence, we will help you with all our means.”29 The IBU took the 
invitation quite literally. In the first half of 1926, the IBU officially approached the 
League of Nations on behalf of all its members to discuss an international statute 
for Radiotelephony. At the time, radiotelephony was the official technical term for 
the act of broadcasting. An international statute should free the way for creating a 
proper “international” space for wireless broadcasting.
The League’s OCT quickly drew the IBU request for an international stat-
ute for Radiotelephony into its own sphere of interest.30 The committee invited 
IBU Secretary General Arthur Burrows to expand upon the idea. In his address, 
Burrows reflected on the complexity and extraordinary pace at which broadcast-
ing was diffusing across Europe. With such challenges ahead, the IBU would be 
incapable on its own of assuring efficiently working broadcasting. Governments 
should take the necessary legislative and administrative action. Though frequen-
cies formed an important aspect of such wireless activities, an international statute 
needed to encompass other aspects of broadcasting, Burrows maintained. It should 
also include international regulation to prevent potential misuse of the medium 
by those who did not support the League’s values of peace, understanding, and 
collaboration. An international statute with government support would resolve 
all broadcasting related problems and enable a more rigid control of broadcasting, 
27 “La radiophonie et la Société des Nations sont étroitement liées par leurs besoins mutuels.” “Confé-
rence Européenne d’ingénieurs, 6 juillet 1925,” 2, P.V. Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU.
28 “Conférence Européenne d’ingénieurs en radiophonie, 6 juillet 1925,” 2-3, P.V. Commission Tech-
nique, 1925-1930, IBU. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume I: The Birth 
of Broadcasting (Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press, 1961), 282.
29 “…dans toute la mésure où nous le pourrons et sans toucher en rien à votre stricte indépendance 
nécessaire, nous vous aiderons de toutes nos forces.” “Conférence Européenne d’ingénieurs en radiopho-
nie, 6 juillet 1925,” 3, P.V. Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU.
30 Initially the IBU proposed the League to discuss the idea with another League Committee, the 
International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation (ICIC).The ICIC mainly dealt with cultural and 
scientific questions, something the IBU considered to fit well with the other broadcasting activities beyond 
frequency allocations. Whereas the ICIC showed little interest in broadcasting in 1926, the OCT argued 
that a statute to control radiotelephony fell within its own sphere of interest. The IBU could not but accept 
discussing such an international statute with OCT. “l’urgence qu’il y a à établir des statuts internationaux 
pour le contrôle de la radiophonie.” “Annexe D. du rapport du Directeur, Extraits du procès verbal de la 
9ième oct. 1926,” Série 310, 1-2, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section des Communications et du Tran-
sit, Général, 1927-1930, IBU.
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resulting in fewer incidents. Burrows clearly called for an international statute that 
was nothing more than a legislative extension of all the activities the IBU was 
working on already. The League was merely a means to an end. 
Burrows’ idea entailed more than an international agreement supported by 
national governments alone. He explicitly urged the deliberate exclusion and 
control of other groups of broadcasters. He was referring to those “broadcasters” 
who mostly operated locally outside the sphere of the IBU: the wireless amateurs. 
Burrows specified he did not oppose amateur research in itself, but argued that 
these activities should be integrated in the international statute to allow for close 
control of amateur broadcasting activities. Though from a technical viewpoint 
“private research might lead to great progress in broadcasting…it was more and 
more obvious that a great number of persons to whom licenses had been granted 
for the establishment of low-power transmitting stations were not carrying out 
serious research work.”31 Moreover, these people were unaware that their broad-
casting activities “not only hindered the experiment of genuine research workers 
but also interfered with broadcasting from wireless stations.”32 Apparently amateur 
activities now interfered with the work of the IBU and its attempts to establish a 
Brussels Checking Center that in the near future would perform measurements in 
wireless interference. With that made clear, Burrows pleaded to control the ama-
teurs at the very moment they were granted a concession. Broadcasting by this 
group hindered, or would even annul the good work of the League of Nations in 
the end, Burrows stressed dramatically.33 
Burrows thus turned in a proposal to the League of Nations with a very par-
ticular vision of an international organization for broadcasting. He argued in favor 
of an international worldwide statute. This should not merely foster collabora-
tion between nation-states, but rather be an agreement encompassing a wide di-
versity of actors, from governments, PTT administrations, and private as well as 
state owned broadcasting organizations, to amateur clubs and individual wireless 
amateurs. Burrows thus advocated an international agreement being concluded 
and supported by what this study calls a transnational community of broadcasting 
experts. Although it might not seem to feature at all in this proposal, Europe was 
in fact at the heart of this entire idea. Burrows felt that such a statute should be 
31 LoN, Commission Consultative et Technique des Communications et du Transit, Procès-Verbal de 
la 9ième session, tenue à Genève, 12 au 17 juillet 1926, LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 
1926), 45, box 17, file Désarmement moral et propagande inadmissible, Général I, jusqu’à 1928, IBU.
32 LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1926), 45.
33 For an excellent account on the discovery of radio broadcasting see: Hugh G.J. Aitken, Syntony and 
Spark: The Origins of Radio (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); Susan Douglas, Inventing American 
Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). 
TEHS7_handels.indd   85 5/9/2012   3:41:11 PM
86 Europe – On Air
nothing more than an official confirmation of the IBU’s own recommendations. 
Since the IBU was merely a European organization, Burrows in reality imagined a 
European oriented statute for transnational broadcasting activities to be adopted 
by organizations outside the European zone. 
 After some discussion the OCT decided not to do anything about an interna-
tional statute for Radiotelephony. The committee opposed in particular Burrows’ 
comments about amateurs, since this particular group had been responsible for 
actually discovering broadcasting as well as a very simple wireless broadcasting 
transmission system. According to OCT member Mr. Stiévenard, “[i]t would be 
contrary to the objects of the Committee to support any action designed to re-
strict efforts which might promote a science still in its infancy, but calculated to 
produce enormous improvements in the means of communication open to man-
kind, the very raison d’être of the Committee.”34 Moreover, he thought that refus-
ing concessions would only encourage the growth of clandestine stations, which 
should be prevented at all cost.35 The OCT decided to adjourn the entire issue to 
be discussed at a later date. The committee recalled the longstanding expertise of 
the International Telegraph Union with respect to wireless questions, and the still 
young status of radiotelephony technology. The IBU clearly lacked national and 
international recognition as an expert organization in the field of broadcasting. 
The IBU idea was wiped off the table.
Other disappointments followed in Washington and Brussels in 1927 and 1928. 
Continuous changes in the status quo and complexity of broadcasting required a 
revision of the Geneva Plan within two years. Even though the Plan had proven 
relatively successful, with some 80% of European broadcasters deciding to comply, 
some 20% had chosen not to. The increasing complexity of the problem as well 
as the non-compliance by part of the IBU community continued to challenge the 
creation of an international frequency plan for broadcasters in Europe. The IBU 
Technical Committee stressed the urgency for its members to comply with and 
participate in these plans. As consolation, it stressed that these plans be seen as 
“an integrated set of amicable arrangements between the various radiotelephony 
organizations and it should be, in no case, a rigid and definitive plan satisfying all 
conditions of whatever era.”36 The urgency for such a new plan became even more 
34 LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1926), 46.
35 Ibid., 45-46.
36 “Il convient d’insister sur ce que tout plan de complaisance répartition doit être considéré comme 
une intégrale d’arrangements amiables entre les différents organismes de radiophonie et ne saurait être, 
en aucun cas, un plan rigide et définitif satisfaisant à toutes les conditions de n’importe quelle époque.” 
“Rapport de la Commission Technique au Conseil,” Série 1268, 20 fév. 1929, 2, box 80ter, file Rapports 
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acute due to the outcome of the International Radio-communications conference 
in Washington organized on behalf of the ITU by the United States in 1927.
The Washington Conference became a decisive turning point for the way 
broadcasters could conceive their organization of broadcasting. This event in 
1927 was the first time ITU integrated broadcasting in its activities. The previous 
conference in London in 1912 had featured telegraphy and early telephony stan-
dards such as maritime communications. The conference in Washington would 
have to take into account an immense development both in radiotelephony and 
radio broadcasting.37 The IBU described the situation in Washington as one com-
plicated “by a set of technical, political, and economic factors,” in which it for the 
first time could negotiate frequency bands for broadcasting with the other means 
of telecommunications.38 The ITU decided to establish the International Radio-
electricity Consultative Committee (CCIR) that would consult the ITU on radio-
electricity questions of any kind in the future. 
Another important turning point concerned the allocation of wavebands be-
tween technologies rather than between countries. Conference participants ne-
gotiated the best options to allocate the available wavebands between the various 
means of communication. With this vast extension of wireless technologies, the 
United States proposed that wavebands and ranges of frequencies be allocated 
among wireless technologies. European participants on the other hand, favored 
an allocation of bands between countries. One country would then be assigned a 
waveband that it could arrange according to its own interests between the various 
wireless technologies it employed. The idea of organization by country evolved in 
line with Europe’s late nineteenth century development of nationalism and state-
centered organization of most wireless technologies. Nonetheless, the conference 
ultimately decided to follow the U.S. model.39 Consequently, broadcasting was as-
signed several specific wave bands that still had to be allocated among broadcast-
ing organizations in the various regions. Washington decided that regional agree-
ments were acceptable for dealing with the allocation of frequencies.
The outcome of the Washington Conference was a disappointment for the 
European broadcasting society and for the IBU. On the first occasion when broad-
casting was taken into account during a globally important conference on wireless, 
the new medium immediately had to succumb to other wireless applications. In 
Généraux de la Commission Technique au Conseil à fin 1931, IBU.
37 “Commission Mixte (Conférence de Madrid) Rapport provisoire de la commission mixte concer-
nant les amendements à apporter à La Convention de Washington (1927) et à règlement générale annexe,” 
Série 2291, 5 janv. 1931, 3, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN.
38 “Commission Mixte,” Série 2291, 3, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN.
39 Wormbs, “Invisible with Global Reach,” 5-6.
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compliance with the Geneva Plan, broadcasters could continue using the 545 to 
200 meters (500 – 1,500 kc/sec to 550 – 1,500 kc/sec) band, with the exception 
of the 200 meter band. They were however severely limited in the band between 
1,875 and 1,314 meters. The only positive outcome was that Washington finally 
set legal specifications for the long wavebands for broadcasting.40 This reduction 
of available wavelengths together with the vastly increasing complexity of the 
European problem made the IBU organize the drafting of a new frequency plan by 
its engineers immediately. This new Brussels Plan went into effect in January 1928. 
The new plan sought to improve the vastly deteriorating situation in the 
European airwaves. In 1927 the IBU had started preparing a follow-up meeting 
for engineers to work on a new plan. They designed a plan that as much as pos-
sible corrected for technological developments in transmission power, an enor-
mous increase in the number of low power stations, and improved frequency mea-
surement that enabled separation between frequencies of less than 20 kc/sec. In 
contrast with the Geneva Plan, the new plan reduced the space between the waves 
above 300 meters to some 9 kc/sec, while the majority of the common waves above 
250 meters became exclusive waves.41 Geographically, the Brussels Plan applied 
to a smaller European zone than the Geneva Plan, bordering Russia in the east.42 
Furthermore, the allocation of exclusive waves between stations did not change 
substantially. Changes in the density of the European wireless network mostly 
happened with commonly used waves, a development that had little effect on the 
shape of the overall network. With the exception of a smaller European zone, the 
difference between the Geneva and the Brussels Plan was relatively slight.
Despite the relative similarity of the two plans, the Brussels Plan failed to gain 
ground. The absence of government officials and PTT Administrations turned the 
Brussels meeting into a rather weak extract of the Geneva Plan. Director of the 
IBU Technical Committee Raymond Braillard at some point even reported to the 
Council:
The Technical Committee does its best to heal the situation, but we can 
only act in the limits of our possibilities and call upon the goodwill of our 
members. We try to convince by the power of technical arguments, which 
reveals often successful. But what can a doctor do if the patient refuses to 
take the remedy that has been prescribed? Isn’t it a fact that a few trouble 
40 George A. Codding, The International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International 
Cooperation (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 122.
41 IBU, Twenty Years, 19-20.
42 “Rapport de la Commission Technique au Conseil,” Série 1268, 3, box 80ter, file Rapports Généraux, 
IBU.
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makers can rain on someone’s parade? And they of all people lament most 
strongly of being troubled.43
The problem with the Brussels Plan was that right after the Brussels meetings, 
other developments took over. At the Washington Conference the Czechoslovak 
PTT Administration promised to organize a regional conference in Prague to draft 
a plan for allocating the available wavebands for broadcasting in Europe.44 The de-
cision about this so-called Prague Conference was reached during the conference 
of the ITU, which had only recently decided to integrate frequency allocation into 
its sphere of interest. The decision was made without consulting the IBU. Both the 
disastrous outcome for wireless broadcasting in Washington and the new player in 
the field of frequency allocation in the form of the ITU, made the IBU increasingly 
aware of the need to gain international recognition for its activities. It had to firmly 
establish itself as the main European expert organization in broadcasting. 
In 1928 the IBU made plans for a central broadcasting organization. After the 
failed proposal for an international statute for Radiotelephony, the IBU again ap-
proached the League of Nations for international support. Quite unexpectedly, 
the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 opened up new prospects for in-
ternational collaboration, providing a breakthrough for the IBU to collaborate 
with other international organizations. The Pact had eased international tensions 
considerably. International elites felt more confident to collaborate internation-
ally, and the League’s idea to further peace through increased interconnectedness 
and collaboration gained more widespread recognition.45 To further this positive 
end that would ultimately lead to the famous Briand Memorandum of September 
1929, the League’s OCT decided to address the organization of frequency alloca-
tions in 1928. 
When the IBU approached the League, it initially requested its OCT try and 
put the political misuse of broadcasting on the League Assembly’s agenda. When 
the OCT discussed the request internally, it decided that such a political issue was 
not a topic for a technical committee like the OCT. Canadian OCT member, Mr. 
Dunning, nevertheless disagreed. In his view, the technical aspect of the issue was 
part of the OCT’s remit. Dunning argued that a country like Canada experienced 
interference, not of a political but of a technical nature. People should be able 
43 Quote translated by Fickers, “Broadcasting as Critical Infrastructure,” 8. From “Raymond Braillard, 
Rapport de la réunion de la Commission Technique à Lausanne,” 3, box 80ter, file Rapports Généraux de la 
Commission Technique au Conseil, à fin 1931, IBU.
44 Wormbs, “Invisible with Global Reach,” 6; Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 93-94.
45 Bo Stråth, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse,” in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, 
ed. Bo Stråth (Brussels; New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2000), 15.
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to communicate without interference of radio waves from neighboring countries. 
Here, he proposed, lay a task for OCT since such technical interference could af-
fect international peace. Independent of the IBU request, Dunning proposed the 
League arrange some sort of international convention to resolve technical inter-
ference. OCT director Haas supported Dunning and referred to the good work of 
the IBU. Haas, however, felt it would be too premature to devise an international 
convention on frequencies, given the vast developments in broadcasting technol-
ogy. He adjourned the meeting.
Dunning did not relinquish his idea. A few days later he argued that he consid-
ered it more and more apparent that an international convention was necessary if 
“national liberty in broadcasting was to be assured, particularly in countries adja-
cent to each other.”46 It was a matter of international arrangement in the interest 
of international goodwill and securing a national neighborhood. Such agreement 
would affect the sovereignty of states regarding their domestic broadcasting activi-
ties. Dunning’s plea proved effective. The OCT decided to “discover some means 
of establishing international agreement to ensure an equitable distribution of wire-
less wave-lengths among the various countries, in order to diminish the probabil-
ity of disturbance in wireless broadcasting.”47 An international convention would 
ensure the firm national roots of broadcasting within the broader international 
focus of the League. The OCT decided that an international convention portraying 
a global world of nation-states would be beneficial at national level too.
The League’s idea for an international convention opened up debates on other 
ways of dealing with interference. OCT invited the director of the ITU Bureau, 
Dr. Raëber as well as IBU Secretary General Burrows to the first meeting of its 
newly established Committee for the Distribution of Wavelengths. The meeting 
hosted the discussion of a possible international agreement that assured an equal 
allocation of frequencies and a reduction of troubles with respect to radiotele-
phony.48 Burrows immediately took the opportunity to express his concern about 
the Washington agreements and explained that the IBU had “recently produced 
a new European wave-plan by which it is hoped to make the best of what is an 
unfortunate state of affairs for the broadcasting services, which can do so much 
46 LoN, “Second Committee, 1928 Assembly, Minutes of the Eighth meeting, held at Geneva, Septem-
ber 19 1928,” LoN doc. ser., A.II/P.V.8, 3, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section des Communications et 
du Transit, Général, 1927-1930, IBU.
47 LoN, Organization for Communications and Transit, Report on the work of the organisation 
between the Eighth and Ninth ordinary Session of the Assembly, September 20 1928, LoN doc. ser., 
A.73.1928.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 1928), 3, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section des Communications et 
du Transit, Général, 1927-1930, IBU. 
48 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1929, 190.
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towards increasing mutual respect between nations.”49 With such an unfortunate 
state of affairs, Burrows argued, the time was right to create a Central Broadcasting 
Authority. 
This Authority would be a newly established international institution with 
which the IBU could collaborate in order to make legally binding decisions relat-
ing to all nations. “It is not difficult to envisage,” Burrows stated, “that in the near 
future special codes of international law will have to be created to regulate these 
problems.”50 He argued that all broadcasting related organizations and all nation-
states would need to accept the decisions of such a global organization. Europe did 
not feature in this vision though it hovered in the background just like when the 
idea for an international statute for Radiotelephony was raised two years earlier.
The League, the IBU, and the ITU reached stalemate almost immediately when 
ITU director Raëber rejected the idea. The ITU had been organizing the allocation 
of frequencies to great satisfaction for years already and saw no need for League 
interference. The ITU could deal with the issue along similar lines to those it used 
for wireless telegraphy and telephony. In response, the League pointed out that 
the international problems of broadcasting concerned more than frequency ques-
tions alone and included copyright issues for instance. Thus the League supported 
some kind of broadcasting authority. Seelinger, the chair of the meeting pondered 
philosophically: 
Was the distribution of wave-lengths a purely technical problem? Did its 
effects reach far beyond the technical domain? Were the present organisa-
tions capable of settling the problem, once its scope had been defined? 
The greatest diversity of opinion on these subjects was quite legitimate at 
present. In any case, the speaker was sure that everyone agreed that the 
problem was both far-reaching and complex, and that the League could 
not dissociate itself from its various aspects.51
The idea of a Central Broadcasting Authority seems to have been too “big” and too 
complex to be decided at such short notice. The problems with technical interfer-
ence were too pressing to await a solution. 
The Prague Conference signified the breakthrough many had been waiting for. 
49 LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, Procès-Verbal of the 
Thirteenth Session held at Geneva, March 15th to 23rd, 1929, LoN doc. ser., C.216.M.81.1929.VIII (Ge-
neva: LoN, 1929), 37, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section des Communications et du Transit, Général, 
1927-1930, IBU.
50 LoN doc. ser., C.216.M.81.1929.VIII, 36.
51 Ibid., 39.
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When the Czechoslovak PTT organized the intergovernmental European Radio-
electric Conference in Prague in April 1929, it invited the IBU as expert orga-
nization to advise. This Conference officially brought together for the first time 
European PTT administrations and broadcasting organizations to discuss issues 
of frequency allocation for broadcasting. It had a more official character than the 
meeting organized by the IBU in Brussels. The new Prague Plan, unlike the 1927 
Washington Convention, did not have the status of a legally binding treaty. As 
planned, the participants nevertheless managed to work the plan into a form of re-
gional amendment to the Washington Convention. This Convention had stressed 
the option for regional allotments without specifying either the definition of a 
“region” or the form of agreement. Consequently, participants had a fair amount 
of freedom with the design.52 In Prague the IBU and the ITU managed to resolve 
technical interference issues in a manner that could be realized in the short term. 
The most important achievement of the Prague Conference was the way the 
IBU, the ITU, and the European PTT administrations arranged their collaboration 
concerning the allocation of frequencies. They decided to strengthen the official 
ties between the organizations, arranging a strict task division that secured effec-
tive frequency allocation plans. All parties accepted the IBU as the official inter-
national expert. As primus inter parus, the IBU would advise the ITU and PTT 
administrations on all questions related to broadcasting. Final decision power 
still remained with the ITU and PTT administrations, but in the meantime, they 
would be allowed to attend all IBU meetings as observers. Those PTT administra-
tions that operated a radio station could now become ordinary IBU members as 
well. These decisions strengthened the role of PTT administrations in an organi-
zation like the IBU and the official character of frequency allocation discussions 
of any kind.53 Shortly afterwards, the IBU amended its statutes and changed its 
official name from Union International de Radiophonie into Union International 
de Radiodiffusion, to clarify the task division between the IBU and the ITU. These 
decisions would influence profoundly any future options to conceive projects for 
European broadcasting.
These new ties could not prevent difficult negotiations over a new frequency 
plan in Prague. Within three years IBU membership had more than doubled and 
the Prague Plan would have to anticipate this large growth. The participation of 
many new members challenged the position of long-term well-established orga-
nizations like the BBC, the German RRG and French broadcasters. New broad-
casting organizations could now actively defend their own interests, having a 
52 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 129-132.
53 IBU, Twenty Years, 23-24.
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right to vote on the final plan.54 In particular, small members questioned the old 
Geneva formula that in their view overvalued industry size. Finland, for instance, 
encouraged emphasis on geographical size, whereas multilingual countries like 
Czechoslovakia urged emphasis on the number of languages and political par-
ties.55 The relative shift in the balance of power might have been smaller than it 
seemed. Several small and relatively new broadcasting stations had already been 
involved in the 1926 Geneva negotiations.56 Czechoslovakia, for instance, had al-
ready participated actively in the founding meetings of the IBU, whereas the Polish 
delegate had joined in the Geneva frequency discussions before Poland even had 
its own broadcasting station on air.57 New rights to vote changed negotiations 
somewhat. They contributed to the complexity of the negotiations between more 
varied groups of stakeholders.
The Prague Conference might actually be regarded as a success for the IBU. At 
the opening meeting, most PTT administrations agreed to take the IBU Brussels 
Plan as the point of departure for discussion. The final plan was merely an adapta-
tion of the previous Brussels Plan.58 The Prague Plan extended the separation as 
defined in the Brussels Plan by 9 kc/sec to the bands below 300 meters, making the 
European broadcasting space more efficient, and allocated both medium and long 
waves. For the first time the plan included all East European broadcasting stations, 
moving the Eastern meridian as discussed in Geneva in 1926, from 32˚30 to 40˚30 
East of Greenwich.59 Almost all European governments accepted the Prague Plan. 
It reflected a European zone extending further eastwards and a vision of neighbor-
hood on a more equal footing between smaller and larger broadcasting organiza-
tions, from west to east and north to south.
Shortly after the realization of the Prague Plan, the vast growth of broadcasting 
in Europe immediately challenged not only the plan itself but the IBU organiza-
tion as a whole. Soon each European country possessed its own, and often na-
tionalized, broadcasting service. IBU membership grew with 24 new broadcasting 
organizations to a total of 66 members between 1929 and 1934. Compared to 123 
transmission stations in 1926 with an aggregate power of 116kw, by 1939 there 
54 Ibid., 16.
55 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 122.
56 Ibid.
57 Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem, 122; IBU, “Conférence européenne d’ingenieurs en radiophonie (Salle 
E.) Palais des Nations, Genève, 6&7 juillet 1925, Disposition des places,” Série 16, registry file 14, box 
R-1139, file 43391/28231, jacket 1, LoN.
58 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 128.
59 BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Radioélectrique européenne de Prague 1929 (Berne: BUIT, 1929), 
142; IBU, Twenty Years, 22.
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Figure 3.3 –Technical development of the European wireless network, 1920-1933 
Source: IBU, Memorandum on the present situation of European broadcasting from the point of view of interfer-
ence, and the best means by which this may be remedied (Brussels 1932), 15.
were 463 transmission stations with an aggregate power of no less than 11,750kw.60 
Compared to the early years, by the late 1920s growth was more and more the 
result of an increase in transmission power rather than an increase in the number 
of stations (Figure 3.3).61 As a result of these changes, the IBU had to cope with a 
large growth in “meetings, conferences, and newly founded sub-commissions of 
both the juridical and programme committee.”62 The IBU extended its Brussels 
Checking Center to ensure the Prague Plan could be carried out. Collaborating 
with the ITU, the Checking Center distributed its control measurements as a kind 
of “soft power” to all broadcasting stations and European PTT administrations. 
Thus everybody could see who adhered to the plan and who did not. All these 
provisional measures proved to be an inadequate response to the vast changes. The 
Prague Plan would have to be adapted. What is more, the medium of broadcasting 
was also in dire need of a larger frequency band.
60 IBU, Twenty Years, 23, 49.
61 Arno Huth, La radiodiffusion: Puissance mondiale (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1937), 40.
62 Fickers, “Broadcasting as Critical Infrastructure,” 10.
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Under the Spanish sun, broadcasters reached political consent. Gathering in Madrid, 
with the Washington Convention disaster fresh in their minds, the European broad-
casting community meticulously prepared to defend the extension of the wavebands 
assigned to broadcasting at the Fourth International Radio Telegraphic Conference 
in Madrid in September 1932. The IBU created a special “Mixed Committee” to 
prepare an official report containing recommendations for the Madrid government 
representatives and national plenipotentiaries.
The Mixed Committee was an inter-organizational collaboration of IBU mem-
bers from the Council, Technical, and Legal Committees along with representa-
tives from ITU and national PTT administrations. Together they produced a report 
proposing specific technical standards to resolve problems of stability and conti-
nuity of transmission, defining “interference,” and the reduction of transmission 
power as well as the geographical distribution of stations. These standards would 
increase an efficient employment of wavebands for broadcasting.63 The report de-
tailed the grounds for a considerable expansion of the available wavebands for 
broadcasting. The wavebands assigned by Washington fell short considering the 
growth of broadcasting in recent years. Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Greece, 
Italy, Austria, and Portugal needed a long wave frequency to create a nation-wide 
broadcasting service. 
Besides emphasizing the facilitation of national broadcasting, the Mixed 
Committee urged an accurate definition of Europe. They said Europe would also 
have to include “the non-European territories touching the Mediterranean and 
the Black Seas, as well as the African Atlantic North of the 30˚ parallel.”64 Though 
these territories had come under the 1926 Geneva and 1929 Prague definitions 
of Europe, the Mixed Committee meetings were the first time technical experts 
in the field of broadcasting specified a southern border reaching beyond coun-
tries bordering the Mediterranean like Italy and Spain. The committee argued that 
this definition would reduce rising inter-continental interference between broad-
casting services worldwide and between broadcasting transmissions and those of 
other telecommunication means operating in the same wavebands in other parts 
of the world. The inter-organizational committee argued that integrating these 
recommendations in the Madrid Convention would improve broadcasting on a 
global scale.
63 “Commission Mixte,” Série 2291, 2, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN.
64 “les territoires non européens touchant à la Mer Méditerranée, à la Mer Noire, ainsi qu’à la côte Atlan-
tique de l’Afrique située au Nord du 30ème parallèle.” Ibid., 9.
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Over a period of 14 weeks, some 80 governments and 85 broadcasting organi-
zations together with a League of Nations observer negotiated their broadcasting 
interests with a special role for the Mixed Committee Report. The final Madrid 
Convention was an improvement compared to the failure of the 1927 Washington 
Convention. Although the conference did not validate all the Mixed Committee 
recommendations, it did decide to enlarge the waveband for broadcasting by 41 
kc/sec. This allowed for an increasing number of frequencies and thus an increas-
ing number of nation-wide broadcasting services. The conference officially ap-
pointed the IBU as international broadcasting expert to modify the existing Prague 
Plan on the basis of this new waveband. The conference modified the statutes of 
the ITU, integrating a name change to “International Telecommunication Union” 
that symbolized ITU’s terrain expanding beyond telegraphy alone. The Madrid 
Conference clearly attached value to the medium of broadcasting. 
Above all, the Madrid Conference officially defined “Europe.” To reduce global 
interference, the 1932 Convention defined the European Region “in the north and 
in the west by the natural boundaries of Europe, in the east by the meridian 40º 
East of Greenwich and in the south by the parallel 30º North, so as to include 
the western part of the U.S.S.R., and the territories bordering the Mediterranean, 
except parts of Arabia and Hejaz which are included in this sector.”65 Nowadays 
Arabia and Hejaz are part of Saudi Arabia. The definition was mostly a one-by-one 
adoption of the European one accepted at the Prague Conference in 1929. 
The conference accepted the Mixed Committee proposal to change the de-
scription of the southern borders of Europe.66 The new phrase in the definition 
indicates a change in the European broadcasting engineers’ mentality. Although 
the Geneva Plan had already defined the southern boundary as the parallel 30º 
North continuing into the northern territories of Africa, in reality they were work-
ing with the southern political boundaries of Europe that stopped at the southern 
borders of Spain and Italy. The Madrid definition explicitly integrated all countries 
bordering the Mediterranean, allowing transmission signals to fade away into the 
Sahara in the south. This led to wireless experts increasingly making a technical 
concept of European boundaries more important than a political one. Overall, 
the Madrid Convention legalized the achievements of the Prague Conference and 
integrated the IBU’s technical advice.
The 1933 Luzern Conference further solidified frequency allocation. The IBU orga-
nized this European Conference of Wireless Broadcasters to re-arrange the Prague 
65 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 157, footnote 113.
66 “Commission mixte,” Série 2291, 9, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN.
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Plan into a new plan including the decisions made in Madrid. In preparation, broad-
casting organizations from 26 countries together with 25 European telegraph ad-
ministrations had drafted the allocation plan based on the IBU Prague Plan, which 
facilitated discussion considerably. The conference also statutorily laid down even 
closer bonds between (inter)national telecommunications and the IBU. The IBU 
agreed that delegates from PTT administrations as well as the ITU Bureau could 
participate actively in all IBU meetings. The IBU even went one step further and 
agreed that when administrations instructed the IBU to organize proposals for fu-
ture conferences, the representatives of the administrations had the right to vote. 
Frequency allocation activities became more and more formal. Unlike the Prague 
Plan, the participation of Government plenipotentiaries gave the Luzern Plan a le-
gally binding character for all parties. The plan went into force on January 15, 1934.67 
Though the overall organization of the IBU continued to be non-governmen-
tal, Luzern increased government influence, and thus national influence, over the 
material infrastructure activities of the Union. An increasing number of broad-
casting organizations become government controlled, and the more official ties 
between the administrations, the ITU, and the IBU, influenced government con-
trol over IBU frequency allocation activities. In the course of eight years, the initial 
European broadcasting society had grown in number and diversity. The fine-tun-
ing activities had resulted in a European wireless network in which the imagined 
nation-wide wireless broadcasting infrastructures formed a firm standard within 
legally binding international conventions. 
Though these early frequency standard negotiations focused on wireless 
broadcasting in Europe, “Europe” remained surprisingly absent, apart from the 
occasional quibbling about the meridians defining its boundaries. Whereas most 
discussions focused on “nationality” and “internationality”, Europe’s boundaries 
changed from a political vision in 1926 to a more technically inspired vision by 
1932. The negotiations on frequency standards show a firm dominating role of the 
nation-state in these transnational Europe-centered efforts. Though the vast na-
tionalization of broadcasting from 1927 onwards explains nation-wide broadcast-
ing, this does not explain the privately owned broadcasting pioneers’ deliberate 
choice in 1925 to concentrate on frequency allocations between countries rather 
than between organizations. Their choice suggests a historical path-dependency 
with late nineteenth century developments in wireless telegraphy and a little later 
with wireless telephony, something which should be examined in relation to rising 
nationalism during the second half of the nineteenth century.
67 IBU, Twenty Years, 25-26.
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The national focus of the European wireless network formed part of a grander 
and explicitly “internationalist” scale.68 Nation-wide wireless services should pre-
vent interference and be complemented by another part of the infrastructure, an 
international relay network. The IBU wanted to build a relay network that would 
allow broadcasters to exchange high quality music internationally across borders. 
So the IBU chose to organize the European wireless network in such a way that the 
national was an inherent component of the international. These activities appear 
to be independent. In reality they were two sides of the same coin. Together they 
formed a European broadcasting network based on the idea of neighborhood and 
collaboration.
Wiring a Continent
Broadcasters wired the European continent in the interwar period. Already in 
1925 the emerging European broadcasting society imagined broadcasting far be-
yond the level of the nation-state. They argued that national wireless networks 
should be complemented by a system allowing for the international exchange of 
local and national programs as well as joint international programs that furthered 
mutual understanding and rapprochement between peoples. To their dismay, in 
1925 the status quo of broadcasting technology turned out to be far from effec-
tive and could not enable their projected high quality transmissions of music and 
speech on a Europe-wide scale. Programs should be able to include “high culture” 
and high quality music like symphony concerts. This genre, however, required 
very broad Herzian frequency ranges compared to other types of music, especially 
in respect of ordinary speech. Whereas the European wireless network lacked the 
power to allow people to listen in over long distances without annoying back-
ground noise, the technology of short wave transmissions was still in its infancy 
in the mid-1920s.69 The IBU had to find other solutions to achieve high quality 
broadcasts across the European continent.
The IBU found its solution in the developing long-distance telephone networks 
that relayed music on a regular basis in Europe, the United States, and Canada. 
Broadcasting organizations like the American CBS and NBC employed telephone 
68 For extensive studies on the allocation of frequencies during the interwar years see: Fickers, 
“Broadcasting as Critical Infrastructure”; Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves”; Wormbs, “Standardising Early 
Broadcasting in Europe.”
69 Huth, La radiodiffusion, 39-41; Trevor I. Williams, A History of Technology: Vol VII The Twentieth 
Century c. 1900 to c. 1950 Part II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 1255.
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cables on a daily basis to diffuse programs between their radio stations.70 CBS and 
NBC created the programs in their national studios. They relayed them via dedi-
cated telephone lines to the many local stations that had joined their networks. 
These local stations in turn could broadcast the programs over their own local 
frequencies, assuring a nation-wide reception of the program.71 British, German, 
and Swedish IBU members had also adopted the practice of relaying music over 
their long distance telephone networks across their countries. They could relay 
programs from one station to another over a maximum of 700 kilometers at night 
without the technical defects that occurred by broadcasting via wireless over simi-
lar distances.72 The BBC for instance used the telephone network to broadcast the 
same program simultaneously from different stations, a system they called simul-
taneous broadcasting.73 All in all, a relay network was meant to complement the 
wireless networks, relaying music that could then be broadcast over the stations’ 
home channels. European broadcasters were well aware of such technical relay-
ing developments. In time, an international telephone network capable of relaying 
music over long distances would enable a regular supply of high quality music to 
all European audiences. 
A relay network required collaboration between different technical experts. The 
idea was not simple nor a short-term solution to the lack of high-quality Europe-
wide broadcasting. The IBU had no connection to or influence over the construc-
tion of telephone networks in general. The European long distance telephone 
network constructed from the early 1920s onwards, which in some cases enabled 
international telephone conversations, was not able to transmit the broad band of 
frequencies accompanying musical performances. For instance: the correct trans-
mission of speech required between 200 and 2500 kc/sec while music required 
no less than 50 or 100 up to 10,000 kc/sec. “The highest note of a piccolo has 
70 “Relais Internationaux, Résume de la situation présenté par le Secrétaire Général,” Série 563, 15 juin 
1927, 2, box 85, file Relais, Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU; IBU, The Problems of Broadcasting (Geneva: 
IBU, 1930), 105.
71 Jennifer Spohrer, “Paradise or Perdition? European Commercial Broadcasters and American Radio, 
1920-1960” (presented at the ESF Inventing Europe Conference: Appropriating America, Making Europe, 
Amsterdam, 2009), 6-7.
72 “Relais Internationaux,” Série 563, 2, box 85, file Relais, Général I, IBU; IBU, The Problems of Broad-
casting, 105.
73 Simultaneous broadcasting was the act of transmitting one program over several radio stations within 
one country at the same time. This increased the efficiency of the network and reduced interference con-
siderably. The British relay network allowed the same program to be supplied to all stations. Asa Briggs, 
The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume II: The Golden Age of Wireless (Oxford [u.a.]: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 27; Paddy Scannell and David Cardiff, “Serving the Nation: Public Service 
Broadcasting before the War,” in Popular Culture: Past and Present, ed. Bernard Waites, Tony Bennett, and 
Graham Martin (London: Croom Helm London, 1982), 165.
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a frequency of 4750, but even more numerous frequencies are produced by or-
chestra music.”74 Having explored various options, in 1925 the IBU turned to the 
International Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIF), the advisory body of 
the ITU dealing with long-distance telephony. 
The IBU approached the CCIF “for a systematic examination…of the possibil-
ity of creating an international network for telephonic circuits specially suited to 
the needs of broadcasting.”75 When the CCIF invited the IBU to its meeting that 
same year, the IBU stressed the utmost importance of the network for thousands 
of people in Europe who listened to broadcasts already. All developments in long-
distance telephony should consider the special needs of radiotelephony, the IBU 
argued, because in three years, broadcasting had become part of European social 
life. CCIF received the request favorably. The agreement turned out to be the start 
of a long-term collaboration between the two bodies to work on the project of a 
European long distance telephone network that enabled the high quality transmis-
sion of music.
The CCIF was an advisory committee that closely managed the building 
blocks of the European telephone network by establishing a “more precise and 
universal set of telephone regulations.”76 In 1924 the French Ministry of Post and 
Telegraphy had given the incentive for the creation of CCIF. Via periodical meet-
ings, telephone experts from various countries would discuss issues and exchange 
information. Within a year the CCIF became part of the ITU at the request of the 
Scandinavian countries, but continued in its original composition. Its only link 
with the ITU was the agreement that all administrations could participate in CCIF 
studies on request, while CCIF would have to communicate its conclusions and 
recommendations to the ITU for publication.77 
According to Léonard Laborie “CCIF is the fine result of a revised articulation 
between national power, which remains central to all approaches, and European 
space...”78 CCIF telephone experts were an interesting mix of the private and public 
74 “note la plus haute du piccolo ayant une fréquence de 4750, mais des fréquences plus nombreuses 
encore sont produites par de la musique d’orchestre.” “Relais Internationaux,” Série 563, 2, box 85, file 
Relais, Général I, IBU.
75 IBU, Broadcasting: An Instrument for the Creation of a Better Understanding Between the Peoples 
(Geneva: IBU, 1937), 88.
76 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 36; Laborie, “La France, L’Europe et l’ordre 
international des communications,” 444-449.
77 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 35-36, 47.
78 “Le CCIF est bien le résultat de l’articulation révisée entre la puissance nationale, qui reste 
centrale dans les approches, et espace européen, qui se construit avec la stipulation américaine: le cadre 
international aux contours raffermis que dessine la coopération offre la possibilité de rester souverain et de 
continuer à poursuivre assidûment ses intérêts.” Laborie, “La France, L’Europe et l’ordre international des 
communications,” 465.
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sector, operating in a technical and commercial culture. They based their entire 
raison d’être on the efficiency and increased use of the network. In addition to such 
a pragmatic culture, they believed their approach would contribute to solidarity 
and peace between Europeans, a generally recognized characteristic of engineers 
who were active on an international level.79 Without cooperation, international 
service would fail to develop.80 Like the IBU, the CCIF did not regard the national 
and the international as mutually exclusive processes.
In accordance with its connection to the ITU and the consideration that net-
works did not stop at Europe’s boundaries, the CCIF took a global perspective 
on matters, with a preference for the American federal model. Laborie stresses 
the link between CCIF secretary Georges Valensi and the United States that in-
fluenced the committee substantially.81 The CCIF for instance regularly designed 
inter-continental agreements and allowed American telephone company AT&T 
to participate in its work on a non-official basis.82 Nonetheless in practice, the 
CCIF focused on designing a European telephone network. Much like the IBU, in 
the 1920s the CCIF brought together cooperators and rivals from the European 
continent and beyond to work on a European scheme that would benefit a global 
network. In the European journal L’Europe Nouvelle, Valensi once pragmatically 
compared the work of CCIF to “the blueprint of the nerve system of the United 
States of Europe.”83 A system of telephone arteries coupled these united states, 
making Europe the simple sum of the various nation states.
Initially, the IBU and CCIF developed a loosely coupled collaboration. The 
IBU approached CCIF each time it needed information about relaying music over 
telephone arteries. The CCIF then performed the necessary study with the IBU 
Technical Committee. It communicated its final solutions to the ITU who then 
forwarded the results to the national PTT administrations. They in turn performed 
the actual construction works.84 As such, the IBU had a considerable impact on 
which issues to bring to the attention of the CCIF, after which the IBU Technical 
79 Ibid., 464; Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: 
Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 
(2008): 198. 
80 Laborie, “La France, L’Europe et l’ordre international des communications,” 464.
81 Georges Valensi was educated as a polytechnician with a long-term interest in transatlantic telepho-
ny including its technical applications in radio broadcasting. He also worked in the United States. 
82 Laborie, “La France, L’Europe et l’ordre international des communications,” 447-449, 466.
83 “l’ébauche d’un système nerveux des Etats-Unis d’Europe.” Ibid., 467; Quote by the editors in the 
introduction to George Valensi, “La téléphonie européenne,” L’Europe Nouvelle 417 (1926): 204.
84 Among others, please see: “Relais internationaux par fils téléphoniques a grande distance. Rapport 
élaboré à l’intention de la Commission des Relais Internationaux par le Secrétaire Générale de l’Union 
Internationale de Radiophonie,” Série 1038, 3 août 1928, box 85, Relais, Générale III, 1928, IBU; Laborie, 
“La France, L’Europe et l’ordre international des communications,” 445-446.
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Committee could collaborate with CCIF engineers. 
In 1930 the two organizations set up a more straightforward cooperation that 
further increased the IBU’s impact on achieving telephone relay network stan-
dards. The IBU could now formally join in with CCIF studies. The heads of the 
IBU Technical Committee and the International Relay Committee assisted at 
CCIF meetings and other IBU delegates such as Secretary General Burrows, head 
of the Rapprochement Committee Czeija, and members of the IBU Technical 
Committee Austrian chief engineer Harbich, British chief engineer Hayes, and 
French chief engineer Baize also participated. These men could negotiate the best 
possible terms for radio broadcasting in respect of the general CCIF activities and 
their European telephony network project.85 
While the CCIF was working on its European telephone “nerve” system, the 
IBU had its own ideas about the nature of such long-distance telephone networks. 
Together they focused on two major aspects. First of all, they had to define stan-
dards to improve the technical quality of the musical programs relayed over these 
networks. In November 1925 the IBU asked the CCIF to study broadening the 
number of frequencies that the telephone cables and so-called aerial lines – the 
plain copper wires hanging between poles – were capable of relaying. The CCIF, 
according to the IBU, had to focus on examining the pupinization of these cables 
and adapting the amplifier stations. These strengthened the transmitted signals 
along the way and avoided receiving extremely faint signals at the end of the line. 
The telephone cables and amplifiers could transmit the limited range of frequen-
cies that characterized speech, but would flatten the musical tones when relay-
ing music by omitting the high and low frequencies that lay beyond the range of 
speech.86 The IBU stressed its desire to avoid such inferior quality of music at the 
end of the line. 
Their other focal point was the design of the network. In order to create the 
best possible transport of programs from A to B, the IBU envisioned a relay net-
work that connected the various European capitals.87 This design would sustain 
the underlying vision of enhancement of European social life or the League’s ideals 
of peace and understanding, and also sustain technical and economic lucrative-
ness. Relays via the telephone network would be exempt from atmospheric dis-
turbances, one of the big problems of wireless broadcasting. From an economic 
85 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1930, 270-271, IBU; P.V. Conseil Administrative 1931, 13-14, IBU.
86 “Au Comité Consultatif International des Communications Téléphoniques à Grande Distance, Paris,” 
4 déc. 1925, 2-3, box 85, file Relais Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU; “August-September 1928, IBU at 
Berlin, Transmission radiophoniques sur circuits, Rapport de M. le Conseiller des Postes Sprinck,” box 85, 
file Relais, Général III, 1928, IBU.
87 “Relais Internationaux,” Série 563, 3-4, box 85, file Relais Général I, IBU.
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perspective, they also increased the efficient usage of the network by employing 
it for radio broadcasting relays during low traffic hours. The last point especially 
could resolve the problem facing the CCIF, namely the declining use of the tele-
phone cable network. The CCIF decided to study a possible relay network between 
several European capitals immediately, along with testing long-distance transmis-
sions of music via cable and plain copper wire.88 In the meantime, the IBU ap-
pointed Braillard as main contact person for the CCIF, and asked its members to 
open their doors to the CCIF in order to facilitate long distance relay experiments. 
Clearly the CCIF responded positively to the IBU’s ideas. These would serve their 
economic, technical, and more idealistic interests simultaneously.
Occasionally experts had to justify their choice of network. Constructing an inter-
national relay network for music was a long term affair, and did not come about 
easily. In the eyes of the IBU, high quality broadcasting and Europe-wide trans-
missions were the Union’s principal goals. These could not be achieved without 
such a relay network. In July 1926 the new Committee for Intellectual, Artistic, 
and Social Rapprochement (Rapprochement Committee) immediately created 
a sub-committee dealing only with relay questions. The sub-committee focused 
on all organizational and legal issues such as the division of costs for renting 
the telephone lines from PTT Administrations. Oskar Czeija, Director General 
of Austrian RAVAG, an inventor and entrepreneur, and one of the most colorful 
people in Austrian radio, coordinated the international relay activities as head of 
the Rapprochement Committee.89 
Czeija, who had wide experience with telephone and telegraph technology, 
realized that progress in international relay over telephone cable or wire could 
not be speedy. Progress depended on the economic and political circumstances 
in European countries and on the developments in telephony. Furthermore, the 
relay ideas went against the grain of telephony engineers’ general tendency to re-
place aerial lines with subterranean cables. Cables were well equipped to transmit 
speech but by no means suitable for music. Czeija stressed the need to adapt and/
or couple existing lines in addition to constructing new connections. Occasionally, 
Czeija warned, IBU members could be asked to contribute to the costs involved 
in adapting circuits to music transmission. Swiss broadcasters were asked to con-
tribute to the cost of adapting a special cable for relaying between stations over a 
88 Ibid.
89 Reinhard Schlögl, Oskar Czeija: Radio- und Fernsehpionier, Unternehmer, Abenteurer (Wien: Böhlau, 
2005); Kilian J.L. Steiner, “Buchbesprechung – Oskar Czeija: Radio und Fernsehpionier, Unternehmer, 
Abenteurer,” Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 52, no. 1 (2007): 120.
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period of ten years.90 An international relay network was thus a technologically 
complicated, costly, and long-term option.
The CCIF and the IBU thought the economic and technical benefits would 
outweigh these obstacles in the long run. A relay network would settle all kinds of 
issues that could not be remedied at a purely local or national level. Relaying music 
over telephone networks, for instance, would circumvent the wireless long-dis-
tance problems such as barriers created by mountain ranges.91 Furthermore, there 
were simply no satisfactory recording systems that could broadcast live concerts 
or important political speeches at another time. It was impossible to exchange 
programs, a factor that maximized program production costs for each broadcast-
ing organization. An international relay network would reduce these individual 
production costs substantially.92 Other economic benefits included the option to 
ward off parasites listening in without a paid license, whereas all-European and 
high quality reception in combination with the offer of a high variety of programs 
would promote radio as an entertainment medium, increasing the number of lis-
teners and the sales of receiver sets.93 As many members of the early broadcasting 
society had a high stake in the radio industry, they would benefit enormously from 
a qualitatively high international relay network. 94 
Within a few years the IBU-CCIF efforts already had effect. Several national 
PTT administrations had already realized part of the international relay network, 
a promising prospect to the IBU who wanted to start regular relays in the autumn 
of 1928.95 Northern and central Europe realized a considerable amount of the relay 
network in their countries. The west and south of Europe followed a little more 
slowly. Each country focused on national improvements to the network, as well as 
on the “liaison of suitable national circuits with those of neighbouring countries.”96 
Scandinavia was one of the first to experiment with this type of relaying. Already 
in June 1926 the Ligue des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberté organized the first size-
able relay event of music and speech between Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. 
Although the music from Copenhagen suffered from distortions due to the sub-
marine cables under the Öresund, the broadcasts from Oslo were excellent as was 
90 “Relais Internationaux,” Série 563, 4, box 85, file Relais Général I, IBU.
91 IBU, “La radiodiffusion: Instrument de rapprochement international, Numéro spécial,” Radiodiffu-
sion, no. 4 (January 1937): 94.
92 IBU, “La radiodiffusion,” 93.
93 “Rapport général du secrétaire à la commission des relais internationaux,” Série 1237, 1 Feb. 1929, 2, 
box 85, file Relais Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU.
94 IBU, Maurice Rambert, 1866-1941 (Geneva: IBU, 1941), 7-11; J. Tomeš a kolektiv, Český biografický 
slovník XX. století, vol. 3 (Praha: Litomyšl; Paseka; P. Meissner, 1999).
95 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1927, 100, IBU.
96 IBU, “La radiodiffusion: Instrument de rapprochement international, Numéro spécial,” 88.
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expected from the frequently exchanged operas from Stockholm.97 
On the continent, Germany had been employing all its means to construct a 
highly efficient telephone cable network and expected to couple with its neigh-
boring European countries on the following dates: Vienna, Austria at the end of 
1927 or early 1928; Zurich, Switzerland at the end of 1928; Prague, Czechoslovakia 
at the end of 1927 or early 1928; Innsbruck, Austria at the end of 1928 and the 
Netherlands in 1928. Furthermore, Switzerland foresaw additional links with 
Austria and Italy (Milan) in the course of 1929. Only the BBC, one of the first 
and most powerful broadcasting organizations in Europe, initially held back from 
these cross-border relays. To the BBC, the quality of the submarine cables between 
Great Britain and Belgium could not satisfy their high demands for quality music 
exchange. In addition to the cables, amplifiers and equalizers would secure modi-
fication as well as guarantee a wider band of frequencies. The BBC followed the 
activities on the continent with interest and considered them full of promise.98
These developments reflect the discrepancy between the number of organiza-
tions in the IBU and the countries working on an international relay infrastructure 
at this early stage. In some countries the economic and political situation influ-
enced their participation, whereas in the Baltic States broadcasting was still in its 
infancy. These countries had not participated in the 1920 IBU-CCIF events and 
did not become IBU members till the early 1930s.99 Consequently, the realization 
of a high quality and Europe-wide relay network for broadcasting was in constant 
flux. The network did not develop evenly in all corners of Europe.
Central and East European broadcasters immediately took the lead. They joined 
forces in October 1927 to integrate their national actions into a broader central 
European regional initiative. At the invitation of the Polish Ministry of Post and 
Telegraphy and Polskie Radjo, the PTT administration and broadcasting organiza-
tions from Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland gathered in Warsaw to 
discuss technical difficulties and create standards in testing, timing, and allocation 
of costs. These countries had developed their relay networks sufficiently to com-
mence experimental relays of live concerts between their capitals. The meeting 
had a transnational character. For the first time, international organizations, state 
and non-state actors as well as telephony and radiotelephony experts, gathered in 
an official context to negotiate their ideas. 
97 “Relais Internationaux,” Série 563, 5, box 85, file Relais Général I, IBU.
98 “Remarques de la B.B.C. sur le rapport de M. le dr. Czeija concernant les relais à grande distance, by 
C.F. Atkinson, 24.6.27,” 26 June 1927, 1, box 85, file Relais Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU.
99 IBU, Twenty Years, 66, 69.
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In Central and Eastern Europe, international relay construction developed 
far more quickly than the IBU’s ability to control the process. Earlier the IBU 
Rapprochement Committee had suggested standardizing the new form of col-
laboration between the radiotelephony and telephony engineers to clarify their 
division of labor. At that meeting the Polish IBU delegate Chamiec proposed cre-
ating a sub-committee to the Rapprochement Committee that would coordinate 
the developments in international relaying in several central and east European 
countries, to help them with their first cross-border relay experiments. Chamiec 
was trying to anticipate the unequal developments in European relaying and their 
potential problems beforehand. Head of the committee Czeija rejected the idea, 
and proposed creating a small group within the committee instead. Soon the 
Rapprochement Committee handed in a request for its reorganization to the IBU 
Council.100 The process would take a while and progressed too slowly to deal with 
the vast growth in international relaying. In the end, the small group of east and 
central European broadcasters consisting of Czeija, Chamiec, the Czech Sourek, 
and the German Giesecke, gathered in Warsaw with their respective PTT admin-
istrations.
The Warsaw meeting began with a considerable amount of official observa-
tions. The opening addresses stressed the unique and international unifying char-
acter of straightforward collaboration between radiotelephony and telephony en-
gineers. Superior Councilor Thurn of the Polish Ministry of PTT pragmatically 
stressed the importance of good relays of music via wire for the artistic domain. 
Polish broadcasting director Chamiec and Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Libicki highlighted the ideological and cultural benefits. The overall aim extended 
beyond a unifying network all the way to the cultural impact such relays would 
have on their audiences. According to Libicki, “the regular exchange of programs 
by wire will contribute to the rapprochement of nations in the domain of the arts 
and will deepen in this way the idea of universal peace.”101 The engineers then 
continued the meeting without the government officials, discussing practical stan-
dards for the regional relay network with these unifying visions of society in mind. 
100 “Procès-Verbal de la Commission de rapprochement, intellectuel, artistique et social tenue à Ouchy,” 
Série 567, 17 juin 1927, 5, P.V. Commissions des Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapproche-
ment et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU. 
101 “[l]’échange régulier des programmes par fil contribuera au rapprochement des nations dans le 
domaine de l’Art et approfondira à cette manière l’idée de la paix universelle.” “Procès-Verbal de la Confé-
rence des délégués des Administrations Postales et Télégraphiques d’Allemagne, d’Autriche, de la Pologne 
et de la Tchéchoslovaquie tenue à Varsovie,” 14-16 Oct. 1927, 2-3, box 85, file Relais, Général I, 1927 et 
précédents, IBU.
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The PTT delegates discussed the broadcasting organizations’ requests. The ra-
diotelephony experts employed by the broadcasting organizations joined them as 
consultants. They agreed to start a series of regular tests to trace and resolve tech-
nology related issues. These tests could start as early as October 27 on the lines 
between Warsaw, Vienna, and Prague. They agreed that initial testing would be 
free of charge. Expenses for any further and future relaying should be paid by the 
broadcasting organizations to their national PTT administrations. There would be 
a fixed tariff for each telephone line used for international relaying. These trans-
national agreements paved the way for the first testing of musical relays between 
capitals in Central and Eastern Europe.
The test results invited further unification activities in European relaying. The ini-
tial tests at the end of 1927, performed in collaboration with the IBU’s newly es-
tablished Brussels Checking Center, were positive. The international relay network 
for music in Central and Eastern Europe was ready to use. The IBU had reorga-
nized its Rapprochement Committee, transforming the relay sub-committee into 
an independent International Relay Committee. This had two members from the 
Technical, Legal, and Rapprochement Committees. Furthermore, the Council ap-
pointed Zygmunt Chamiec as its head.102 With the Brussels Checking Center and 
International Relay Committee, the IBU now possessed a more efficient apparatus 
to coordinate developments in long-distance relaying.
Relay infrastructure was taking shape all across Europe. In close collabora-
tion with IBU and CCIF technical experts, the national PTTs constructed tele-
phone lines suitable for transmitting music. In spring 1928, regular music re-
lays began. At first the music was relayed via dedicated telephone lines between 
Germany, Poland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. On arrival, the music was then 
broadcast over their publicly accessible home channels.103 Broadcasting organiza-
tions in Hungary and Yugoslavia were able to join the network by 1929 when their 
PTTs had completed the lines.104 In 1931, the network diffused further north to 
Scandinavia and south into France, while Italy was connected to Austria.105 In the 
meantime, British, Belgian and German broadcasters and PTTs developed inter-
national relaying in Western Europe. The PTTs linked London to Berlin through 
Belgium. The BBC developed close contact with Radio Belgium. It received its 
102 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1928, 139-140, IBU.
103 IBU, Twenty Years, 32.
104 “L’avenir des nuits nationales, Rapporteur H. Giesecke, Conseil, no. 4 de l’Ordre du Jour,” Série 1592, 
4 Nov. 1929, box 85, file Relais, Programmes nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926-1931, IBU. 
105 “Second talk to be given on April 13 (not checked by Achkridge): Relaying from a distance,” 5, box 
85, file Relais, Général V, 1931, IBU.
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first experimental program of 45 minutes transmitted from Ostend to London on 
August 27, 1927. In 1928, relays extended from Liege and Cologne to London, en-
abled by strategically located repeaters in Canterbury, La Panne, Ostend, Bruges, 
Ghent, Brussels, Tirlemont, Liege, and Aachen. Two years later they had developed 
the network into the Netherlands and throughout the whole of Germany, foresee-
ing new high-quality sub-marine cables for the coming year.106 Cross-border links 
in Europe now relayed high quality programs on a regional basis, with Germany 
participating both in the eastern and western initiatives.
The uneven regional development of international relaying moved the repre-
sentatives from Belgium, Germany and Great Britain to propose the establishment 
of so-called regional secretariats. The proposal was in sharp contrast to the initial 
IBU project of an internationally coordinated Europe-wide relay network. At a 
conference in Brussels in October 1929, the PTT administrations and broadcast-
ing organizations from these three countries considered creating a central secre-
tariat for north-western Europe. Such a secretariat would centralize and provide 
the interested organizations with all the relevant information for international 
relaying. The IBU rejected the proposal. It argued that there was no direct need 
for such a secretariat at that moment.107 The coordination of international relay-
ing was still expected to become Europe-wide in the hands of the IBU. The vision 
of a Europe consisting of regional relay networks for music across long distances 
vanished as quickly as it had arisen.
Shortly after the regional network discussion, the IBU confirmed its role as 
central coordinator of the international relaying of music over the network owned 
and established by the PTTs. Network construction efforts were well underway 
and central European countries had been relaying programs on a regular basis for 
some years already. The IBU argued that the time had come for a more straight-
forward collaboration between European broadcasters. At the IBU Council in 
Budapest in October 1930, the International Relay Committee organized a meet-
ing with representatives from the central-eastern and west European groups to 
discuss linking up their projects. The east European group had met in Warsaw 
one month before and agreed to relay five to ten symphony concerts between 
Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.108 Other broadcasters 
had expressed their desire to join the central European group at any rate in part of 
106 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1929, 225, IBU; “Second talk to be given on 13th of April,” 5, box 85, file 
Relais, Général V, IBU.
107 “Conférence de Bruxelles, les 8, 9, et 10 octobre 1929: Protocole final, séance plénière de clôture,” 
box 85, file Relais, Général III, 1929, IBU. 
108 “Décisions de la Réunion de Varsovie des 25-26.9.30,” 1, box 85, Relais, Concerts Internationaux, 
1931 à 1939, Général, IBU.
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its relays.109 As a result of these preliminary talks, the Council meeting in Budapest 
decided in favor of “a complete unification of these two groups…”110 
The straightforward collaboration immediately led to mutual agreements 
about future relaying. Their program directors would meet twice in the following 
year to discuss program contents under the auspices of the IBU Relay Committee. 
Most importantly perhaps, they anticipated a series of concerts of the highest 
quality to be relayed each month at fixed dates by all participants to further their 
ideas about rapprochement between peoples. These concerts would bear the name 
Concerts européens (see Chapter 6) and be part of a large, systematic exchange of 
artistic programs.111 All “organizations that have not participated in this cordial 
exchange” would be encouraged “to adhere to it in accordance with their techni-
cal possibilities resulting from the progressive organization of the international 
telephone circuits…”112 All parties now voluntarily and formally agreed to create a 
Europe-wide internationally coordinated relay network. Moreover, they imagined 
that such a network should be used for an extensive international exchange of na-
tional programs as well as unique joint European programs. 
These agreements inspired increased uniformity in standards for the interna-
tional relaying of music via cable and plain copper wire. Although by 1930 the 
network did not yet encompass the whole of Europe (Figure 3.4), it would expand 
rapidly in the following years. The broadcasting organizations agreed that there 
were no costs attached to the musical programs. Each IBU member would at some 
point organize a concert or produce specific programs. Overall, these activities 
should ensure an equal division of costs among the various organizations. The cost 
of renting the relay network from the national PTT administrations, on the con-
trary, was another matter. The IBU and PTT administrations agreed that special 
standards should ensure the division of costs and provide a clear set of rules for 
the act of relaying. 
The following outlines the standards specifying the cost for using the interna-
tional relay network. In all circumstances the IBU member who organized a relay 
would have to submit a request to its national PTT administration for renting the 
109 “Perfectionnement des concerts destinés aux relais: Commission des Relais, Rapporteur M.S. de 
Chamiec,” Série 2130, 7 octobre 1930, 1, box 85, file Relais, Général IV, 1930, IBU.
110 “une union complète des deux groupes…” “Réunion des membres du groupe des échanges de pro-
grammes de l’Europe Centrale et de l’Europe Occidentale: Budapest – Octobre 1930,” 1, box 85, file Relais, 
Concerts Internationaux, 1931 à 1939, Général, IBU.
111 “Réunion des membres du groupe des échanges de programmes,” 1, box 85, file Relais, Concerts 
Internationaux, Général, IBU.
112 “…incite tous les organismes qui n’ont pas pu participer à cet échange cordial à y adhérer au fur et 
mésure que les possibilités techniques résultant de l’aménagement progressif des circuits téléphoniques 
internationaux…” P.V. Conseil Administrative 1930, 270, IBU.
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Figure 3.4 – The telephonic circuits usable for high quality radio relays, 1930 
Source: Box 85, Relais 1927-1936, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
entire circuit required for all participants to receive the relay. Only in cases of local 
drawbacks of the circuit or an emergency could participants apply to their local 
PTT. If broadcasters wanted to participate in relays at the last minute, they could 
only do so with the consent of the organizing broadcasting IBU member. The costs 
for renting the relay network, however, would have to be divided equally among all 
broadcasting members using specific arteries of the relay network. For instance, if 
three out of ten broadcasting members benefitted from one specific artery in the 
relay network, they would have to split the costs equally. 
An exception to this rule was if a country wished to produce and relay a pro-
gram from a location in another country that did not want to participate in the re-
lay. In such cases, the foreign country would have to apply to the IBU Council rep-
resentative in the country where the broadcast would take place as well as notify 
its own IBU Council representative. If the request was not considered harmful to 
the country where the broadcast would take place, negotiations between the par-
ties could proceed. If favorable, negotiations from then on could be on a bilateral 
basis if desired, but in general between the IBU Council representatives from the 
requesting broadcasting organization and their counterpart in the country where 
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the broadcast would take place.113 The firm integration of the national into the inter-
national relay network clearly did not simplify a process like creating standards for 
cost divisions. 
The standards assuring a Europe-wide relay network for broadcasting were a 
complex and highly nationally oriented set of rules. These rules had to combine lo-
cally produced programs with nationally owned telephone and broadcasting net-
works, as well as international streamlining activities. The standards bound, fine-
tuned, and integrated the local, the national, and the international into one set of 
European standards that consequently had a transnational character. Though con-
temporaries clearly specified the internationality of the relay network, in the early 
years these standards only focused on Europe. Together with the wireless network, 
the relay network enabled the IBU community to create a high-quality and Europe-
wide diffusion of music.
Wireless World Visions
The development of the short waves offered visions of a wireless world. Rapid tech-
nological innovations by the late 1920s and early 1930s posed new challenges to the 
community of experts and their European standards. These new challenges made 
the IBU rethink its 1926 outwardly communicated idea of being an all-international 
society in relation to its recently recognized status of European broadcasting expert. 
According to the director of the Technical Committee “at present the IBU is for 
all else a European union.”114 The development of the short waves opened up un-
expected opportunities to create wireless broadcasting with a global reach via low 
power and therefore less expensive radio stations. Many organizations therefore 
quickly employed these waves for so-called empire broadcasting: to overseas pos-
sessions, to colonies.115 The Technical Committee reasoned that the narrowness of 
the medium and long bands assigned to broadcasting by the Madrid Convention 
further enticed the explosive employment of the short waves.116 The short waves had 
quickly become an attractive complement and alternative to broadcasting. 
113 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1930, 246-247, IBU; “Rapport de la Commission des Relais au Conseil, 
no. 8 de l’Ordre du Jour,” Série 1900, 20 mai 1930, box 85, file Relais, Général IV, 1930, IBU.
114 “Radiodiffusion mondiale: Rapporteur: R. Braillard, Président de la Commission Technique,” Série 
3140, 23 mai 1932, 1, CA Document Series, IBU.
115 Donald R. Browne, International Radio Broadcasting (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1982); James Wood, 
History of International Broadcasting (London: Peregrinus, 1992).
116 “Recommandation de la commission technique au conseil: Extension de l’U.I.R. Collaboration avec 
les autres organismes similaires,” Série 4840, 22 fév. 1935, CA Document Series, IBU.
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In the meantime, further expansion of the European broadcasting network in-
creased the incentive to broadcast on a global scale. Both the wireless networks and 
the international relay network in Europe continued to diffuse and became denser 
in the 1930s (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). In particular the swift expansion of the European 
relay network and subsequent flow of cross-border relays almost immediately at-
tracted the attention of stations in and beyond Europe. In 1929 for instance, the 
Spanish Union-Radio Madrid asked the French PTT to discuss the availability of 
telephone lines for relays with France and other European countries.117 However, 
it was the inter-continental relay of the American program “Compte Zeppelin” via 
the short waves to the European relay network that raised a lively interest across the 
entire globe. The zeppelin, owned by the German Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin 
made its first ever intercontinental flight. Several European and non-European sta-
tions expressed their disappointment to the IBU that they had been unaware of the 
relay of an event with such worldwide importance.118 In hindsight Secretary General 
Burrows recognized the “Compte Zeppelin” experience as the first moment the IBU 
realistically opted for envisioning an international relay network on a global scale.119 
Such intercontinental events gave a new dimension to European relaying activi-
ties beyond its borders. Broadcasting experts could now project a global, interna-
tional broadcasting network. Problematically, the global radius of these waves in-
terfered with the frequency standards designed by the IBU, ITU, and PTT admin-
istrations, which were only significant to the European region. The problem with 
the short waves challenged IBU’s European focus and the standards for frequency 
allocation. Consequently, the IBU and other parties also had to renegotiate Europe’s 
role in a globalizing world. 
The number of contacts between European broadcasters and worldwide broad-
casting stations grew instantly. As early as 1927, National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC) in the USA, stations in India and Australia, the Peruvian PTT, as well as 
Nohon Hoso Kyokai (JOCK Broadcasting Station) in Japan joined the IBU as as-
sociate members. Initially, inter-continental activities mostly developed between 
the active European members of the IBU and the major U.S. broadcasters NBC 
and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). Partly thanks to their shared language, 
NBC, CBS and BBC bilaterally developed a lively program exchange. These ex-
changes opened up a huge variety of new music to the British and on occasion other 
117 “Rapport général du secrétaire à la Commission des relais internationaux,” Série 1237, 1 fév. 1929, 3, 
box 85, file Relais, Général III, 1929, IBU.
118 “Relais internationaux d’évènements d’intérêt mondial, rapporteur: A.R. Burrows,” Série 1142, 21 
nov. 1928, 1-2, box 85, file Relais, Général II, 1928, IBU. 
119 “Rapport général sur les progrès accomplis dans le domaine des relais internationaux, rapporteur 
A.R. Burrows,” Série 1852, 29 avril 1930, 2, box 85, file Relais, Général IV, 1930, IBU.
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Figure 3.5 – Rise in number and power of European radio stations in 1933 and 1938
Source: “Projet d’attribution des fréquences aux stations de radiodiffusion de la région européenne 
établi par l’Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion en exécution des stipulations du Protocole 
Additionnel aux Actes de la Conférence Internationale des Radiocommunications du Caire, 1938 
et présenté au Gouvernement de la Conféderation suisse,” Doc. 536, Bruxelles, 29 nov. 1938, 37, 
registry file 9G, box R-4322, file 35525/663, jacket 1, League of Nations Archives, UNOG Library. 
Used by the courtesy of United Nations Office, United Nations Library, Geneva.
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Figure 3.6 – The European relay network in 1933 and 1939 (on page 115)
Source: “Carte des circuits Internationaux d’Europe spécialement établis ou aménagés pour 
transmettre la musique” (Berne: 1933, 1939), International Telecommunication Union Archive 
(Hereafter ITU). Used by the courtesy of the International Telecommunication Union, Geneva.
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European audiences.120 Additionally, CBS attempted to establish a multilateral 
program exchange with several European countries.121 Both American organiza-
tions had become IBU associate members by 1930, appointing directors as their 
first foreign broadcasting representatives in Europe.122 
120 “Rapport général sur les progrès accomplis,” Série 1852, 2, box 85, file Relais, Général IV, IBU.
121 “Radiodiffusion mondiale,” Série 2862, 15 oct. 1931, 1-2, box 85, file Relais, Général V, 1931, IBU.
122 In their roles, César Searchinger for CBS and Dr. Max Jordan for NBC had close relationships with 
the various European broadcasting stations and frequently attended IBU meetings, not only Council 
meetings but also those of the various committees. From 1932 onwards they even became actively involved 
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The IBU also began to collaborate with Japan and established a short wave con-
nection between Europe and Japan to relay the Naval Disarmament Conference 
in London in 1932. Both the request to Japan to participate in the relay and the 
broadcast itself made a big impression outside Europe. The broadcast demon-
strated the potential of the existing short wave stations in Europe for further de-
veloping the international relay network beyond European borders.123 The growth 
in such inter-continental contacts soon imposed a sense of urgency on studying 
worldwide broadcasting via the short waves. 
Worldwide broadcasting increasingly came within sight. The first global encoun-
ters took place alongside improving international relations. The French Prime 
Minister Aristide Briand, in his famous address to the League’s General Assembly 
on September 5, 1929, proposed the creation of a United States of Europe.124 The 
League had never officially followed up any of the IBU proposals, even when the IBU 
stressed the importance of European activities to the world as a whole.125 Informally, 
however, some members continued to exchange views on the vision of a worldwide 
organization for broadcasting, of a Radiodiffusion mondiale.126 Discussions took 
place in particular between the key wireless expert of the League’s OCT, Gijsbert 
Frans van Dissel, and IBU Secretary General Burrows. They agreed that such an or-
ganization should coordinate efficiently the evolution of a global and fully intercon-
nected broadcasting space based on global standards for wireless and wired broad-
casting. Burrows had expressed his opinion to Van Dissel that “the question of ra-
dio broadcasting is a question of worldwide interest.” Van Dissel in turn reflected 
that global broadcasting should be centralized under the auspices of the League.127 
When Briand proposed a United States of Europe, Van Dissel and Burrows consid-
ered a global organization for broadcasting beyond European borders.
Van Dissel’s thoughts on developing international broadcasting may not have 
been unexpected considering his personal life, education, and work experience. 
He grew up in a family that lived for some time in the Dutch East Indies. Although 
in the joint meetings of the IBU International Relay Committee and the Rapprochement Committee to 
exchange ideas about establishing a satisfactory international relay network. “Développement des relais 
internationaux depuis octobre 1931, rapporteur A.R. Burrows,” Série 3167, 20 mai 1932, box 85, file Relais, 
Concerts Internationaux, 1931 à 1939, Général, IBU; CBS, Spanning the Seven Seas: A Résumé of Inter-
Continental Broadcasting in 1935 (New York; London: Columbia Broadcasting Organization, 1935), 3.
123 “Rapport Général sur les progrès accomplis,” Série 1852, 2, box 85, file Relais, Général IV, IBU.
124 LoN, Verbatim Record of the 10th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 6th Ple-
nary Meeting, LoN doc. ser., A.10.1929 (Geneva: LoN, 1929), 5.
125 “Utilisation commerciale des émissions radiophoniques, rapporteur: O. Czeija,” Série 839, 11 juin 
1928, 3, box 85, file Relais, Général II, 1928, IBU.
126 “Utilisation commerciale,” Série 839, 3, box 85, file Relais, Général II, IBU.
127 13 fév. 1931, 3, P.V. Commission Mixte, Commission Relais, Commission Spéciales, IBU.
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his brother and sister were born there, Van Dissel was born in the Netherlands, in 
the Hague, on October 6, 1891. He studied civil engineering in the Netherlands 
and specialized in radio telegraphy at the École Supérieure de l’Électricité in Paris, 
France. In 1921 he published a book on the international organization of radio-
electric traffic.128 Initially, he worked as a civil engineer in the Dutch East Indies on 
railway, bridges, and irrigation matters. During these years overseas he had become 
aware of the important role of long distance communication in the “development 
of relations between the motherland and the colonies.” 129 After his specialization 
in radio telegraphy he returned to the Dutch East Indies to work for the PTT. 
As chief operations of the large telegraphy and telephony stations in Bandoeng 
(Malabar) on the island of Java, he gained extensive experience with overseas 
long distance communications. He was in charge of communications with Europe 
and other continents. As chief of operations he regularly represented the Dutch 
East Indies government at international conferences.130 He married twice. After 
his divorce from a Dutch woman in 1931, he married a Filipino woman. His life 
and work suggest a highly internationally oriented mind. When he applied to the 
League of Nations he stressed his desire to work for a “highly humanitarian insti-
tution pursuing such a noble ideal.”131 He died in Geneva on September 29, 1958.
In the 1930s the cordial relationship between Van Dissel and Burrows impacted 
profoundly on international broadcasting developments. It strengthened the good 
relationship between the League and IBU’s activities. Van Dissel had an important 
role, and for both the IBU and the League as a whole, he was the key expert on 
wireless questions in the widest sense.132 He began as an ordinary member of the 
OCT regularly representing the League at international conferences, IBU Council 
meetings, and technical discussions on broadcasting. In 1935, he became Director 
of the OCT when Robert Haas died.133 Van Dissel’s highly international orienta-
128 Gijsbert Frans van Dissel, De internationale organisatie van het radio-electrische verkeer: Voor-
drachten gehouden door comm. Brenot voor de afdeling der radio-telegrafie van de école supérieure 
d’électricité gedurende het semester 1920-1921 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, n.d.).
129 “Letter from G.F. van Dissel to R. Haas,” The Hague, 19 Oct. 1929, Personal Files: G.F. van Dissel, LoN.
130 “Letter from Eysinga, to League Secretary General Drummond,” Leyden, 5 Oct. 1929, Personal Files: 
G.F. van Dissel, LoN.
131 “Letter from Van Dissel to Haas,” The Hague, 19 Oct. 1929, 3, Personal Files: G.F. van Dissel, LoN.
132 During the early 1930s Van Dissel focused on electricity issues and was appointed secretary of the 
OCT’s Committee on Electric Questions. Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in 
the Construction of Electricity Networks (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008), 90.
133 A few years later the OCT merged with the Economic and Financial section as a result of which 
the entire directorate disappeared and Van Dissel gave up his position as Chief. BUIT, Documents de la 
Conférence Européenne des Radiocommunications Lucerne, MAI/JUIN 1933 (Berne: BUIT, 1933), 18; IBU, 
First Intercontinental Meeting of Broadcasting Organisations, Paris, Febrary 27-March 6 1936: Preparatory 
Documents and Minutes of the Meeting (Geneva: IBU Office, 1936), 12; BUIT, Documents de la Conférence 
Internationale des Radiocommunications du Caire (1938), Tome I: Propositions transmises au Bureau de 
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tion must have stimulated the discussions with Burrows further, in particular their 
exchange of views on a Radiodiffusion mondiale. Their contacts seem to have been 
frequent, informal, perhaps even on the basis of friendship. Van Dissel would give 
their visions about a Radiodiffusion mondiale an official character.
In October 1931 he sent a provocative Memorandum to the IBU Secretariat. 
In light of international developments across the globe, he proposed that the IBU 
extend its view and influence beyond the borders of Europe. He mentioned the 
short wave stations employed in France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, 
and North America, and the rapidly increasing interest in radio broadcasts by au-
diences in far-away countries with different climates and political circumstances 
who lacked a regular broadcasting service. According to Van Dissel, there was no 
time to lose in ending this transitory and irregular phase. A collective effort was 
required on a global scale.
Van Dissel dwelled on his plan for a Radiodiffusion mondiale. In addition to 
an expansion of inter-continental program exchange activities, the IBU, in his 
opinion, should accelerate the process of worldwide broadcasting in general. Van 
Dissel believed that the IBU should establish a permanent special committee for 
short waves in which other interested organizations could participate. Moreover, 
he considered it of the utmost importance that an independent global institution 
be created for broadcasting as well, to oversee its efficient development. Members 
of such an organization should come from the private sector, governments, or in-
ternational institutions that either already possessed or would soon acquire the 
technical means to realize broadcasts with a global radius.134 According to Van 
Dissel, the IBU should examine as quickly as possible the format of such an orga-
nization consisting of members with different nationalities.
In Van Dissel’s view, a special study committee should prepare the statutes for 
this new organization with the help of expertise available in the IBU Legal, Relay 
and Rapprochement Committees. Since the world already recognized the IBU as 
European broadcasting expert, it would be fair to place the new organization un-
der direct supervision of the IBU during its first phase, Van Dissel reflected. This 
construction was designed to be as supportive as possible of the new organiza-
tion. Supervision here referred to an indirect relationship since many members of 
the new organization were IBU members already. During a transitory period the 
new organization should then gain sufficient strength to become an independent 
l’Union pour être soumises à la Conférence: Propositions, notes, déclarations, études, remarques soumises 
pendant la Conférence (Berne: BUIT, 1938), xxi; BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Européenne de Radio-
diffusion, Montreux, Mars/Avril 1939 (Berne: BUIT, 1939), 12.
134 “Radiodiffusion mondiale,” Série 2862, 15 Octobre 1931, 1-2, quote: 2, box 85, file Relais, Général V 
1931, IBU. 
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organization. After that it could become an ordinary IBU member like all other 
broadcasting organizations.135 Van Dissel had designed a relatively complicated 
transnational structure for a global broadcasting institution that should realize 
efficiency in worldwide broadcasting under the supervision and later as member 
of the IBU. The IBU Council decided to let the Rapprochement Committee study 
the proposal.136
Only one day later Van Dissel withdrew his proposal. He realized that his idea 
had been too premature given the state-of-the art technology. He proposed that 
the IBU should focus on the exploration of a possible role for the short waves in in-
ternational relaying activities instead. There appeared to be a large basis of support 
for his proposal in the IBU. The IBU Council translated the League memo into a 
resolution, recognizing the power of broadcasting to improve international rela-
tions. The Council encouraged its members to fully cooperation with studies and 
conferences on topics related to the international nature of the medium. Its mem-
bers should “develop in their countries radio broadcasting via the short waves.” The 
Council decided to integrate Van Dissel’s initial idea of a worldwide organization 
for broadcasting. Both the Technical and the Rapprochement Committee should 
study the options to develop “this interesting form of radio broadcasting.”137 Van 
Dissel’s memo was the first time that the League set the IBU’s agenda, proposing 
a European led, global organization of broadcasting. The IBU did not need any 
further encouragement to pursue such an organization.
The IBU paved the way for a Union universelle. Between 1932 and 1936 the IBU 
Technical and Rapprochement Committees sought to establish international 
broadcasting on a global level. Initially, they explored options to expand the Union 
from a European to a universal organization. Such an idea might seem utopian at 
first, Burrows argued, “but it is highly likely that in some years’ time it will be con-
sidered the normal development of new possibilities offered by broadcasting.”138 
According to Braillard: 
the increasing evolution of broadcasting problems renders increasingly 
135 “Radiodiffusion mondiale,” Série 2862, 2, box 85, file Relais, Général V, IBU.
136 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1931, 71, IBU.
137 “développer dans leurs pays la Radiodiffusion mondiale à ondes courtes”…“cette forme intéressante 
de radiodiffusion.” P.V. Conseil Administrative 1931, 78, IBU; “Procès-verbaux des réunions de la Com-
mission de Rapprochement tenue à Rome,” Série 2924, 25 nov. 1931, 4, P.V. Commission des Programmes 
[Anciennement Commissions de Rapprochement et Relais] 1926-1939, IBU.
138 “mais il est probable que dans quelques années elle sera considérée comme le développement normal 
des nouvelles possibilités offertes par la radiodiffusion.” “Expansion de l’Union, Rapporteur: A.R. Bur-
rows,” Série 3188, 24 mai 1932, 1, CA Document Series, IBU.
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urgent the organization of worldwide broadcasting: this responds to tech-
nical necessities on the one hand and, on the other, responds to the gen-
eral scope that broadcasting has to pursue in its broadest sense, this is to 
say the rapprochement between peoples.139
Whereas Braillard approached the idea from a technical perspective, Burrows in 
contrast added the political and economic ramifications. Both promoted a global 
union of broadcasters in light of what they considered the main aim of broadcast-
ing, namely the creation of mutual understanding between peoples. 
Braillard discussed the idea of a Union universelle in the context of the never-
ending increase in inter-continental relaying and the complex character of the al-
location of short wave frequencies. Broadcasting over the short wave increased 
rapidly. Braillard referred to growing colonial broadcasting, to the global broad-
casts of the League of Nations and Vatican Radio (Chapter 4), and to increased 
relay activities between parts of the globe sharing the same languages. As well as 
the English language, this also applied to regular relays between South America 
and Spain, he pointed out. Though the need to make arrangements for the regula-
tion of short wave frequency allocations was not urgent at that moment, Braillard 
stressed that such urgency would soon emerge. Would it not be better to prevent 
rather than try to cure a disease?140 
Such standardization required substantial analysis of the characteristics of the 
short waves. The technicalities of broadcasting over the short waves proved more 
problematic than broadcasting over all the other waves together. Favorably, broad-
casts over the short waves “could be directional if desired, and with quite modest 
power of perhaps 10 kW, could attain ranges of many thousands of kilometers, 
relying on reflection from the ionized layers in the upper atmosphere.”141 They 
were a cheap alternative to the long and medium waves. The short wave transmis-
sions however, rather than following the curvature of the earth like the medium 
and long waves, beamed against the ionized layers in the air. Varying with the time 
of day as well as the season, reception depended on the distance between the trans-
mitter and the receiver. As a result, one station needed several frequencies during 
the day to be able to broadcast its programs.142 Together with the need to improve 
139 “…l’évolution incessante des problèmes de la radiodiffusion rend de plus en plus urgente l’organisation 
d’une Radiodiffusion mondiale: ceci répond à des nécessités techniques d’une part, et, d’autre part, répond 
au but général que doit poursuivre la radiodiffusion dans son sens le plus général, c’est-à-dire le rappro-
chement des peuples.” “Radiodiffusion mondiale: Rapporteur: R. Braillard, Président de la Commission 
Technique,” Série 3180, 23 mai 1932, 1, CA Document Series, IBU.
140 “Radiodiffusion mondiale,” Série 3180, 1, CA Document Series, IBU.
141 Williams, A History of Technology: Vol VII The Twentieth Century c. 1900 to c. 1950 Part II, 1255.
142 Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 203.
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short wave transmitters, increase power, and fine-tune antennas and improvements 
in short wave receivers, these frequency characteristics complicated standardization 
activities substantially.143 The expanding international relay activities and the tech-
nically complicated structure of the short waves required a global approach to the 
problems of broadcasting. Braillard therefore pleaded for a Union universelle.
Braillard and Burrows outlined the idea of a Union universelle under the head-
ing of expanding the IBU. In their opinion the IBU had made some remarkable 
achievements, creating standards to which so many organizations adhered. Burrows 
pointed out that the European broadcasters had put much research and effort into 
these standards. Many extra-European broadcasting organizations like those in 
Japan had always followed these developments with interest, using them to their 
advantage. This implied a broad interest in and recognition of IBU standards outside 
the IBU community, even though such standards would not always be integrated 
one-by-one. It also implied that the greater research and development burden re-
mained with the European broadcasters. According to Burrows, transforming the 
IBU into a Union universelle would further strengthen the global position of IBU 
standards.144 Moreover, research and development costs could then be divided more 
equally among broadcasters globally, a development that would reduce costs for 
European broadcasters.145 The new situation would bring economic and technical 
efficiency under the supervision of a Union universelle, the IBU.
The discussion explored several different visions of such a Union universelle. 
The IBU could become a global organization with active membership only, in 
which all national members had the same rights and obligations including the right 
to vote. In this case the world would resemble a community of national broad-
casters in which Europe would not have a central or exceptional position. The 
IBU could also become some kind of federation of broadcasters. Supported by his 
Technical Committee, Braillard favored a simple amendment of the IBU statutes 
that would delete the Extra-European membership category altogether. Current 
Extra-European members would then become active members, turning the IBU 
into a universal organization almost overnight.146 The alternative was much less fa-
vorable, Braillard argued. In a scenario where other parties in the world developed 
a similar initiative, they might even absorb the IBU in the end. Braillard suggests 
that with more and more organizations participating across the world, the univer-
sality of the IBU would eventually become firmly grounded over time.147 
143 Fickers, “Broadcasting as Critical Infrastructure,” 14.
144 “Expansion de l’Union,” Série 3188, 2, CA Documents Series, IBU.
145 Ibid.
146 “Radiodiffusion mondiale,” Série 3180, 1, 3, CA Document Series, IBU.
147 Ibid., 3.
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Braillard proposed another concept as alternative or step towards a Union uni-
verselle. To avoid difficulties with extra-European organizations, the IBU could 
establish sections based on regional definitions like a European section that in-
cluded Northern Africa or a South American section. These sections could then 
optimally fine-tune global interests with problems of a more continental nature 
comparable to issues in the present-day IBU. From time to time qualified delegates 
would participate in a joint conference studying problems of a global nature.148 
If the proposal took root, the IBU would then become a federation in which the 
regional sections would have relative freedom to maneuver under the auspices of 
the general aims and standards of the Union. Although Europe would be only one 
section among others, the federation would continue in the European tradition of 
the IBU with Geneva as central hub for the organization.
Burrows posed the question more openly to the other discussants. We have to 
know “if the Union wants to become a global organization or remain a European 
organization,” he asked.149 There was possible global support for expanding 
the Union into a Union universelle. Burrows urged the discussants to consider 
Braillard’s proposal, adding that the IBU could also approach the extra-European 
members to give them the choice of active membership. This might make it easier 
to achieve a Union universelle. Whatever format the Union universelle might have, 
Burrows in any case pleaded in favor of an “inter-continental expansion of the 
Union.”150 He agreed with Braillard that it was absolutely necessary to envisage 
worldwide collaboration if only to resolve the increasingly pressing problems with 
global interference. These problems could not be resolved without a strong spirit 
of international collaboration.151
The discussion ended with the general recognition that no effective study about 
a specific format for a Union universelle could be undertaken until the IBU com-
mittees had all the documentation on the topic. The Rapprochement Committee 
would look at the possibility of more straightforward cooperation with the Extra-
European countries on all aspects of broadcasting. The committee sought an-
swers to questions such as whether they should consider expanding the IBU given 
the actual situation of broadcasting in and outside Europe, and if so, in which 
148 “section européenne englobant le Nord de l’Afrique, section Nord Américaine, section Sud Amé-
ricaine, section du Pacifique englobant le Japon, l’Indochine, l’Australie, etc…Chacune de ses sections 
traiterait au mieux les intérêts, communs, les problèmes de caractère continental analogues à ceux qui pré-
occupent notre Union actuelle, mais de temps à autre, des déléguées qualifiés de chacune de ses sections se 
réuniraient en conférence pour étudier en commun les problèmes ayant un caractère mondial.” Ibid.
149 “si l’Union veut devenir un organisme mondial ou rester un organisme européen.” “Expansion de 
l’Union,” Série 3188, 1, CA Documents Series, IBU.
150 “expansion intercontinentale de l’Union.” Ibid., 3.
151 “Radiodiffusion mondiale,” Série 3180, 4, CA Document Series, IBU. 
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domains and in what form a more straightforward cooperation might emerge. The 
Technical Committee in turn would carry out a separate study on international 
relaying over the short waves that should clear the way for future standardization 
of their usage.152 It would seek straightforward collaboration with engineers from 
extra-European countries at the 1932 Madrid Conference. The Assembly agreed 
but decided instead that the Technical Committee should focus on all the ques-
tions that could possibly hinder IBU’s freedom of action in the future.153 
In order to seek a more straightforward collaboration and possible expansion of 
the Union, the IBU contacted the United States representatives at the 1932 Madrid 
Conference. Regular relays between Europe and the United States existed already, 
but their broadcasting standards and networks differed substantially. Braillard 
noted that “especially in the United States there has developed another technique 
of which we know too little in general, just as Americans are often poorly informed 
about what we do in Europe.”154 Their mutual ignorance had led to troubles at 
times, Braillard found. Straightforward collaboration would facilitate efficient 
broadcasting. Moreover, it would have a positive effect on their position during 
international conferences like Madrid regarding other means of telecommunica-
tions. Straightforward collaboration would benefit all. 
The United States had already been expressing interest in exchange and col-
laboration. In addition to CBS and NBC, the American National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) had recently applied for IBU extra-European membership. 
Burrows described the NAB as a kind of American union for broadcasting that 
represented some 170 American broadcasting organizations.155 The NAB was the 
primary lobbying organization for commercial broadcasters in the United States, 
and consequently the best place to start discussing straightforward collaboration. 
Although the IBU representatives in Madrid approached engineers from several 
organizations, they above all seem to have had positive discussions with Louis 
Caldwell, President of the NAB Committee for Foreign Relations. The IBU asked 
Caldwell to consider developing an association for all American broadcasting 
152 “Procès-verbaux des Réunions de Commission de Rapprochement et de Relais réunis tenue à 
Montreux,” Série 3245, 10 juin 1932, 8-9, P.V. Commission des Programmes [Anciennement Commissions 
de Rapprochement et Relais] 1926-1939, IBU.
153 “Procès-verbal de la Réunion commune de la Commission de Rapprochement et de la Commission 
Technique,” Série 3263, 27 juin 1932, 1-2, P.V. Commission des Programmes [Anciennement Commissions 
de Rapprochement et Relais] 1926-1939, IBU. 
154 “Parallèlement, et notamment aux Etats-Unis, une autre technique s’est développée dont, en général, 
nous connaissons trop peu de chose, de même que les Américains sont souvent assez mal informés de ce 
que nous faisons en Europe (nous avons pu le constater encore récemment à Copenhague.)” “Radiodiffu-
sion mondiale,” Série 3180, 2, CA Document Series, IBU.
155 “Expansion de l’Union,” Série 3188, 1, CA Documents Series, IBU.
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organizations and to establish more straightforward cooperation between any 
such new organization and the IBU.156
Caldwell has been called “one of the most influential figures in the history of 
broadcasting regulation.”157 The IBU decided it could not wish for a better ally. He 
“was the most visible [and most important] legal authority on broadcast policy” in 
the United States. He “worked as a top-level legal adviser on behalf of both NAB 
and NBC,” as chair of the American Bar Association and, moreover, had a success-
ful law practice with the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) as its clientele.158 In 
the eyes of the IBU, Caldwell could establish and lead the lobby for setting up an 
encompassing organization for broadcasting in the USA. Though Caldwell seems 
to have responded positively to the IBU overture, the initiative stalled before it 
could get started. Caldwell almost immediately became deeply involved with in-
ternal NAB difficulties at home. Even though the IBU continued to correspond 
with Caldwell, they would not pursue the idea in the following years.159 The in-
ternal U.S. difficulties were an unfortunate set-back for the IBU and its hopes to 
realize a Union universelle in the short term. 
In the meantime, the regional organization of telecommunications and 
broadcasting across the globe took off. The African countries had postponed the 
regulation of broadcasting to a later date, but several did establish the African 
Telecommunication Union following the ITU model in October 1935.160 Efforts 
in South America as well as in Asia and Oceania also focused on the organization 
of broadcasting.161 In Latin and Southern America, broadcasting seems to have 
156 “Procès-verbal des Réunions des Commissions de Rapprochement et de Relais tenue à Bruxelles,” 
Série 3550, 10 mars 1933, 1, P.V. Commission des Programmes [Anciennement Commissions de Rappro-
chement et Relais] 1926-1939, IBU. 
157 Michele Hilmes, Only Connect: A Cultural History of Broadcasting in the United States (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 67.
158 Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications, Mass Media, and Democracy: The Battle for the Control 
of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 131; Hilmes, Only Connect, 67.
159 “Procès-verbaux des Réunions des Commissions de Rapprochement et des Relais tenue à 
Amsterdam,” Série 3922, 13 nov. 1933, 2, P.V. Commission des Programmes [Anciennement Commissions 
de Rapprochement et Relais] 1926-1939, IBU.
160 John D. Tomlinson, “The International Control of Radiocommunications” (Ph.D. diss., Université de 
Genève, 1938), 251-252.
161 “G. Gallarti to A. Pelt,” March 5, 1935, 3, registry file 9G, R-4321, file 15874/663, LoN. Whether 
their efforts followed up on the IBU initiatives in Madrid to seek straightforward collaboration with these 
organizations remains unclear from the archives. Neither material on the Madrid Conference collected by 
the ITU, nor the IBU Relay and Rapprochement Committee documents give any details on the contacts 
and discussions the IBU had with the engineers and participants of extra-European broadcasting organi-
zations. BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Radiotélégraphique Internationale de Madrid (1932): Tome 
II: Travaux de la Conférence (Délibérations, Actes définitifs) (Berne: BUIT, 1932); Box 14, Conférences 
et conventions internationales, IBU; Box 85, Relais 1926-1950, IBU; P.V. Commission des Programmes 
[Anciennement Commissions de Rapprochement et Relais] 1926-1939, IBU; P.V. Conseil Administrative 
1932-1935, IBU.
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developed in two different ways. Most Latin and Southern American broadcasting 
stations worked closely with the American radio industry and U.S. advertizing 
agencies. Moreover, U.S. policy makers worked hard to increase their influence 
over the development of broadcasting in this region in order to reduce European 
influence during large International Telecommunication Conferences. These 
American efforts turned out to be very successful.162
When one explores the organization of broadcasting into larger regional agree-
ments and pan-national Southern American organizations, there seems to have been 
considerable overlap with IBU initiatives. In August 1934, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay together signed the South American Radio Agreement 
in Buenos Aires. In the eyes of Tomlinson, the new South American Broadcasting 
Union (USARD) performed many of the functions for South American countries 
which the U.I.R. [IBU] performed for Europe.163 Though none of the signatories 
had links to the IBU, the organization and its focal points resembled IBU activities 
substantially.164 Like the IBU, USARD had a permanent center in Montevideo but 
no technical center. Unlike the IBU, each USARD agreement had to be ratified by 
the national governments, while countries outside the agreements could choose to 
adhere to them. The agreement in any case facilitated the technical development of 
broadcasting networks by for instance creating frequency tables and preventing pro-
grams that would damage international understanding.165 Both aspects of the agree-
ment corresponded with focal points discussed in the IBU. The initiatives in South 
American broadcasting seemed to combine the tradition of American broadcasting 
as well as that of the IBU. 
Unlike U.S. and South American developments, the initiatives in Asia and 
Oceania appeared to still be in their infancy. Broadcasting organizations in these 
areas seemed to want to develop their medium in the direction of a regional or-
ganization.166 Both the recent movement in the east as well as the establishment 
of USARD west of Europe took place before the IBU took any decisions about its 
possible global expansion. As a result, the IBU was forced to consider these new 
developments. The Union created a small sub-committee to examine the possible 
162 James Schwoch, The American Radio Industry and its Latin American Activities, 1900-1939 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1990), 7, 81-83.
163 Their second conference in June 1937 revised the initial Buenos Aires agreement, and went into 
force January 1, 1938. Tomlinson describes the Union as an organization of a semi-permanent character 
that consisted of periodic conferences held at least every two years. Tomlinson, “The International Control 
of Radiocommunications,” 212-213.
164 Only Argentina would become an IBU associate member in 1936, followed by Uruguay in 1939. 
IBU, Twenty Years, 73-74.
165 Huth, La radiodiffusion, 388.
166 “G. Gallarti to A. Pelt,” 3, registry file 9G, R-4321, file 15874/663, LoN.
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consequences of these latest developments on their idea of a Union universelle. 
The IBU concluded that it was less problematic to realize a federal union. The idea 
of a universal union with only active members who were equally important was 
abandoned. The IBU decided to pursue the vision of itself as a long-term global 
federal union for broadcasting, seemingly based on a Eurocentric idea of global-
ism. The recent developments of a new regional organization might well facilitate 
IBU’s transition into such a federal union, the sub-committee had argued. In fact, 
the pressing problem of the short waves had already triggered American, South-
American and also groups from the Far-East to ask the IBU to take the “initiative to 
these studies.” They even “declared themselves ready to collaborate efficaciously.”167 
Apparently, these other groups were seeking more straightforward collaboration 
worldwide and wanted the IBU to take the lead. The Rapprochement Committee 
advised its Council it would be better if these extra-European members organized 
broadcasting by their own choice in groups analogous to that of the IBU and that 
these groups could meet in a federal cooperation.168 With this decision the IBU 
accepted that there should be a worldwide federal organization of broadcasting, 
preferably based on the IBU’s exemplary role.
In response to these requests to take the lead in global studies on short wave 
broadcasting, the IBU Council decided to organize a world conference on broad-
casting in 1936. The conference would have to establish close and straightfor-
ward global collaboration between broadcasting organizations on the most 
pressing issues. In addition, the conference needed to make firm preparations 
for the important international CCIR conference in Bucharest in 1937 and for 
the 1938 International Radio Communications Conference in Cairo. The First 
Intercontinental Meeting of Broadcasting Organizations in Paris in 1936 would 
have to strengthen the existing bond between PTT Administrations, the IBU asso-
ciate members, and other broadcasting groups across the globe. The IBU seemed 
to envisage that Paris would pave the way for a transition of its organization into a 
global federation for broadcasting in the long term. This vision was facilitated by 
the request of broadcasters in other regions to take the lead in global studies on 
the short waves.
167 “…l’initiative de telles études, en se déclarant prêts à y collaborer efficacement.” “Recommandation 
de la commission technique au conseil,” Série 4840, CA Document Series, IBU.
168 “qu’il serait désirable qu’elles s’organisent selon leur propre choix en des groupements analogues à 
celui de l’U.I.R. et que ce groupements à leur tour se réunissent en une coopération fédérative.” “Procès-
verbaux des Réunions de la Commission de Rapprochement tenue à Varsovie,” Série 5273, 2 août 1935, 
3-4, P.V. Commission des Programmes [Anciennement Commissions de Rapprochement et Relais] 1926-
1939, IBU.
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During the preparations for Paris, Van Dissel posed a serious warning to the 
IBU. He had stayed in touch over the years. By 1935 he had become a regular at-
tendee at IBU Technical Committee meetings on short wave broadcasting, some-
thing he would continue to do after the conference in Paris in 1936.169 Van Dissel 
warned Braillard of the potential problems the IBU could face if it really tried 
to integrate the standardization of the short waves into its activities. Since short 
wave transmissions reached out globally, Van Dissel insisted, the IBU should de-
part from its official framework that was currently nothing more than a European 
union. Moreover, he foresaw the need to seek a practical definition for the genre of 
short wave broadcasting “since it does not fall within the idea of national broad-
casting anymore. Together with the value given to these special services, this ques-
tion will raise problems of an international character, some even of a non-technical 
and political character.”170 Van Dissel’s warning merely seems to have stimulated 
the IBU to find a line of discourse that would justify its taking the lead in the global 
rather than the European matter of short wave broadcasting. 
IBU took the advice and circumvented the problem by discussing a vision of 
global collaboration based on an equal footing between regions. Simple collabo-
ration between regions would not interfere with the IBU’s status as a European 
union and envisioned a world that would not favor Europe over other regions. The 
world meeting would have an informal and unofficial character. It would bring 
together PTT administrations, IBU associate members, representatives of national 
and international unions, associations and broadcasting groups created outside 
Europe as well as extra-European organizations operating where there were still 
no such international groups. Together they would have to find ways of convincing 
governments of the necessity to reach international agreements on short waves. 
This was because, even though “broadcasting over the short waves, on short no-
tice, has become a true public service,” its technological expansion “continuously 
and more vigilantly holds the attention of governments,” Braillard argued.171 The 
169 Though most of the exchanges of ideas must have happened in the hallways or over dinner, the 
archives indicate that these discussions continued even after the League Memorandum before the IBU 
Council in 1931. “Letter from Burrows to Van Dissel,” 2 May 1932, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 
13698/2081, LoN. 
170 “ne rentre plus dans le cadre d’une radiodiffusion nationale, et cette question, ainsi que la valeur à 
donner à ces services spéciaux, soulèveront, des problèmes d’un caractère international, certains même 
d’un caractère non technique et parfois politique.” “Rapport sur la session du Conseil de l’Union Interna-
tionale de Radiodiffusion tenue à Genève du 20 au 26 février 1935,” 11 mars 1935, 4, registry file 9G, box 
R-4321, file 15874/663, LoN.
171 “…la radiodiffusion sur ondes courtes est devenue en très peu de temps un véritable service 
publique qui retient l’attention sans cesse plus vigilante des gouvernements.” Raymond Braillard, “L’avenir 
de la radiodiffusion sur ondes courtes et la conférence du Caire,” Radiodiffusion, no. 5 (November 1937): 
13.
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relatively small short waveband between 6,000 and 28,0000 kc/sec, assigned to 
broadcasting by Madrid, only guaranteed space for about 91 available channels, 
or even as few as 85.172 The real number of channels in operation exceeded this 
number by far. In its plea, the IBU merely stressed its advisory role.
The IBU could plan the conference program as it wished. Consequently, the 
IBU Bureau, together with the heads of its committees, put all topics of a techni-
cal, juridical, and programming nature on the agenda. Each issue served to clarify 
the mechanism for establishing effective worldwide cooperation with a permanent 
character.173 In other words, the IBU set the agenda to visualize global broadcast-
ing in all relevant domains. The issue of short waves was one of the most pressing 
172 Tomlinson, “The International Control of Radiocommunications,” 219.
173 “Procès-verbaux des Réunions de la Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 5273, 4, P.V. 
Commission des Programmes, IBU.
Table 3.1 – List of inter-continental circuits spreading out from Europe, 1935-1936
1. France Paris Algiers – Rabat – Cairo – Saigon 
Maracay – Rio de Janeiro – Buenos Aires
2. Germany Berlin Bandung – Bangkok – Mantilla – Tokyo
Cairo – New York – Maracay – Buenos
Aires – Rio de Janeiro – certain ships at sea
3. Great Britain London* Canada – New York – Rio de Janeiro
Buenos Aires – the Cape – Australia
Tokyo – British India – Egypt
Palestine – certain ships at sea
4. Italy Rome New York – Tokyo – Buenos Aires
Rio de Janeiro – Cairo
5. League of Nations Prangins New York – Buenos Aires – Rio de 
Janeiro – Shanghai – Tokyo – Sydney
Melbourne
6. Netherlands Hilversum Dutch East and West Indies – Japan 
British India – South Africa –
Egypt – Palestine – United States
Central and South America – Australia
New Zealand – other regions by 
special arrangement
7. Spain Madrid Buenos Aires
* “These circuits can be used for broadcasting during the hours announced for public service; 
the indication of these hours can be obtained from the General Post Office. Broadcast trans-
mission may, however, sometimes be arranged outside of these hours; applications for the use 
of these circuits for broadcasting must be made to the local telephone authorities who will put 
themselves into communication on the subject with the British General Post Office.” 
Source: Brochure des Relais: corrigendum à la série 5652, Chapter VII, Série 5779, 22 avril 1936, 
box 85, file Relais, Brochures des Relais 1927-1936, IBU.
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technical questions. As the IBU could also set the agenda for the technical discus-
sions, it could actively pull the use of short waves into the domain of public broad-
casting and towards the ideological goal of driving the improvement of interna-
tional relations, of mutual understanding, and neighborliness between people. The 
Paris meeting in 1936 was a unique event in broadcasting history. It was the first 
time broadcasting organizations joined in a world-wide meeting dealing with all 
aspects of broadcasting. Because of the IBU’s dominant role, the meeting seemed 
to have been inspired by European expertise and visions of society.
In preparation for Paris, the IBU and ITU experts on the IBU technical commit-
tee studied the issue of short waves from the perspective of the European region. 
They collaborated with organizations like the Bureau of Standards in Washington 
D.C. In order to perform a field survey, the IBU Brussels Checking Center opened 
up a station to measure short wave transmissions in 1935. The field survey pro-
vided a wealth of new information on the status quo of short waves in Europe. 
The short waves expanded extremely rapidly (Table 3.1). They mostly reached out 
to colonies like the Paris connection with Algiers, the London connection with 
British India, and the Netherlands Hilversum connection with the Dutch East and 
West Indies. Other connections had been constructed only recently either to facili-
tate bi-lateral or multilateral inter-continental program exchange or in response to 
the call from the IBU and the League of Nations in 1930 to develop short waves. 
The connections with the United States, Japan, and China had been constructed 
for this purpose. The League of Nations’ short wave station at Prangins could also 
be employed as an intercontinental connection in the inter-continental relay net-
work.174
Many broadcasters in Europe employed short waves to communicate with spe-
cific audiences. At times when they exchanged programs with other organizations or 
continents, their short wave stations functioned instead as hubs in regional relay net-
works. These short waves then connected regional relay networks across the globe, 
creating a global relay network. At the receiving end, broadcasting organizations 
174 The idea to make the LoN short wave station at Prangins available to the IBU coordinated inter-
national radio broadcasts seems to have been discussed only recently in light of the broadcast of “Youth 
Sings over the Frontiers” (Chapter 6). The League wondered if such a broadcast “could be considered 
important enough and of such character that it could be relayed by Radio Nations’.” “ne pourrait pas être 
considérés assez importants et d’un caractère tel qu’ils puissent être relayés par ‘Radio Nations’.” “Rapport 
sur la session du Conseil de L’Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion,” 9, registry file 9G, box R-4321, file 
15874/663, LoN. One month later the League again considered the employment of Radio Nations for re-
laying the IBU international programs. The Committee considered the idea in light of Radio Nation’s role 
in times of crisis or peace, and ultimately decided that a Comité des Telecommunications should examine 
the issue. Van Dissel in any case seems to have been a proponent of the idea. “Metternich to Pilloti,” 12 
April 1935, 3-5, registry file 9G, box R-4321, file 15874/663, LoN.
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would broadcast the shared programs over their home channels. Such a construc-
tion allowed the IBU to negotiate its European standards on a global scale. Since the 
relayed programs would ultimately be broadcast over national channels, the short 
wave relays served as a means to an end in a similar fashion as the European stan-
dards for wired and wireless broadcasting created by the IBU and ITU. 
Creating a global broadcasting network turned out to be far more complicated 
than an interconnected regional network consisting of wireless broadcasting over 
the medium and long waves. The technicalities of short waves, in particular the lack 
of knowledge about them, prevented a simple employment of these stations for the 
IBU relaying activities. Short waves gave no guarantee that inter-continental hubs 
could be used for broadcasting at every hour of the day. Some circuits could adjust 
wavelengths according to the time day, but for others there were certain moments in 
the daytime when the regularity of services over long distance radiotelephonic cir-
cuits could not be assured. In these cases, parties would have to contact the respon-
sible radio-telephonic authorities before they decided in favor of relays that included 
hiring an inter-continental radiotelephonic circuit.175 The Paris meeting would have 
to provide additional knowledge about the technicalities of short waves in other than 
European areas of the globe in order to deal with these problems and uncertainties. 
The Technical Section of the 1936 Paris meeting established a special sub-com-
mittee to deal with these extra-European issues of short wave broadcasting.176 The 
committee considered the current situation of these extra-European regional net-
works, within what limits and bands they wanted an extension of their wavebands, 
and what local or technical reasons such as geography, demography, climate, or 
parasites they thought would justify such extension.177 The sub-committee con-
sisted of representatives from the French PTT, the Ente Italiano per le Audizioni 
Radiofoniche, the Portuguese PTT, the Russian PTT, the German Reichspost, 
RCA, the Argentine Association of Broadcasters (the initiators of USARD), the 
Papal State, the Dutch Philips Gloeilampenfabriek [light bulb company], as well as 
the League’s wireless expert Van Dissel. The committee had a fair representation 
of engineers from public broadcasting organizations, PTT administrations, and 
private radio industry enterprises, but a less balanced geographical representation. 
Europe dominated the committee, supported by representatives from Southern 
175 “Brochure des Relais: Corrigendum à la Série 5652,” Série 5779, 22 avril 1936, Chapter VII, box 85, 
file Relais, Bruchures des Relais 1927-1936, IBU. The IBU officially developed the Brochure in 1935 in 
preparation for the Paris World Conference to be held early 1936.
176 It also focused on the status quo of broadcasting in general, on interference, on the drafting of 
technical grounds for creating an intercontinental agreement on the distribution of available short wave 
frequencies. IBU, Documents of the Paris Meeting, 183.
177 Ibid., 229.
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and Northern America, as well as global wireless broadcasters like Vatican Radio 
and the League’s Radio Nations. The east did not participate at all. The committee 
that was supposed to focus on broadcasting questions outside Europe had a trans-
national character, but an unbalanced Europe-centered global representation.
No international meeting had been held about the technicalities of short waves 
on such a global scale before. The committee obtained a clear status quo of short 
wave activities by compiling a list of all the short wave stations in operation across 
the world, their frequencies, and the regularity with which they broadcast (all day 
or less regularly). The few short wavebands assigned to broadcasting by the 1932 
Madrid Convention failed by far to meet the demand in 1936. The frequent use of 
short waves for global broadcasting from Europe already caused problems, but the 
true problem was in the tropical countries close to the equator. The geographical 
location and mountainous terrain meant that medium and long waves could not 
secure a nation-wide broadcasting service like they could in Europe or Russia. The 
Columbian PTT stressed the dire need for using short waves for national broad-
casting, let alone for realizing regional broadcasting.178 Global interaction on short 
waves should secure a global connection of regional broadcasting networks as well 
as the idea that national broadcasting services existed at the receiving end. 
The Paris meeting concluded in favor of creating an “intercontinental wave plan” 
based on the cordial relations established there. It was hoped that such a plan would 
serve “effectively the cause of better international understanding and the cause of 
peace” as the French host Pellenc expressed it.179 Non-European participants unani-
mously agreed that the IBU should take the lead in the realization of such a plan, 
to which end the organization would have to arrange future follow-up meetings.180 
The Paris meeting seems to have paved the way for the IBU’s transition into a global 
federal organization for broadcasting, and the IBU was appointed to centrally co-
ordinate the process. European values and traditions would form the basis of the 
federation, creating a Eurocentric global organization of broadcasting. In practice 
this meant that the IBU, ITU, and European PTT administrations, via their statutory 
collaboration, were closely involved in the process.181 
178 Ibid., 209-210.
179 Ibid., 183, 220, 235.
180 Ibid., 240-241.
181 Where the overseas countries asked the IBU to take the lead in coordinating technical aspects, at 
the same time the section dealing with programs accepted a resolution with similar content. The resolu-
tion appointed the IBU Office “as the centralising office for documentation relating to intercontinental 
programme questions and to act as a liaison office between interested organisations for the time being.” 
Ibid., 223, 237.
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Figure 3.7 – Testing the directivity of short-wave transmitting aerials, July-October 1937 
Source: BUIT, Documents de Caire Tome I, 408. The test has been published by the International 
Telecommunication Union, but has been originally made by the International Broadcasting 
Union. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
The organization of global broadcasting became a loose collaboration officially. In 
the years leading up to the 1938 International Radio Communications Conference 
in Cairo, broadcasters conducted further regional tests with short waves as arranged 
in Paris (Figure 3.7). As agreed, the IBU collected all test results. Though the tests 
immediately increased the efficiency of the global wireless short wave network, the 
improvements could not compete with the incessant growth of short waves during 
these years. In January 1937 only half of the more than 200 short wave stations from 
48 countries could operate within the short wavebands assigned for broadcasting by 
Madrid. No fewer than 94 stations operated outside these bands, 17 in Europe, 8 in 
Asia, 68 in Central and South America, against 1 in Africa between the 50-10 meter 
band.182 Less than five months later the number of short wave stations had risen to 
217, of which some 99 functioned outside the Madrid wavebands.183 As these were 
minimum figures, the actual situation was far more pressing. 
182 “Proposition pour la Conférence Internationale des Télécommunications du Caire (1938),” Doc. 366, 
Bruxelles, 25 janv. 1937, 6-8, registry file 9G, box R-4321, file 27520/663, LoN.
183 “Sous comité des ondes courtes,” Doc. 418 corrigée, Bruxelles, 22 juin 1937, 3, registry file 9G, 
R-4321, file 29167/663, jacket 1, LoN. 
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When the IBU discussed the new status quo in 1937, it established a special sub-
committee to deal with short waves. As a result, the IBU decided that the time was 
right to create standards for short wave broadcasting like the separation of waves of 
10 kc/sec, exploration of simultaneous broadcasting over short waves, and the pos-
sible employment of directional antennas. The IBU decided that standardizing the 
power of stations would be too premature given the state-of-the art technique.184 On 
the basis of these globally conducted tests, the IBU designed a draft plan as starting 
point for discussion at the Cairo Conference.
The plan urged Cairo to create larger wavebands for broadcasting over long, 
medium, and short waves, as well as in the fixed services (since the broadcasting 
relay activities went over the telephone lines). The different regions would continue 
to allocate medium and long waves according to their own regional standards for 
wireless broadcasting. Regarding the short wave bands, Cairo should distinguish 
between “intercontinental services” and “regional services in the tropics.” Both 
categories agreed with the European IBU standards of cross-border connections 
via relay links, complemented with nation-wide wireless broadcasting services. 
Due to a lack of short wave regulations, the IBU, on behalf of all broadcasting sta-
tions in the world, recommended organizing a world conference on short wave 
broadcasting. Such a conference would need to create a rational global plan.185 The 
broadcasters imagined a loosely coupled global broadcasting network of regions 
linked via the short waves whereby program exchange would enable international 
programs to be broadcast over the national home channels of countries worldwide. 
The plan suggests that the allocation of short waves happened along the same lines 
with similar visions of society as with the European standards. Nonetheless, the 
global plan integrated the concept of neighborliness between regions as well as 
between nation-states.
Even though Cairo was a significant improvement compared to Madrid, the 
1938 Convention failed to meet all the global broadcasting society’s recommenda-
tions. The short waves developed far more quickly than official regulations could 
manage.186 Cairo nevertheless recognized the problems of short wave broadcast-
184 Like broadcasting over medium and long waves, the short waves could be used for “simultaneous 
broadcasting” as well, the activity in which several broadcasting stations within one geographical area 
transmitted the same program via the same frequency. Simultaneous broadcasting improved usage of 
medium and long waves, and did the same for short waves. “Rapport sur les travaux des commissions 
de l’Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion tenues à Ouchy du 17 au 25 juin 1937,” 5-8, registry file 9G, 
R-4321, file 29167/663, jacket 2, LoN.
185 “un plan mondial rationnel.” “Proposition,” Doc. 366, Bruxelles, 6-8, 10, 12, registry file 9G, R-4321, 
file 27520/663, LoN.
186 “Rapport au Conseil sur réunions de la Commission Technique à Ouchy du 20 au 27 juin 1938, 
Rapporteur: Raymond Braillard,” Doc. 501 (remplaçant le no 494 corrigée), 7 juillet 1938, 2, box 80ter, file 
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ing, and agreed to organize a world conference to create a global standard for 
allocating short waves.187 Cairo entrusted this to the IBU who had to arrange this 
alongside its regular European conference for broadcasting in Montreux in 1939. 
According to Van Dissel, preparations for this short wave conference would have 
to start in Montreux.188 This assignment further indicates that the IBU was be-
coming the “leader” of the regional broadcasting organizations. Cairo herewith 
unofficially acknowledged the IBU as a kind of global federal expert on broadcast-
ing without interfering in regional independence. Officially broadcasters would 
not manage to create a global federal Union universelle. In reality however, such a 
structure seems to have been slowly emerging.
The 1930s would not witness the creation of a global wireless frequency plan 
for short waves. The preparatory work done by the technical experts of the IBU, 
ITU, and PTT administrations did result in a new frequency plan for the European 
region in Montreux in 1939. Just before the Montreux plan was to go into effect, in 
March 1940 the IBU Technical Committee recommended that European govern-
ments should not implement the Montreux Plan “until the moment the existing 
conditions in Europe will allow it.”189 Furthermore, with the outbreak of World 
War II, the preparations for organizing a world conference on allocating short 
waves came to a standstill. 
The results of the global studies on short waves had increasingly been finding 
their way into short wave broadcasting routines across the globe in the 1930s. 
Though these results would never be recognized as legally binding standards in 
the interwar years, many organizations integrated them into their activities, fol-
lowing the recommendations for shared waves, directional antennas, and sepa-
ration in kc/sec. With respect to frequency allocations, the various stations did 
not necessarily follow the European model, and mostly continued along the lines 
they had developed over the years.190 By the time war broke out, the IBU’s vi-
sion of becoming a loosely coupled Europe-centered global federation based on 
a European broadcasting tradition was far from reality. However, the European 
Rapports Généraux de la Commission Technique au Conseil, de 1932 à 1946, IBU.
187 “The wish expressed by the Cairo Telecommunication Conference of 1938 concerning the Meeting 
of a World Conference for Shortwave Broadcasting proposed by the Committee for the European Broad-
casting Conference,” Série 7610a, 9 July 1938, CA Document Series, IBU.
188 “Letter by Van Dissel to M. Metternich,” 17 Feb. 1939, 1, registry file 9G, box R-4322, file 36772/663, 
jacket 1, LoN.
189 “Rapport au conseil sur l’activité de la commission technique et du centre de contrôle pendant 
l’exercice 1939,” Doc. 633, 18 mars 1940, 2, box 80ter, file Rapports Généraux de la Commission Technique 
au Conseil, de 1932 à 1946, IBU.
190 Tomlinson, “The International Control of Radiocommunications,” 215-218; IBU, Twenty Years, 73-
74.
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expert community did achieve an unofficial leading position that over time might 
have developed into such a federation if the war had not intervened.
Conclusion
Over the years, the transnational expert community standardized wireless and 
wired broadcasting. The aim was to resolve the problem of electromagnetic in-
terference across borders as well as create an international long distance music 
relay network. This was not a straightforward process. It was one of negotiation, of 
redefinition, of catching up, of falling behind, and of visions that failed and visions 
that were challenged. Experts continually had to keep pace with the technology. 
In response, they created a community consisting of IBU broadcasting experts, 
wireless experts of the League of Nations, and international radiotelephony engi-
neers in the ITU and CCIF, as well as radiotelephony engineers from the various 
national PTT administrations. Together they tried to match their standardization 
efforts to the fast developing broadcasting technology. First of all, they developed 
specific transnational skills for this purpose. These skills were geared towards rec-
onciling national interests with the political and technical aspects of their activities. 
Their expertise can be seen as a kind of transnational techno-political diplomacy, 
useful for anticipating high-speed and complicated transnational developments.191 
Secondly, the expert community kept the structure of their international or-
ganizations relatively open, informal, and flexible. At times their easy cross-in-
stitutional collaboration could not effectively resolve problems due to inconsis-
tent developments in the organization versus broadcasting technology. Persistent 
problems with the allocation of frequencies made the IBU, the ITU, and national 
PTT administrations decide to form an official statutory partnership. Although 
this solved some of the problems, it also limited future freedom for organizational 
action. 
Initially, the expert community decided to focus on Europe to resolve their 
technical issues. This was an obvious choice since the problem of electromag-
netic disturbances caused major problems, particularly in Europe with its large 
number of nation states. Although the IBU experts defined Europe geographi-
cally for the first time in 1926, this was not a topic which aroused emotion and 
interest. Europe’s spatial definition only became of interest to the transnational 
191 For a discussion on the idea of techno-politics see: Andreas Fickers, “The Techno-politics of Colour: 
Britain and the European Struggle for a Colour Television Standard,” Journal of British Cinema and Televi-
sion 7, no. 1 (2010): 95-114.
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broadcasting community when what were defined as short waves opened up the 
option of worldwide broadcasting. Agreed European standards gained more ex-
plicit recognition once they were fine-tuned with other standardization efforts 
across the globe. The broadcasting community thus determined the spatial defini-
tion of Europe in the encounter with the global and non-European. By the time 
World War II broke out, the community’s push for a global broadcasting system 
resulted in an unplanned regionalization of broadcasting. 
In the course of these processes, the broadcasting experts pursued a wide va-
riety of visions about who was included in this system and who was excluded. 
Initially the community projected a transnational system with a place for local 
participants such as radio amateurs. The wave of nationalizing broadcasting or-
ganizations, however, eventually resulted in an infrastructure that interlinked na-
tional stations, mostly at the expense of amateurs. The relationships between these 
national broadcasting stations were not only envisioned via proposals like the in-
ternational convention for broadcasting over long distances, which was proposed 
by the League OCT. They were also envisioned via transnational organizational 
formats like Radiodiffusion mondiale or Union universelle. These had a global fo-
cus, but were mostly designed by the IBU, which had earned its reputation in the 
1920s as a European expert. Such global visions could only be realized in the long 
term. In the short term, the search for global solutions outlined and stimulated the 
search for practical solutions to inter-organizational collaboration. 
The expert community was not striving for a specific European solution. Of 
course, the experts brought their Eurocentric visions and traditions to the negoti-
ating table. They also believed that building networks would contribute to interna-
tional peace and rapprochement between nations and states. These developments 
revealed the impact of visions defining the linking, or non-linking of networks 
and broadcasting organizations. In the interwar years, the IBU visions were trans-
lated into standards which then became dominant but did not remain unchal-
lenged. Other actors with transnational interests were also building broadcasting 
networks: Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, Vatican Radio and Radio Luxembourg. 
These were grounded in other visions.
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Chapter 4  
Battles over Europe’s Borders
 “Dui arcano Dei consilio succedimus loco Principis Apostolorum…’”
It was the first time in history that a pope’s voice was heard by the world at large. Beyond the borders of the 
Vatican, in every country in Europe, in all of the five continents, a multitudinous audience, the 
greatest that had ever listened to a single man, listened in devout silence to words which only very few 
could understand. In many places through the far-flung Christian world men and women knelt in streets 
and public places, listening with feelings of bliss and awe. A maze of radio circuits carried the words 
around the earth.
César Searchinger, European Director of CBS1
Thus César Searchinger describes the mind-blowing global relay event on Febru-
ary 12, 1932 that fired everyone’s imagination: a radio speech given by his Holiness 
the Pope. It was a speech by “the Old Gentleman,” the code word for this unimagi-
nable event. Up till then Searchinger had been working as the first foreign and 
overseas radio representative of the U.S. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) in 
London. He had mostly worked on two-way relays between the United Kingdom 
and the United States, but occasionally arranged the relaying of an event from the 
European continent over the nation-wide CBS broadcasting network. A few weeks 
earlier, CBS had been taken by surprise when its largest competitor, National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC), had managed to relay the one radio speech Italy’s 
Benito Mussolini would ever give in English during his entire life. To Searchinger 
this “was an awful blow.” 
But only a few days later he was given the lead of his life. Marchese Guglielmo 
Marconi had been working on a wireless short wave station in Vatican City. The 
whole project had been shrouded in secrecy, not least because of its technical ca-
pabilities which people predicted to be no less than scientifically almost perfect. 
“No one had ever dared to suggest that the Holy Father himself would engage 
1 César Searchinger, Hello America! Radio Adventures in Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 
1938), 78.
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in anything so mundane as broadcasting…But fools rush in where clerics fear to 
tread. And we Americans have the imagination of fools,” as Searchinger vividly 
described the event.2 Since he was the only CBS representative in Europe at the 
time, his arena suddenly expanded to the whole of Europe. Running ahead of de-
velopments he placed “European Director” on his letterhead, hoping for the best. 
He rushed to Vatican City, and few weeks later he had the scoop of a lifetime, the 
first worldwide speech by the Pope. It was made possible via Vatican Radio’s short 
wave station and a maze of relay circuits, among them that of CBS, all of which had 
been connected for the occasion. It was this global broadcast that quite by chance 
transformed Searchinger’s job into that of European director.
Searchinger’s anecdote reveals that there were different plans for one particular 
broadcasting space. Although the Vatican broadcast made Searchinger the first 
European director for CBS, Vatican Radio did not consider itself European at all. 
It targeted a global rather than a European Catholic community. Apparently not 
every station on the European continent thought of itself as European, whereas the 
overseas CBS considered every station on the European continent to be European. 
Vatican Radio and stations like Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, and Radio 
Luxembourg created their international broadcasting networks according to the 
kind of society they desired to create, or in other words, the audience they wanted 
to reach. With different broadcasting systems being constructed in the European 
Region, the broadcasters would have to deal with one another to secure the ef-
ficiency and the operability of their stations. They had to fine-tune their efforts. 
At times these negotiations could be harsh and led to true battles over Europe’s 
borders. Standards that would make viable Vatican Radio’s global Catholic com-
munity, for instance, would not necessarily have to coincide with International 
Broadcasting Union (IBU) and International Telegraph Union (ITU) European 
standards for frequency allocation that little by little found their way into “the of-
ficial conferences of Prague, the Hague, Copenhagen, of the CCI, etc…”3 Several 
proposals ignored Europe as a category altogether, whereas others wanted to con-
struct an entirely different kind of European system. These different broadcasting 
projects each in their own way challenged the evolving European standards as 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
This chapter shows how the USSR designed a global broadcasting network 
for spreading the socialist message. Though the socialist view rejected the idea 
2 Searchinger, Hello America!, 65-68. 
3 “Peu à peu une technique général s’est créée, et elle a pu se faire reconnaître dans les conférences 
officielles de Prague, la Haye, Copenhague, du C.C.I., etc…” “Radiodiffusion mondiale: Rapporteur: R. 
Braillard, Président de la Commission Technique,” Série 3180, 23 mai 1932, 2, CA Document Series, IBU.
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of nation-states in the long run and the category of Europe altogether, by the late 
1920s the USSR did seek practical collaboration with the IBU. The chapter contin-
ues with an examination of Vatican Radio and Radio Nations. Whereas the first 
was aimed at all Catholics worldwide, the League of Nations had established Radio 
Nations primarily to facilitate worldwide communications in times of emergency. 
The two stations aimed for a global audience, but for various reasons focused on 
Europe as a distinctive category. The chapter ends with an examination of Radio 
Luxembourg, generally described as the main nationally-owned broadcasting sta-
tion that deliberately aimed at a Europe-wide audience for commercial motives. 
Radio Luxembourg initially saw itself as part of Europe, as a niche in the IBU and 
League of Nations joint initiatives. Nevertheless, it was brutally rejected by this 
community partly on the grounds that it had not been a problem for this commu-
nity to collaborate with Radio Moscow, Vatican Radio, and Radio Nations. These 
cases give us an insight into the negotiating of a Europe on the threshold of differ-
ing broadcasting infrastructures. 
Radio Moscow and Confining Europe in the East
Radio Moscow’s activities were confined to the east of Europe. The USSR already 
had its own established broadcasting network for some years when broadcasting 
organizations in Europe began collaborations based on neighborliness between 
nations. The USSR did not show much interest in IBU developments, preferring a 
broadcasting system that suited its needs. In his seminal work The Age of Extremes, 
Eric Hobsbawm writes “…the history of the Short Twentieth Century cannot be 
understood without the Russian revolution and its direct and indirect effects.”4 The 
same holds true for understanding the way early building of broadcasting systems 
played out between the USSR and the IBU.
As early as 1918, Russian engineer-inventor M.A. Bonch-Bruyevich began 
developing long-range radio transmission in a small laboratory at the Tverskaya 
Central Receiving Radio Station. Though he and his team initially had a certain 
degree of freedom, Soviet leader Vladimir Il’yich Lenin soon interfered. Directly 
after the end of the war, the USSR experienced a revolution in which a social-
ist regime came to power under the leadership of Lenin. The USSR aimed at a 
global revolution of workers. Lenin, who had an interest in radio engineering, 
immediately wanted to create a global broadcasting network to ensure worldwide 
4 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 1994), 84.
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diffusion of the Socialist Revolution’s ideals. To Lenin, radio was a “newspaper 
without paper and without distances.” 
Such a socialist world had a highly specific outlook. Already in 1915 Lenin 
had stated that a “united states of Europe” was either impossible or reactionary if 
it should come about under capitalism.5 Lenin argued that only a successful and 
worldwide Socialist Revolution would lead to some kind of “united states of the 
world.” Then the whole idea of a state would wither away.6 Lenin rejected Europe 
both as a geographical entity and as an ideal. He focused on a large movement of 
socialist workers with no relation to any kind of “Europe.” Nation-states would only 
play a role initially. As soon as Lenin decided to interfere with Bonch-Bruyevich’s 
efforts, broadcasting in the USSR developed along socialist lines. Russian broad-
casting focused on the world rather than on Europe or nation-states. 
Lenin tried to speed up the development of broadcasting. He set up a large 
state scientific research center for radio engineering in Nizhniy-Novgorod with 
Bonch-Bruyevich in charge. In March 1920 the Council of People’s Commissars, 
the official name for the Russian Soviet Council, charged the Commissariat of 
Posts and Telegraphs (NKPiT) to construct a Central Moscow Radiotelephone sta-
tion as well as stations in other important points in the Republic.7 In 1922 Russia 
inaugurated its first radio station with long wave transmitters. The station was 
formally owned by COMINTERN, a private global organization of national com-
munist parties, and bore the name Imeni Kominterna. The station would diffuse 
socialist ideals and facilitate the social revolution.
The western world feared the idea of a large socialist broadcasting network 
operated by COMINTERN, associating it directly with the Russian Communist 
Council. Such a scenario could allow the unbound diffusion of the Russian so-
cialist message firmly into the western world. The Russian government rejected 
the idea of state-interference by arguing that COMINTERN was a private orga-
nization in whose affairs it could not intervene.8 Less than two years later the 
Council officially strengthened its influence over broadcasting. It voted in favor 
5 Peter Bugge, “The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914-1945,” in The History of the Idea of 
Europe, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge, 1993), 112.
6 Bugge, “The Nation Supreme,” 112. The information comes from: Vladimir I. Lenin, “On the Slogan for 
a United States of Europe,” in Lenin Collected Works. Originally in Sotsial Demokrat, No. 4, 1915, ed. Marx-
ist Internet Archive, vol. 21 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 339-343.
7 The NKPiT would later become the Ministry of Communications. S.V. Kaftanov and Soviet Union. 
Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po radioveshchan i iu i televiden i iu, Radio and Television in the USSR (Wash-
ington: U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, 1961), 6-11.
8 Jennifer Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves: Radio Luxembourg and the Origins of European National 
Broadcasting, 1929-1950” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008), 315-316; Vernon van Dycke, “The 
Responsibility of States for International Propaganda,” The American Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 
(1940): 59-60.
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of opening “the way for a development of amateur radio and offered extensive 
possibilities for the utilization of radio by the population for economic, scientific 
and cultural requirements.”9 Furthermore, the Council aimed to facilitate “the 
development of the radio engineering industry and the dissemination of radio 
engineering knowledge.”10 The Council created Radio Transmissions, a joint stock 
company that served as an umbrella for all kinds of broadcasting activities.11 Radio 
Transmissions had its headquarters in Moscow. The fear of the western world 
seemed well-founded. 
In 1933 the Council formally standardized the institutional structure of 
Russian broadcasting when it changed a 1926 resolution that “assured a systematic 
party guidance of radio broadcasting” into a firm and state-owned organization of 
radio. With this decision the Council ended all discussions on the issue of private 
or government ownership and control. Little by little the Council was increasing 
its control over broadcasting and created a centrally organized and state governed 
socialist broadcasting network.12
Right from the start, Bonch-Bruyevich envisioned a Russian broadcasting net-
work with long-range radio possibilities. Wireless broadcasting should assure both 
global and domestic coverage, whereas a relay network would have to connect 
the various Russian regions with the major centers for Soviet culture. In 1925 al-
ready, Bonch-Bruyevich was able to equip Imeni Kominterna with the world’s first 
shortwave transmitter. This was a unique achievement since short wave broad-
casting was still in an experimental phase in the West. The new transmitter could 
spread the socialist message for international unification of workers, and came to 
be known as Radio Moscow. In addition to its global outreach, the new transmitter 
enabled full domestic coverage, something that had been a big problem given the 
size of the country. By 1925 already, Radio Moscow’s shortwave transmitter had 
become an important node in the development of a domestic relay network as well 
as a means to reach out to all supporters of socialism across the globe.
NKPiT and Radio Transmissions together developed the domestic relay net-
work. Radio Transmissions helped cities like Khar’kov, Minsk, Voronezh, Rostov-
on-the-Don, Krasnodar and others to construct long wave radio stations. Together 
9 Kaftanov and Soviet Union. Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po radioveshchan i iu i televiden i iu, Radio and 
Television in the USSR, 12.
10 Ibid.
11 The initial name of the organization was Radio-for-All. For a discussion of its organizational struc-
ture see Arno Huth, La radiodiffusion: Puissance mondiale (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1937), 144-146.
12 “In view of the fact that radio is acquiring exceptional significance in the entire economic and politi-
cal life of the country…” the Party centralized all radio activity within an All-Union Radio Committee 
directly under the Council of People’s Commissars USSR. Kaftanov and Soviet Union. Gosudarstvennyi 
Komitet po radioveshchan i iu i televiden i iu, Radio and Television in the USSR, 14.
TEHS7_handels.indd   141 5/9/2012   3:41:20 PM
142 Europe – On Air
Figure 4.1 – Main Soviet radio broadcasting stations situated within Europe, 1936-1937
The names of a number of these Russian cities have changed over the years. Leningrad is present-
day Saint Petersburg, Gorky was the name of Nizhny-Novgorod in between 1932-1990, Stalingrad 
nowadays is Volgograd, and Stalino is renamed Donetsk. Source: Arno Huth, La Radiodiffusion: 
La puissance mondiale (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1937), 143.
with NKPiT it then arranged these stations into a single relay network.13 The relay 
connections served to link “a number of theaters, a conservatory and Smol’nvy 
for the rebroadcasting of plays, concerts and conferences.”14 Transmissions often 
13 Both parties extended their collaboration with a contract enabling them to give shape to this na-
tional relay network. Radio Transmissions obliged itself to construct a number of new radio transmitters 
in the largest centers of the country. NKPiT would allow Radio Transmissions the usage of its transmitters 
for several hours a day whilst constructing a number of new stations as well.
14 Kaftanov and Soviet Union. Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po radioveshchan i iu i televiden i iu, Radio 
and Television in the USSR, 12.
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focused on “political information, reports, transmissions for workers, for the vil-
lage, educational programs, broadcasts for national republics and oblasts, regu-
lar concerts, radio plays and radio dramatizations, [as well as] rebroadcasts from 
theaters.”15 The relay network diffused these programs, statements of new socialist 
culture and way-of-life, to the various long wave stations which broadcasted these 
programs domestically, and to the short wave station which in turn relayed pro-
grams across the country and further abroad.16 
Throughout the 1930s, the domestic relay network expanded with one new 
short wave station and a large number of regional long wave stations.17 By 1936 
the USSR had arranged its “local” relay activities effectively into three territories 
covering the central Russian provinces, the areas with national populations like 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Transcaucasia, as well as the Ural and 
Siberia.18 With this domestic relay network and wireless global outreach, the 
USSR had created a centrally organized global broadcasting network without re-
gional, national, or continental boundaries. They foresaw no place for “Europe” in 
whatever form. 
Geographically speaking, however, the USSR bordered many European countries. 
People living in the border regions experienced annoyance due to interference 
between their own national and Russian broadcasts. Only by fine-tuning their ac-
tivities would the USSR and other European countries be able to deal with the 
problem. 
While the USSR ignored IBU efforts, in 1926 the IBU community tried to re-
duce interference by creating a Geneva Plan integrating those parts of Western 
Russia that bordered Europe. Only then could interference truly disappear. The 
IBU had not invited Russia to its conferences. Russia was not and would never 
become an IBU member. The IBU simply decided to assign the Russian stations in 
the border regions five medium wave frequencies and informed the Russian PTT 
of their decision after the conclusion of the Plan.19
15 Ibid., 13.
16 On Soviet cultural expressions see: Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (New 
York: The Penguin Press, 2002).
17 Huth, La radiodiffusion, 146-147.
18 Ibid., 145.
19 The Conference participants assigned to the USSR five frequencies with such casualness that the 
designers of the Geneva Plan might well have been in touch with the USSR before the Conference to 
discuss the border frequencies. Such informal contacts are characteristic of the international climate since 
the late nineteenth century, and they remain largely invisible in archives of international organizations like 
the International Broadcasting Union. Notwithstanding, it could also well be that Russia did not use these 
medium waves. 
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The USSR in the meantime prepared itself well for the first International Radio-
communications Conference in years. It handed the organizers of the Washington 
Conference a complete draft of service regulations that could serve as a points of 
discussion during the negotiations.20 However the United States, which organized 
the conference on behalf of the ITU, declined to invite the USSR since it refused to 
acknowledge the Russian Soviet Council. The decision placed the ITU in an awk-
ward position, questioning its alleged political neutrality.21 The USSR had been 
an ITU member ever since 1866 and had taken part in the previous 1912 London 
Convention. Article 12 of that convention even stated that these “conferences are 
composed of delegates of the governments of contracting countries,” an agreement 
the USSR lived up to.22 Needless to say, the USSR felt disturbed by the Washington 
developments which, it considered, indicated the subordination of “the interests of 
international telecommunications to purely political considerations.”23 Apparently, 
ideological beliefs greatly influenced the negotiation of frequency standards.
After the Washington Conference, the USSR gradually took a more active in-
terest in the practical fine-tuning of frequencies to secure the efficiency of its own 
network. The USSR and the IBU intensified their collaboration. In its 1928 Brussels 
Plan, the IBU still excluded Russia, defining a European zone without the USSR 
“with the exception of a band very closely situated to the west of this country.”24 
One year later the Czech PTT, at the request of the IBU, invited the Russian PTT 
to the Prague Conference to fine-tune the medium and long waves. The USSR 
accepted the invitation. Both the USSR and the IBU appeared to share a strong 
discontent over the course of events in Washington that according to the Russian 
PTT “has not sufficiently taken into account the needs of radiotelephony.”25 This 
shared discontent facilitated their collaboration substantially.
These exploratory overtures in frequency allocations were a turning point that 
would affect the boundaries of IBU’s Europe and Russia’s relation to and position 
20 There are documents that suggest that in preparation for Washington, Russia and the IBU for the 
first time joined forces. These nonetheless do not give any details. John D. Tomlinson, “The International 
Control of Radiocommunications” (Ph.D. diss., Université de Genève, 1938), 60; IBU, Twenty Years of 
Activity of the International Broadcasting Union (Geneva: IBU, 1945), 19.
21 Nina Wormbs, “Technology-Dependent Commons: The Example of Frequency Spectrum for Broad-
casting in Europe in the 1920s,” International Journal of the Commons (submitted): 7.
22 Tomlinson, “The International Control of Radiocommunications,” 59-60; George A. Codding, The 
International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International Cooperation (Leiden: Brill, 1952), 
31; Quote from BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Radiotélégraphique Internationale de Washington 
(1927): Tome II: Travaux de la Conférence (Délibérations, Actes définitifs) (Berne: BUIT, 1928), 731-732. 
23 BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Radioélectrique européenne de Prague 1929 (Berne: BUIT, 1929), 84.
24 “Rapport de la Commission Technique au Conseil,” Série 1268, 20 fév. 1929, 3, box 80ter, file Rapports 
généraux de la commission technique au Conseil à fin 1931, IBU. 
25 “la Conférence n’a pas assez tenu compte des besoins de la radiophonie.” BUIT, Documents de 
Prague, 84.
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within the international but Europe-oriented society of broadcasters. Since the 
IBU was increasingly recognized worldwide as the European broadcasting expert, 
the USSR had to deal with this “Europe” if it wanted to improve the efficiency of 
the broadcasts over its long waves in the western part of its broadcasting space. 
From the USSR’s point of view, Europe was useful on the sidelines for reasons of 
practical fine-tuning. 
Europe became a politico-economic strategy to the USSR in 1927. In addition to 
the technological motivations, changes in Russia’s political and economic situation 
affected its decision to collaborate with “Europe.” Stalin replaced Lenin as the new 
Soviet leader. The USSR now “pursued a policy of reconciliation with the west, 
insofar as possible, while preparing Russia for isolation and defense.” Stalin’s com-
missar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov tried to ease this policy. He argued that 
safety for his country could only be achieved “through some form of integration 
into the European System. First and foremost he had to create a breathing space for 
the USSR…”26 For economic reasons, Moscow could not permit itself to become 
isolated internationally. The USSR needed the Europeans to boost its economy in 
case it wished to effectuate Stalin’s second Five Year Plan.27 Consequently Russia 
pursued a general “effort to improve its relations with the outside world at a time 
of domestic upheaval.”28 The new politico-economic strategy opened the doors to 
a more intensive collaboration. 
One point of discussion in Prague was the Brussels Plan, which according to 
the IBU, had to be adapted to integrate Russian radio stations. Czech chief en-
gineer Steinbach, who had been working on IBU technical activities since the 
founding days of the Union, mentioned that the “delimitation of the territory on 
the basis of which the plan must be applied and the solution of radio broadcasting 
wave distribution on nearby territories” deserved special attention, in particular 
long waves in the USSR.29 All parties could have agreed to design a plan in which 
the USSR formed the border of the IBU European zone, similar to the Brussels 
Plan. In Prague the participants however decided to relocate the Eastern border of 
the European zone to include part of the USSR. With this definition they returned 
to the ideas of the 1926 Geneva Plan. They adapted their definition of Europe 
26 Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 546.
27 Russian economic strategies and economic targets were communicated via the so-called Five Year 
Plans. A state planning commission saw to the conclusion and development of these plans. 
28 Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 526.
29 “délimitation du territoire sur lequel le plan doit être appliqué et la solution de la distribution des 
ondes de radiodiffusion sur les territoires voisins.” BUIT, Documents de Prague, 24.
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eastwards to the 40˚ meridian East of Greenwich, a little further to the east than 
the initial Geneva Plan definition. The new meridian ran right across the west 
of the USSR, directly through Moscow. Suddenly the western part of the USSR 
voluntarily and in agreement became part of a newly IBU defined European infra-
structure. The participants suitably termed the meridian, the Moscow meridian.30
Though the Prague meeting raised the question of defining the territory for 
the Plan, the documents make no reference to discussion about any such new 
definition. Most likely the engineers did not consider the discussion important 
enough, or they addressed the issue over coffee, lunch, or dinner. Only during the 
last meeting did the NKPiT stress that it “reserved for itself total freedom in the 
choice for waves east of the Moscow Meridian.”31 A new “Europe” that integrated 
part of the USSR had clearly been defined.32 The lack of discussion on the defini-
tion in the Prague documents either suggests the minor importance attached to 
the definition or the obvious need for it. In any case the new definition seamlessly 
matched the USSR’s new politico-economic strategy and it managed to achieve 
some kind of integration into the European system.
As a result of the growth in European broadcasting stations and the participa-
tion of the USSR in the Prague meeting, the Prague Plan integrated an agreement 
made in Washington on the practice of derogation. The idea was that stations could 
have a waveband between the medium and long wave bands assigned to broad-
casting which were used for maritime and air traffic. Derogation was allowed as 
long as stations did not disturb the existing traffic. The Prague Plan placed about 
ten European and six Russian stations between the wavelengths assigned to two 
stations, separated by 4.5 kc/sec. This practice worked well since most of the sta-
tions were located at a long distance from other stations.33 Even though the USSR 
had not signed the Washington Convention, it did adhere to the convention when 
collaborating with the European broadcasting community on material infrastruc-
ture related issues.
30 Ibid., 142.
31 “se réserve toute liberté dans le choix des onders à l’est du Méridien de Moscou.” Ibid.
32 The only reference that the archives provide is that the decision to move the borders of Europe 
eastwards to the Moscow Meridian happened on juridical grounds. The document literally states: “Cette 
extension a été basée, du point de vue juridique, soit sur l’article 5, paragraphe 1er, du Règlement, soit 
sur l’arrangement intervenu à Prague en 1929 entre les Administrations européennes. Il est à noter que 
l’U.R.S.S., qui n’a pas adhéré à la Convention de Washington, a participé à la Conférence de Prague.” 
“Commission Mixte (Conférence de Madrid) Rapport provisoire de la Commission Mixte concernant 
les amendement a apporter a la Convention de Washington (1927) et au reglement general annexe,” Série 
2291, 5 janv. 1931, 9, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN. 
33 Wormbs, “Technology-Dependent Commons,” 8; Nina Wormbs, “Invisible with Global Reach: 
Radio Spectrum for Broadcasting in Europe” (presented at the the Fourth Tensions of Europe Conference, 
Sofia, Bulgaria, 2010), 6-7.
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With the Prague Plan in place, the USSR continued to join in discussions 
about the projection of European broadcasting with the IBU Legal, Technical 
and Program Committees as well as European PTT administrations. Preparing 
for the 1932 Madrid conference, they speculated about the “Europeanness” or 
form of a European region for telecommunications in general and for broadcast-
ing in particular. The Mixed Committee established by the IBU for the occasion 
would have to devise a plan that was advantageous to broadcasting. In June 1930, 
to improve collaboration, the IBU had begun sharing technical information with 
the Russian Council. The IBU exchanged lists of long wave partition, its monthly 
bulletin with all sorts of broadcasting related information, radiotelephony laws, 
statistics, and technological information.34 The USSR accepted the request. The 
Washington agreement had to be revised for it contained errors, head of NKPiT 
Hirschfeld pointed out.35 The NKPiT helped to draft the Mixed Committee Report 
that served as basis for the discussions on broadcasting frequencies in Madrid. 
The final Mixed Committee report made two requests concerning the defining 
of a European region. The Committee argued it was necessary to examine whether 
the European border in the east defined by the Moscow Meridian in the Prague 
Plan should not move a little further to the east, all the way to the Ural Mountains. 
Furthermore, the Report proposed a differentiation between affairs that could be 
resolved by regional arrangements for Europe only, and those that specifically re-
quired arrangements of a more universal character.36 The USSR collaborated on 
a proposal that made a clear distinction between the world and a Europe that 
integrated an even larger part of its territory into what Madrid would call “the 
European region.” Over the years, the USSR actively pursued its politico-economic 
strategy. By participating in Prague and in the Mixed Committee, it realized a 
form of integration into “the” European system within the material and organiza-
tional domain.
During the mid-1930s, the USSR increasingly bailed out of active European col-
laboration. Its shift in politico-economic strategy had clearly opened up the pos-
sibility to fine-tune technical standards. However ideological differences were a 
considerable problem especially regarding organizational issues in light of the 
vastly deteriorating international relations. The ideological differences between 
the IBU that was formed in a capitalist system and socialist Russia, became near 
34 “Rapport du Directeur sur les mesures prises pour exécuter les décisions adoptés par le Conseil en 
mai 1930,” Série 2061, 24 Sept. 1930, 1, CA Document Series, IBU. 
35 “Procès-verbal de réunion de Commission Mixte,” Série 2370, 9 fév. 1931, 4, P.V. Commission Mixte, 
Commission Relais, Commission Spéciales, IBU.
36 “Commission Mixte,” Série 2291, 9, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN.
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to insurmountable (see Chapter 5). The success of the technological collaboration 
ultimately depended on how well all parties were able to leave ideology out of their 
discussions. 
During the Prague Conference, when socialist Russia and the IBU collabo-
rated for the first time, the various parties tried to make the collaboration work. 
The dominant discussions in Prague were the role and responsibilities of the 
ITU regarding the IBU. The conference agreed that final responsibility remained 
with the ITU whereas the IBU would become the official European expert for 
broadcasting issues. Initially the IBU had tried to obtain final responsibility. The 
Russian delegation objected, tenaciously debating that the ITU must have final 
responsibility. The ITU did not object and the Russian delegation got its way in 
the end.37 Thus the USSR achieved an agreement that the final decision power 
remained with an international organization that had no interest in the cultural 
and political side of broadcasting. Ideology would stay out of material network 
discussions. 
Nonetheless, the question of trust between the USSR and other European 
countries lay dormant during the ensuing years. The 1932 Madrid Conference 
opened up the opportunity to discuss interference between Russian and other 
European stations in which the trust issue came to the fore.38 Germany expressed 
fear of possible interference with a frequency which had been assigned jointly 
to Germany and the USSR. The Russian delegate replied in pro-European terms 
that the USSR had always collaborated in the best possible spirit with the other 
European countries to avoid possible interference. The USSR would continue to 
do so in the future and “foresaw a way to treat the issue in question separately 
with the German Administration.”39 The USSR was positive about collaboration 
37 BUIT, Documents de Prague, 88-93.
38 In preparing for the Fourth International Radio Telegraphic Conference in Madrid the USSR had 
organized a preparatory Conference in Moscow to discuss all its telecommunication technologies together 
currently in use in radio electricity. From that Conference followed a path-breaking proposition for 
frequency allocations in telecommunications. The Madrid Conference quickly rejected the proposition 
because it proved too costly, yet worthwhile considering in a small sub-committee. A German delegate 
mentioned the proposal was too new and the time was too short too fully grasp the idea and implement 
it now. IBU, Extrait des documents de la Conférence Radiotélégraphique Internationale de Madrid (1932): 
COMMISSION TECHNIQUE (Geneva: Selection of all formal Madrid proceedings on broadcasting, 
1932); BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Radiotélégraphique Internationale de Madrid (1932): Tome 
I: Propositions transmises au Bureau de l’Union pour être soumises à la Conférence: Propositions, notes, 
déclarations, études, remarques soumises pendant la Conférence (Berne: BUIT, 1932), 881.The examina-
tion of this preparatory meeting in Moscow might open up Russia’s point of view not only on global and 
European telecommunications in general but also on its own position in this global and European world of 
telecommunications.
39 “envisagera la manière de traiter cette question particulière séparément avec l’Administration alle-
mande.” IBU, Extrait des documents de Madrid, 1065.
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with other broadcasters which up until now had only happened outside the sphere 
of official frequency standard debates. The delegate affirmed his country’s com-
mitment more strongly by adding that the USSR was ready to collaborate with the 
other European countries individually as well as in European conferences to create 
a better organization of wireless services in the European region.40
Ultimately the parties agreed to integrate the USSR into their European broad-
casting space, but under a special heading. The fact that the USSR was not obliged 
to adhere to Washington and thus had designed a different network than the 
Washington standards would need to be specified, according to the UK. Though 
the overall tone could be a little harsh at times, the participants finally agreed 
that the convention should maintain an extra clause that stressed the exceptional 
status of the USSR “for reasons of individual rights.”41 The USSR could use spe-
cifically assigned frequencies. This exceptional position, as agreed in the Madrid 
Convention, allowed both the USSR and the IBU to realize the fine-tuning of 
their wireless broadcasting networks over the long and medium waves. Moreover, 
the formulation indemnified both parties against any liability of the other party 
whether of an ideological or a practical nature.
The discussions in Madrid show that even though the USSR remained outside 
the official European institution for broadcasting, it discursively portrayed itself 
as a European friend. In practice this meant that Russian experts actively partici-
pated in the European broadcasting community. Madrid adopted the Prague defi-
nition of the border of Europe in the east determined by the IBU, PTT administra-
tions, ITU and Russian delegation.42 The friendly collaboration of Russian experts 
as part of both this physical Europe and this European broadcasting community 
rather surprisingly extended to the short waves as well. In spite of ideological dif-
ferences that formed a political complication when it came to global broadcasting, 
the USSR obtained one of the Vice-Presidency seats in the Technical Section of 
the 1936 Paris Meeting that studied the short waves.43 It is highly likely that the 
technical nature of the discussions as well as the fact that the IBU did not have 
the power to allocate the short waves facilitated this surprising development. By 
then the USSR had already been collaborating with the European community of 
broadcasters for over seven years. The relatively stable and peaceful status quo 
remained almost until the outbreak of World War II. In 1938 the USSR still signed 
40 Ibid., 1068.
41 “a de ce fait des droits individuels et est justifié à présenter à ce sujet des réserves en ce qui regarde 
l’utilisation spéciale, par ses services, des fréquences suivantes :…” Ibid.
42 Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, 157, note 113.
43 IBU, First Intercontinental Meeting of Broadcasting Organisations, Paris, Febrary 27-March 6 1936: 
Preparatory Documents and Minutes of the Meeting (Geneva: IBU Office, 1936), 181.
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the International Telecommunications Convention in Cairo, that like Madrid, 
made up for Russia’s exclusive position.44 But shortly after, international tensions 
would brutally disturb their mutually developed contact.
Part of these tensions arose because of the vast increase in broadcasting sta-
tions in combination with the scarcity of available frequencies. The problems 
started with the drafting of the 1939 Montreux Plan. The new frequency plan as-
signed the USSR far fewer frequencies than the 1933 Luzern Plan. The USSR felt 
betrayed for not being taken seriously by a plan that was “absolutely unacceptable 
to the USSR.”45 The final plan would reduce the density of the Russian wireless 
network considerably. It assigned the USSR far fewer exclusive waves, and obliged 
the country to reduce considerably the power of many of its stations to avoid in-
terference with other European ones. Consequently, many stations would have 
to be taken off the air for quite some time to apply technical adjustments to their 
transmitters.46 It would be a costly affair. The documents suggest that the USSR 
felt insulted by the shrinkage of the wireless network in western Russia as pro-
posed at Montreux. The USSR had the feeling that it was sacrificing far more than 
other countries. 
Though the large growth in stations made it difficult to create a plan favorable 
to all parties, it is highly likely that political considerations decisively influenced 
Europe’s attitude towards socialist Russia. The USSR could not understand why it 
had to make concessions to such a degree when other countries who broadcasted 
solely in one language obtained extensive favors (see Table 4.1). The USSR insisted 
on obtaining 18 exclusive waves as proposed in the draft plan in contrast to the 
now intended 8 exclusive waves.47 It proposed several changes to the plan as a 
whole, but concluded that the conference had not been very forthcoming with its 
remarks and requests. The USSR refused to sign the Montreux Plan. 
The Russian delegation disappointedly and harshly declared that it reserved the 
right to assure itself of a satisfactory broadcasting service on Soviet territory, and 
resolve broadcasting problems conformable to its national needs. Furthermore, in 
case of interference with foreign stations on Soviet territory, the USSR “reserved 
for itself the right to protect by all means necessary the interests of its services 
44 BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Internationale des Radiocommunications du Caire (1938), Tome II: 
Travaux de la Conférence (Délibérations, Actes définitifs) (Berne: BUIT, 1938).
45 “absolument inacceptable pour l’U.R.S.S.” BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Européenne de Radio-
diffusion, Montreux, Mars/Avril 1939 (Berne: BUIT, 1939), 101.
46 Russia would lose one exclusive wave within the band of 150 to 285 kc/sec. lowering its number 
from four to three, and additionally would receive far too few exclusive waves in the band between 600 to 
192,3 m.
47 BUIT, Documents de Montreux, 101-103.
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against disturbances caused by the stations placed in infringement.”48 The USSR 
refused any further collaboration with the IBU members. Technologically the 
USSR again isolated itself, returning to a policy it had pursued at the end of World 
War I. International tensions and rapidly increasing distrust towards communism 
by the end of the 1930s had created too harsh a climate for the frequency standard 
debates between the USSR and other European countries. The USSR bailed out of 
friendly collaboration with the European broadcasting community as coordinated 
by the IBU, but would continue to officially form part of the Madrid definition of 
the European Region. 
For the major part of the interwar years, the Russians and the IBU commu-
nity managed to fine-tune their material broadcasting networks relatively well. 
They could collaborate technically as long as they held no responsibility for one 
another and avoided ideology. The USSR managed to place final responsibility 
for the frequency plans with the ITU during the Prague Conference. Moreover, 
the Madrid Convention confirmed that neither of the two parties could be held 
responsible for each other’s actions. Initially the USSR had envisioned a global 
broadcasting network based on socialist ideologies without intending to place 
48 “se réserve le droit de protéger par tous les moyens utiles les intérêts de ses services contre les pertur-
bations causées par les stations placées en dérogation.” Ibid., 261.
Table 4.1 – Excessive favors to countries according to the USSR in the draft 
Montreux Plan, 1939







































Source: BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Européenne de Radiodiffusion, Montreux, Mars/Avril 
1939 (Berne: BUIT, 1939), 102-103.
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emphasis on “Europe.” Practical problems of interference and a shift in Russia’s 
politico-economic strategy laid the foundation for some form of Russian integra-
tion into the IBU’s European broadcasting system. Though western Russian terri-
tory formed part of the European Region as defined in Madrid, organizationally 
the USSR portrayed itself as a friendly collaborator in the European broadcasting 
community. In the end, nonetheless, ideological upheavals hindered the relatively 
stable, fruitful, and peaceful collaboration.
Vatican Radio, Radio Nations, and Established Standards 
Vatican Radio and Radio Nations did not suit established European broadcasting at 
all. By the early 1930s, both Vatican City, in other words the Roman Catholic Church, 
and the League of Nations had created a transnational broadcasting network. Their 
stations transmitted over the short waves from within the newly defined European 
Region to audiences in and beyond the borders of Europe. Their institutional stan-
dards as well as the geographical scope of their networks deviated substantially from 
the stations represented by the IBU. In the course of their attempts to realize global 
broadcasting networks, both organizations found themselves hindered by techno-
logical deficiencies and ongoing European developments in frequency standardiza-
tion. As a result, they would have to collaborate with the IBU and ITU and be forced 
to distinguish Europe in their developing broadcasting networks. 
The League projected its own global station. This idea goes back to the discus-
sions about the establishment of the League itself. At the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919 U.S. officials proposed “a project that equips the future organization for 
world peace with an instrument for diffusion and communication of its ideas and 
its activities.” The project integrated “the possibility of erecting in Switzerland a 
radio electricity station in the proximity of the terrain where the League of Nations 
will be set up.”49 Such a radiotelegraphic station would not only stimulate the de-
velopment of the League but also trigger “the peaceful future of mankind.”50 When 
shortly afterwards the USA decided not to enter the League of Nations, the idea 
died prematurely. 
49 “un projet de doter la future organisation de la paix mondiale d’un instrument de diffusion et de com-
munication de ses idées et de ses activités…la possibilité d’ériger en Suisse une station radioélectrique à la 
proximité des terrains où s’installera la SdN.” Antoine Fleury, “La Suisse et Radio Nations,” in The League 
of Nations in Retrospect: Proceedings of the Symposium (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1983), 196. 
50 “l’avenir pacifique de l’humanité.” “Relais internationaux, Résumé de la situation présenté par le 
Secrétaire Général,” Série 562, 15 juin 1927, 4, box 85, file Relais, Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU.
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The plan for a wireless radiotelegraph station to diffuse its message globally con-
tinued to lie dormant within the organization. The League’s Communications and 
Transit Committee witnessed the creation by Radio-Swiss S.A of a Swiss broadcast-
ing network, as well as the establishment of the IBU some three years later. When 
the IBU asked the International Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIF) in 1925 
to examine the possibility of relaying music over the telephone cable network, the 
League approached the IBU to let Geneva be treated as a European capital in this 
proposal. A direct connection would make Switzerland the center of international 
broadcasting. A central office in Basel or Zürich would be working under the aus-
pices of the Geneva headquarters and would serve its ideals of peace and of the pre-
vention of war.51 This alternative plan for a Europe of national capitals would allow 
the League to contact other European capitals in case it did not realize its proper 
radiotelegraphic station.
When in 1926 the League discussed for the second time building its own ra-
dio station, existing regulations narrowed down their options of realizing the global 
network the way they projected. In December 1926 the League Council asked the 
OCT to examine having “at its disposal a radio-telegraphic station of its own, suf-
ficiently powerful to enable it to communicate independently with the greatest pos-
sible number of State Members of the League.”52 Ownership of an independent radio 
station seemed to be the most advantageous option. Participation in the relay net-
work as envisioned by the IBU would subject the organization to various systems of 
national communication. The importance of having access to independent means of 
communication could prove essential during “times of emergency.” In time of war, 
the League would have to be able to contact all European governments while the 
League Secretary-General could contact member countries (especially its Council 
members). In the eventuality that it had to use existing stations for its communica-
tions, the League would be hampered by the International Telegraphic Convention 
which reserved each Government “the right to suspend the international telegraphic 
service for an indefinite time if it thinks necessary, either as a whole or only on cer-
tain lines and for certain classes of correspondence, provided that it immediately 
informs each of the other contracting Governments.”53 To live up to its Covenant for 
the maintenance of peace the League wanted to establish its own radio station. The 
station must have global radius and would have to fall outside the sphere of influence 
of national governments, in particular that of the Swiss.54 
51 “Relais internationaux,” Série 562, 4, box 85, file Relais, Général I, IBU.
52 LoN, Establishment of a League of Nations Radio-Telegraphic Station, LoN doc. ser., A.22.1928.VIII 
(Geneva: LoN March 1928), 1. 
53 LoN doc. ser., A.22.1928.VIII, 2.
54 Ibid., 1.
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This plan for a League radio communications network connecting with nation-
states on a global scale did not refer to Europe in any way. In March 1928 the 
OCT advised the Council to build a short wave station that could transmit over 
two wavelengths simultaneously, supplemented, if necessary, by a medium wave 
transmitter. For financial reasons it dismissed the idea of a long wave transmit-
ter altogether. An additional medium wave transmitter would only be required 
in case the short wave transmissions could not be received within Europe. The 
League would then have to distinguish between Europe and the rest of the world 
for technical reasons. The station would allow the League to communicate via 
wireless telegraphy and live broadcasts with all countries in and outside Europe. 
The station would strengthen relations between the League, all governments, and 
all people worldwide.55
The Swiss intervened immediately. Radio Swiss S.A. and the Swiss government 
were not at all pleased to have such a global and pan-national broadcasting sta-
tion within Swiss borders. Though they shared the basic ideological aims of the 
League, they had economic and political objections. Radio-Suisse needed to fol-
low the League project closely. Director Fritz Rothen remarked that “Switzerland 
should stay vigilant towards this project; it cannot oppose it, but it must make 
the League understand the difficulties and inconveniences of an independent 
station.”56 Rothen was afraid of the competition from another radio station in his 
country. The Swiss government on the other hand foresaw potential problems with 
the country’s strict position of neutrality including possible effects for its national 
defense.57 “Switzerland must avoid being faced with a fait-accompli.”58 As a result, 
a few months after the OCT report, the Swiss federal political department made a 
counter-proposal that set the tone for a period of intense deliberation between the 
Swiss authorities, Radio-Suisse, and the League.
The Swiss counter-proposal gave the League three options. Firstly, the League 
could establish its own radio station according to its initial plan, to the dismay of 
the Swiss. Secondly, the Swiss proposed a mixed solution whereby the Swiss and 
the League equipped a radio station together. The Swiss would administer and 
55 Ibid., 2-3, 5.
56 “la Suisse doit rester attentive à l’égard de ce projet; elle ne peut s’y opposé, mais elle doit faire com-
prendre à la SdN les difficultés et les inconvénients d’une station indépendante…” Fleury, “La Suisse et 
Radio Nations,” 200.
57 LoN, Radio-Telegraphic Station for the Purpose of Ensuring Independent Communications for the 
League of Nations at Times of Emergency, Note and Memorandum from the Swiss Federal Government, LoN 
doc. ser., A.31.1928.VIII (Geneva: LoN 1928), 1.
58 “la Suisse doit éviter d’être placée devant un fait accompli.” Fleury, “La Suisse et Radio Nations,” 201.
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exploit the station in normal times while the League would take over in times 
of crisis. Though this solution was built on mutual trust and collaboration, the 
Swiss government wanted to secure its neutrality by agreeing to a written consent 
that Switzerland could not be held responsible for any of the League’s actions or 
transmissions. The third option assumed that the Swiss would administer and ex-
ploit the station at all times even in times of crisis. The Swiss then would not only 
guarantee the League independence and security of communications, but would 
also allow a League delegate to work as observer in the station.59 Though the Swiss 
preferred the last option, it did not play an important role in the discussions. 
Each option had its advantages. Whereas the second option would enable the 
League to make great cost-efficiencies, the first option would exclude complicated 
collaborative efforts. Both options enabled the League to communicate with the 
largest possible number of members in and outside Europe, downplaying any 
future dependency on re-transmissions that were currently necessary for com-
munication with extra-European countries.60 Regarding the mixed option, the 
League would have to agree to the technical specifications jointly with the Swiss 
wireless telegraphy and telephony joint stock company Radio-Suisse.61 The pros 
and cons expressed by the League’s wireless engineers led to extensive behind-the-
scene lobbying between the Swiss and League Secretary-General, Drummond. In 
September 1929 the League Assembly finally voted in favor of the mixed solution. 
The Assembly considered the new station to be one of worldwide importance 
and Rothen confirmed that Radio-Suisse fully backed the League’s ideals. He men-
tioned his delight at participating in a collaboration that would satisfy needs be-
yond the reach of a national station alone: 
‘It is because we are friends of the League and we consider it a privilege 
to facilitate its mission that Radio-Suisse…has the honor to establish the 
widest possible number of international links.’ On balance, it declares it-
self happy to collaborate with the LoN to construct a station that has to 
satisfy the needs more than a national station could have done alone.62
59 Ibid., 207-208.
60 LoN, Radio-Telegraphic Station for the Purpose of ensuring Independent Communications for the 
League of Nations at Times of Emergency, Supplementary Report of the Advisory and Technical Committee 
for Communications and Transit, LoN doc. ser., A.23.1928.VIII (Geneva: LoN 1928), 2-3.
61 LoN doc. ser., A.31.1928.VIII, 2. In the mixed solution operations could consist of 1) radio-tele-
graphic connections for correspondence between the League and other parties like government and press; 
2) weekly exchanges of traffic on appointment; 3) “Daily broadcasting of one or more League communiqués 
by means of suitable transmitting apparatus in order to establish contact daily with the stations intended to 
receive messages from Geneva”; 4) a listening-in program consisting of other stations sending information 
to Geneva. LoN doc. ser., A.23.1928.VIII, 6.
62 “‘C’est parce que nous sommes des amis de la Ligue et nous considérons comme un privilège de faci-
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Figure 4.2 – Radio Nations, Prangins
Source: League of Nations Archives, UNOG Library. Used by the courtesy of United Nations 
Office, United Nations Library, Geneva.
Though all parties seemed to be happy, the League would soon experience limita-
tions when seeking to influence the development of its station’s network. 
The League had agreed to construct a network that radiated globally, but for 
its technical qualifications and collaboration with the Swiss broadcasters, distin-
guished between Europe and the world. The construction of the global network 
over the short waves would have to become a truly international project to avoid 
liter sa mission que Radio-Suisse…s’est fait l’honneur d’établir le plus grand nombre possible de liaisons 
internationales.’ En fin de compte, il se déclare heureux de collaborer avec la SdN à la construction d’une 
station qui doit satisfaire des besoins au-delà ce qu’une station nationale eût pu assumer seule.” Fleury, “La 
Suisse et Radio Nations,” 208.
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political quarrels. The League ordered that all major radio industry companies 
including Telefunken, Marconi, and RCA should take part in the construction 
of the station.63 The short wave connection would assure global communication, 
with a special desire to communicate with South America, Argentina and Brazil 
in particular.64 Within Europe, the new station could rely on the already existing 
medium wave transmitter of Radio-Suisse that allowed broadcasting to all stations 
within IBU’s Europe including those in large parts of the USSR, in North Africa 
and the Near East. The League of Nations in its political affairs was thus dealing 
with a smaller Europe than the one to which it broadcasted over the European 
wireless network of medium waves. 
The League’s decision to collaborate with the Swiss limited its influence sub-
stantially. The League could operate its short wave network freely as to date there 
was no regulation of the short waves. The medium waves were a more difficult 
matter. The Swiss PTT owned the Swiss network. Moreover, it was Radio Suisse 
that had a seat in the IBU and consequently could negotiate and influence the allo-
cation of the medium waves and the designing of the relay network in Europe. The 
League could only make use of the medium waves assigned to the Swiss within the 
existing European frequency plans. By deciding to collaborate with the Swiss, the 
League chose to distinguish between Europe and other parts of the globe. Thereby 
it bound itself to European regulations and appointments for radio broadcasting 
that it could not influence. Its station, Radio Nations, went on air on February 2, 
1932.
The plan for a global Catholic station encountered similar problems. Vatican Radio 
was established in response to political upheavals between the Papal States and the 
Italian government. The upheavals revealed the need to guarantee the voice of 
the Catholic Church in the future. Pope Pius IX had lived in exile in Vatican City 
for years until the signing of the Lateran Treaty in 1929. The Treaty made Vatican 
City an independent state with its own laws and its own currency, returning free-
dom of travel to the Pope. Shortly afterwards, tensions again arose between the 
Pope and Mussolini. The Church sought to strengthen the Vatican’s power in or-
der to avoid any repeat of defeat in modern world politics. According to Cardinal 
Eugenio Pacelli (later Pope Pius XII), the new medium of radio could be employed 
to spread the Catholic message. “Through radio, no pope could ever be driven 
63 LoN doc. ser., A.23.1928.VIII, 6.
64 LoN, Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, Minutes of the Sixteenth Ses-
sion, held at Geneva, May28th-June 2nd, 1931, LoN doc. ser. C.417.M.173.1931.VIII (Geneva: LoN 1931), 
75.
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into isolation again; geographic and political borders had become virtually mean-
ingless when confronted by the ‘airwaves’ of broadcast technology.”65 In 1930 the 
Church contacted Guglielmo Marconi, who not only was Italian by birth, but also 
a staunch Roman Catholic. A few months later, after a quick construction process, 
the station Vatican Radio went on air on February 12, 1931.66 
Unlike the League, the Vatican could organize its broadcasting network far 
more quickly and easily. Marconi began by constructing a short wave station to 
secure the Vatican global reception of its own voice. After six months, the Vatican’s 
programs could be broadcast in seven languages through seven non-directional 
shortwave transmitters. The Society of Jesus operated the station which had the 
call signal “Station HJV” referring to the Holy See, Jesus Christ, and the Vatican. 
According to the Vatican, the new station required a “certain knowledge, dedi-
cation and commitment to the Pope and the Catholic Church through the next 
millennium.”67 They envisioned a global Christian broadcasting network that de-
spite transmitting from within the European region, did not pay any attention to 
Europe as a category. 
Like the League of Nations, Vatican Radio experienced problems with recep-
tion. The short waves did not allow for the best quality of reception over short 
distances within Europe. In 1937 the Vatican gave its station a technological boost 
by adding a new 25kw shortwave station complemented by four 400kw shortwave 
antennas, and also by constructing a 5kw tower for medium wave transmission. 
These improvements greatly enhanced the Vatican station’s reception in Europe 
and across the globe in new areas like Japan and South America. Broadcasting 
increased from seven languages to ten and then to twelve by 1939.68 Contrary to 
the IBU and Radio Nations, Vatican Radio did not envision an audience based on 
the idea of nation-states. Like the League, by 1937 Vatican Radio technologically 
imagined a broadcasting space that distinguished between Europe over the me-
dium waves and other parts of the world over the short waves. The medium waves 
had already been standardized in European institutions by 1931. Radio Nations 
and Vatican Radio could not avoid integration into the European broadcasting 
community if they wanted to have a say in their own network development.
65 Marilyn J. Matelski, Vatican Radio: Propagation by the Airwaves, Media and Society Series (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 1995), xvi.
66 “Inauguration de la station du Vatican,” Série 2386, 11 fév. 1931, CA Document Séries, IBU.
67 Matelski, Vatican Radio, xvi. 
68 Ibid., xvi, 169. Radio Vatican added Polish and Ukrainian to its languages in 1938-39, and after the 
war it quickly added eleven new, mostly Eastern European languages, to its services: Hungarian, Ruma-
nian, Czech, Russian, Slovene, Slovak, Latin, Bulgarian, Croatian, Belorussian, and Albanian.
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The two stations related differently to the enduring European system. Despite no 
regulation of the short waves, the IBU and ITU together could still arrange the 
medium waves. Initially, Vatican Radio did not broadcast over the medium waves. 
Since the conventions designed under the auspices of the ITU allocated a small 
wave band to broadcasting, Vatican Radio joined the ITU and CCIR in 1931.69 
In this manner the Vatican could actively participate in international discussions 
on the allocation of waves between various forms of telecommunications as well 
as in technical discussions on the development of radio-electricity technology in 
broadcasting and wireless communications. Though Vatican City was largely in-
terchangeable with the Roman Catholic Church and as such would not fit the idea 
of the genuine PTT administrations that joined the ITU, in legal terms it was a 
nation-state. This greatly facilitated its integration into the European community 
for radio communications. But Vatican Radio was not interested in IBU member-
ship. The IBU dealt with European issues and could not influence the regulation 
of the short waves. 
The League of Nations was a totally different matter. It wanted to join organiza-
tions like the ITU and the IBU, but did not meet their standards for adherence to 
the union. The developing European frequency standards assumed a nation-wide 
and public broadcasting network. The League not only sought to create global 
broadcasting, but was also an intergovernmental organization that at times op-
erated a radio station of another broadcasting organization. The League’s broad-
casting activities caused considerable confusion. For years, the organization had 
joined in various international meetings of the IBU Technical Committee as well 
as the ITU consultative committees on telegraphy (CCIT) and radio-electricity 
(CCIR) as an observer with consultative voice. Now the League wanted to become 
a full IBU member in order to have some influence over the European part of its 
broadcasting activities with respect to Radio-Suisse. In 1930 the League requested 
IBU membership.70 The IBU could simply not allow the League to join the Union, 
because the League station did not meet its standards. 
Neither the IBU nor the League had any experience in this field. In particular 
the issues of ownership and transmission content caused complications. Regarding 
ownership, the IBU foresaw a problem with international rights, since the League 
had a special role in world affairs. The IBU Council asked its Special and Legal 
Committee to study the issue. The study should also explore the possibilities with 
respect to Vatican Radio, even though they had not approached the IBU with a 
69 “Procès-verbal des réunions de la Commission Spéciale à Budapest, Octobre 1930,” Série 2195, 6 
nov. 1930, 2-3, P.V. Commission Mixte, Commission Relais, Commission Spéciales, IBU.
70 “Procès-verbal des réunions de la Commission Spéciale,” Série 2195, 1, P.V. Commission Mixte, IBU.
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request for adhesion.71 The study results argued that the League could not be wel-
comed as full IBU member. First of all, the League used a station that was oper-
ated by another organization. That other organization could join the IBU, but the 
League could not.72 Moreover, the League did not suit IBU standards for transmit-
ting broadcasting programs to an anonymous audience either. The League rather 
sought to transmit communiqués to member governments and League Council 
members.73 The IBU Council altogether sidelined the idea of making Vatican 
Radio a member. The organization did not intend joining the IBU anyway. The 
League would still be welcome as an observer to relevant IBU meetings.74
Only four months later, IBU director of legal affairs, Ladislav Sourek, and 
League wireless expert, Van Dissel, met each other half way. Sourek now recog-
nized that the League wanted to broadcast genuine programs to a mass audience. 
Van Dissel approved a membership in which the League would have all the advan-
tages of active membership without the right to vote. The League was an impartial 
international organization that represented many countries. A right to vote would 
undermine that position.75 The IBU moreover thought that League membership 
would positively influence its own position during the Madrid Conference the 
following year. The IBU modified its statute.76 With an eye to both Vatican Radio 
and Radio Nations, the IBU created the category of “special membership.” Special 
members would have all the obligations of active members, but could only join 
with a consultative voice.77 In spite of the fact that final decision power remained 
with Radio-Suisse, special membership would in any case give the League the 
right to participate in discussions on medium waves. 
With international legal issues in place and broadcasting contents clarified, the 
international economic crisis brutally disturbed the formal bonding of the League 
and the IBU. In June 1932 Van Dissel informed IBU Secretary-General Burrows 
that he had to turn down, or at least postpone, League membership of the IBU. He 
71 The Special Committee held a temporary nature. During the last year it had been examining the 
relationship between the IBU and other international organizations, questions very much in line with the 
League’s request for adhesion. P.V. Conseil Administrative 1930, 229, IBU; P.V. Conseil Administrative 
1930, 230, IBU.
72 “Procès-verbal de la Commission Spéciale tenue à Paris,” Série 1996, 22 juillet 1930, 4-5, P.V. Com-
mission Mixte, Commission Relais, Commission Spéciales, IBU.
73 “Procès-verbal de la Commission Spéciale,” Série 1996, 4-5, P.V. Commission Mixte, IBU.
74 Ibid.
75 “Procès-verbal des réunions de la Commission Spéciale,” Série 2195, 2, P.V. Commission Mixte, IBU.
76 The discussions about new forms of memberships would continue for almost a year. Ibid., 2; P.V. 
Conseil Administrative 1931, 28, IBU; Série 1886, 2156, 1995, 2389, 2616, 2647 révisé, 2653, CA Docu-
ment Séries, IBU. 
77 According to Van Dissel IBU membership would possibly concern the OCT, the League body that 
would be exploiting Radio Nations. P.V. Conseil Administrative 1930, 265-266, IBU; P.V. Conseil Adminis-
trative 1931, 28, 45, IBU.
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remarked:
My dear Burrows,…I am very sorry to inform you, considering the eco-
nomic depression we all are passing through, I am obliged to adjourn the 
question of adhesion to the ‘Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion’ by 
‘Radio Nations’ until next year. I hope the amelioration of the financial 
conditions will permit us then to offer you a formal demand for adhesion, 
as we are very interested, theoretically and practically, in the work of the 
Union.78
The plan did not die altogether. Having reconsidered its options, in 1935 the 
League decided that it wanted the same advantages as active members including 
the right to vote. A right to vote was indispensable for the League to be able to be 
“completely independent with regard to the Swiss Government,” argued member 
of the League Secretariat, Metternich.79 Since the League was an organization of 
international public rights, the League should be placed on equal footing with 
state organizations, on equal footing with a state administration charged with tele-
communications. Moreover, the League would be represented by “a delegate act-
ing as an expert for one of the interested bodies of the League of Nations” a similar 
construction as agreed to with CCIR and CCIT.80 Both IBU Secretary-General 
Burrows as well as the by now Director of OCT Van Dissel, did not foresee any 
problems.81
In the end the matter was never resolved mainly because of the League’s posi-
tion as intergovernmental organization striving for international peace and col-
laboration. On the one hand, the main bottleneck would continue to be the right 
to vote relating to the League’s legal position in world affairs. On the other, rapidly 
deteriorating international tensions due to ideological differences also curtailed 
more and more of the space left to the League to maneuver. Whilst Metternich 
advised the League to stay out of IBU discussions until the form and conditions 
for collaboration between the two organizations were resolved, Nazi Germany 
78 “Letter from Van Dissel to Burrows,” 2 june 1932, 1, registry file 9G, box R-2601, file 13698/2081, LoN.
79 “une indépendance complète vis-à-vis du Gouvernement suisse” “Report by Metternich,” 9 Feb. 1935, 
3, registry file 9G, box R-4321, file 663/663, jacket 1, XV, LoN.
80 “par un délégué agissant en qualité d’expert de l’organisme intéressé de la Société des Nations…” 
Though the archives reveal that the League desired to become an ITU member and to be able to join in the 
meetings of the ITU consultative committees, the documents do not give any indication that the League 
managed to acquire membership. The documents do indicate that the League wanted to give it a try during 
the 1932 Madrid Conference, and reveal that League representatives joined CCIR and CCIT meetings 
around the middle of the 1930s. “Report by Metternich,” 4, registry file 9G, box R-4321, file 663/663, LoN.
81 Ibid., 5; “Rapport sur la session du Conseil de L’Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion tenue à 
Genève du 20 au 26 février 1935,” 11 March 1935, 18, registry file 9G, box R-4321, file 15874/663, LoN.
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decided to withdraw from the League.82 When the League in Cairo requested plac-
ing the question of the re-transmission of League broadcasts on the agenda of the 
Montreux Conference, Germany and Italy objected.83 The League even sent a del-
egate to Montreux the evening preceding the conference to calm the atmosphere 
and create favorable conditions for the discussion of “a particularly delicate ques-
tion given the fact that certain organizations, those of Germany and Italy, oppose 
our request.”84 By the time of the outbreak of World War II, several League experts 
recognized that “[w]hatever little success is achieved by our radio service during 
its short career is due primarily to our contacts with members of the U.I.R.”85
One year before its medium wave transmitter went on air, Vatican Radio for 
the first time showed some interest in “Europe” when it handed in a request for ad-
hesion to the IBU in 1936.86 By then the IBU had already amply discussed the issue 
of special membership. It immediately granted Vatican Radio access to the IBU 
broadcasting community as a special member. As a result, Vatican Radio could im-
mediately join in all meetings relating to its technical and non-technical activities 
in medium waves. The Vatican, however, showed a broader interest in the IBU com-
munity. Its representatives actively participated in meetings of the Rapprochement 
Committees and assisted in the legal discussions of the Intercontinental confer-
ence for broadcasting in Paris in 1936.87 Furthermore, Vatican Radio representa-
tives also joined in mutual League and IBU activities with respect to broadcasting 
in the interest of peace (Chapter 5). Vatican Radio’s clear religious orientation and 
its specific global interests deviated from established IBU standards. The station 
nonetheless shared an important ideological belief with the IBU and the League 
that made it an acceptable partner to the European broadcasting community. They 
shared a desire for the international peaceful use of the airwaves.
82 “Letter by Metternich to the League Secretary General,” 30 janv. 1936, 1, registry file 9G, box R-4321, 
file 22092/663, II, LoN.
83 “Letter by Van Dissel to Metternich,” 17 Feb. 1939, 1, registry file 9G, box R-4322, file 36772/663, 
jacket 1, XII, LoN.
84 “une question particulièrement délicate étant donné que certaines Compagnies, telles que la Compa-
gnie allemande et la Compagnie italienne, s’opposent à nôtre requête.” “Note by Vejerano to De Makay,” 1, 
registry file 9G, box R-4322, file 36772/663, jacket 1, XV, LoN.
85 They agreed that in particular the role of IBU Secretary General Arthur Burrows had been essential 
to their success. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that the personal contacts between Burrows and Van Dissel 
formed the basis of whatever success they had. Metternich’s advice did not stop Van Dissel from continu-
ing to attend and participate in events organized by the IBU, like the 1936 Paris Meeting. “Dunning to 
Pelt,” 25 April 1940, 2, registry file 9G, box R-4322, file 40118/663, III, LoN; IBU, Documents of the Paris 
Meeting, 12.
86 “Demande d’admission du service de radiodiffusion de la Cité du Vatican, (Rapporteur: A.R. Burrows),” 
Série 5661, 13 fév. 1936, CA Document Series, IBU.
87 IBU, Documents of the Paris Meeting, 9, 21.
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Whereas both Vatican Radio and Radio Nations had initially envisioned a 
global broadcasting network to connect with their audiences, they could not but 
deal with Europe as a special category. The technicalities of short waves did not al-
low for high-quality reception of broadcasting within Europe. Consequently, they 
would have to transmit over medium waves as well, an activity that was already 
being standardized at European level. In the case of Radio Nations, contingen-
cies with the Swiss made the organization decide to integrate Europe as a special 
category in its global network. Regarding audiences however, Radio Nations and 
Vatican Radio had different views. Radio Nations acknowledged and aimed at 
nation-states in its communiqués and broadcasts. Vatican Radio preferred Radio 
Moscow’s plan, reaching for a global Catholic rather than socialist community. 
Similar to the case of Radio Moscow, over the years Europe became part of the 
Radio Nations and Vatican Radio’s broadcasting projects for practical reasons.
Radio Luxembourg and Reluctant Experts
Radio Luxembourg was the sole station aimed explicitly at Europe. It was an initia-
tive that deliberately desired to broadcast to a Europe-wide audience by means of a 
Europe-wide wireless network. Radio Luxembourg in fact would be the one station 
in the European Region that explicitly claimed to be European. Moreover, contrary 
to the developing European standards based on the idea of public broadcasting, 
Radio Luxembourg would be broadcasting on a commercial basis. Its case reveals 
how threatening the very idea of a European commercial broadcasting station ap-
pears to have been to the developing establishment of European broadcasters. 
Before Radio Luxembourg there already was a commercial broadcasting tradition 
in Europe. When the French, in collaboration with Luxembourg PTT adminis-
tration, established the Luxembourgeois Broadcasting Company, they were thus 
not doing anything highly unusual (Table 4.2).88 By 1928, European stations like 
Hilversum (Netherlands), Radio Paris (France), Scheveningen (Netherlands), Tour 
Eiffel (France), and Radio Belgique (Belgium) at regular intervals issued commercial 
broadcasts that often specifically targeted British audiences.89 French station Radio 
Normandy, which would become one of the most important commercial stations 
along with Radio Luxembourg, operated outside the IBU community. Other stations 
88 Seán Street, Crossing the Ether: British Public Service Radio and Commercial Competition, 1922-1945 
(Eastleigh: John Libbey Publishing, 2006).
89 Street, Crossing the Ether, 147-148. 
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like Radio Paris and Radio Toulouse, however, were respected members of the IBU. 
Several stations in Europe issued commercial broadcasts or advertizing.90
In the early years “commercial” stations mainly sought to cover costs via in-
creased sales of receiver sets. The IBU whose 1926 statutes explicitly claimed that 
the “Union does not pursue any commercial scope” in reality consisted of many 
private broadcasters who created the IBU to stimulate the increase of set sales.91 The 
IBU members mainly tried to achieve this goal via improvements in the quality of 
the technology and the broadcasts while they asked their listeners for a listening fee. 
Occasionally some members apparently had additional advertising activities. Along 
with several French stations, the German RRG for instance on occasion broadcast 
advertisements, in Germany “only if they promoted German-made products, and 
were placed through the German Reichspostreklame, a subsidiary of the German 
90 The activity of commercial broadcasting in the north, east and south of Europe deserves further 
scrutinization.
91 UIR, “Statuts,” Série 176, 23 mars 1926, 1, box 33 l’Histoire de l’UIR – statuts, IBU.
Table 4.2 – Commercial broadcasting stations in Europe in the interwar years
Name Established IBU membership
Radio Paris 1921 1925
Radio Normandy 1924 -
Poste Parisien 1924 1925
Radio-Lyon 1924 1926-1932, rejoined in 1943
Radio-Toulouse 1925 1926-1929, rejoined in 1943
Radio Méditerranée (Radio-Côte 
d’Azur/Nice Juan-les-Pins)
1927 1943
Radio Luxembourg 1931 -
Radio Athlone 1933* 1928 (in 1933 partially commercial)
EAQ Madrid ? -
*The broadcasting service of the Irish PTT, member of the IBU, would commercialize part of 
its activities in 1933.  It named that part of its activities Radio Athlone.
The stations in this table are an indication of the number of commercial broadcasting stations in 
Europe only. There have been other stations who over time incidentally or regularly sold airtime 
to commercial stations like the IBC.
Source: Seán Street, Crossing the Ether: British Public Service Radio and Commercial 
Competition, 1922-1945 (Eastleigh: John Libbey Publishing, 2006), 229-258; Arno Huth, La 
radiodiffusion: Puissance mondiale (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1937), 100-102; IBU, Twenty 
Years of Activity of the International Broadcasting Union (Geneva: International Broadcasting 
Union, 1945), 65-72. 
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PTT…”92 Consequently, in these early years there was no clear-cut view on com-
mercial broadcasting in the IBU, or a shared view on what no “commercial scope” 
actually meant.
One of the most prolific personalities behind the commercial transmissions 
was Captain Leonard Plugge. At regular intervals stations like Radio Paris, Radio 
Toulouse, and the Spanish EAQ sold him airtime. Plugge formalized his commer-
cial activities when he created the International Broadcasting Company (IBC). 
The IBC mainly purchased airtime from radio stations on the European continent 
to broadcast ads and sponsored programs from British advertisers into British 
territory. In this way, British and foreign industries could reach a large part of 
British society. The BBC had always pursued a policy of high quality and educa-
tive broadcasting that according to its management did not suit advertising activi-
ties. Commercial broadcasts rather consisted of low key and low-quality programs 
that attracted a large number of audiences. At some point, BBC’s overseas director 
Atkinson stated: “…if we calmly allow this kind of thing to go on, sooner or later 
we shall be forced off the ‘no advertising’ standard, which, to my mind, would be 
disastrous.”93 Their protests and the efforts of the British government to lay down 
the no advertising standard for broadcasting into British law did not help. IBC 
continued to expand its activities and would also start to use stations other than 
the French ones, stations like Katowice, Poland.94 By 1933 commercially spon-
sored Sunday programs had increased to some 12 hours over Radio Normandy, 
2.5 hours over Radio Paris, 1.5 hours over Radio Toulouse, and 1 hour over Radio 
Côte d’Azur.95
The development of commercial broadcasting in Luxembourg followed nat-
urally from the country’s tradition of economic diversification. With an open 
market policy, the Grand Duchy had always tried to survive in a world of Great 
Powers. Not surprisingly, the first radiotelegraphic initiatives in Luxembourg in 
1922 focused on economic interests and business support from the point of view 
of competitive advantage. The state rejected the idea. Unlike other countries, 
Luxembourg did not have a license system in place with which it could grant con-
cessions to broadcasting stations. The Luxembourg government argued that the 
airwaves could not be seen as state property. Moreover, it was of the opinion that 
radio served as an extension of the press rather than other means of telecom-
munication. As a result, in July 1929 François Anen created the private National 
92 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 277.
93 Street, Crossing the Ether, 150.
94 Ibid.; Alan Davies, “The First Radio War: Broadcasting in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939,” Histori-
cal Journal of Film, Radio and Television 19, no. 4 (1999): 473.
95 Street, Crossing the Ether, 151.
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Luxembourg Broadcasting Company. The station used a medium wave frequency 
with a radius of about 70 kilometers which had been assigned to Luxembourg 
by the 1926 Geneva and 1929 Prague Plans. The station, Radio Letzeburg, was a 
quasi-amateur or at least low-capital operation aimed at a Luxembourg market but 
which also reached peoples and markets beyond the country’s boundaries. In 1929 
Anen requested IBU membership. The IBU refused on the basis that the station 
broadcasted without a concession granted by the state.
By December 1929 the Luxembourg government had finally put legislation in 
place and opened up bids for concessions. The state decided that Luxembourg 
would work with a monopoly concession as it would be highly unlikely that 
European frequency plans would grant the Duchy more than one frequency. The 
monopoly would be granted to a private party, the only option given the small 
size of the country. In the end, a French company the Société luxembourgeoise 
des études radioélectriques (SLER) won the concession. SLER would create the 
Compagnie luxembourgeoise de radiodiffusion, the Luxembourg Broadcasting 
Company (CLR) to operate the new station, Radio Luxembourg. Raymond 
Braillard, director of the IBU’s Technical Committee, had been actively involved in 
the concession process in Luxembourg. He held an active stake in SLER, and had 
a lot to gain from SLER and Luxembourg PTT collaboration.96 Braillard managed 
to discredit Anen’s broadcasting initiative with the Luxembourg PTT on the basis 
of the station’s lack of expertise.97 Anen’s station caused considerable disturbance 
to other European stations, he reported. As such, Braillard recommended to the 
Luxembourg PTT a company which had years of experience with the French sta-
tion Radio Paris: SLER.
Before SLER had even built the station, the situation in Luxembourg almost 
immediately led to disagreements within the IBU. Braillard had favorably received 
a request from SLER to join the IBU. Nonetheless, when Burrows found out that 
SLER intended to establish a station for international commercial broadcasting, he 
immediately sought support from other IBU officials. German IBU delegate and 
IBU Vice President Heinrich Giesecke for instance shared Burrows antipathy to-
wards low key entertainment programs, whereas Swiss delegate Maurice Rambert 
supported Burrows due to legal concerns. Braillard on the other hand gained 
support from IBU Vice President Robert Tabouis who also had a stake in SLER. 
Tabouis feverishly tried to influence discussions about a change in IBU statutes 
concerning special membership. Braillard and Tabouis ultimately failed to prevent 
96 Braillard moreover had been working for the French CSF for years. CSF backed SLER and owned 
Radio Paris. 
97 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 58-59.
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the addition of an important clause to the statutes.98 The IBU would refuse the ad-
hesion of any member that specifically aimed to broadcast across borders since it 
would only welcome all organizations “operating a broadcasting service in Europe 
with the main object of providing for national needs…”99 Burrows got his way.
The commercial activities in Europe that considered the UK their main tar-
get area influenced decisively people’s opinion on advertising sponsored, popular 
broadcasting. Since several IBU members were involved in commercial activities 
like advertising on occasion, the IBU used double standards for a while. It justified 
its decision to amend the statutes and thereby exclude a Luxembourg station from 
membership by referring to the educative high culture standard the organization 
pursued as well as the national basis for wireless broadcasting in Europe. In the 
end, the IBU judged SLER on the basis of a simple vision for international com-
mercial broadcasting. They were judging the mere idea of a station that had not 
yet even been built. 
Initially Radio Luxembourg combined commerce with internationalism. The sta-
tion’s management projected an international economic broadcasting network. 
The network would collaborate and align its broadcasting with the League of 
Nations’ economic and ideological goals.
Radio Luxembourg’s ideas were relatively progressive or at least different from 
dominant perceptions. According to managing director Jacques Lacour-Gayet and 
his colleagues, the private media should defend liberalism, conventional compe-
tition and private enterprise rather than promote cartel capitalism and protec-
tionism. Furthermore, they argued that an economic liberalist use of the private 
media should become a proponent for European unity and growth.100 With such 
perspectives, Radio Luxembourg was following in the footsteps of the first plans 
for broadcasting in 1922 when Luxembourg had sought to play an important 
98 Other major IBU officials probably shared the opinion of Burrows. President Charles Carpendale for 
instance is known to have supported enthusiastically the BBC model. Moreover, it is highly likely that the 
Czech delegate and head of the IBU Legal Committee Ladislav Sourek supported this view as well, just like 
the Polish delegate and head of the International Relay Committee Zygmunt Chamiec, and the Austrian 
delegate and head of the Rapprochement Committee Oskar Czeija. Ibid., 277; Ryszard Miazek, Przeminelo 
z radiem: opowiesc o Zygmuncie Chamcu – zalozycielu i pierwszym dyrektorze Polskiego Radia (Rzeszów; 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wyzszej Szkoly Informatyki i Zarzadzania; Polskie Radio, 2005); Reinhard 
Schlögl, Oskar Czeija: Radio- und Fernsehpionier, Unternehmer, Abenteurer (Wien: Böhlau, 2005); Eckhard 
Jirgens, Der deutsche Rundfunk der 1. Tschechoslowakischen Republik: Eine Bestandsaufnahme (Frankfurt 
am Main: Lang, 2005).
99 UIR, “Statutes of the International Broadcasting Union, Adopted by an Extraordinary General 
Assembly of the International Broadcasting Union, Budapest in October 1930,” 123, box 33 l’Histoire de 
l’UIR – statuts, IBU; Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 273-280.
100 Ibid., 88-90.
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information role in economic life. Such a role would allow the medium to become 
a vehicle for international peace and growth in economics and finance. 
According to Spohrer, Lacour-Gayet “represented a new type of commercial 
professional.”101 He was not from a commercial family, but grew up in an intel-
lectual milieu with cultural interests. He studied liberal arts at the French École 
normale supérieure but rather than following a career in academia or politics, he 
entered commerce. He became a retail industry lobbyist, and tried to free the way 
for the economic liberalization of European trade markets. In the years leading up 
to the establishment of Radio Luxembourg, Lacour-Gayet raised a large part of the 
capital for the new station. Spohrer shows how Lacour-Gayet personally sought 
to recruit like-minded individuals who desired to create a European market. He 
feverishly tried to give these men a position in companies and organizations in 
which he had vested interests.102 These men often shared bourgeois backgrounds 
and ideas about commerce and liberalism. Their backgrounds led them to connect 
commerce and competition with international peace and progress.
When these men constructed Radio Luxembourg they connected their ideas by 
envisioning an international economic broadcasting network. Their station would 
adhere to the latest ideas expressed by the International Conference of Industry 
and Commerce. The conference had shown interest in the creation of a truly inde-
pendent and international broadcasting station for industry and commerce. Such 
an international and independent station should above national broadcasts “cre-
ate a larger space for international economic problems,” for special international 
transmissions.103 Radio Luxembourg considered it was qualified to do the job and 
could become part of the European broadcasting community within the institu-
tional framework of the IBU, with a very specific niche function. It wanted to be-
come an all-European or even global station that combined commerce with the 
internationalist ideals of the League and the IBU.
With a reluctant European community of broadcasters in the back of their 
minds, the founders of Radio Luxembourg took matters in their own hands. They 
made a de facto claim to the long wave frequency of 1190m (252 kc/sec) and de-
cided to start experimental broadcasting in March 1932. The station agreed to 
start regular broadcasting only after the conclusion of the 1933 Luzern Plan. The 
claimed frequency fell outside the wavebands officially assigned to broadcasting 
101 Ibid., 88.
102 Ibid., 88-89; Laurence Badel, Un milieu libéral et européen: Le grand commerce français, 1925-1948 
(Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière, 1999).
103 “une place plus large au problèmes économiques internationaux.” BUIT, Documents de la Conférence 
Européenne des Radiocommunications Lucerne, MAI/JUIN 1933 (Berne: BUIT, 1933), 123.
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by the ITU.104 In general, new stations in countries that had signed the 1927 
Washington Convention had the right to claim unused frequencies as long as they 
did not cause any interference with existing stations. These de facto claims would 
then be taken into consideration the moment a new frequency plan was conclud-
ed.105 Though Luxembourg had not signed the Washington Convention, the sta-
tion hoped that the maneuver would secure its technical network for the future. 
Meanwhile, the station promoted a “Europe” in accordance with the League’s 
economic and commercial aims. The station portrayed itself as a “bon européen,” 
and claimed to serve unity internationally.106 In July 1932, several months before 
the Madrid Conference, Radio Luxembourg approached the League’s International 
Co-operation Organization (ICO) that dealt with the diffusion of the League’s aims 
in science and the arts. The station offered to try and put the station at the service 
of the ICO “for the scope that your committee pursues tirelessly.”107 With its high 
power transmitter and its central position in Europe, Radio Luxembourg might 
provide an interesting instrument for the aims of the League, Radio Luxembourg 
director Henri Étienne pointed out. In the absence of the League’s wireless expert 
Van Dissel, the ICO favorably received the request, with “very lively appreciation 
and profound gratitude…”108 
ICO invited Etienne to consider interesting options for collaboration within 
the League’s ideological framework. In response Etienne offered the League the 
use of its microphone for an hour every day between 7 and 8 p.m. It would be bet-
ter if the League itself thought of the kind of propaganda it desired to pursue first, 
in order to then find the most suitable broadcasting formula.109 Etienne therefore 
encouraged the League to suggest its own broadcasting content available for an 
hour each day to all audiences in Europe. With its generous proposal to the League 
to broadcast an hour every evening at the very time most people were listening to 
the radio, the station was clearly trying to make its powerful medium available for 
the ideals and the needs of the League. 
104 “Note à Monsieur de Montenach par Van Dissel,” registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, 
6.X.32, LoN; Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 147.
105 Ibid., 144.
106 Huth, La radiodiffusion, 19.
107 “vers le but que poursuit inlassablement votre commission.” “Lettre du Compagnie Luxem-
bourgeoise de Radiodiffusion au Président de la CICI,” 20 juillet 1932, registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 
38270/38270, LoN. 
108 “la très vive appréciation et la profonde gratitude…” “Lettre de J.D. de Montenach à Etienne,” 27 juil-
let 1932, registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, LoN; LoN, International Committee on Intellectual 
Co-Operation, Minutes of the Seventh meeting held at Geneva, July 21st 1932, LoN doc. ser. C.I.C.I./14th 
Session/ P.V.7, 11.
109 “Lettre de Etienne à J.D de Montenach,” 19 août 1932, registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, 
LoN.
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This generous offer did not stand a chance. Almost immediately, voices of 
protest arose within the League of Nations regarding possible collaboration with 
Radio Luxembourg. Though OCI was convinced it should make use “of the good-
will of these people,” doubts within the committee made them decide to inform 
the station that they could not undertake any definite action before consulting 
wireless expert Van Dissel.110 In the meantime, the IBU found out about the re-
quest via its regular exchange of minutes with OCI. Burrows immediately mo-
bilized his personal network to prevent such collaboration. Burrows contacted 
the chair of the OCI, British Professor Gilbert Murray.111 He stressed that the sta-
tion acted in contravention of the 1927 Washington Convention as much as with 
the national laws of several countries that forbade the broadcasting of advertiz-
ing. For more information Burrows referred Murray to the biggest opponents of 
Radio Luxembourg in Europe, IBU Vice-President Carpendale and BBC director 
John Reith.112 A British offensive would have to undermine a League and Radio 
Luxembourg collaboration.
Van Dissel would come to the aid of the British. After ample deliberation with 
the British, Murray contacted the League Secretariat who assured him that the 
League had not made any promises to the station and could easily back out. When 
Van Dissel returned from his travels, he immediately put an end to the discussion. 
The “said station has been constructed at the margins and even in violation of the 
1929 Prague Convention,” he objected.113 The League would have to act carefully 
and decided to “continue ad infinitum the preliminary measures.”114 It retreated 
silently without communicating its decision to Radio Luxembourg. Thus Radio 
Luxembourg had no idea that its idea to develop a specific niche role within the 
IBU and League of Nations collaboration had come to a halt almost the minute 
the proposal was made, having been boycotted by a tight, well-established and 
intimate personal network of stakeholders. 
Seemingly unaware of these events, the Luxembourg PTT tried at the 1932 
Madrid and 1933 Luzern conferences to turn its de facto claim for a long wave 
110 “Letter by Montenach to Comert,” registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, LoN; “Lettre de J.D. 
de Montenach à Etienne,” 6 sept. 1932, registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, LoN.
111 Christopher Stray, ed., Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 297, 299.
112 Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, and Great Britain by law forbade broad-
casting for advertizing purposes. “Letter from Burrows to Murray,” 17 Sept. 1932, 1-2, registry file 5B, box 
R-2259, file 38270/38270, LoN.
113 “Letter from Van Dissel to J.D. de Montenach,” registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, 6.X.32, 
LoN.
114 “de continuer ad infinitum ces mésures préliminaires.” “Letter from International Co-Operation sec-
tion to Van Dissel,” 19 Oct. 1932, registry file 5B, box R-2259, file 38270/38270, LoN. 
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frequency into an officially accepted frequency for Luxembourg. The PTT ex-
plained that a long wave would suit their plan to build an international economic 
station. Such a station would have a special role in the European broadcasting 
community, serving the League’s economic and financial aims. In addition to a po-
litical side there was also an economic side to internationalism. Radio Luxembourg 
wanted to provide this new kind of service complementary to, though without 
harming, the existing situation coordinated by the IBU, ITU, and national PTT 
administrations. Perhaps to show its sincerity, the PTT suggested that the organi-
zation of the station’s programs could “be submitted to an international commit-
tee composed of the most qualified representatives from each country and that 
in keeping with the national broadcasting organizations.”115 This proposal meant 
the station was offering to subject its entire program schedule to an external in-
ternational committee consisting of program experts and national broadcasting 
organizations. Radio Luxembourg thus wanted to create a Europe-wide supported 
and partially pan-national program schedule, constructing European economic 
culture by mutual consent.
The Luxembourg PTT argued that the station would not only cross national 
borders by choice with its material network, but would also respond to a dire 
need for a station that surpassed the national in its contents. Up until then na-
tional cultural products dominated broadcasting without having too much inter-
est in the cultures of other countries. In particular this attitude existed amongst 
stations in the larger countries. PTT Administrator Jaaques argued that “maybe 
my small country could, without injuring other stations, serve as a conduit to re-
lay the principal productions of the genius of the large neighboring countries.”116 
Radio Luxembourg would fulfill an internationally oriented and impartial (from 
national interests) role. Its programs would feature pan-national economic broad-
casts as well as programs promoting Europe’s diverse national cultures. Such a 
vision of Europe would only be a partially radical departure from the IBU’s efforts 
to create a Europe of bordering nation-states via its technical and public standards.
Radio Luxembourg strengthened its plea for full collaboration with the 
European community for broadcasters and its immediate stakeholders by refer-
ring to the practical cost-benefit advantages. The station was located close to the 
115 “l’organisation des programmes sera soumise à une commission internationale composée des repré-
sentants les plus qualifiés de chaque pays, et cela en accord avec les organismes nationaux de radiodiffu-
sion.” BUIT, Documents de Lucerne, 123.
116 “Peut-être, mon petit pays pourra-t-il, sans nuire aux autres postes, servir de relais pour répandre les 
principales productions des génies de grands pays voisins.” BUIT, Documents de la Conférence Radio-
télégraphique Internationale de Madrid (1932): Tome II: Travaux de la Conférence (Délibérations, Actes 
définitifs) (Berne: BUIT, 1932), 862.
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IBU Checking Center in Brussels. Therefore it could easily be employed to diffuse 
the ideological aims of the IBU and the European community of broadcasters at 
large. Moreover, from a technical point of view the station “could provide a crucial 
case study as part of the studies and experiments carried out by the international 
control center in the common interest of European listeners.”117 The station placed 
itself at the disposal of the Checking Center to be used for the IBU technical stud-
ies. These propositions suggest a technical and ideological participation of Radio 
Luxembourg from within the European IBU broadcasting community, directly 
matching the station’s proposal to put its microphone at the disposal of the League 
of Nations. 
The Madrid and Luzern conferences rejected Luxembourg PTT’s proposal and 
refused to accept the de facto long wave frequency claimed by Radio Luxembourg. 
In particular the IBU and individual countries that pursued a policy of high cul-
ture and educative broadcasting objected strongly. Though the League did not in-
terfere in the debate it silently supported the objections stating that it had not yet 
collaborated with Radio Luxembourg and had “simply taken note of the offer of 
collaboration made by the Luxembourg Administration, as it had taken note of 
other offers presented to the section by other organizations.”118 The Czech govern-
ment supported the objections made by the British. One of the Czech delegates re-
marked that the broadcasting community in recent years had developed standards 
that substantially reduced chaos in the airwaves. What use would international 
regulations have if organizations did not adhere to them, he pondered. Immediate 
suppression of such behavior should prevent any future continuation of such ir-
regularities.119 They boycotted Radio Luxembourg on the basis of standards they 
had created in previous years. They boycotted the station seemingly without giv-
ing a second thought to the idea of a specific niche station in their network.
In the following years the experts worked around an unfortunate situation. 
Between 1933 and 1935, commercial broadcasting in France changed. Its focus 
shifted from an increase in sales of sets to the idea that the act of broadcasting 
could become a vehicle for the selling of airtime.120 The shift in thinking evolved 
117 “puisse constituer un élément de premier ordre pour les études et les expériences assurées, dans 
l’intérêt commun des auditeurs européens, par ce centre international de contrôle.” BUIT, Documents de 
Lucerne, 123.
118 “…simplement pris acte de l’offre de collaboration faite par l’Administration luxembourgeoise, ainsi 
qu’elle a pris acte des autres offres présentées à la section part d’autres organismes.” Ibid., 198.
119 BUIT, Documents de Madrid Tome II, 862-863.
120 Marc Martin, “Publicité et programmes radiophoniques dans la France d’avant-guerre,” in Histoire 
des programmes, histoire des jeux à la radio et à la télévision, ed. Michèle de Bussierre, Caroline Mauriat, and 
Cécile Méadel (Paris: GEHRA, 1986), 121-123; Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 86. In the United States there 
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around the same time as Radio Luxembourg was rejected in Luzern. Initially Radio 
Luxembourg did not want to give up its idea to contribute to the League’s cause. It 
created so-called national soirées that concentrated on one European country every 
evening of the week. Within a year, the station had already rescheduled the soirées to 
daytime hours when it did not manage to attract sufficient advertising revenues from 
all European countries.121 In the meantime the station followed the French way of 
viewing commercial broadcasting. The station began selling airtime, that is, specific 
time slots, to advertisers who among other things could sponsor a program. Soon 
Radio Luxembourg would mostly produce sponsored advertizing and low-culture 
broadcast entertainment.122 Its vision of becoming a specific niche for international 
economic affairs vanished.
Since Luxembourg is such a small country the station decided to proceed with 
its idea of becoming an all-European station. Not having been promised a long 
wave frequency in Madrid, the station used a long wave frequency which, to the 
annoyance of the Danish delegation, caused interference with the Danish station 
Kalundborg’s officially assigned long wave of 1154m (260 kc/sec).123 Moreover, when 
24 hours after the 1933 Luzern Plan went into effect the Russian station in Minsk had 
not commenced broadcasting over its newly assigned long wave, Radio Luxembourg 
occupied this frequency instead. Usage of this frequency caused direct interference 
also with Danish stations. In the following year Radio Luxembourg would change 
frequencies at regular intervals leading to protests to the ITU by Denmark as well 
as the UK, and later by the Netherlands, Switzerland, Iceland, Italy, and Austria. An 
increasingly unworkable situation made the IBU decide to intervene by December 
1934. The IBU arranged a frequency that Radio Luxembourg could use without too 
much disturbance. Even though the Danish station Kalundborg continued to dis-
pute Radio Luxembourg, the station would continue to broadcast on this frequency 
of 232 kc/sec arranged by the IBU. This usage would be tolerated by the European 
community of broadcasters for the remainder of the 1930s.124 
The reluctant toleration might seem odd given the initial harsh negotiations to 
exclude Radio Luxembourg from the European broadcasting community. Whereas 
happened a similar shift although that preceded developments in Europe by a couple of years (see chapter 2).
121 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 186-192, 219-220.
122 For an extensive elaboration on the programming activities of Radio Luxembourg see: chapter 3 of 
Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves.” 
123 This frequency fell within the band of 1250-1132m (240-265 kc/sec) which broadcasting had to 
share with other telecommunication services according to the Madrid Regulations. “Memorandum 
concernant Radio – Luxembourg, Annexe au Procès-verbaux de la 1ère séance de la Commission Tech-
nique,” Série 4841, 17 fév. 1935, 1, registry file 9G, R-4321, file 15874/663, LoN.
124 “Memorandum concernant Radio – Luxembourg,” Série 4841, 2-3, registry file 9G, R-4321, file 
15874/663, LoN; Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 134.
TEHS7_handels.indd   173 5/9/2012   3:41:23 PM
174 Europe – On Air
on the one hand a desire for efficiency in the European airwaves formed the back-
bone for the final decision, intervention via personal networks played an important 
role as well. In 1933 IBU Vice President and proponent of Radio Luxembourg from 
its earliest days, Robert Tabouis, had left the IBU to join the executive board of the 
Luxembourg Broadcasting Company. Tabouis requested to speak before the IBU 
Council on behalf of the new station.125 In the eyes of the IBU, Tabouis and his col-
leagues were “men of position, antecedents and high cultural standing.”126 Tabouis 
urged the IBU Council kindly but forcefully to bear Luxembourg in mind when 
making amendments to the Luzern Plan in the future. If “the IBU does not man-
age to resolve the problem, Radio Luxembourg will seek to conclude agreements 
between Administrations.” The station would then conclude plural bilateral agree-
ments and bypass the IBU.127 The IBU took the “request” seriously. The IBU would 
tolerate the station’s usage of a long wave outside the wave bands assigned to broad-
casting in the 1932 Madrid convention. 
Around 1936 Radio Luxembourg explored its options to turn its European 
network into a global one. The station thus made a deliberate connection between 
global broadcasting and commercial activities. By then, the international broad-
casting community had already started exploring a global broadcasting space. The 
Luxembourg PTT, on the advice of its government, contacted the ITU requesting 
information about the technicalities of the construction of a short wave station. The 
ITU immediately referred the PTT to the IBU for the organization’s expertise on the 
issue at hand.128 Even though the IBU studied the technicalities of the short waves 
together with stations such as Radio Moscow and Radio Nations, the IBU refused 
to collaborate with Luxembourg. The IBU conservatively argued that it was not of-
ficially authorized to deal with short wave regulation. Moreover, this concerned 
broadcasting to areas beyond the borders of the European region, to areas beyond 
the influence of the IBU.129 Luxembourg got stuck in a vicious circle in which the ITU 
and IBU continuously referred to one another on the basis of existing conventions 
and recommendations that the Luxembourg government had never accepted. Such 
125 Ibid., 278; P.V. Conseil Administrative 1933, 164, IBU.
126 Richard Nichols, Radio Luxembourg, the Station of the Stars: An Affectionate History of 50 Years of 
Broadcasting (London: W.H. Allen, 1983).
127 “l’U.I.R. ne réussit pas à résoudre le problème, Radio Luxembourg essaiera de procéder à des 
ententes entre Administrations,” P.V. Conseil Administrative 1933, 165, IBU. 
128 BUIT, Documents de Lucerne, 123. “Demande de l’Administration Luxembourgeoise des P.T.T. en 
vue d’obtenir des renseignements sur les caractéristiques techniques d’une station de radiodiffusion à 
ondes courtes de rayon mondial (Rapporteur: le Secrétaire Général),” Série 6333, 26 janv. 1937, 1-3, CA 
Document Series, IBU.
129 “Demande de l’Administration Luxembourgeoise des P.T.T.,” Série 6333, 3, CA Document Series 
IBU; P.V. Conseil Administrative 1937, 88, IBU.
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behavior at least suggests that the ITU and the IBU boycotted Radio Luxembourg 
together.
In its attempt to prevent Radio Luxembourg from “going global” the European 
broadcasting community dealing with the material side of the medium sud-
denly used “Europe” (the European Region as registered in the international ITU 
Conventions) as a means of refusing data provision and collaboration regarding 
worldwide broadcasting. Thus the European Region became an excuse to hinder 
the establishment of a radio station with global reach on European soil. Since 
neither Radio Nations nor Vatican Radio, which also broadcast from within this 
European region, had ever experienced hindrance of this kind, the move can be 
considered as a deliberate attempt to exclude Radio Luxembourg.130 Besides, the 
community participated with Radio Moscow on issues of global broadcasting 
even though European political society feared Russian socialist ideology. The en-
tire broadcasting community dealing with the material side refused to support a 
station that wanted to link global broadcasting to commerce. The Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg did not manage to realize its global aspirations in the interwar years. 
Luxembourg continued to insist on building a veritable European network. On 
behalf of the government the Luxembourg PTT stressed the station’s ability to “fill 
a very regrettable lacuna in European broadcasting, since no other broadcasting 
station could claim to be truly European.”131 Materially, Radio Luxembourg real-
ized a European network with its long wave station that had a radius of at least 
480 km covering the European continent and the British Isles. Nevertheless, the 
station would fall short of building the continental audience it promised its ad-
vertisers. Both its programming and its advertisements became increasingly west 
European, especially British and French, as well as urban oriented. The station 
failed to attract large audiences and advertisers for countries like Czechoslovakia 
and Italy, whereas programs for Luxembourg, Dutch, Flemish, and Swiss listeners 
continued in “abbreviated form and outside of prime-time hours.”132 Similar to its 
vision of a global station, Radio Luxembourg over time increasingly failed to real-
ize its vision of an all-European station program-wise as well. 
In the meantime, Radio Luxembourg’s plans indirectly forced the IBU to rede-
fine itself. Internally, IBU representatives clashed due to their different personal or 
national stakes in Radio Luxembourg. The IBU had to re-formulate its own scope 
and activities to ensure the support of all its members and representatives. Over the 
130 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1937, 197-198, IBU. 
131 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 147; BUIT, Documents de Lucerne, 122.
132 Advertisers became big international enterprises which mostly targeted the British market. Spohrer, 
“Ruling the Airwaves,” 193, 219-229.
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years, the IBU projected itself more explicitly as a European organization aiming 
to create high culture educational standards for broadcasting. Its main objective, 
for national needs and acceptance of membership based on concessions granted 
by states, even caused statutory changes. The IBU nonetheless remained an expert 
in technology driven organization, reluctantly tolerating Radio Luxembourg on 
the long wave band to keep an efficient wireless broadcasting network in Europe.
Like the IBU, Radio Luxembourg had to regularly redefine its ideas about the 
kind of broadcasting network it wanted to create. Many of its ideas failed, being 
brutally rejected by the European community of the IBU, the ITU and League 
experts, including closely involved stakeholders. Although the expert community 
hid behind agreed standards and juridical arguments, sentiments of fear were 
probably an important reason for rejection. Before the establishment of Radio 
Luxembourg, commercial activities had already defined international ideas about 
the “do-nots” of commercial broadcasting whatever “commercial” meant. So why 
would the broadcasting community go to all the effort of rejecting a station that 
wanted to complement its ideological activities by becoming an economic niche 
rather than oppose the ideology of its community? And why would the same com-
munity actually tolerate the station broadcasting over the long waves after the sta-
tion had let go of these ideals of peace and rapprochement and become an ordi-
nary low-culture internationally broadcasting entertainment station? In spite of 
these rejections, Radio Luxembourg would have an enormous impact in Europe, 
with people listening in from all corners of the continent. Listeners had finally 
found a station that offered entertainment and relaxation. 
Conclusion
Radio Moscow, Vatican Radio, Radio Nations, and Radio Luxembourg developed 
their systems based on their own ideas and interests. With the exception of Radio 
Luxembourg, which was the sole station that explicitly claimed to be European, 
these stations mostly had global plans for broadcasting. Radio Moscow for in-
stance was initially not interested in participating in European standardization 
efforts. It changed its mind only when “Europe” could positively serve its new 
politico-economic strategy of collaboration with the West. In spite of most of these 
global outlooks, the notion of Europe did often enter these projects. Europe usu-
ally became important due to the need for system fine-tuning to prevent interfer-
ence, and thus as a derivative of practical problems.
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With the exception of Radio Moscow, most of these stations were constructed 
by the time the IBU and ITU frequencies were already well on their way to be-
coming the European standard. Whereas these standards envisioned a Europe of 
national wireless broadcasting networks, thus a Europe of nation-states, the plans 
of the promoters of the new stations did not always fit into this concept. These sta-
tions found out that they could not ignore the ITU and IBU’s increasingly domi-
nant standards. Nor could the IBU and ITU ignore these new stations either. They 
had to engage in a process of fine-tuning in order to save their standards. 
Therefore the various parties had to renegotiate how they defined building a 
European network of national broadcasting stations. Fine-tuning standards with 
the structure of Radio Moscow, for instance, would redefine the boundaries of 
Europe in the east. Furthermore, Radio Nations and Radio Luxembourg threat-
ened from within the very idea of a Europe of nation-states. They either sought a 
pan-national approach organizationally, as in the case of the intergovernmental 
Radio Nations, or materially, as in the case of Radio Luxembourg. 
Fine-tuning happened via diffuse personal networks. Informal contacts be-
tween men like Burrows and Van Dissel for instance, affected the fine-tuning 
process between Radio Nations and the European standards defined by the IBU 
and ITU. Their relationship also played a decisive role in the deliberate boycott 
of Radio Luxembourg as a possible niche station in the IBU and the League of 
Nations’ broadcasting efforts. The personal involvement of Raymond Braillard 
and Robert Tabouis with Radio Luxembourg played a dominant role in the ulti-
mate creation of the station, including its unofficial tolerance in the European long 
wave band by the mid-1930s. At times, official routes would fall short or prolong 
procedures. The informal and personal networks then served as a route for im-
mediate mediation or outright defense of technology related standards, including 
efforts of a more ideological nature. 
The history of the fine-tuning process shows that this could be achieved with-
out a shared ideology. The case of Radio Moscow shows that the station collabo-
rated well with the IBU community as long as they managed to leave ideology 
out of their discussions. The case of Radio Nations reveals that a shared ideology 
would not be sufficient to make the station an IBU member in the end. Ideology 
did not seem to affect fine-tuning activities as long as international circumstances 
proved favorable for collaboration. Nonetheless, the medium of broadcasting was 
a culturally and politically sensitive instrument. In a situation when international 
relations deteriorated, the medium could easily become a bone of contention be-
tween nation-states. Ideological differences then re-entered the scene and could 
make effective fine-tuning of standards impossible. The following chapter focuses 
on the use of broadcasting for improving international relations.
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Chapter 5  
War and Peace in the Sky
Heute gehört uns Deutschland. Und morgen die ganze Welt.1
Thus reads a line from the well-known Nazi Party anthem. These anthems propa-
gated a specific sense of belonging to the people of Germany. At the same time they 
communicated a message of German domination to all peoples outside Germany’s 
borders. Hitler’s Nazi Party found that this and similar propaganda activities were 
crucial for diffusing its message among the masses. Hitler’s Reichsminister für 
Volksaufklärung und Propaganda Joseph Goebbels became the symbol of the propa-
ganda machine that Nazi Germany established in the course of the 1930s. Already in 
1933 he stated that broadcasting was the most influential and important intermedi-
ary between ideological movements and the nation-state as well as between ideology 
and people.2 Broadcasting propaganda was a weapon that could effectively imple-
ment the ideas of the Nazi Party into the minds of the masses.3
Goebbels related infrastructure construction directly to program development, 
propaganda broadcasting in particular. He argued that effective and long-lasting 
propaganda should be accomplished by means of an efficient system that reached 
beyond the borders of Germany. Only a system that had a clear direction could 
create a sense of belonging.4 Goebbels defined a kind of propaganda radically dif-
ferent from that of the past, referring to providing people with information, with 
facts. “Keep it simple,” was his motto. “It is not a matter of doing the right thing; 
the people must understand that the right thing is the right thing. Propaganda 
includes everything that helps the people to realize this.”5 In his eyes, propaganda 
was not truth, but the act of communicating that the truth was the truth. This also 
1 “Today Germany belongs to us. And tomorrow the whole world.” “Es zittern die morschen Knocken” 
by Hans Baumann can be translated into “The frail bones are trembling.” This was the official song of the 
Hitler Youth. 
2 Joseph Goebbels, “Der Rundfunk als achte Groβmacht,” in Signale der neuen Zeit. 25 ausgewählte 
Reden von Dr. Joseph Goebbels (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1938), 197-207.
3 Goebbels, “Der Rundfunk als achte Groβmacht,” 197-207. 
4 Joseph Goebbels, Der Kongress zur Nüremberg 1934 (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP; Franz Eher 
Nachfolger GmbH, 1934).
5 Goebbels, Der Kongress zur Nüremberg 1934.
TEHS7_handels.indd   179 5/9/2012   3:41:23 PM
180 Europe – On Air
Figure 5.1 – The Grand Hall of the Reichs Rundfunk Gesellschaft m.b.H. in 1936
Source: Box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
applied to political propaganda, meaning state activities intended to create a feel-
ing of belonging to a nation.6 A broadcasting network that reached beyond the 
nation in combination with effective political propaganda broadcasts allowed the 
state to plant its ideals into minds at home and abroad. 
In German propaganda activities, like the above Nazi anthem, Deutschland 
could easily have been replaced by Europa.7 According to internationally active 
Norwegian broadcasting expert Arnold Raested, the Nazi Party discursively em-
ployed “Europe” as a stepping stone towards world domination. He argued that 
the Party could be linked directly with Napoleonic thinking, which claimed that 
“the master of Europe was the master of the universe.”8 Germany was (to be) the 
dominant leader in Europe, and therefore the one righteous master of the world. 
Such a German Europe would first of all have to combat Russian Bolshevism as 
a united front. One the one hand, this would serve Germany’s Drang nach Osten. 
On the other, it would also serve the National Socialism ideals that did not tolerate 
6 Goebbels, Der Kongress zur Nüremberg. 
7 Arnold Ræsted, Europe and the Atlantic World (Oslo: I kommisjon hos Aschehoug, 1958), 43.
8 Ræsted, Europe and the Atlantic World , 42-43. 
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transnational communities like a global socialist society. Moreover, domestically 
it would have to disseminate the idea of Blut und Boden nationalismus, of a su-
perior German Aryan race.9 In Raested’s view, it was clear that the propagation, 
via cross-border broadcasting, of the National-Socialist idea of Europe led by a 
Germany consisting of one pure race, had a substantial effect. 
This chapter looks at the role of broadcasting in the light of interwar debates 
about war and peace. As the example of Goebbels’ propaganda activities shows, 
broadcasting programs could be filled with any kind of meaning and therefore 
with all kinds of visions of “Europe.”10 Furthermore, Goebbels linked system 
construction to program construction, highlighting the spatiality of propaganda 
broadcasting. His contemporaries considered broadcasting a powerful instrument 
for shaping society. It could easily influence international developments, encour-
aging war or strengthening peace as desired. Consequently, decisions about the 
form and shape of propaganda broadcasts in the context of war and peace debates 
became crucial for broadcasting communities. The debate became the place where 
broadcasting communities envisioned and negotiated the formation of their sys-
tems and the direction of society at large. 
This chapter concentrates on people’s different notions regarding the potential 
roles for broadcasting as a society-building instrument. Immediately after World 
War I, a large number of people projected the reconstruction of European soci-
ety. Above all the intellectual elites rejected the idea of employing technology as 
a means to such an end. In the meantime, the enlightenment-based ideals of the 
International Broadcasting Union (IBU) community clashed with propaganda ef-
forts pursuing goals of international segregation or national unity at the cost of 
international peace. The IBU community sought to prevent “misuse” and push 
the “righteous” use of its medium in an international atmosphere of reluctance. 
These mixed feelings disappeared into the background when international rela-
tions improved by the late 1920s. The loosely coupled IBU agreements for pro-
paganda broadcasting which had been established by then, would find their way 
into international government supported agreements in the first half of the 1930s. 
Rising nationalism by the mid-1930s however, caused international relations to 
quickly deteriorate, and pinned broadcasting to warfare. These changing relations 
impacted on the kind of society which was envisioned and constructed, in which 
Europe would only have a marginal or indirect role.
9 Peter Bugge, “The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914-1945,” in The History of the Idea of 
Europe, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge, 1993), 107-110.
10 Alexander Badenoch, Voices in Ruins: West German Radio across the 1945 Divide (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 224.
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Elites Doubting a Technology’s Virtue
Elites doubted the virtue of broadcasting. Nazi Germany was not the first country 
to actively relate the diffusion of ideology via broadcasting to the creation of segre-
gation, superiority, and even incitement to warfare. It was merely the first country 
that built a deliberately effective apparatus to achieve this. Broadcasting developed 
and crossed borders in a world and especially on a continent that had served as the 
main battleground for World War I and where people still felt anger, hate, sadness, 
and loss. Although people still felt the war intensely, they wanted to create peace 
and restore their daily lives. The political balance of power in Europe had shifted. 
The world created the League of Nations, and the political elites redrew many na-
tional boundaries in Europe, especially in the east. It was in this vulnerable and 
tense international atmosphere that stakeholders like governments, intellectual 
elites and broadcasters developed the first international standards in propaganda 
broadcasting. These stakeholders had different opinions about the role, if any, that 
broadcasting should have in the world.
Whereas the USSR immediately recognized the unifying prospects of broadcast-
ing, other European governments and intellectual elites regarded the medium with 
reluctance. In the eyes of the Russian leader, Lenin, broadcasting was an instrument 
more than capable of creating global peace and democracy along socialist lines, 
while totally ignoring Europe and the nation-state (Chapter 4).11 These Russian ideas 
contrasted sharply with the opinion of the majority of European stakeholders who 
tried to restore peace by designing special “projects” for Europe.12 
Elites consciously related these projects to European civilization in a variety of 
ways. They felt this civilization should not be based on modernity and technological 
innovation. In fact, most elites rather blamed the destructive forces of modernity 
explained as materialism, technology, and mass society for the crisis in European 
civilization. In their eyes, technology in particular had characteristics of low, non 
culture.13 Radio had even incited war when nationalists used the medium for their 
own ends. Radio technology should not be trusted as a society-building instrument. 
Although many of these elites had zealously supported rising nationalism 
11 Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War 
(London; Washington: Brassey’s, 1997), 1; S.V. Kaftanov and Soviet Union. Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po 
radioveshchan i iu i televiden i iu, Radio and Television in the USSR (Washington: U.S. Joint Publications 
Research Service, 1961), 22.
12 For an extensive discussion of such European projects see: Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, 
eds., The History of the Idea of Europe (London: Routledge, 1993).
13 Jan Ifversen, “The Crisis of European Civilization after 1918,” in Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy 
of the First World War, ed. Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 17; Count 
Richard Coudenhoven-Kalergi, Paneuropa (Wien: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1926), 16.
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during the second half of the nineteenth century, after the war they blamed it for 
the outbreak of war. They blamed nationalism for the demise of European civiliza-
tion. At the same time however, they had always rooted their nationalism deeply 
in a common awareness of a shared European destiny. Elites did not so much think 
that rising nationalism had destroyed European civilization, but rather destroyed 
Europe’s sense of supremacy and confidence among other things.14 In response, 
the international elites desired to rebuild Europe along similar lines as prior to 
World War I. This time they chose to appropriate their projects in order to avoid 
any repeat of war in the future.15 Neither nineteenth century inspired ardent na-
tionalism nor radio technology could find a place in these projects. It was in this 
atmosphere of reluctant politicians and elites that the new IBU took its first steps 
towards creating a cross-border broadcasting space in 1925.
Each in their own way, the USSR and the IBU argued that their medium could 
send out messages of unity and peace. Whereas the Russian government imme-
diately adopted broadcasting, the IBU headed off as a private body, trying to con-
struct a European broadcasting system without substantial government support. It 
was aware of the widespread reluctance with regard to its medium and the connec-
tion that elites made between radio, war, and nationalist sentiments. Meanwhile, 
the IBU also felt the threat of the Bolsheviks, who after the war “called for a class 
war in every country.”16 The Russian rejection of the idea of nation states as well as 
the idea of Europe as a site for building systems directly opposed the IBU’s activi-
ties to create a European broadcasting system connecting nation-states. These atti-
tudes hindered IBU members’ pursuit of their tasks. With a reluctant government 
and elite community, they could only depend on their own collaborative efforts if 
they wanted to create efficient international broadcasting. 
In 1925, the IBU devised a Gentleman’s Agreement. Already at its first meeting, 
the IBU had discovered that there “was the need for some international method 
of dealing with what is known in French as propagande inadmissible.”17 Day to day 
broadcasting of illicit propaganda impeded IBU’s efforts to create an efficient system. 
14 Bo Stråth, “Introduction: Europe as a Discourse,” in Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other, ed. 
Bo Stråth (Brussels; New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2000), 15; Pim den Boer, “Europe to 1914: The Making of an 
Idea,” in The History of the Idea of Europe, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London: Routledge, 
1993), 77. 
15 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1997), 60, 70-78.
16 Bugge, “Essay 2: The Nation Supreme,” 87.
17 “Address (made by Secretary-General A.R. Burrows) before the Conference on “Moral Disarmament” 
arranged by the International Students’ Associations, Geneva, April 1st 1933,” 3-4, box 74, file Propagande 
de l’Union ou des Membres, Général II, 1932/1936, IBU.
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International litigation on controversial broadcasts could even impede collaboration 
between the broadcasters themselves. According to the IBU, illicit propaganda for-
warded through broadcasting stations and wireless amateurs alike included all “…
political, religious, economic, intellectual, or artistic matter liable to injure that spirit 
of international co-operation and understanding…”18 Illicit or negative propaganda 
in the eyes of the IBU above all emanated in the form of pressing nationalistic pro-
paganda by newly established states or the Russian Bolsheviks who aroused people 
to join the Socialist Revolution.19 Using its Gentleman’s Agreement as strategic tool, 
the IBU positioned itself politically and ideologically among the international com-
munity of politicians and international elites.
In fact, the Union did not choose the term “Gentleman’s Agreement” ar-
bitrarily. The 1926 Agreement stated that “all existing members of the Union 
Internationale de Radiophonie have agreed to assist mutually in promoting the 
ideal of international fellowship, by exercising the strictest possible control in the 
direction of avoiding the broadcasting of material calculated to give offence in 
other countries.”20 Since the IBU was a non-governmental organization, it could 
only make non-binding recommendations. The IBU’s idea of society-building, 
civilization, and peaceful co-existence shared characteristics with what people 
generally understood as being a “gentleman.” The idea of “civilization” implied a 
dubious correlation between mannerly conduct and ethical behavior. According 
to Terry Eagleton, the term gentleman similarly “equates manners and morals, and 
holds a cult of secular, progressive development.” 
To be civilized or cultivated is to be blessed with refined feelings, well-
tempered passions, agreeable manners and an open mind. It is to behave 
reasonably and moderately, with an innate sensitivity to others’ interests, 
to exercise self-discipline, and to be prepared to sacrifice one’s own selfish 
interests to the good of the whole.21
Because of the non-governmental character of the IBU, its members would have to 
behave in a gentlemanlike way. Other kinds of behavior would harm the success of 
its recommendations. The effectiveness of its activities was considerably improved 
18 LoN, Commission Consultative et Technique des Communications et du Transit, Procès-Verbal de la 
9ième session, tenue à Genève, 12 au 17 juillet 1926, LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII (Geneva: LoN, 
1926), 28-30, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section des Communications et du Transit, Général, 1927-
1930, IBU.
19 LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII, 28-30.
20 IBU, International Union of Broadcasting Organisations – Union Internationale de Radiophonie (Ge-
neva: IBU, 1926), 15; IBU, Twenty Years of Activity of the International Broadcasting Union (Geneva: IBU, 
1945), 28-29.
21 Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 9, 18.
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thanks to “the fact that delegates to the Union’s meetings were always housed in the 
same hotel; they breakfasted, lunched and dined in the same restaurant and mixed 
together in the lounges in the evenings,” as Secretary-General Arthur Burrows 
described. These delegates worked “in the same medium in their respective coun-
tries and developed common friendships. They became a little, unofficial, but very 
practical League of Nations.”22 The Gentleman’s Agreement had the characteristics 
of rapprochement, cooperation, respect, and civilized behavior. This approach was 
the most effective way to achieve an international broadcasting network. 
Figure 5.2 – A view to “Gentlemanness” 
In the middle: Raymond Braillard, Director of the IBU Technical Committee and Brussels 
Checking Center with his colleagues at Ouchy, 1941.
Source: Box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
22 “Address (made by Secretary-General A.R. Burrows),” 3-4, box 74, file Propagande, Général II, IBU.
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The Gentleman’s Agreement would above all focus on illicit propaganda prob-
lems resulting from zealous nationalism. As the war had redefined many national 
boundaries especially in Eastern Europe, their governments tried to create a sense 
of national belonging. Broadcasts from stations in border regions particularly 
hampered international relations. In these cases the agreements would have to 
include a code of conduct for civilized behavior. A few months after the signing 
of the Gentleman’s Agreement, the Hungarian broadcasting station transmitted il-
licit propaganda, thus hindering Czechoslovakia. IBU Secretary-General Burrows 
volunteered to mediate.23 The Czech delegate pointed out that the incident was 
part of a larger problem in central Europe. He urged the IBU to step up its efforts. 
In his eyes, transgressors should be sanctioned. A station that offended another 
station and continued to do so after repeated warnings should lose the protection 
of the Union if the offended country wished reprisal. The Belgian delegate consid-
ered the proposal rigorous and dangerous. He suggested contacting the League of 
Nations about adopting a resolution on propaganda broadcasting. This should in 
turn be passed on to the various governments. His idea found approval.24 
In the meantime, the Gentlemen’s Agreement continued. In August  1927, 
Burrows sent a confidential circular to all IBU members stating: “One of the best 
results, from a moral point of view, obtained by a mutual entente between the 
members of the International Broadcasting Union, has been the suppression of all 
transmissions of an offensive nature to another country.”25 Apart from the issues in 
the first half of 1926, the Gentlemen’s Agreement had promising results. Program 
directors should continue their encouraging efforts. According to Burrows, there 
had been no new cases of illicit propaganda reported to the IBU as a result of ar-
dent nationalism. The question remains why the IBU then felt the need to contact 
the League of Nations to make the Gentleman’s Agreement legally binding and 
supported by government. This means the problem of illicit nationalistic propa-
ganda still existed, and required firm legislative standards. 
With a lack of legislation, the IBU sought to ensure adherence to its Agreement 
by dealing with the negative side of propaganda. It discursively defined illicit propa-
ganda, the “misusage” of its medium as those efforts that opposed internationalist 
23 “Commission juridique, Propagande inadmissible, Ladislav Sourek,” box 17, file Désarmement 
moral et propagande inadmissible, Général I, jusqu’à 1928, IBU.
24 P.V. Administrative Council 1926, 59, IBU.
25 “L’un des meilleurs résultats, au point de vue moral, obtenu par une entente mutuelle entre les 
membres de l’Union Internationale de Radiophonie, a été la suppression de toute diffusion revêtant un 
caractère offensant pour un autre pays.” “Circulaire confidentielle pour tous les membres de L’Union 
Internationale de Radiophonie,” Série 641, 12 août 1927, box 17, file Désarmement moral et propagande 
inadmissible, Général I, jusqu’à 1928, IBU.
TEHS7_handels.indd   186 5/9/2012   3:41:24 PM
 War and Peace in the Sky 187
ideals of peace and rapprochement. The Agreement was a clear case of problem 
solving, dealing with negative experiences. Nonetheless, the IBU had nothing 
against nation-states or nationalism per sé. It promoted, however, any avoidance 
of broadcasting propaganda at the cost of other countries. According to the IBU, 
national and international interests did not have to be mutually exclusive. They 
could be pursued together. The Gentleman’s Agreement communicated a vision 
of a very loosely coupled international world of sovereign nation states. In such a 
world people could cooperate peacefully along civilized lines of mutual trust. The 
IBU tried to create a firm basis for the national in its world views and in its inter-
national recommendations. 
Reluctant intellectual elites hindered the efforts. The Gentleman’s Agreement was 
a first attempt to set an informal standard focusing on the negative use of broad-
casting. To solidify the Agreement, the IBU needed wide support. In 1926 already 
it asked its members to urge their governments to take legal and administrative 
action in line with the Agreement when they granted new broadcasting conces-
sions.26 Additionally, it also approached the League of Nations in July 1926 to dis-
cuss illicit propaganda. The IBU felt hindered by a continuing reluctance towards 
its medium by politicians and elites in Europe. Just like governments and the elite 
community, the League did not show any interest in propaganda broadcasting. In 
order to persuade the League, the IBU not only focused on propaganda problems 
but above all told the League “what we can do for you.”
From day one, the IBU had demonstrated its desire to pursue the aims of the 
League by deciding to contribute to rapprochement, collaboration, and peace. As 
intergovernmental organization, the League represented nation states worldwide. 
At the time of the establishment of the League, people still regarded the young 
Soviet Russia as a possible model for social change.27 The League provided an 
alternative. The IBU broadcasting community set its hopes on the League to create 
harmony internationally. 
The IBU approached the League’s Secretary-General, requesting effective and 
straightforward collaboration with the League’s 6th Technical Committee: the 
International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation (ICIC). IBU Secretary-
General Arthur Burrows would be the main contact for the League on the matter 
of propaganda broadcasting. At all times he would be supported by the work of 
the IBU Legal Committee headed by the Czech Ladislav Sourek. Burrows was an 
26 LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII, 84.
27 Stråth, “Introduction,” 28.
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expert in propaganda activities and wireless interception.28 As such, he possessed 
the required skills to align national and international interests in war and peace 
related propaganda broadcasting.
Aiming at reducing the negative effects of propaganda broadcasting, the IBU 
above all advertized broadcasting as a cultural and technical medium beyond com-
parison, as a positive propaganda instrument. Broadcasting was a medium par 
excellence to achieve co-operation, mutual understanding, and peace, Burrows 
told the League’s Secretary-General. The IBU proposed a regular exchange of 
documents with the ICIC, thus creating mutual documentation at the same time. 
Furthermore, it suggested that broadcasters could put their microphones at the 
disposal of the national affiliations of the ICIC.29 In the eyes of the IBU, the ICIC 
was the place to be in order to gain widespread recognition for the positive nature 
of its medium. The IBU offered the Committee its full services. 
In order to bolster international co-operation, dialogue, and peace, the League 
had established a number of technical committees. These committees had to re-
solve practical problems regarding disarmament, economy and finance, transport 
and communication, as well as intellectual life. In 1922 the League had created 
the ICIC to deal with the latter. The ICIC pursued quite literally the idea of in-
ternational synergy via standardization in fields like academia, the arts, and the 
sciences.30 The committee aimed to “be of direct service to intellectual life and in-
tellectual workers, either by placing facilities at their disposal or by defending their 
rights.”31 One of the founding fathers of the ICIC, Henri La Fontaine, once stated 
that in “the work of promoting international co-operation it is important that the 
League, as a league of nations rather than as a league of governments, should not 
be lost sight of.”32 
28 Burrows had been employed at the Marconi Company during the war when it had operated as the 
British wireless interception service. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Vol-
ume I: The Birth of Broadcasting (Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford University Press, 1961), 34, 73.
29 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1926, 59, IBU.
30 Until the present the scrutinization of the ICIC has been highly neglected. The one profound and 
well-founded study on the establishment, organization, and work of the ICIC is: Jean-Jaques Renoliet, 
L’Unesco oubliée: La Société des nations et la coopération intellectuelle, 1919-1946 (Paris: Publications de la 
Sorbonne, 1999). Patricia Clavin only briefly touches upon the ICIC in: Patricia Clavin, “Europe and the 
League of Nations,” in Twisted Paths: Europe 1914-1945, ed. Robert Gerwarth (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 325-354. Greaves describes its work in broad lines in: Harold R.G. Greaves, The League 
Committees and World Order: A Study of the Permanent Expert Committees of the League of Nations as an 
Instrument of International Government (London: Oxford University Press; H. Milford, 1931).
31 LoN doc. ser., A.23.1931.XII, 5.
32 The International Office of Bibliography in Brussels (1895) and the Union of International As-
sociations (1910) preceded the establishment of the League of Nations. Via these organizations, the two 
prominent Belgian internationalists Henri La Fontaine and Prof. Paul Otlet had pioneered in promoting 
“literary and scientific co-operation between peoples.” The origins of the League itself are intimately bound 
up with the ideas of the Union of International Associations, which before the war had already stated that 
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The ICIC created this international synergy by bringing together under one 
roof private and public organizations in the field of intellectual life.33 ICIC ex-
perts and sub-committees formed the crème de la crème of the sciences, the hu-
manities, and the arts, with people like Henri Bergson, Béla Bartók, Mme. Curie, 
Albert Einstein, Edouard Herriot, Salvador de Madariaga, Thomas Mann, and 
Paul Valéry, to name but a few.34 Initially, these intellectuals mostly came from 
Europe. Only in the course of the 1930s would the ICIC reflect a more global rep-
resentation.35 Thus in the interwar years, European intellectual life substantially 
influenced the international standardization of the sciences, the arts, and humani-
ties via the ICIC. 
The backgrounds of these eminent intellectuals greatly influenced the ICIC’s 
efforts to achieve intellectual collaboration. Its executive organ in Paris, the 
International Institute for Intellectual Co-Operation (IIIC), coordinated and stim-
ulated studies in University Relations, Science and Bibliography, Letters and Arts, 
Intellectual Rights, the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League (1928), and 
the Interchange of Teaching Staff (1928).36 The intellectuals in the ICIC did not 
relate broadcasting to their intellectual world or to culture. More importantly, they 
had not even decided to use music in general for their society-building activities. 
Broadcasting and music lay beyond their scope.
The ICIC did, however, try to pursue the League’s goals in many areas. Both the 
wide diversity of topics and the inability to define its main spearheads were major 
obstacles for organizing the committee as a whole. Consequent lack of concrete 
action disturbed financers who decided to refrain from donating large sums of 
money.37 The ICIC even felt that the League did not consider itself a truly official 
technical committee.38 When the IBU approached the League in 1926 to collabo-
“‘a League of Nations was the ultimate end of all international movements.’” According to Greaves, the 
“Brussels activities were not merely the precursors of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, they 
were responsible to a not inconsiderable degree for the materialization of the League itself.” Greaves, The 
League Committees and World Order, 111-112, 129.
33 The American representatives G. Hale (1922), R. Millikan (1923-1932) and J. Shotwell (1933-1939) 
were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie donation. Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée, 184-
185, 187, 197.
34 League of Nations, Ten Years of World Co-Operation (London: Secretariat of the League of Nations, 
1930), 313-314.
35 At its inauguration in 1922 the ICIC had members from India (1922-1923), France, Norway, Brazil, 
France-Polish, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and the USA, whereas in 1939 
the members came from: Great Britain, Switzerland, Rumania, China, the USA, Portugal, France, Poland, 
Peru, the Netherlands, Hungary, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil, Latvia and India. 
Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée, 184-185.
36 Ibid., 187-191; League of Nations, Ten Years of World Co-Operation, 318-325.
37 Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée, 184-185.
38 LoN doc. ser., A.23.1931.XII, 5. 
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rate with the ICIC on the issue of propaganda broadcasting, the Committee had 
little direction and achieved only very modest results. 
In addition to the ICIC’s lack of vigor, the question of whether the League 
should deal with broadcasting content at all, and if so, which technical commit-
tee would have to address this, led to internal discussion and delay. Since the 
Communications and Transit Committee was already dealing with the technical 
aspect of broadcasting, some time passed while the ICIC and the OCT debated 
their role. Whereas the OCT saw the technical advantages of broadcasting, the 
ICIC did not show any interest in the medium with respect to its cultural possi-
bilities.39 Only in 1928 would the League start to show an active interest in propa-
ganda broadcasting. On the one hand, international relations improved with the 
signing of a number of international conventions. On the other, the League took 
its first steps towards employing electronic media for relaying its message. 
In 1928 the international climate changed due to the signing of an important 
international treaty. Stalin had replaced Lenin in Russia. He pursued a seem-
ingly more open tactic of European collaboration. Russia was one of forty-seven 
countries that in 1928 signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, formally known as the 
International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy. The Pact was also known by its home base Paris. It renounced the use of 
force for resolving disputes. According to Zara Steiner, this Paris Pact “was sym-
bolic of the coming together of different strands of internationalism.”40 In particu-
lar Akira Iriye views the Paris Pact with optimism. He claims that it “should be put 
in the context of the energetic efforts by men and women everywhere to construct 
a more interdependent world, to open up people’s minds so that they would un-
derstand one another a little better…”41 The Paris Pact signified an era of hope and 
optimism that the creation of a peaceful world would be possible. 
With respect to broadcasting, Iriye’s optimism was not misplaced. Around 
the time of the Paris Pact the League changed its mind about the cultural role of 
broadcasting. Rumanian League delegate Vespasian Pella argued that the question 
of illicit propaganda: 
39 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Eighth Session, held at 
Geneva, July 26th-29th, 1926, LoN doc. ser., C.462.M.181.1926.XII (C.I.C.I/8th Session/P.V.) (Geneva: LoN, 
1926), 21; LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII, 84; LoN, “Deuxieme Commission, Assemblée 1928, PV 
provisoire de la 6ème séance, tenue à Genève, 15 sept. 1928,” A.II/P.V.6, 2, box 92, file Société des Nations, 
Section des Communications et du Transit, Général, 1927-1930, IBU.
40 Zara S. Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 572-573.
41 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, 88.
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is of particular interest, given the tendencies that manifest themselves in 
all states, pressing on moral foundations of the organization of peace, ten-
dencies that have found their highest confirmation in the recently signed 
pact in Paris against warfare. Such a pact can have wholesome effects. And 
in spite of all international forces, it is absolutely necessary to consolidate 
the will of peace that inspires the nations today and to remove all misun-
derstandings and frictions that could still divide peoples.42
In the eyes of Pella, the Paris Pact reduced international tensions, and facilitated 
a spirit of working towards a peaceful world. Pella considered it time to act upon 
these changes. The League should safeguard broadcasting from propaganda. 
Broadcasting propaganda not only hindered the relations between states, but also 
hampered well-functioning communications.43 According to Pella, broadcasting 
had proven to be one of the most efficient instruments to inform the people, the 
very basis for pacification between nations.
At the same time, the ICIC submitted a resolution to the League Assembly 
addressing the issue of illicit propaganda in relation to its new technology-based 
activity, cinematography. The Italian delegation proposed the establishment of an 
International Educational Cinematograph Institute in Rome (IECI).44 The Italian 
proposal was in response to a discussion that had started outside the ICIC in 1926. 
During an International Cinematography Congress, participants had discussed 
the social and educational capabilities of the cinematograph.45 Linking a technical 
medium with youth education neatly fitted in with the ICIC’s recent creation of 
two new sub-committees, the Committee on Letters & Arts and the Committee on 
the Education of Youth in the Aims of the League. When the ICIC questioned the 
positive nature of the cinematograph, it included broadcasting in the discussion. 
42 “présente…un intérêt tout à fait particulier, étant donné la tendance qui se manifeste dans tous 
les Etats de poser sur les assises morales l’organisation de la paix, tendance qui a trouvé sa plus haute 
consécration dans le Pacte puisse produire ses effets salutaires et à défaut de toute mesure de contrainte 
internationale, il est absolument nécessaire de consolider la volonté de paix qui anime aujourd’hui les 
nations et de faire disparaître tous les malentendus et les frictions pouvant encore diviser les peuples.” 
LoN, “Deuxieme Commission, Assemblée 1928,” A.II/P.V.6, 2.
43 Pella was professor in Law in Rumania and lectured in various countries including the Netherlands, 
France and Switzerland. Throughout the interwar years he occupied several positions within the League of 
Nations for Rumania. He was active in the Council (1936-1938) as well as in numerous expert groups such 
as pour la repression du faux monnayage (1926-1928) and the Commission permanente du Régime des Eaux 
du Danube (1934-1936). His work as the Rumanian delegate and reporter at the diplomatic conference that 
facilitated the international circulation of educational films (1933) had been of particular interest, as well 
as the Disarmament Conference 1932-1934. George Ripert, Hommage au professeur V.V. Pella: Promoteur 
de l’unification du droit criminel, artisan insigne de l’organisation d’une justice pénale internationala. (Paris: 
S.n., 1939), 43-44.
44 Zoë Druick, “The International Educational Cinematograhp Insitute, Reactionary Modernism, and 
the Formation of Film Studies,” Canadian Journal of Film Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 83-91.
45 League of Nations, Ten Years of World Co-Operation, 326.
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The ICIC pointed out “the dangers of the cinematographic spectacles and the ra-
diotelephony transmissions of a spirit opposed to that of the League of Nations. 
[italics – s.l.]”46 The League finally acknowledged the problem of illicit propa-
ganda. Improper use of broadcasting or the cinematograph went against the spirit 
of the League of Nations.
Shortly after its establishment, the IECI requested the ICIC to “extend its ac-
tivities to questions related to broadcasting in the service of educational cinema-
tography, to television, and to the recording of speech and sounds.”47 When the 
ICIC acknowledged the request, the IBU sought to secure its expertise in the area. 
Together with the BBC, the IBU asked to meet in person the head of the ICIC and 
supporter of broadcasting, Professor Gilbert Murray. Murray was a member of the 
British social elite, a professor of Ancient Greek and proponent of the restoration 
of civilization.48 He fervently pursued his internationalism via the press and the 
cinema as well as broadcasting.49 The IBU pleaded for an active role for broadcast-
ing in the work of the ICIC.50 To press for a breakthrough, the IBU also contacted 
the Secretary-General of the League, Albert Dufour-Mercier.51 Although the 
League refused IBU a consultative voice in the Committee, the IECI soon there-
after concluded that almost all examined activities, including broadcasting, fell 
completely outside its scope.52 The IBU thus managed to maintain its position as 
46 “les dangers des spectacles cinématographiques et des émissions radiotelephoniques d’un esprit 
contraire à celui de la Société des Nations.” LoN, Travaux de la Commission et de l’Institut International de 
la Coopération Intellectuelle, Rapport de la sixième commission à l’Assemblée, Rapporteur: M.G. Gallavresi 
(délégué de l’Italie), LoN doc. ser., A.74.1928.XII (Genève: LoN, 1928), 3, box 92, file Société des Nations, 
Section de Coopération Intellectuelle, Général 1927, 1927-1932, IBU.
47 LoN, C.I.C.I./214, Geneva, July 20th 1929, 1; LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Opera-
tion, Minutes of the Eleventh Session, held at Geneva, July 22nd-26th, 1929, LoN doc. ser., C.342.M.121.1929.
XII (Geneva: LoN, 1929), 63.
48 Christopher Stray, ed., Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre, and International Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 233-234.
49 Already in 1926 he found that: “As one listened, and felt that some millions of one’s fellow citizens, 
whatever their opinions, were listening at the same time and getting the same knowledge, one felt comfort 
in the thought of that living voice which could pass from end to end of the nation and amid the noises of 
discord make us one.” Stray, Gilbert Murray Reassessed, 299. Quote from: “Broadcasting the News,” Radio 
Times, 28 May 1926, 350.
50 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1929, 190, 202, IBU.
51 “Lettre d’Albert Dufour Mercier à Burrows,” Genève 17 juillet 1929; “Lettre de Burrows à Albert 
Dufour Mercier,” Genève 27 juillet 1929, box 92, file Société des Nations, III, Général 1929, 1930, IBU.
52 Television for instance, was still a “subject of scientific research pure and simple...the transmission of 
scenes, living images, etc., has not yet been completely achieved.” LoN doc. ser., C.342.M.121.1929.XII, 63. 
Telecinematography, the broadcasting of moving pictures, of cinematographic films which could be picked 
up with special receiving fittings by anyone who was prepared to install this latest product of science and 
technical knowledge, indeed was possible and considered useful to the IECI. In broadcasting however, 
“enormous interests are involved, and for the complete study of which a huge and intricate organisation 
would be necessary.” According to the IECI director the scope of its Institute could not be extended in 
such a way that these problems could be integrated in its activities and was beyond the possibilities of the 
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the main international expert organization in the area of broadcasting in Europe. 
Yet, above all it had finally drawn the attention of the League to the importance of 
combating the negative use of its medium.
In 1929 the ICIC decided to direct its focus more towards the aims of the League. 
It worked towards the creation of a new international state of mind. For years the 
ICIC had felt like the League’s illegitimate child, not being taken seriously and 
uncertain about its spearheads. By 1930 its sub-committee of Letters & Arts even 
claimed that it “sometimes resembled a kitchen in which were prepared foods 
which did not appeal to the world’s appetite.”53 The ICIC had always focused on the 
systemization of university life and the sciences. In 1929 the Committee decided 
to extend its activities “to render more direct service to the League,…to propagate 
the spirit of the League, to make it still better known, and to instill its ideals into 
the new generation.”54 On the basis of these new aims, the temporary Committee 
of Enquiry to Study the Programme, Work and Organisation of the International 
Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the Institute conducted an inquiry. Its 
results led to a profound reorganization of the Committee and its agenda in 1931 
(Figure 5.3).55 The newly named Intellectual Co-Operation Organization (OCI) 
proved successful. The League received favorably the new agenda of the OCI and 
its new focus on building an international mind-set. It fully accepted the OCI as 
one of its technical committees.56
For the OCI, an international mind-set entailed more than just linking nation-
states. It should also focus on communities beyond national confines. Sir Frank 
Heath, Chair of the Committee of Enquiry, had long term experience with the 
administration of academia and science in an international setting.57 Heath argued 
Institute. In the end IECI decided only to study “the relations between educational cinema and broadcast-
ing…so far as tone – and speaking – films make use of broadcasting devices or so far as broadcasting may 
be used to supplement educational projections by means of lectures, lessons, etc…” LoN, C.I.C.I./214, 
Geneva, July 20th 1929, 2-4.
53 LoN doc. ser., C.428.M.129.1930.XII, 31.
54 LoN doc. ser., A.23.1931.XII, 5.
55 LoN doc. ser., C.428.M.129.1930.XII, 1-4. The ICIC replaced its sub-committees by so-called Com-
mittees of Experts; it established an executive and Director’s Committee to follow and supervise closely 
the ever increasing progress in intellectual co-operation and provide for execution of decisions taken by 
the ICIC. Furthermore, the ICIC aimed to enhance closer relationships with its national committees to 
improve their engagement. Finally, the Paris Institute, the IIIC, was reorganized to facilitate alignment 
with the general scheme of ICIC’s reorganization. Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée; LoN, International Commit-
tee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Report by the Committee on the Work of its Twelfth Session, LoN doc. ser., 
A.21.1930.II (Geneva: LoN, 1930), 2-3, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section de Coopération Intellec-
tuelle, Général, 1927-1932, IBU. 
56 Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée, 119. 
57 Sir Frank Heath (1863-1946) had two university degrees, was a professor in English language and 
literature, and had wide knowledge and experience in education and research. His inquiries led to the 
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Figure 5.3 – The structure of the Intellectual Co-Operation Organization, 1931
Source: Jean-Jacques Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée: La Société des nations et la coopération  
intellectuelle, 1919-1946 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), 118.
Organization of Intellectual Co-Operation
that in the long run “progress in this matter [the development of an international 
mind] as in civilization in general would always be the result of individual thinking. 
Everything depended on how the individual mind developed and surrounded itself 
with the support of others.”58 As such, the OCI not only should employ the best in-
tellectual minds for this cause, but also direct its attention to the worldwide masses. 
The war had brought together a large number of people whose aroused emotions 
had damaged stable international relations considerably. In order to create peace, 
establishment of a Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in the British government. In the mid-
1920s he performed similar studies in Australia and New Zealand. Afterwards similar departments were 
established in Canada, India and South Africa, all of them based on Heath’s work. His knowledge of the 
organization of education and research must have formed an important input in the work of the ICIC re-
garding the organization of universities across the globe. Peter Gosden, “Sir (Henry) Frank Heath,” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biographies, 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33791?docPos=14.
58 LoN doc. ser., C.428.M.129.1930.XII, 54.
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one should prepare ordinary people throughout the entire world for more global 
and peaceful outlooks.59 People would have to free themselves from nationalist sen-
timents fed by war. They would have to open their eyes to the world beyond their 
national borders, to feelings of international mutuality and peace. 
Similarly they would have to open their eyes to all ethnic minorities living in 
their countries. To the OCI, the integration of ethnic and cultural diversity into 
visions of national communities and global interconnectedness of people and na-
tions was fundamental to their concept of a true international mind. “No thought-
ful person,” Heath argued, “would deny that the progress of civilization depended 
more and more on the produce of countries whose riches could only be developed 
with the help of races which, up to present, had not participated to the same degree 
as some other races in the development of culture.”60 Up until then, not all ethnic 
groups had participated equally within civilization. It was vitally import that these 
people were heard and allowed to participate in society to a greater extent than they 
had done up until 1931. 
Heath focused mainly on the European experience. In his view it was important 
to achieve acceptance through inclusion. In several regions “there were problems of 
tradition and economics which, if dealt with imprudently, would give rise to great 
dangers.”61 With a rapidly expanding economic depression and the unstable political 
and economic situation in eastern Europe since new boundaries were drawn in 1919, 
“great dangers” could lie just around the corner. The League named those who were 
not part of the dominant group in a country “minorities.”62 During its reorganization 
discussions, the OCI spoke of nation, race, and civilization rather than of national 
confines, ethnicities, and minorities. The OCI apparently used the discourse of the 
internationalist elite movement where race, culture, and civilization were closely re-
lated themes.63 All in all, the OCI imagined a world in which all citizens would feel 
acknowledged: east, west, from every nation, from every local community, and every 
group. The OCI imagined an international mind with a veritable transnational char-
acter, based on European experience and European circumstances.
59 Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order, 69.
60 LoN doc. ser., C.428.M.129.1930.XII, 25.
61 Ibid.
62 In the interwar years minority issues became fully integrated into the activities of the League of Na-
tions. League of Nations, Ten Years of World Co-Operation, 354-378.
63 For extensive discussions of civilization, culture and races as well as nineteenth century cultural 
internationalism see: Wilson and Van der Dussen, The History of the Idea of Europe; Eagleton, The Idea of 
Culture; Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order; Daniel Laqua, “Internationalisme ou affirmation 
de la nation? La coopération intellectuelle transnationale dans l’entre-deux-guerres,” Critique – Internatio-
nale, Une autre approche de la globalisation: socio-histoire des organisations internationales (1900-1940) 52 
(2011): 51-67. 
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The OCI decided that broadcasting would be the most important means of dis-
seminating its idea of an international mind across the globe. It would educate and 
inform the masses concerning the new way of thinking about the free and peaceful 
co-existence of nations and peoples. A special sub-committee of the Committee 
of Enquiry foresaw a major role for broadcasting in education and museums. Mrs. 
Laura Dreyfus-Barney was a member of the expert committee for the Instruction 
of Youth in the aims of the League. Her main role was Vice-President of the peace 
section of the International Council of Women (ICW). She considered the cin-
ematograph and wireless “…two of the most powerful weapons at the disposal 
of the teaching profession throughout the world.”64 The OCI now realized “that 
the League had actually in its hands an instrument of immense power which was 
scarcely being used.”65 When the IBU heard of these developments, Burrows wrote 
a letter to BBC director John Reith. For the first time the League officially showed a 
positive interest in the development of broadcasting by the IBU, and its relation to 
building social order.66 The League not only wanted to deal with the problem of il-
licit propaganda. It also began focusing on broadcasting’s positive use in the cause 
of peace, and as a propaganda instrument for diffusing an international mind-set 
across the globe. 
Politicians Embrace Broadcasting
Soon politics firmly embraced broadcasting. Deteriorating international circum-
stances highlighted the importance and impact of the medium. Wall Street crashed 
in November 1929. What is more, the first traces of harshening political relations 
64 LoN doc. ser., A.21.1930.II, 17; LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Min-
utes of the Thirteenth Session, held at Geneva, July 20th-25th, 1931, LoN doc. ser., C.471.M.201.1931.XII 
(C.I.C.I./13th session/P.V.) (Geneva: LoN, 1931), 7. Laura Dreyfus-Barney was one of the leading ladies of 
the ICW, an organization that worked with the League of Nations in the 1920s in order to promote health, 
peace, equality and education. Leila Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s 
Movement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). She was American by birth and French by 
marriage. According to Burrows she was “much behind the scenes in international affairs.” “Letter from 
Secretary General Arthur Burrows to BBC Director General Sir John Reith,” 13 July 1931, 4, box 92, file 
Société des Nations, Section de Coopération Intellectuelle, Général, 1927-1932, IBU. The influence of 
women like Laura Dreyfus-Barney within the international elite community could be worth examination. 
Books like Rupp’s are written from a largely feminist perspective. The case of broadcasting networks sug-
gests that the influence of women must have reached a long way behind the scenes, on very practical issues 
as well.
65 “Letter from IBU’s Secretary-General Burrows to Miss A. Hallstein-Kallis, co-worker of Gilbert 
Murray. Discussion of a letter from the President of the ICIC, Murray to the British Government,” 29 July 
1931, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section de Coopération Intellectuelle, Général, 1927-1932, IBU. 
66 “Letter from Secretary-General Burrows to BBC’s Director-General Sir John Reith,” 1, box 92, file 
Société des Nations, IBU.
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reared their head when new totalitarian regimes germinated in Germany, Italy, 
and Eastern Europe. Collaboration between the IBU and the ICIC took place in a 
setting that mirrored not only late 1920s optimism, but also gradually developing 
feelings of insecurity.
In these turbulent times, the IBU and the international cultural elites of the 
OCI tried to fine-tune their projects for Europe and the world by addressing legally 
binding standards for propaganda broadcasting. Similar to the frequency standard 
allocations, urgent practical problems had led to these negotiations. Propaganda 
broadcasts in the border regions of Poland and Germany caused stringent upheav-
als. As a result, broadcasters immediately refined the Gentleman’s Agreement and 
reconsidered their plans for Europe. The Polish Government took the results of 
these discussions directly to the 1932 Disarmament Conference organized by the 
League of Nations. This act led to new international standardization attempts for 
propaganda broadcasting in which the OCI would play an important role. By the 
time the disarmament conference eventually failed, the OCI had firmly integrated 
the matter into its activities. With the help of the IBU, its efforts trickled down into 
the International Convention for the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. 
The early 1930s thus saw a more formally shaping of their activities in propaganda 
broadcasting and their plans for Europe and the world. 
In particular the 1931 German Polish Broadcasting Agreement was a watershed 
moment. Some four years after the signing of the Gentleman’s Agreement, prob-
lems arose at Germany and Poland’s borders in the Upper Silesian Plebiscite. These 
problems showed the vulnerability of the international situation there where peo-
ples were separated by the newly drawn boundaries. Moreover, the Polish-German 
problems revealed the role that broadcasting could play in creating cohesion and 
segregation.67 The international elite community would have to find ways to deal 
with these strongly related issues. 
The repartition of the Silesia territory in 1919 had stirred local uprisings and 
diplomatic rivalries when the Allies assigned the major part of the area to Poland. 
Ever since then, the situation in the border region had remained delicate. Some 
Poles lived on the German side of the border. Some Germans now lived on the 
Polish side of the border. In 1925 and 1927 Germany had opened radio stations 
in Silesia that also radiated on Polish Silesian territory.68 In 1927 the Poles opened 
67 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1929, 202, IBU; IBU, Twenty Years, 29-30.
68 Its most well-known radio station was situated in Gleiwitz (Gliwicea in Polish). After WWII the sta-
tion came into Polish hands and would be used for the broadcasting of Radio Free Europe programs across 
the Iron Curtain.
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a radio station near their borders in Silesia as well, in Katowice. To celebrate the 
opening of this Katowice station, the Poles broadcast the opera Halka. This was 
one of the strongest expressions of Polish national music and Polish nationalism. 
According to Polish philosopher Dembowski, the opera promoted the cause of na-
tional realization and independence.69 Works like Halka actually opened the opera 
season in Poland, “and the country’s elites would gather at the event to celebrate 
the official national culture.”70 Near the Polish border, Germans could receive the 
Polish broadcast as well. They felt offended by the nationalist spirit and political 
claim of independence expressed by the opera. To avoid potential hostilities in the 
future, director of Polskie Radjo Zygmunt Chamiec travelled to Berlin twice. He 
stated that he would do everything he could to avoid harmful relations between 
the two countries.71 
On air, German-Polish relations remained relatively stable until four years later, 
so the story goes, when the German Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft m.b.H. (RRG) 
decided to broadcast a German circus show. During the show “two clowns, joking 
with each other, made a few uncomplimentary remarks about the Poles, in a play of 
words.”72 In reaction to the broadcast, which the Poles had heard loud and clear, the 
Polish Government officially protested to its German colleagues. Shortly after, on the 
tenth anniversary of the Silesian area, several programs broadcast both in Poland and 
Germany contained less innocent remarks. These immediately led to considerable ir-
ritation on both sides of the border. In response to litigation, RRG and Polskie Radjo 
negotiated an agreement unique in its kind, designed to avoid future incidents. 
The 1931 agreement was based largely on the 1926 Gentleman’s Agreement though 
with some crucial improvements. Thus Germany and Poland now agreed they would: 
undertake in future to do everything in their power to ensure that matter – 
whether political, religious, economic, intellectual or artistic – broadcast 
from their stations shall not compromise in any way the spirit of co-op-
eration and good understanding which is necessary if broadcasting is to 
fulfill its mission of drawing the nations together.73
69 Harry White and Michael Murphy, Musical Constructions of Nationalism: Essays on the History and 
Ideology of European Musical Culture, 1800-1945 (Cork University Press, 2001), 167-173.
70 Philipp Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” in The Oxford 
Handbook to the New Cultural History of Music, ed. Jane Fulcher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
199.
71 Ryszard Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem: opowiesc o Zygmuncie Chamcu – zalozycielu i pierwszym 
dyrektorze Polskiego Radia (Rzeszów; Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wyzszej Szkoly Informatyki i Zarzadzania; 
Polskie Radio, 2005), 137, 139-140.
72 John D. Tomlinson, “The International Control of Radiocommunications” (Ph.D. diss., Université de 
Genève, 1938), 226.
73 Extract from the Agreement of March 31, 1931, concluded between the German and Polish Broad-
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The IBU strongly influenced these proceedings. The national departments of 
the German and Polish organizations allowed IBU Council members from their 
countries to come to terms.74 These two men, Heinrich Giesecke and Zygmunt 
Chamiec, held key positions in the IBU outside the Council. Giesecke was one of 
IBU’s Vice-Presidents. Chamiec was head of the International Relay Committee. 
They frequently collaborated in Geneva and had stood at the cradle of the IBU to-
gether, designing its goals from scratch.75 Their IBU activities had been an impor-
tant part of their daily lives for years. They knew each other well. Consequently, 
the entire agreement breathed the work of the IBU.
The two men also added some recent IBU work on propaganda broadcasting to 
the Gentleman’s Agreement. Both organizations accepted certain amounts of posi-
tive propaganda with a view to national activities as long as “the matter broadcast 
does not in any way offend the national sentiment of listeners who are subjects of 
the other” country.76 For the first time these two organizations officially distin-
guished between broadcasts intended for national audiences and those intended 
for foreign audiences (Fremdsprachsendungen). They agreed that in neither of the 
two cases was broadcasting to offend foreign listeners.77 Secondly, because they 
were public broadcasters, their stations could on occasion be employed by their 
Governments. They added that all matters broadcast by their Governments over 
their stations, “in accordance with the concessions granted to the companies, the 
supervision of such matters is entirely in the hands of the Government authorities 
of each country.”78 As such, the organizations renounced any accountability for the 
latter.79 These two appointments filled a lacuna in the internationally renowned 
1926 Gentleman’s Agreement.
casting Companies (Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft m.b.H. – Polskie Radio). LoN, Moral Disarmament, 
Memorandum from the Polish Government, LoN doc. ser., C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D. 16] (Geneva: 
LoN, Sept. 23rd, 1931), 4.
74 IBU, Twenty Years, 11. 
75 Although Polskie Radjo, in contrast to the RRG which was one of the founding members of the 
IBU, only became an IBU Member in 1927, Zygmunt Chamiec had been working on the establishment of 
Polish broadcasting long before. In light of his interest and wish to establish broadcasting in Poland along 
the ideological lines of the international radio community regarding peace and mutual understanding, 
Chamiec had been present during the very first IBU conferences. In 1928 France awarded him the Order 
of the Legion of Honor for “his remarkable achievements in promoting peaceful cooperation across the 
airwaves.” Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem, 122, 147, 311.
76 LoN doc. ser., C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D. 16], 4.
77 Heinz Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik: Zur Geschichte des deutschen Rundfunk von 
1923/38 (Hamburg: Verlag Hans Bredow-Institut, 1955), 367.
78 LoN doc. ser., C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D. 16], 4.
79 Pohle, Der Rundfunk als Instrument der Politik, 367.
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The real break with the past, however, was that both the German and Polish 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs supported the agreement.80 In a more complex and 
extended form, the Gentleman’s Agreement had found its way to the desks of two 
of the responsible government departments in Europe. Some would say that such 
bilateral agreements went against the grain of the IBU’s non-governmental charac-
ter. On the contrary, the IBU had always desired that its agreements would trickle 
down into national law. When the IBU agreed to the Gentleman’s Agreement in 
1926 it urged its members to accordingly bring the agreement to the attention of 
their respective governments.81 The 1931 agreement responded to these wishes. 
Both countries, however, needed a pressing conflict to finally bring the problem 
to the attention of their governments. As the German and Polish governments 
fully backed the agreement on propaganda broadcasting, from the point of view 
of international law, this meant the arrangement did “not present any essential dif-
ference from the arrangements concluded between State Administrations such as 
those of Posts and Telegraphs.”82 The IBU’s transnational work had filtered down 
into the national laws of two countries. Consequently, Poland and Germany ac-
knowledged the importance of international activities for the smooth functioning 
of their nation-states.
The IBU immediately turned the bilateral agreement into a new recommen-
dation. It added the improvements and promoted the German-Polish agreement 
as an example for similar initiatives. In October 1931 the IBU recommended all 
its members negotiate similar agreements if the occasion arose. Furthermore, in 
the hope uniformity on the matter would arise internationally, in May 1933 the 
IBU asked administrations who controlled stations outside the IBU to adhere to 
these principles as well.83 Consensus should diffuse beyond the confines of the 
IBU’s broadcasting space. Prior to the German-Polish agreement, several gov-
ernments had already made arrangements with the USSR “that included more 
stringent anti-propaganda clauses.”84 Several others followed suit. In 1934 Poland 
and France agreed to add arrangements about regular program exchange to the 
80 Tomlinson, “The International Control of Radiocommunications,” 227; LoN, Broadcasting and 
Peace: Studies and Projects in the Matter of International Agreements (Paris: International Institute of Intel-
lectual Co-Operation, 1933), 129-130.
81 LoN doc. ser., C.595.M.231.1926.VIII, 84.
82 LoN, Broadcasting and Peace, 30.
83 IBU, Twenty Years, 30.
84 Jennifer Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves: Radio Luxembourg and the Origins of European National 
Broadcasting, 1929-1950” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2008), 343; Stephen Duggan, “Radio: An 
Agency for International Understanding or Friction, In ‘Radio: The Fifth Estate’, Special Issue,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 177 (1935): 178; Vernon van Dycke, “The Responsibility of 
States for International Propaganda,” The American Journal of International Law 34, no. 1 (1940): 60.
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German-Polish decisions.85 In 1936, the British and Italians would also follow 
the German-Polish example. The British requested that the Italians refrain from 
harmful propaganda broadcasts into its Middle East territories. In turn, the British 
would then recognize Italy’s victory over Abyssinia.86 The increasing number of 
bilateral agreements facilitated the practical realization of an efficient European 
broadcasting network.
These bilateral agreements along German-Polish lines reflected the importance 
of the work of international non-governmental experts in everyday life. Similar to 
the Gentleman’s Agreement, the German-Polish agreement portrayed a Europe 
in which the Eurocentric international and national were being fine-tuned. Both 
co-existed in the international recommendations as well as the bilateral na-
tional agreements. Unlike the Gentleman’s Agreement, the “national” within the 
German-Polish agreement now also consisted of levels below that of the nation 
state, levels which integrated all minorities. As such, the international became in-
clusive of the heterogeneity, of the transnationality, of the national. In turn, this 
refined internationalism infiltrated national laws. National laws were corrected 
for awareness and feelings of responsibility beyond their national confines. It was 
the first time transnational non-state efforts based on international elitist ideas of 
peace and rapprochement had found their way into legally binding national rules. 
The German-Polish agreement marked a watershed in broadcasting regulation. 
The Agreement found its way to the Disarmament Conference. This event her-
alded the exploration of widely shared legally binding international standards for 
propaganda broadcasting. The Polish Government decided to use the agreement 
in its Memorandum on Moral Disarmament to the Preparatory Committee for 
the Disarmament Conference. The Polish Government used this to open a de-
bate about establishing a widely supported international standard for propaganda 
broadcasting. If governments ratified these standards, they would trickle down 
into national laws on a far wider scale than the bilateral German-Polish agreement.
 In his Memo of September 17, 1931, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 
Zaleski, requested placing the issue of moral disarmament on the agenda of the 
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. The conference 
would start in January 1932. It aimed to reduce the number of arms produced and 
owned by the various nation-states to avoid warfare in the future. According to 
Zaleski, factual disarmament could not be achieved without an equal disarmament 
85 Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem, 157.
86 Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 343-344. There are indications that more such agreements were 
made across the European continent. Further research in national broadcasting archives could clarify this.
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Figure 5.4 – War can start now! 
Translation: “War can break out now! The American broadcaster is ready to fulfil its cultural 
task!” Press release in Dutch radio guide which announces that American broadcasters are going 
to bring the news from the frontlines in case war will break out between Italy and Abyssinia. The 
idea is to bring the news from both Italian and Abyssinian side.
Source: VARA, “De oorlog kan nu uitbreken!,” De Radiogids, no. 47 (1935), 5. Used by the cour-
tesy of the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision, Hilversum, the Netherlands. 
of the mind.87 The “dangerous agitation of certain elements which are endeavour-
ing to poison relations between the peoples and to sow the seed of fresh conflicts 
in the minds of their supporters,” increased the vulnerability of the world to yet 
another war.88 Zaleski believed that at the basis of a negative mindset lay national 
laws that tied individuals to their national interests. What about the interests of a 
“higher society…outside the nation – namely the international community?” he 
asked.89 Without a change in the direction of a moral international mind, practical 
87 LoN doc. ser., C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D. 16], 2.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 3.
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disarmament efforts would not be effective. Zaleski pointed at the destructive 
forces of negative and nationalist propaganda. Positive propaganda, on the con-
trary, would disarm the mind. It would spread a message that looked beyond bor-
ders, to the community of international elites and their efforts to improve mutual 
benefits.
The idea of “moral disarmament” was nothing new. It already went back a long 
way. The idea had flourished widely amongst pacifists and internationalists ever 
since the International Peace Conferences held before the war and before govern-
ments had signed the Covenant of the League of Nations.90 To pacifists, moral disar-
mament initially meant: 
‘the transformation of this [nationalist] aggressive mentality, vindictive and 
vengeful to a conciliatory mentality. It is…the sacrifice of national interests 
to interests no less real of the great human family. It is altruism substituted 
for egoism, it is reason and equity put in place of passion and injustice.’91
Pacifists and internationalists alike related moral disarmament to converting pub-
lic opinion towards a mentality of peace. Pacifists considered it sufficient to re-
late this change of mind directly to international collaboration and to education. 
Internationalists rather linked this conversion of mind to international security, to 
treaties, to factual disarmament.92 In pursuit of the latter, Aristide Briand had al-
ready addressed the first Disarmament Conference in Washington in 1921, argu-
ing that “moral disarmament is as necessary as the material armament.”93 The 1928 
Kellogg-Briand Pact also evolved around this internationalist view of moral disar-
mament. Though the entire pact was a factual measure of moral disarmament, it 
failed to integrate a paragraph on the route to go, on the technique that would realize 
such change of mind amongst the masses.94 
In his memo Zaleski not only assumed an internationalist perspective, he 
also proposed a practical technique which could achieve disarmament of the 
90 George A. Finch, “A Pact of Non-Aggression,” The American Journal of International Law 27, no. 4 
(1933): 725.
91 “‘…c’est la transformation de cette mentalité aggressive, rancunière et vengeresse en une mentalité 
conciliante. C’est, quand le bien général l’exige, le sacrifice des intérêts nationaux aux intérêts non moins 
réels de la grande famille humaine. C’est l’altruisme substitué à l’égoïsme, c’est la raison et l’équité mises à la 
place de la passion et de l’injustice.’” Elly Hermon, “« Le désarmement moral en tant que facteur dans les 
relations internationales pendant l’entre-deux-guerres »” Historical Papers/Communications historiques 22, 
no. 1 (1987): 199.
92 Hermon, “« Le désarmement moral en tant que facteur dans les relations internationales pendant 
l’entre-deux-guerres »,” 200.
93 International Conciliation, Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, vol. 169 (Green-
wich: American Association for International Concilliation, 1921), 516.
94 Julien Luchaire, Le désarmement moral (Paris: Librairie Valois, 1932), 83-85.
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mind. He gave the example of the medium of broadcasting, and pointed to the 
German-Polish agreement as a guideline for possible international agreements. 
Broadcasting, according to Zaleski, was one of the crucial media for achieving 
moral disarmament. Moreover, the 1931 German-Polish Broadcasting Agreement 
was an excellent example of how such a focus on the international good could be 
realized practically. “This agreement may go to show that practical results in this 
field are in no way impossible,” Zaleski argued.95
When the Preparatory Committee forwarded Zaleski’s memo to the OCI, the 
pacifist and internationalist views on moral disarmament came together. Whereas 
the Disarmament Conference took an internationalist approach, the OCI worked 
on closely related themes from a pacifist point of view. With its reorganization 
from 1930 to 1931, the OCI and its community of intellectuals linked their peace-
ful international minds to education. According to former director of the IIIC, 
Julien Luchaire, moral disarmament should be seen as an intellectual movement 
that employed propaganda as a means of creating a mind of peace, as a common 
tactic, and an actual technique.96 He foresaw a critical role for intellectuals who 
could create a rapprochement of minds, a unique and universal “soul,” a universal 
civilization that presented the best of all existing civilizations.97 Luchaire linked 
pacifism to internationalism when he spoke of moral disarmament. 
These developments in the OCI went hand in hand with growing feelings 
amongst intellectuals outside the committee.98 They argued, as recent isolation-
ist economic developments showed, the pacifist approach had not sufficed. On 
January 18, 1931, roughly 180 French intellectuals followed by at least 188 German 
intellectuals signed a manifesto in which they promised to combat a spirit of war 
“at the moment when Europe must organize itself or perish, and cannot organize 
itself other than by the pacification of minds and the forgetting of hostilities…”99 
To these intellectuals, moral disarmament not only meant the birth of a mind of 
peace, but also the end of a mind of warfare; two things not altogether the same.100 
In response to these voices and Zaleski’s Memo, OCI director Gilbert Murray em-
phasized “the need for a regular practice of international cooperation in the field 
95 LoN doc. ser., C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D. 16], 3.
96 Luchaire had been the director of the IIIC in Paris before the 1930-1931 reorganization. He was a 
French writer and a member of ICIC’s Committee on Letters and Arts.
97 Luchaire, Le désarmement moral, 39, 53.
98 For an exploration of the intellectual context in which the OCI operated see: Daniel Laqua, “Trans-
national Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations and the Problem of Order,” Journal of Global 
History 6, no. 2 (2011): 223-247. 
99 “‘A l’heure où l’Europe doit s’organiser ou périr, et ne peut s’organiser que dans la pacification des 
esprits et l’oubli des ressentiments…’” Luchaire, Le désarmement moral, 8.
100 Ibid., 39, 53.
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of science, arts and literature in order to achieve moral disarmament.”101 Murray 
especially referred to education, to youth, and to modern means of communica-
tion like broadcasting and cinema. The work on moral disarmament “could be re-
garded as the ultimate expression of all the work of the Intellectual Co-operation 
Organisation.”102 The OCI offered the Disarmament Conference its full cooperation.
The Political Committee of the Disarmament Conference decided to establish 
a Committee for Moral Disarmament in pursuit of the Polish memo. The Swiss 
Mr. Perrier chaired the committee. He was assisted by two Polish representatives 
Mr. Szumlakowski and Mr. Komarnicki. Their participation further strength-
ened Polish dominance regarding the question of moral disarmament.103 The 
Committee for Moral Disarmament leaned heavily on the OCI’s activities and re-
sults. Perrier joined in an OCI meeting in July 1932 when the OCI formulated its 
recommendations in line with the German-Polish broadcasting agreement. The 
OCI discussed the positive and negative side of propaganda. It would be wise to 
establish “agreements to eliminate from broadcast programmes elements preju-
dicial to good international relations.” Moreover, one should pursue an interna-
tional mind positively “by making the outstanding characteristics of the genius 
of different peoples known to each other, whether expressed by poetry, music, 
drama or in prose writings.”104 The OCI recommended that the Committee for 
Moral Disarmament take a positive rather than a negative approach to the is-
sue at hand. Only then could one obtain a “fuller knowledge of each other’s real 
characteristics.”105 Only by creating an international mind could one facilitate ac-
tual and mental disarmament. 
The Moral Disarmament Committee addressed these recommendations in 
two of its studies featuring broadcasting as a technique to create disarmament of 
the mind. One study dealt with “questions concerning intellectual co-operation 
and technical means of spreading information, including the problems of edu-
cation, utilization of cinematography and broadcasting.” Another dealt with the 
101 “la nécessité d’une pratique régulière de la coopération international dans l’ordre scientifique,  
artistique et littéraire pour atteindre le désarmement moral.” Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée, 303.
102 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session,  
Minutes of the Eight Meeting, held at Geneva, July 21st, 1932, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./14th Session/P.V.8 
(Geneva: LoN, 1932), 8.
103 LoN, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Moral Disarmament, held at  
Geneva, July 25th, 1932, LoN doc. ser., Conf. D. 138 (Geneva: LoN, 1932), 1.
104 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session,  
Minutes of the First Meeting, held at Geneva, July 18th, 1932, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./14th Session/P.V.1  
(Geneva: LoN, 1932), 4-5.
105 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Fourteenth Session,  
Minutes of the First Meeting, held at Geneva, July 18th, 1932, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./14th Session/P.V.2  
(Geneva: LoN, 1932), 2.
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legal aspects.106 In light of the first study, Szumlakowski prepared a draft conven-
tion. This allowed for preventive measures to help avoid the diffusion of illicit 
propaganda.107 The draft made four positive suggestions. These were with regard 
to the education of the younger generation, co-operation in the intellectual world, 
the use of technical means of spreading information, and the ways and means 
of giving effect to possible undertakings.108 The study on legal aspects addressed 
and recommended negative measures. It addressed penal measures for diffusing 
illicit propaganda. The so-called Pella Report referred to its drafter Dr. Pella, the 
Rumanian delegate to the Disarmament Conference and member of the OCT. 
Pella had worked hard to place the issue of illicit propaganda broadcasting on 
the League’s agenda in the second half of the 1920s. The two studies addressed all 
aspects of the disarmament of the mind via propaganda. 
Throughout the discussion of these two reports, the Committee for Moral 
Disarmament strongly opposed any form of preventive control of programs close 
to censorship. The committee seemed “none too ready to include, in the conven-
tion…clauses destined to prevent certain wireless transmissions by the application 
of penal measures.”109 The committee asked its members to discuss the draft con-
vention with their respective governments. Based on these suggestions a special 
drafting committee would prepare a new text to be discussed at a later meeting if 
necessary.110 The committee thus designed a preliminary convention for the dis-
armament of the mind that provided ample space for propaganda activities con-
trary to warfare, in favor of peace. Though this draft focused on propaganda in its 
broadest sense, it was based on previous achievements, recommendations, and 
standards in broadcasting propaganda. It obtained a large space for broadcasting 
as a practical technique to pursue or not pursue propaganda. 
The two studies opened up a discussion between the OCI and the Committee 
for Moral Disarmament about the role of the state if broadcasting were to be used 
to create moral disarmament. The discussion related the roles of the state and 
broadcasters to the extent of freedom of the individual in its broadest sense. It re-
lated broadcasting to the freedom to project societies. The OCI argued that moral 
disarmament should be pursued by furthering active interest among governments 
as well as co-operation with the IBU. The OCI acknowledged the broad expertise 
of the IBU and took note of its advice that too rigid an international convention 
would “preclude adaptation of the broadcasting programmes to the particular 
106 LoN doc. ser., Conf. D. 138, 1.
107 LoN, Broadcasting and Peace, 156.
108 LoN doc. ser., Conf. D. 138, 2.
109 LoN, Broadcasting and Peace, 157.
110 LoN doc. ser., Conf. D. 138, 2.
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needs of each country.”111 One should make room for national diversification. This 
could only happen if national laws and international conventions would leave 
some space for expert organizations like the IBU and its national members to ma-
neuver. 
Though Perrier thought it wise if OCI left the obligations of states to the 
Committee for Moral Disarmament, he agreed with its stance on government 
involvement. Perrier pleaded for an end to state supremacy. States would have 
to correct their legislation for international needs, and could not do everything 
themselves. Perrier urged “that in the cause of moral disarmament, great lati-
tude must be allowed, as far as this was compatible with public order, to associa-
tions, organizations and even racial groups for the purpose of solving the difficult 
minority question.”112 Though the OCI agreed in principle, it argued that there 
should be some form of state intervention to recognize the importance of moral 
disarmament. According to OCI member Destree “it was a truism to some people 
that patriotism could be combined with international fellowship,” but this was far 
from a general conception. He felt surprised to see that technology was much in 
advance of political theory which still focused narrowly on national sovereignty.113 
Real patriotism, in his opinion, consisted of recognizing interdependency between 
countries, though such “solidarity did not imply that individual liberty should in 
any way be restricted. Each country had its own sentiments, language, traditions. 
These must all be protected and guaranteed, as well as the rights of minorities.”114 
All discussants seemed to agree that there was a direct though inverse link 
between the degree of state intervention and the freedom of the individual. The 
higher the level of state intervention, the lower would be the freedom of broad-
casters and their ability to correct for national differences. The lesser the ability to 
correct for diversification, the lower would be the degree of individual freedom in 
society. Freedom for broadcasters would secure the correction of such national and 
ethnic differences. In contrast, too little government interference would downplay 
any effective regulation of propaganda altogether. It would lead to complete anar-
chy of the airwaves. This would reduce individual freedom as well, giving way to 
propaganda which incited war. The parties agreed that the degree of government 
control was a measure by which they could influence war and peace propaganda 
efforts. The degree of state intervention and the closely related freedom for broad-
casters defined the extent to which the international good could find its way into 
111 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./14th Session/P.V.2, 2.
112 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./14th Session/P.V.8, 2.
113 Ibid., 3.
114 Ibid.
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regulations and broadcast programs. It also defined the extent to which broadcast-
ers could integrate the wellbeing of minorities within nations into these interna-
tional agreements and broadcasts. The OCI favored a slightly larger control of the 
state than the Moral Disarmament Committee and the IBU, who both argued in 
favor of as limited state control and as much freedom for broadcasters as possible. 
The Disarmament Conference created an international plenipotentiary hub for 
governments, the intellectual cultural elite, and lawyers, to discuss propaganda 
in the light of war and peace. The propaganda efforts of the European broadcast-
ing community had been an important basis for discussion. Moreover, the me-
dium of broadcasting became recognized as an obvious technique for pursuing 
propaganda. The Conference formally made the IBU’s preventive and positive 
propaganda activities part of the international and political efforts to avoid war 
and create peace. These events freed the way for new international agreements on 
propaganda broadcasting. Such agreements would secure the legal implementa-
tion of the IBU’s internationalist outlook among national governments across the 
globe. The question remained how the Committee for Moral Disarmament would 
present its conclusions. They could be in the form of an international convention 
on disarmament, or perhaps a separate convention, an additional protocol, or a 
relatively simple recommendation.
The League started on a broadcasting project for peace. This project was a new 
turning point in its efforts relating transnational broadcasting to projects for soci-
ety. It built on the major results of previous studies tackling the problem of broad-
casting within the broader context of moral disarmament. The OCI assembled a 
group of well-established experts to frame these results into a formal international 
convention. The experts could reflect on a number of parameters that would affect 
society such as the degree of state control over broadcasting content, the freedom 
of broadcasters to determine their radio schedules, and the freedom of the indi-
vidual in its broadest sense. In this way, they would be able to influence substan-
tially the place and role of broadcasting in times of war and peace. They could give 
direction to society-building.
In 1931 already the OCI asked the League Assembly to examine the role broad-
casting could play in schools to educate young people about an international state 
of mind. First of all the Committee wanted to seek the opinion of qualified ex-
perts in the world of education. Furthermore it wanted to explore the best ways to 
employ broadcasting to develop such a spirit of understanding. The Assembly in 
particular valued the broadcasting part of the inquiry. The OCI should however 
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extend its scope to “improvements of relations between peoples.”115 It should focus 
on the masses worldwide rather than only on young people. The OCI brought 
together a group of experts to study existing agreements on broadcasting for 
peace, notably the German-Polish agreement. The experts would question the 
purpose and underlying conditions of these agreements especially those govern-
ing the preparation of an international project.116 Bearing in mind the previous 
studies, the experts aimed to make provisions for a possible International World 
Agreement or, in any case, a European Agreement.117
The Committee of Experts met in Geneva at the end of February 1933. The 
Norwegian Dr. Arnold Raested chaired the committee. His doctorate in law and 
his varied experience with governments and the broadcasting community made 
him the right man for the job. He was the former Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, a current delegate to the League Assembly, the chair of the board of direc-
tors of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, and part of IBU’s legal team. In 
1939 his work on propaganda broadcasting helped to mold him for the position 
of IBU Vice-President. Raested was assisted by Henri Bonnet, director of the IIIC, 
De Montenach, secretary of the ICIC, and a group of experts who held hybrid 
positions. These experts represented national governments, national broadcast-
ing organizations, the IBU, the ITU, the International Broadcasting Committee, as 
well as the wireless listeners’ associations via the participation of the Association 
Générale des Auditeurs de T.S.F.118 ITU and IBU participation proved a valuable 
contribution as their experts had over eight years practical experience with pro-
paganda broadcasting from a technical and political point of view.119 All experts 
were European with the exception of the Mexican participant. They would have 
to translate the prevailing consensus on the problem of propaganda broadcast-
ing into a workable and practical solution. The committee had a predominantly 
European though very diverse outlook. It dealt with global affairs, but mostly ap-
plied European experience.
The experts’ General Report shaped the contours for agreements on the use of 
broadcasting to promote peace. Most of their five recommendations focused on 
115 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./14th Session/P.V.1, 4.
116 “Some notes on the U.I.R. Memorandum on the activities of the International Broadcasting Union 
for the use of broadcasting in the cause of peace and on the relations between the League of Nations and 
the U.I.R. in connection with this activity,” 14.9.1936, 7, box 17, file Désarmement moral et propagande 
inadmissible, Général V, 1933-1939, IBU; Arthur R. Burrows, “La Convention Internationale sur l’Emploi 
de la Radiodiffusion dans l’Intérêt de la Paix,” Radiodiffusion, no. 3 (October 1936): 32.
117 “Some notes on the U.I.R.,” 19, box 17, file Désarmement moral, Général V, IBU.
118 Ibid., 14-15.
119 “Address (made by Secretary-General A.R. Burrows),” 2, box 74, file Propagande, Général II, IBU; 
LoN, Broadcasting and Peace, 19.
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previously discussed topics. One of these looked at the use of positive and penal 
measures concerning broadcasting propaganda.120 The experts recommended that 
preventive measures should be restricted “to the penalising of violations of mani-
fest gravity.” Such violations should be restricted to severe threatening or mislead-
ing news broadcasts “with a view to disturbing the interior or exterior security of 
another country.”121 Positive measures should rather be drafted in general terms for 
reasons “of the diversity of conditions and requirements” across the European con-
tinent and the world.122 The experts reasoned that if the positive measures proved 
successful, in time the preventive measures could be applied less frequently. The ex-
perts’ advice to draft the positive measures in general terms shows the importance 
they attached to drafting an agreement that could be sustained in the long run. The 
general terms would allow for the diversity in national, local, as well as regional cir-
cumstances, and any changes over time. 
A similar intention came to the fore in another recommendation. This described 
the role that states and the IBU should play in ensuring that individuals, minorities, 
and nation-states were free to maneuver. The committee advised in favor of the im-
portance of broadcasting related associations. Their work should be supported in any 
possible way. The experts specified this interdependency when they discussed “what 
questions should be settled within each State by means of instructions addressed by 
the government to the broadcasting companies.”123 Based on the IBU’s long experi-
ence, the expert advice was varied and included: “preliminary examination (con-
trol) of messages and various matters likely to promote international understand-
ing and also practical measures for the development of this kind of broadcast…”124 
Consequently, the experts advised governments to impose the measures on the or-
ganizations in their countries that these broadcasters had developed in the IBU. This 
advice implies a great amount of freedom for broadcasting organizations and limited 
government influence on program content. The experts projected the organization 
of propaganda broadcasting in relatively general and transnational terms.125
120 Burrows, “La Convention Internationale,” 19, 29, 33, 49-51.
121 Ibid., 49-50.
122 Ibid., 29, 50.
123 Ibid., 19.
124 Ibid., 51.
125 The committee also made observations for discussion topics at a later date. One topic concerned 
“the distribution of authorised press information on events of international importance circulated by the 
broadcasting stations.” Another was the possible development of a news service by the League in various 
languages. Burrows, “La Convention Internationale,” 51. The relationship between the international press 
and the development of transnational broadcasting in the interwar years is worth studying. Whereas news 
broadcasting could be considered a threat to the established press, broadcasting could also be a business 
opportunity for the press. Furthermore, the international standards created for the regulation of the press 
across borders often served as example for the international regulation of broadcasting. See: the Archives 
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With this organization of broadcasting in mind, the experts advised the League 
on the most suitable type of agreement. According to IBU Secretary-General 
Burrows, an agreement should not be too rigid. Broadcasters had difficulty de-
termining what issues or music harmed or did not harm listeners. “National feel-
ing is much more aroused and wounded in some countries than in others. There 
are parts of the world which appear to be politically ‘volcanic’ in character; other 
parts where political life is much more tranquil.”126 A rigid convention would 
not be able to correct for these differences, especially in the case of a worldwide 
convention. The experts recommended the League to create an international 
convention in general terms. Countries could then complement the convention 
with regional or individual agreements between governments or between broad-
casting organizations. Such regional arrangements should be designed “to settle 
local difficulties and tighten the bonds between the neighbouring countries.”127 
Burrows pointed out that it would be impossible to imagine France not being 
capable of broadcasting the story of Joan of Arc, or the British being “so foolish 
as to protest against such broadcast.”128 The experts proposed an international 
convention that settled the standardization of propaganda broadcasting in gen-
eral terms complemented by regional, local, or bilateral agreements that filled 
out specifics as and when necessary. 
The Committee for Moral Disarmament closely followed the findings of the 
group of experts. It integrated these recommendations in its draft convention for 
the high contracting parties of the Disarmament Conference in November 1933. 
At times, the committee found it hard to accept certain OCI formulations. The 
committee was an assembly of governments rather than a group of experts.129 The 
draft convention stressed that governments should use broadcasting and cinema-
tography to enhance a spirit of goodwill between nations. They should support 
any action of the OCI and other organizations with the same objective, and should 
avoid “the showing of films, the broadcasting of programmes and the organisa-
tion of performances obviously calculated to wound the legitimate sentiments 
of other nations.” Governments should monitor these activities “in accordance 
with the special system in force in their respective countries.”130 Although the draft 
of the League of Nations.
126 “Address (made by Secretary-General A. Burrows),” 2, box 74, file Propagande, Général II, IBU.
127 LoN, Broadcasting and Peace, 50.
128 “Address (made by Secretary-General A.R. Burrows),” 7, box 74, file Propagande, Général II, IBU.
129 The documents give no clear example of such difficulties. LoN, International Committee on Intel-
lectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Fifteenth Session, held at Geneva, November 21st, 1933, LoN doc. ser., 
C.I.C.I./15th Session/P.V.9 (Geneva: LoN, 1933), 10.
130 LoN, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Committee for Moral Disarmament, 
Text Adopted by the Committee, LoN doc. ser., Conf. D/C.D.M./36 (Geneva: LoN, Nov. 21st 1933), 2. 
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convention focused on the disarmament of the mind in its broadest sense, it de-
voted an entire article to cross-border broadcasting and cinematography.
The committee meeting in October 1933 would be its last. In the course of two 
years their efforts had created international recognition among government pleni-
potentiaries on a number of issues related to broadcasting. Their final draft con-
vention would pay tribute to the work of the OCI on questions of moral disarma-
ment and the importance of technical media. The draft convention would also ar-
ticulate that national and local diversity formed an inherent aspect of international 
projects. A member of the Moral Disarmament Committee, Mr. Peroso, expressed 
to the OCI his wish that the convention should be acceptable to non-League mem-
bers as well.131 A convention that was drafted in general terms would facilitate 
such development. For the first time, an assembly of governments had accepted 
broadcasting as a means of building peace. For the first time, an assembly of gov-
ernments had drafted a convention using the expertise of the IBU, ITU, and OCI. 
Within months of the drafting of the convention, difficulties caused by changing 
international relations destroyed the hopes of the Disarmament Conference.132 
The favorable international climate since the signing of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact in 1928 had proved short-lived. The economic crisis had de-stabilized the 
world economy. Moreover, one of the two men greatly responsible for the relative 
entente in Europe died in 1929. In the post-war years the Frenchman Aristide 
Briand and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Gustav Stresemann had man-
aged to create relative stability in international relations between the largest en-
emies of the Great War.133 Already during years of ill-health, Stresemann had lost 
domestic support for his international policy. When Hitler rose to power in 1933, 
Germany not only withdrew from the Disarmament Conference but also from the 
League at large. The disengagement by Germany meant the beginning of the end 
of the conference.134 
Initial uncertainty about the future of the Disarmament Conference led the 
OCI to rework the draft into a convention for broadcasting in the cause of peace. 
Its commitment to work on such a convention was a desperate attempt to hold 
on to an internationalist ideology when international relations increasingly 
131 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./15th Session/P.V.9, 10.
132 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Sixteenth Session, 
Provisional Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, held at Geneva, July 21st, 1934, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./16th 
Session/P.V.11 (Geneva: LoN, 1934), 2.
133 Steiner, The Lights that Failed, 486.
134 Andrew Webster, “The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of 
Nations’ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920-1938,” Contemporary European History 14, no. 4 
(2005): 516.
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depended on dividing nationalistic ideals. The OCI relatively hopelessly pointed 
to the importance of the initial text of the Moral Disarmament Committee. The 
text had been drawn up with the consent of an assembly of governments. It was 
absolutely fundamental to secure “measures of execution in the field of moral 
disarmament.”135 The League Assembly appointed a committee of lawyers to draft 
a convention. Dr. Raested again chaired the committee, which drafted a World 
International Convention. In February 1934 as well as in April 1935, the IIIC com-
municated several drafts to the national governments for approval. Criticism by 
national governments, however, prevented the drafting of a final convention.136 As 
a result, the League Assembly organized an international plenipotentiary confer-
ence. On September 23, 1936 the conference finally produced the International 
Convention for the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace.
The final convention integrated almost all the recommendations of the 1933 
group of experts. Consequently, the key points of the 1926 IBU Gentleman’s 
Agreement and the 1931 agreement on German-Polish Broadcasting had be-
come the basis for an international convention for broadcasting in war and peace. 
Nevertheless, several countries objected to parts of the convention. Rumania, for 
instance, argued that the preventive and positive measures for broadcasting con-
tent were insufficient. It requested that a special clause be added. Each country 
should avoid the construction and operation of stations that due to their proxim-
ity to frontiers and their power “are capable of interfering appreciably with the 
reception of neighbouring countries of broadcasts of such countries.”137 Rumania 
had made the same request at the Madrid Conference in 1932, but was rejected 
for the political rather than technical nature of the request. The 1936 conference 
on propaganda also rejected the Rumanian request. The convention had already 
accounted extensively for the content of the broadcasts from these high power and 
frontier stations. These measures should suffice.
Not all expert advice found its way to the convention either. During discus-
sions on the draft agreement, Poland questioned the experts’ recommendation for 
supervising compliance with the convention. The experts advised that the IBU 
should fulfill that role. They argued that governments should act through the in-
termediary of their representative within the IBU. Poland disagreed. It argued that 
the OCI should be the one to act as intermediary. Article 7 of the convention 
135 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./16th Session/P.V.11, 3.
136 For some discussion of these drafts see: Registry file 5B, box R-3998, file 17704/1658 and 
18271/1658, LoN.
137 LoN, “Intergovernmental Conference for the Conclusion of a Convention for the Use of Broadcast-
ing in the Cause of Peace, Amendment Proposed by the Rumanian Government, Geneva, September 17th, 
1936,” Conf.E.R.P./13, registry file 5B, box R-3998, file 25664/1658, LoN. 
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complies with the Polish request. It states that involved parties would have to re-
solve the question via diplomatic channels. If these measures failed, one would 
have to bring the issue to the Permanent Court of International Justice. By com-
mon consent, however, the parties could also decide to appeal to the OCI. The 
OCI could then establish a special committee for this purpose. This solution could 
be an alternative to the diplomatic or international juridical path. The conference 
participants added Recommendation VII to the convention. As it was the first 
time the OCI would take on such a task, the special committee should preferably 
be chosen on the advice of and from the members of the IBU and the IECI. These 
advisors could possibly be complemented by recommended people from the ITU 
or the International Federation of Journalists. In the end, the convention did after 
all suggest involvement of the IBU in the supervision of the convention, although 
in a different form.138
Although the convention was drafted by European experts on the basis of 
mainly European experience with propaganda broadcasting, the final convention 
had a global scope. No fewer than 36 countries participated in the Paris Conference 
of 1936. In addition, Estonia, Latvia, Siam, the USA’s International Section of the 
Federal Communications Commission, the IBU, and the Rockefeller Institute 
sent observers to the meetings. Ultimately a mere 28 out of 36 active participants 
signed the agreement in the course of 1936. Only Bulgaria, Chile, Cuba, Finland, 
Italy, Nicaragua, Portugal, and Sweden participated, but did not sign for a variety 
of reasons. Germany had refused to join the conference altogether.139 At least two 
thirds of the signatories were European (see Table 5.1).140 The list of countries that 
signed the convention suggests that the global convention had a largely European 
component both by reason of content and geographical territory.
138 LoN, “International Cooperation Organisation, Executive Committee, International Convention 
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, Draft Rules for Application, Explanatory Note, 
Geneva, December 12th, 1936,” C.I.C.I./Com.Ex./79 (Geneva: LoN, 1936), registry file, 5B, box R-3999, file 
27006/1658, LoN.
139 “Intellectual Cooperation Organisation, Executive Committee, Paris December 21st and 22nd, 1936,” 
C.I.C.I./Com.Ex./79, 1-2, registry file 5B, R-3999, LoN. 
140 It remains unclear how many countries signed the convention in between the end of 1936 and May 
1, 1937, the official date of closure for the Signing of the Treaty. LoN, “Conference for the Conclusion of 
an International Convention for the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, Action to be taken as a 
result of the Conference, Report by the French Representative, Geneva, October 9th, 1936,” LoN doc. ser., 
C.440.1936.XII (Geneva: LoN, 1936), 2, registry file 5B, R-3999, file 25871/1658, LoN.
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Table 5.1 – Signatories of the International Convention for the Use of Broad-
casting in the Cause of Peace in the course of 1936
Albania Czechoslovakia Irish Free State Rumania
Argentina Denmark Lithuania Spain
Austria Egypt Luxembourg Switzerland
Belgium France United States of Mexico Turkey
United States of Brazil Greece Netherlands USSR
United Kingdom Hungary New Zealand Uruguay
Colombia India Norway Yugoslavia
Source: LoN, Intellectual Cooperation Organisation, Executive Committee, Paris, December 
1st and 22nd, 1936, C.I.C.I.Com.Ex./79 (Geneva: LoN, 1936), 1, registry file 5B, R-3999, file 
27006/1658, LoN. 
Table 5.2 – Ratification and accession to the International Convention for the 












Union of South Africa
Guatemala
Source: “International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace,” 
The American Journal for International Law 32 (1938), 113. 
The true reach of the convention did not deviate greatly from the number of 
initial signatories. In legal terms, the signing of a convention does not make its 
contents binding for national governments. A signature merely communicates an 
intention of the signatory country that it will deal further with the issue in its na-
tional parliament. Only when national parliaments implement the international 
convention into their national laws, does the country truly ratify it. In 1938 the 
Convention went into effect. By then seven countries that had participated in the 
conference had ratified the convention. Some five additional countries that had not 
participated accessioned it as well (see Table 5.2).141 According to the OCI, by July 
1939 some twenty-three countries had ratified the convention, which was “a striking 
result in the circumstances.”142 Furthermore, the members of the South American 
Broadcasting Union (USARD) agreed to the 1936 convention mostly indirectly by 
141 “International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace,” The Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 32, no. 3 (1938): 113-114; Spohrer, “Ruling the Airwaves,” 349.
142 The documents do not specify further these twenty-three countries. LoN, International Committee 
on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Twenty-first Session, held at Geneva, July 20th, 1939, LoN doc. 
ser., C.I.C.I./21st session/P.V.7, 53.
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adopting a special clause in their own agreement that was based on previous drafts 
of the 1936 convention.143 In spite of the large number of ratifications and countries 
that accessioned the agreement, it was an unfortunate state of affairs that the conven-
tion “could not be said to be thriving very vigorously yet,” the OCI found in 1939.144
Over the following years the OCI stepped up its activities in day-to-day broad-
casting. The committee increasingly worried about the further demise of civilization 
since the failure of the Disarmament Conference. Murray expressed it vividly: “The 
knowledge was there, the desire was there, but civilization, after three years of effort, 
seemed unable to save itself.”145 In case civilization was not lost forever it “at least 
merged in some unknown period of darkness.”146 In order to deal with this demise, 
the OCI above all tried to organize adherence to and ratification of the 1936 conven-
tion. Moreover, it tried to forge the convention by actively extending the positive 
measures for propaganda broadcasting in the cause of peace. In the years leading up 
to World War II, the OCI organized meetings of experts to discuss a large number of 
issues. These varied from options for unifying broadcasts to possible copyrights for 
music and authors’ rights that until then had been arranged at a national rather than 
an international level.147 The League frantically pursued its broadcasting project for 
peace within an increasingly deteriorating international climate. 
Nationalism Shatters Peace Regulation
Rising nationalism shattered the IBU’s options to regulate propaganda broadcast-
ing. International relations changed drastically in 1933. Hitler rose to power in 
Germany and dictatorial regimes emerged in other parts of Europe such as Italy 
and Poland. Deteriorating national and international relations aroused slumber-
ing nationalist sentiments. Incitement to warfare appeared to be just around the 
corner. These harsh sentiments immediately affected the drafting of propaganda 
broadcasting standards. On the surface, cooperation between the various parties 
143 SdN, “Commission Internationale de Cooperation Intellectuelle, projet de résolution sur la radiodiffu-
sion et la paix, Genève, le 18 juillet, 1935,” C.I.C.I. 397 II, 1, registry file 5B, R-3998, file 18271/1658, LoN. 
144 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./21st session/P.V.7, 53.
145 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Seventeenth Session, held 
at Geneva, July 15th, 1935, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./17th session/P.V.1, 8.
146 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Seventeenth Session, held 
at Geneva, July 15th, 1935, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./17th session/P.V.1, 6.
147 See amongst others: LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the 
Nineteenth Session, held at Geneva, July 15th-17th, 1937, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./19th session/P.V.1-8; LoN, 
International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Twentieth Session, held at Geneva, July 
11th-15th, 1938, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./20th session/P.V1-10; registry file 5B, R-3999, file 27006/1658, file 
27047/1658, file 27719/1658, file 30730/1658, file 32583/1658, 33585/1658, LoN. 
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continued without apparent difficulties. These sentiments nonetheless affected the 
international broadcasting community’s working environment. Heated debates, 
suspicion, fear, and warfare over the airwaves typify the 1930s. The IBU, repre-
senting the major part of the European broadcasting community, had to obviate 
these contingencies. 
Broadcasting’s political implications severely tested the IBU’s technical approach. 
Already in 1933, incidents forced the IBU Council to reconsider its officials’ par-
ticipation in external study groups on politically charged issues. The non-govern-
mental IBU had always claimed to be what it called an “a-political” organization. 
Up to then this claim had allowed the IBU to work on politically charged issues 
in an efficient and technical manner. It never expected that its claim might be 
used against the Union. In contrast, the OCI study groups had an official political 
character. They were part of the intergovernmental League of Nations. For years 
the IBU could rely on its “a-political” approach and collaborate smoothly with the 
OCI on political issues. However by 1933, a number of incidents revealed that 
claiming an “a-political” policy could become a liability for the IBU if it wanted to 
pursue its internationalist ideals.
During discussions on the issue of broadcasting in the cause of peace, prob-
lems of a diplomatic nature arose. In 1933, the OCI invited several IBU officials to 
participate in their official capacity or as broadcasting experts in their own right. 
Official cooperation with the OCI in drafting agreements on propaganda issues 
contradicted the concept of an IBU that stood above politics. Nonetheless, no-one 
seemed to have thought about that. For the IBU it was a practical way of promot-
ing the use of its medium for peace and rapprochement. It had no clear guidelines 
and none of its members questioned its participation. Then problems of a diplo-
matic nature arose between the Belgian IBU delegate and the OCI. 
In 1932, IIIC director Henri Bonnet invited Baron van den Bosch to join the 
group of experts. The OCI regularly valued his opinion on various reports. When 
the OCI called the experts to meet in Paris, Van den Bosch had neither received an 
invitation nor a rejection. Van den Bosch explained to the IBU Council that an in-
cident had led to an official protest at an IIIC meeting in Brussels.148 As a result the 
Belgian Government had communicated the incident to the League of Nations. 
The OCI then decided not to invite Van den Bosch to the meeting of experts. 
The Belgian government in turn decided to refuse Van den Bosch participation in 
any study related to propaganda broadcasting in collaboration with OCI as well 
148 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1933, 134, 137, IBU.
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as possible voting on the topic.149 The relationship between Belgium and the OCI 
became completely distorted. 
Even though the nature of the incident remains unclear from the archives, it 
was important enough to provoke discussion in the IBU. Along with another re-
lated issue, it would eventually even change the IBU’s international role as expert 
organization. Although in the end Van den Bosch was not part of the OCI study, 
other IBU officials like Burrows, Atkinson, Giesecke, Raested, and Sourek did par-
ticipate. Sourek had performed an in-depth study on frontier stations and propa-
ganda broadcasting. At the IBU Council meeting he clarified that the conclusions 
of the group of experts did not entirely match those of the individual broadcasting 
experts who had not been involved in the final editing process. Moreover, the OCI 
had consulted other experts outside European radio enterprises as well. The IBU 
Council decided in hindsight that all studies for the OCI on politically charged is-
sues were and should be made in their own right. The OCI could not make any dec-
laration in the name of the IBU. The IBU experts should warn the OCI that they had 
performed all their studies in their own right without any reference to the IBU.150 
The IBU officially distanced itself from any participation or advisory role in relation 
to politically charged issues. Cleverly, the decision to approve participation in their 
own right allowed these men to continue their activities on the very same politically 
charged issues. 
The German-Austrian dispute that emerged in 1933 marked a turning point in 
transnational broadcasting. It can even be considered the first real broadcasting 
war over the airwaves. As Germany and Austria were both members of the IBU, 
the war affected the Union directly. The IBU’s internationalist outlook turned out 
to be vulnerable to nationalistic thinking. Moreover, its claim of being “a-political” 
became an instrument that hindered rather than assisted its internationalist proj-
ects for society.
In 1934 the IBU Council decided that the study of political problems related 
to broadcasting was a matter for governments only.151 For two years Austria and 
Germany had been at war over the airwaves. Their dispute led to litigations within 
the IBU between the German Reichs Rundfunkgesellschaft (RRG) and Austrian 
Ravag. Austrian Ravag protested strongly against German broadcasting politics. It 
also objected to one of Germany’s most aggressive propaganda broadcasts under 
the leadership of Theo Habicht. He above all directed his propaganda broadcasts 
149 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1935, 248, 267-268, IBU.
150 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1933, 146, IBU.
151 LoN, Broadcasting and Peace, 30.
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towards Austria’s dictatorial Dollfuß government. The Dollfuß government had 
been leading the Austrian Parliament with an almost non-existent majority. In 
March 1933 Dollfuß suspended Parliament indefinitely when expectations rose 
that the Austrian Nazi party, the SDAP, would gain a majority during the next elec-
tion. Dollfuß now ruled by decree, to the dissatisfaction of the Germans. 
In response, the Germans started serial broadcasts from the Reichssender 
München into Austria. For geographical reasons, these broadcasts could be re-
ceived in most parts of Austria. Sometimes the reception was even better than that 
of Austrian stations. Habicht issued a series of broadcasts designed to rouse the 
Austrian population to revolt against their government. The broadcasts not only 
contained speeches by Habicht and by Frauenfeld, leader of the Austrian National-
Socialist Party. They also included brief notes on the situation in Austria, describ-
ing the distress of the population and the curtailing of their freedom. Habicht 
warned that their government would further restrict their freedom in February 
1934 by banning the Austrian SDAP altogether. Dollfuß was not pleased.
The subsequent dispute touched the very heart of IBU standards on propaganda 
broadcasting. Austria accused its German counterpart of deliberately broadcasting 
harmful propaganda to audiences across its borders. Germany claimed that it was 
merely informing its domestic audiences about Austrian political developments. 
In line with IBU recommendations, Austria requested rectification and sight of 
the scripts beforehand. Germany refused. RRG considered it impossible to control 
every single presenter in German broadcasting. This was a rather weak excuse. For 
years the European broadcasting community had been working on this particular 
propaganda issue. When Austrian protests had no effect, other countries like Italy, 
France, and Britain tried to interfere. The broadcasting war had become a diplo-
matic dispute. 
Italian, French, and British ambassadors took turns in pressing Germany to 
stop nationalistic broadcasting activities against Austria. They urged Germany to 
comply with the Lausanne Protocol of 1932. This protocol obliged Austria to re-
frain from economic or political cooperation with the German Reich. More im-
portantly, they urged Germany to comply with the Four Power Pact signed in July 
1933, the Locarno Treaty of 1925, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. The Four 
Power Pact between Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy was designed to in-
troduce a new era of cooperation in Europe under the guidance of the League. The 
pact should guarantee peace for the next ten years, but turned out to be relatively 
weak. In spite of diplomatic efforts, Germany refused to cooperate, claiming that it 
was adhering to international standards for propaganda broadcasting.
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The German-Austrian broadcasting war was the main topic of a turbulent IBU 
Council meeting in 1934. Austrian Ravag accused the Nazi controlled RRG of 
poor broadcasting politics. Both organizations threatened their withdrawal from 
the IBU. Ravag would withdraw if the IBU could not prevent further German pro-
paganda broadcasts. RRG would withdraw if it was accused officially of transmit-
ting illicit propaganda.152 To avoid such a development, RRG tried to detract at-
tention from the subject. 
Together with other IBU members, RRG rallied against the idea to discuss a 
draft of the Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace.153 It 
argued that the issue did not belong on the Council’s agenda as it had a political 
nature and addressed governments only. The official IBU contact for the League 
of Nations Maurice Rambert responded that he understood the critique. He did 
not want to ignore the Union’s official statement that it did not interfere in politi-
cal discussions, but rather tried to keep the microphone away from government 
influence. In particular, articles 4 and 5 of the convention would allow immediate 
and direct government participation in broadcasting programs. Rambert argued 
that IBU members should examine the consequences for their organizations and 
for the development of broadcasting at large. The IBU statutes pointed out that 
the consequences for the development of broadcasting did fall within the direct 
jurisdiction of the IBU.154 Rambert put considerable effort into directing the mi-
crophone away from government influence via his politically charged negotiations 
with the League of Nations. The National-Socialist RRG did not want to collabo-
rate with the League and had no interest in keeping the microphone away from 
governments. Its National-Socialist ideology clashed with the internationalist ide-
als of the IBU.
When the situation threatened to escalate, IBU President Carpendale made 
it his personal task to find a solution. A presidential delegation consisting of the 
Czech, Polish, and Swiss representatives considered all complaints and issues, 
including those of Austrian Ravag and German RRG.155 In the end, the Council 
accepted a resolution stating that the IBU officially refrained from participation 
in political discussions. The decision was in compliance with the wishes of RRG. 
Furthermore, the Council advised its members to contact their governments about 
152 Werner Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein 1933-1938,” Rundfunk und Fernsehen 19, 
no. 4 (1971): 435.
153 Heinrich Giesecke, “Der Weltrundfunkverein: Seine Enststehung und sein Wirken bis zur Luzerner 
Konferenz,” in Weltfunkverein: Studien zum Weltrundfunk und Fernsehrundfunk (Heidelberg; Berlin; Mag-
deburg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1941), 48.
154 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1934, 187-188, IBU.
155 Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein,” 434.
TEHS7_handels.indd   220 5/9/2012   3:41:26 PM
 War and Peace in the Sky 221
the draft convention if they deemed it necessary. They could then take measures 
accordingly if desired.156 
The Council decision suggests a profound change in IBU’s approach to politi-
cally charged problems. The IBU would no longer participate in the discussions 
on the Convention for the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. Nevertheless 
it could attend the 1936 conference as observer. In previous years the IBU had 
deliberately functioned as an intermediary in quarrels on propaganda broadcasts. 
Now the Union officially refused to interfere in such affairs. Furthermore, the IBU 
decided to halt all its previous efforts in the OCI relating to broadcasting propa-
ganda disputes. The increased influence of nationalist ideologies and state inter-
vention in broadcasting affairs forced the IBU to give way to the OCI and national 
governments. They reduced its ability to realize an international society character-
ized by friendship between nations and inclusion of all peoples. These decisions 
foregrounded the technical expertise of the organization over any possible form of 
techno-political expertise. The IBU now possessed fewer tools to pursue its inter-
nationalist aims for society.
The Spanish Civil War showed how much space to maneuver the IBU actually 
lost. Sören Brinkmann terms the Spanish Civil War “a kind of dress rehearsal for 
the catastrophe of World War II.”157 According to Alan Davies, it was also the first 
radio war where all broadcasting techniques were put to the test over a period 
of four years.158 It was a war that quickly acquired a substantial international di-
mension, even though that would only become clear with hindsight some years 
later. It was a war between National-Socialists and Fascists on the one hand, and 
Russian Bolshevists on the other. Yet they never confronted each other directly. It 
was also a war that left international organizations like the League of Nations and 
the IBU completely helpless. The war opposed their principles as the Gentleman’s 
Agreement already reflected in 1926. The broadcasting battles of the Spanish Civil 
War reveal the firmness of the shift from internationalist ideology towards nation-
alist ideologies in the European broadcasting community. 
Initially the Spanish War was a domestic affair. It began with a military coup 
supported by poor land workers who threw off the ruling Republican socialist 
156 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1934, 188, IBU.
157 “ein Art Generalprobe für die Katastrophe des Zweiten Weltkrieges.” Sören Brinkmann, “Bilder eines 
Krieges: Europa und der Bürgerkrieg in Spanien,” in Europäische Öffentlichkeit: Transnationale Kommu-
nikation seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Jörg Requate and Martin Schulze Wessel (Frankfurt am Main; New 
York: Campus, 2002), 250.
158 Alan Davies, “The First Radio War: Broadcasting in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939,” Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television 19, no. 4 (1999): 494.
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government. Compared to European averages, modern economic development in 
Spain had spread very unevenly across the country and across society. The coup 
had its origin in “the cumulative political, social and cultural anxieties provoked 
by a rapid, uneven and accelerating modernization.” An unequal diffusion of 
modernization and fear of the progressive technical means of achieving ends had 
caused fear about “where change was leading.”159 The coup resulted in a civil war 
between the Nationalists who had started it and the Republicans who opposed it. 
The Republicans had control over the major transmitters covering the urban areas. 
The Nationalists used recently invented mobile transmitters. Both sides set up a 
center from which they organized their propaganda activities.160 
The war quickly acquired a European character when Germany, Italy, and 
Russia started meddling in Spain’s affairs. COMINTERN mobilized its entire lo-
gistical apparatus to support the Republicans in Spain. On a Europe-wide scale, 
all communist press offices recruited volunteers to join the war. No fewer than an 
estimated 59,000 mostly European volunteers joined. In the eyes of Brinkmann, 
this action set the tone for a more open and more connected Europe via com-
munication structures like broadcasting.161 Though COMINTERN supported the 
Republicans, its overall foreign policy had become less radical during the 1930s. 
Stalin favored a soft approach and did not want to antagonize western powers or 
Germany out of fear of repercussions in the east of Europe. Consequently, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Litvinov applied some sort of crisis-management in Spain rather 
than a frontal attack on National Socialism.162 
In response to Hitler’s overt attack on Bolshevism, Russia redefined its role 
in Europe. It now promoted itself as the “stabilizer of the European order.”163 
Russia became a member of the League of Nations in 1934 and signed the 1936 
Convention on the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace. Beneath this surface 
it still aimed to separate itself from the post-war international order in Europe. 
Doubts amongst Soviet leaders, western distrust, as well as hostility by authori-
tarian states in Eastern Europe fed this ongoing desire for separation.164 Via its 
approach in Spain, COMINTERN thus not only created an open European social-
ist communication structure. It created a great feeling of brotherhood among the 
159 Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 1.
160 Davies, “The First Radio War,” 484.
161 Brinkmann, “Bilder eines Krieges,” 257.
162 Silvio Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War, 1936-1941 (London: Frank Cass, 2002), xi.
163 Pons, Staling and the Inevitable War, x.
164 Ibid., x-xi.
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immense group of European volunteers and communist society as well.165
Germany and Italy in contrast came to the aid of the Nationalists. They provided 
them with support on all fronts. At the heart of German activities lay the work of 
Anti-Komintern established by Goebbels in 1933. Anti-Komintern sought to un-
dermine Russian power in front of a global audience by means of anti-Bolshevist 
propaganda.166 As such, it supported the Nationalists to degrees beyond compari-
son. The Nationalists acquired valuable information, technical equipment like a 
20kw transmitter, knowledge on propaganda broadcasting and the like. Moreover, 
Anti-Komintern introduced the so-called ghost broadcasts. Such broadcasts ap-
peared to be Republican, but were Nationalist instead.167 The Italians supported 
these activities by covering broadcasting in the east of Spain. 168 Together Germany 
and Italy established a very effective support for the broadcasting war in Spain.
In a similar way to Russia, Germany also promoted itself as the defender of 
European hegemony. With hindsight Arnold Raested argues that in the eyes of 
Germany, Europe was a “field of power politics in which Germany would have 
to try to gain a hegemony of some kind.”169 Raested even recalls Hitler’s use of 
“Europe” to achieve anti-Bolshevist hegemony. Hitler said that “the bolshevizing 
of Spain both menaced the peace of Europe and threatened to upset the balance 
of power in Europe.” Furthermore, in 1939 Hitler added that Germany had inter-
vened in Spain to “protect the European culture, and the real culture, against its 
Bolshevist enemies.”170 
The use of pro-European propaganda in a war like the Spanish Civil War be-
came a means of gaining international support for personal ideologies. Russia used 
positive propaganda to promote Bolshevism as the stabilizer of European order. It 
avoided destructive propaganda against nationalist ideologies. On the contrary, 
nationalist ideology tried to weaken a global socialist ideology by claiming to de-
fend European hegemony. It used a considerable amount of negative destructive 
Bolshevist propaganda. By then Hitler’s attack on Soviet Bolshevism had, however, 
lost credibility. Countries in Europe seem not to have feared Socialism anymore. 
Even in Britain, where Hitler’s propaganda had been effective for long, Russians 
were no longer feared.171 Thus, even though the Nationalists won in Spain, Hitler’s 
165 Lorna L. Waddington, “The Anti-Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 4 (2007): 586-587; Brinkmann, “Bilder eines Krieges,” 258-259. 
166 Waddington, “The Anti-Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s,” 575.
167 Ibid., 582; Davies, “The First Radio War.”
168 Davies, “The First Radio War,” 484.
169 Ræsted, Europe and the Atlantic World, 42.
170 Ibid., 42.
171 Waddington, “The Anti-Komintern and Nazi Anti-Bolshevik Propaganda in the 1930s,” 591.
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anti-Bolshevist attack failed. It was National-Socialism and its Lebensraum politics 
that created widespread fear by 1939.
In the meantime, the League of Nations and the IBU saw a government that 
had supported their ideals of peace and understanding, collapsing in disarray.172 
They could not intervene. When war broke out in Spain, the Spanish broadcast-
ers withdrew from the IBU. Their act rendered the resolutions and agreements of 
the IBU obsolete. Moreover, when Spain signed the 1936 Convention on the Use 
of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, it added a special clause. Spain retained 
the right “to put a stop by all possible means to propaganda liable adversely to 
affect internal order in Spain and involving a breach of the Convention…”173 At 
the League Assembly, administrations discussed an OCI resolution about non-in-
tervention in the conflict in Spain. They differed in opinion whether intervention 
or non-intervention would assure that the conflict did not cross Spain’s borders.174 
The OCI foresaw a danger to European conditions. The League might degener-
ate into “a mere alliance of one group of States against another group.” The Irish 
OCI participant De Valera even stated that it “would be the end of our hopes for 
a real League.”175 The League decided not to interfere in what it considered to be 
a domestic affair. In retrospect, the League decision made room for Germany and 
Russia to propagate and realize their ideologies at the expense of the international-
ist ideals of the League and the IBU.
Rising nationalism would even divide the IBU from within.176 In the second half 
of the 1930s, nationalist tendencies were spreading across Europe. They changed 
regimes in the east and gained support across countries in the south and west. 
Especially the smaller European states became main National Socialist targets. 
Whereas in Poland an authoritarian government came to power, Germany occu-
pied smaller countries like Czechoslovakia and the larger Austria. These nationalist 
172 The ruling government had supported the 1931 constitution based on democratic, liberal, and 
reformist principles.
173 LoN, “Intergovernmental Conference for the Conclusion of a Convention for the Use of Broadcast-
ing in the Cause of Peace, Declaration by the Spanish Government, Geneva, September 23rd, 1936,” Conf. 
E.R.P./26, 1, registry file 5B, R-3998, file 25664/1658 XXVI, LoN.
174 LoN, The Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Verbatim Report of the Eleventh Meeting, held 
at Geneva, October 2nd, 1937, box 92, file Société des Nations, Général VI, de 1936 à 1940, IBU.
175 LoN, The Eighteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, October 2nd, 1937, box 92, file SdN, Général 
VI, IBU.
176 This section is an exploratory attempt to delineate the influence of the individual in international 
non-governmental organizations at the hand of biographies, archive material from international organiza-
tions, and available secondary literature. In order to get a fuller and more reliable grasp these results 
should be complemented by the consultation of private archives or the archives of national organizations 
where those individuals have been employed.
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ideologies imagined society in an essentially different way from the ruling inter-
national elites of the League of Nations and the IBU. Nationalist ideals entered 
such international organizations, creating ongoing internal tensions. A technical 
committee like the OCI dealt with these European changes by attracting a larger 
number of committee members from outside of Europe. The OCI maintained a 
global rather than a European outlook.177 Such an organization as the IBU could 
not resolve the problem that easily. The IBU represented most of the European 
broadcasting community and considered Europe its core area of activity. In spite of 
its non-governmental character and its own claim of being an “a-political” Union, 
internally the IBU encountered changes and firm clashes between ideologies. 
Individuals would play a key role in the fine-tuning of these ideologies inside 
the IBU. With the rise of new regimes, several members of the European broad-
casting community were replaced by people who were loyal to these new regimes. 
In Germany, for instance, Hitler immediately reorganized the infrastructure of 
German broadcasting. He fired the heads of broadcasting, flattened the organi-
zation structure, and placed both organization and control over radio schedules 
under the direct supervision of Goebbels.178 Consequently in 1933, IBU Vice-
President Heinrich Giesecke had to leave RRG and was replaced by someone 
who represented the new regime. Shortly after, Polish and Austrian broadcasting 
faced a similar fate. Zygmunt Chamiec from Polskie Radjo had to leave the IBU 
in 1936, followed by Oskar Czeija of Austrian Ravag in 1938. In just a few years, 
the IBU lost its long-term vice-president, its director of the International Relay 
Committee, as well as its Rapprochement Committee director. These three men 
had been involved in the founding of the IBU, designing from scratch their idea 
of an internationalist society via broadcasting. New people who supported the to-
talitarian regimes replaced these men domestically and in the IBU. The IBU could 
only partially downplay the repercussions of these changes. 
In Poland the economic recession of 1932 led to riots that replaced the Polish 
government with the Piłsudski regime in 1933. This regime wanted to have full 
control over Polskie Radjo. Such control nonetheless was impossible without the 
majority consent of the stakeholders.179 Zygmunt Chamiec was not only the sta-
tion’s managing-director but also one of the major stakeholders. Always a former 
government supporter, Chamiec soon became isolated internally. The number of 
employees supporting the Piłsudski regime increased steadily. When the station 
177 Renoliet, L’Unesco oubliée, 184-185.
178 Goebbels, “Der Rundfunk als achte Groβmacht.”
179 The Polskie Radjo financial structure from 1926 onwards: 40% government; 40% stock market (spe-
cific banks and individual stakeholders like Chamiec); 20% stock market. Miazek, Przeminelo z radiem, 93.
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appointed Piłsudski supporter Roman Starzynski as Vice Managing Director, 
Chamiec faced increasing difficulties. He now had a hard time keeping the micro-
phone away from the government, which had been one of the leading principles of 
Polskie Radjo since its foundation. After fighting a losing battle, he was discharged 
as major stakeholder in August 1935.180 Government now fully controlled Polskie 
Radjo and desired it be “led by completely loyal people, Zygmunt Chamiec was 
not one of them.”181 By preventing the government from employing broadcasting 
to achieve its own ends, Chamiec had become an enemy of the state.
The IBU managed to cope with the regime shift in Poland relatively easily. 
With the departure of Chamiec, the IBU had lost one of its most notable figures 
and most ardent supporters of its internationalist ideals. Poland lost its impor-
tant role in the IBU. Chamiec had been IBU Vice-President since 1935 and head 
of the International Relay Committee since 1928. The new president of Polskie 
Radjo, Roman Starzynski, replaced Chamiec at the IBU. Starzynski did not get 
the chance to continue Chamiec’s work. Instead he became head of the Budget 
Committee in 1937.182 The IBU ejected Polskie Radjo from major IBU roles, plac-
ing Poland in a “leading” finance position where its nationalistic visions could 
do no harm. Moreover, the IBU merged the International Relay Committee over 
which Chamiec had presided with the Rapprochement Committee. The IBU ap-
pointed the Dutch Antoine Dubois as director of the new Program Committee.183 
The IBU relocated Chamiec’s posts to men from small west European broadcasting 
180 In the end the shareholders voted in favor of the change in organization structure, because, accord-
ing to what Chamiec told his family, the Polish PPT delayed the listener payments to Polskie Radjo (license 
fees were paid to the PPT and were then forwarded to Polskie Radjo). As a consequence of these PPT 
actions, dividends to the stakeholders were delayed. Ibid., 187-215.
181 Ibid., 312.
182 The Budget Committee seems to have been relatively small and unimportant in respect to the other 
committees. The IBU did not have a large budget. The committee merely seems to have handled admission 
fees, and day-to-day administration costs such as meetings, conferences, committee budgets, and the like. 
Charles E. Sherman, “The International Broadcasting Union: A Study in Practical Internationalism,” EBU-
Review 25, no. 3 (1974): 32-36.
183 Dubois (1997-1956) was an electro-technical engineer and radio-expert. He had a background in 
wireless telephony for which he had travelled to the Dutch East-Indies and China. He had led and estab-
lished the Radiotelegraphic service of the Dutch Ground forces, and became director of the Nederlandse 
Seintoestellenfabriek (NSF) after the war. The NSF built navigation apparatus for ships and aircraft, 
and constructed transmission and reception apparatus for wireless telegraphy and telephony. The NSF 
broadcasted from a transmitter in Hilversum. To finance transmissions, Dubois created the broadcasting 
organization, the Hilversumse Draadloze Omroep, in 1923. From 1928 onwards Dubois chaired the Dutch 
Comité van Omroepverenigingen, a consultative body that represented the interests of all Dutch broad-
casting organizations. After having been the head of the IBU Program Committee for two years, he would 
become the new president of IBU in 1937. The Swiss C.A. Dümling would succeed him as new head of 
the Program Committee. J.H.J. van den Heuvel, “Dubois, Antoine (1887-1956),” Biografisch Woordenboek 
van Nederland. Deel 1 (’s Gravenhage, 1979), 153-154, URL: http://www.inghist.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/
BWN/lemmata/bwn1/duboisa. Accessed on March 13, 2008. 
TEHS7_handels.indd   226 5/9/2012   3:41:26 PM
 War and Peace in the Sky 227
organizations, men who had a history with the IBU and its internationalist ideals.
The merger of the International Relay Committee and the Rapprochement 
Committee also cushioned the problems resulting from the regime shift in 
Austria. Ravag managing-director Oskar Czeija had been the director of the 
Rapprochement Committee for ten years. To the dismay of the Nazi Party, Czeija 
had always received the full support of the Dollfuß government. According to the 
Party, Czeija was the personification of all Austrian evil. He was politisch unzuver-
lässig. After the Germans invaded Austria, they dismissed him in March 1938.184 
The Germans gave Ravag the name Reichssender Wien. The station fell under full 
National-Socialist control and was integrated into the German RRG. 
The German IBU representative now represented the former Ravag as well. 
With the creation of the Program Committee, the IBU gave Czeija’s former posi-
tion to someone in the West. Consequently, the German IBU representative could 
not claim the one position in the IBU which allowed the holder to shape the image 
of a cultural society via music and plays. In Austria, Hitler did not replace all the 
main broadcasting staff as he had done in Germany. Several Ravag employees had 
been active in the IBU for a long time and could continue their work. For years E. 
Künsti had represented Czeija when he was unable to attend IBU meetings. He was 
well known at the IBU. Moreover, chief engineer Schwaiger had been a respected 
member of the Technical Committee from the days of the foundation of the IBU.185 
Schwaiger continued his work at the IBU and would become head of the commit-
tee when Raymond Braillard left in 1940. Both Künsti and Schwaiger had a long 
history of working along internationalist lines.186 These developments suggest that 
the IBU managed to downplay several options that the National-Socialist invaders 
might have utilized to increase their influence over the Union. 
Notwithstanding, the IBU could not refuse the new German representative 
an important IBU position. Germany was one of the largest and most important 
broadcasting nations in Europe. Its membership fee accounted for a large part of 
IBU revenues. German IBU representative Heinrich Giesecke had been known 
for his support of internationalist projects. The Nazi Party named him a “Träger 
des alten System-Rundfunks,” a “barrow boy” of the former ideology. Goebbels re-
placed him with Kurt von Boeckmann. He had been forced to join the Nazi Party 
184 Reinhard Schlögl, Oskar Czeija: Radio- und Fernsehpionier, Unternehmer, Abenteurer (Wien: Böhlau, 
2005), 129.
185 “Conférence européenne d’ingénieurs en radiophonie (Salle E.) Palais des Nations, Genève, 6 
& 7 juillet 1925, Disposition des places,” Série no. 19, 6 juillet 1925, registry file 14, box R-1139, file 
43391/28231, LoN. 
186 See: file P.V. et documents complémentaires Commission Technique, 1925-1930, IBU; file P.V. Com-
mission des Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU.
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and stood under clear watch of Goebbels himself. Von Boeckmann would replace 
Giesecke in the IBU.
Von Boeckmann was educated in history and philosophy and had a doctorate 
in law. He was fluent in Italian, English, and French, and had travelled the world 
from Italy and Greece to the United States. He had been director of the Research 
Institute for Cultural Morphology in Munich for five years when he started work-
ing at the Deutsche Stunde in Bayern GmbH in May 1925. Within months he was 
promoted from the position of program director to artistic director and business 
leader. In early 1928 he again got promoted to the position of managing-direc-
tor.187 In 1933 he would take over Giesecke’s position in RRG and became manag-
ing-director of Deutsche Welle, the German short wave station near Berlin.188 Von 
Boeckmann had been involved in broadcasting developments from the start when 
Giesecke and his companions managed RRG. He had a largely internationally ori-
ented background, a love of music and a love of the medium of broadcasting. 
Von Boeckmann seems to have struggled with his internationalist background 
and his work for the Nazi Party. According to Wilhem Schwipps, who has exam-
ined Von Boeckmann’s role in German broadcasting during the Nazi regime, he 
opposed an ideology that he had to support, and supported an ideology that he 
had to reject. Consequently, Von Boeckmann was an important cog in the orga-
nization where the internationalist ideals of the IBU were fine-tuned with the na-
tionalistic ideals of Nazi-Germany. According to Schwipps, his pre-1933 human-
istic ideals and international orientation towards cooperation did not disappear 
when he joined the Nazi-Party.189 In addition to his position as IBU Council mem-
ber and vice-president from 1935 to 1936 and 1938 to 1939, he devoted much of 
his time in the IBU to his favorite topic: music. Between 1935 and 1939 he was on 
the International Relay Committee where he negotiated television’s rightful place 
with the IBU rather than with the IECI in Rome.190 He also took the international 
program Youth sings across the frontier (1935) into his brief.191 Schwipps argues 
that in his heart, Von Boeckmann was an internationalist. According to his wife, 
187 Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein,” 430.
188 According to Wilhelm Schwipps the Party had to use soft pressure to make Von Boeckmann accept 
Giesecke’s former position. Ibid., 430; Kurt von Boeckmann, Von der Arbeit des Deutschen Kurzwellen-
senders (S.l.: S.n., 1939). 
189 Unfortunately, Schwipps neither reflects on the form and shape of these humanistic ideals nor the 
nature of the orientation towards international cooperation. Furthermore, though he clearly has consulted 
the archive of Deutsche Welle and the personal archive of Von Boeckmann, his references at times appear 
careless and sometimes even arbitrary.
190 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1935, IBU; IBU, “Procès-Verbaux des Réunions de la Commission de 
Rapprochement, tenue à Varsovie, juin 1935,” Série 5273, 2 août 1935, 4-5, file P.V. Commission des Pro-
grammes [anciennement commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU. 
191 P.V. Conseil Administrative 1936, 6, 22-23; IBU, Twenty Years, 63-64.
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he resigned from the Nazi Party when war broke out, but the Party refused to ac-
cept his resignation. Von Boeckmann escaped into illness, an excuse that enabled 
him not to return to his desk but rather to spend his days in Bayern.192 
Germany used the IBU and its internationalist ideals strategically as instru-
ments to pursue its own targets. It was Von Boeckmann who brought such a 
strategy to the attention of Goebbels. In line with Germany’s withdrawal from 
the League, Goebbels had also wanted to leave the IBU. Von Boeckmann argued 
that strategically such a move would be undesirable. Germany would lose its ad-
vantage of participating in important frequency debates. He pointed out that the 
IBU was also a key player in program exchange. The IBU could be used to propa-
gate German culture and politics abroad. Nazi-culture could then reach areas like 
Scandinavia, the Baltic States, Hungary, Italy, and maybe even Turkey. Goebbels 
agreed that such a strategy could only benefit the propagation of Nazi-ideology.193 
In his eyes, such a move was an effective way of keeping up appearances. He posi-
tioned National-Socialism within an internationalist ideology that embraced the 
idea of sovereign nation-states. In reality he would rather use this position to gain 
support for Nazi-ideology and the destruction of internationalism from within.
Goebbels managed to greatly frustrate international activities even though Von 
Boeckmann was able to limit the damage. He ordered Von Boeckmann to cre-
ate confusion in some parts, thwart resolutions unfavorable to the Nazi regime, 
and pursue Nazi ideology via the IBU’s international programs. Von Boeckmann 
mostly impeded processes around IBU-League collaboration in propaganda 
broadcasting. These activities disturbed German transmissions of its ideology 
across borders. Sometimes Von Boeckmann disrupted negotiations on authors’ 
rights and gramophones. These discussions were part of IBU and League collabor-
ative efforts within the OCI to improve peace via broadcasting.194 Von Boeckmann 
knew the IBU would merely appoint a sub-committee to study his questions fur-
ther then continue its activities as planned. Other than mere irritations, these dis-
turbances were not too damaging. 
192 Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein,” 440.
193 Ibid., 432-433.
194 See for extensive discussions on the topic: Box 86, file Relations internationales, Collaboration avec 
la S.D.N. & l’I.I.C.I. X, 1938, IBU; File P.V. Commission des Programmes [anciennement commissions de 
Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU; LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, 
Minutes of the Nineteenth Session, held at Paris, July 16th 1937, C.I.C.I./19th Session/P.V.6&8 (Geneva: LoN, 
1937), 60-61,74; LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Twentieth 
Session, held in Geneva, July 14th, 1938, C.I.C.I./20th Session/P.V.7&9 (Geneva: LoN, 1938), 57-60, 85-89; 
C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R.1-C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R.6, LoN; C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.1- C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.3, LoN; Registry 
file 5B, box R-3999, file 33583/1658, file 34534/1658, LoN. 
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The IBU did not passively watch RRG destroy all its propaganda activities. Von 
Boeckmann could easily refuse to conclude bilateral agreements with other coun-
tries on the illicit use of propaganda.195 He simply never followed up on any of their 
requests.196 He could less easily ruin the IBU’s work in relation to international 
conventions. In 1936 Von Boeckmann tried to exclude the IBU from intervening 
in propaganda affairs even further. Vatican Radio had reopened the discussion. 
It proposed integrating the 1936 convention into the IBU Statutes.197 This would 
lead to RRG’s isolation in the IBU and from international relations at large. The 
question could best be dealt with in private meetings with the IBU president. Von 
Boeckmann objected to the idea on the basis of the 1934 Agreement that stated the 
IBU would not deal with politically charged questions. Although Vatican Radio 
withdrew its proposal in response, several IBU members regretted accepting the 
1934 agreement. The BBC requested a revision. The Council reaffirmed that the 
IBU did not deal with politics, but decided that Burrows could attend the 1936 
Conference in Paris as observer.198 
This decision might be viewed as a first attempt to maneuver away from na-
tionalist domination of discussions related to propaganda broadcasting. On behalf 
of the IBU, Burrows and legal director Sourek continued to attend expert meet-
ings on broadcasting organized by the OCI. Burrows even took part in an advi-
sory role, something the 1934 resolution had prohibited.199 Moreover, Raested and 
Sourek remained involved in the drafting of the final 1936 convention. The IBU 
Council had encouraged its members to infiltrate their governmental delegations 
which were to draft the convention.200 The IBU stepped up its activities to counter 
internally flourishing nationalist ideals via its normal and alternative routes.
Over the years, the Nazi Party not only used the IBU for its own ends. Schwipps 
suggests that the same thing happened the other way around. Von Boeckmann 
managed to counter some of these National-Socialist attempts to disturb the IBU’s 
195 Alexander J. Mackenzie, Propaganda Boom (London: J. Gifford, 1938).
196 Both Sourek of the Czech Radiojournal authorized by his Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Edouard 
Beñez and Oscar Czeija of Austria Ravag made a proposal for a bilateral agreement with RRG along lines 
similar to the 1931 German-Polish Agreement. Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein,” 435-436.
197 IBU, “Conférence mondiale sur la radiodiffusion et la paix à Genève – 1936, Lettre reçue de la sta-
tion de radiodiffusion de la Cité du Vatican,” Série 5931, 17 juin 1936, CA Documents Series, IBU.
198 Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein,” 437-438. These quarrels seem to have remained 
outside the minutes of the IBU Council and Rapprochement Committee. The IBU does examine its pos-
sibilities for activities at the meeting in Paris. See: P.V. Conseil Administrative 1936, 39, 64. 
199 SdN, Organisation de Coopération Intellectuelle, Comité d’Experts chargé d’élaborer des suggestions 
concernant l’utilisation de la radiodiffusion dans l’intérêt de la paix, Procès-verbal provisoire de la deuxième 
séance, tenue à Genève, 17 juin 1938, C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.1-C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.2, box 86, file Relations 
Innternationales, Collaboration avec la S.D.N. & l’I.I.C.I., X, 1938, IBU. 
200 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1936, 58-59.
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Figure 5.5 – IBU’s visit to RRG in 1936
Source: Box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
international peace-related activities. Von Boeckmann addressed relatively un-
important issues and managed to promote international peace-related efforts to 
Goebbels as National Socialist activities.201 Though the IBU initially kept a close 
eye on Von Boekmann, Schwippes concludes that over the years, the European 
broadcasting community accepted him as one of their own. After the war, IBU 
general director H.W. Glogg apparently referred to him as a man who guarded 
201 Schwipps suggests this, and the IBU archives seem to support this view. The personal archives of 
Von Boeckmann should confirm this more strongly. They can be found at the Bayerischer Rundfunk 
Historisches Archiv, Bestand NL/20 Nachlass Kurt von Boeckmann 1885-1950. 
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ideals of rapprochement and peace, and “suffered from…a world view with which 
he could not identify.”202 Von Boeckmann could not however stop National-
Socialism attacking the internationalist ideals of the IBU from within.
In the course of the 1930s, the IBU became less effective in realizing its inter-
nationalist ideals. The IBU was not a static entity. As an “a-political” organization, 
the IBU could not refuse membership to the National-Socialist RRG, nor interfere 
in broadcasting wars like the German-Austrian or Spanish ones. It could not even 
ignore Germany as a venue for a meeting in 1937 (Figure 5.2). Moreover, the role 
of individual experts in reacting to changes in war and peace-related activities ap-
pears to have been incredibly important. IBU’s claim of being an organization that 
did not meddle in political affairs and its open organizational structure made it an 
increasingly vulnerable organization. In a world of strong international tensions, 
the IBU proved less effective than it would have liked.
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored broadcasting construction in the context of war and 
peace. In an internationally unstable situation, broadcasters tried to cement their 
first steps towards a transnational system. They envisioned and constructed a 
medium that in the eyes of the dominant elites was exemplary for low culture 
and segregation between people, and could easily be used for illicit propaganda 
across borders. The opinion of the elites and state officials was important to the 
broadcasting community, because these people influenced nation-state broadcast-
ing policies, and tried to reconstruct Europe after the war. IBU promoters needed 
their collaboration in order to transform recommendations into legally binding 
agreements. 
The IBU community rejected the use of broadcasting for illicit propaganda. In 
their eyes, illicit propaganda was the broadcasting of national programs directed 
towards the construction of national unification, causing political and ideological 
tensions across the border. These programs disturbed the IBU’s efforts to build a 
European broadcasting network of national stations. Over the years, the IBU pur-
sued preventive measures to counteract illicit propaganda. It also pushed for cor-
rect use of the medium which would help to build peace in Europe. Propaganda 
was not necessarily bad, as long as it was used for the benefit of all. To pursue its 
aim, the IBU sought integration into the European intellectual elite community 
202 “…der persönlich unter dem zunehmenden Druck der Nationalsozialismus litt, mit dessem Weltan-
schauung er sich nicht indentifizieren konnte.” Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein,” 440-441.
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as represented by the OCI. However, by the time these two organizations had es-
tablished a good understanding, strained international relations interrupted their 
efforts. 
In this context, the IBU increasingly became a victim of its own policy of de-
politicization. Pressed by some of its members, the IBU decided to step down its 
efforts to regulate propaganda. It increasingly placed the regulation of propaganda 
broadcasting in the hands of the League’s OCI, who pursued and designed the 
efforts amid quickly growing international tension. Consequently, the IBU had 
fewer tools to pursue its broader internationalist ideals, in particular fostering 
peace.
Over the years, fear of war and hope for peace affected the IBU’s broadcasting 
efforts. Discussions on the standardization of propaganda broadcasting show that 
most of these projects were in line with plans for a global society. The IBU com-
munity did not concentrate on building a European society. During the various 
design processes they rather spoke the language of the internationalist movements 
focusing on international, national, local, civilization, and ethnic questions. Such 
discourse served the integration of the national into the international and vice 
versa. As a result, nationalist sentiments would become detached from warfare 
and coupled to ideas of peace and prosperity. Although Europe as a project did not 
feature in these discussions, broader visions of European civilization and culture 
formed the backdrop for the broadcasting expert community’s global visions. 
The change in who regulated propaganda might have reinforced the global di-
mension of the transnational discussions on standardizing propaganda broadcast-
ing. Just like the League, the OCI pursued a global rather than a European pro-
gram. The internationality of the program became even more pronounced when 
the OCI, anticipating increasing European tensions, hired more and more non-
European members for its committee. The idea of propagating peace via broad-
casting was a global aim.
Contrary to the IBU, both National Socialism and Russian Bolshevism began 
to exploit the European theme more prominently in their broadcasting projects 
in the 1930s. To the Nazi Party and to Stalinist Russia, the idea of a peaceful and 
united Europe served as a kind of Trojan Horse that would have to win over as 
many souls as possible for their true ideals. Although they employed similar rheto-
ric to the European broadcasting community, their ideas for European peace and 
prosperity rather served as a stepping stone towards an integrated third Reich and 
a Socialist world without borders. 
TEHS7_handels.indd   233 5/9/2012   3:41:27 PM
234 Europe – On Air
Governments’ role in propaganda broadcasting was considerable and they 
were inclined to mainly use the medium for domestic nationalist purposes. 
Consequently, broadcasting propaganda systems in Europe increasingly projected 
a Europe of national differences, stressing the dominance of some nations and the 
inferiority of others. At the same time, regulations on propaganda broadcasting 
increasingly found their way into international and national laws. These created an 
international world of nation states that peacefully co-existed and understood one 
another based on civilized European behavior. The intellectual elites in the OCI, 
the IBU, and governments worldwide tried to balance their interests and plans 
against a backdrop of greatly changing international relations. The outbreak of 
war brought all this international regulation of propaganda broadcasting to a halt.
To Goebbels the IBU was a potentially interesting tool for his propaganda 
efforts. He desired to “integrate” the National-Socialist RRG into the European 
broadcasting community because these were the people who discussed the day-
to-day content. Over the years, broadcasters and related stakeholders became 
increasingly aware of the fact that the medium could diffuse and change ideas, 
culture, and opinion via international programs and program exchange. The fol-
lowing chapter focuses on the programming side of broadcasting where visions of 
European culture were negotiated.
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Chapter 6  
Broadcasting a Musical Culture
My own idea…– of which I have been fully conscious since I found myself as a composer – is brotherhood 
of peoples, brotherhood in spite of all wars and conflict. I try – to the best of my ability – to serve this 
idea in my music; therefore I don’t reject any influence, be it Slovak, Romanian, Arabic, or from any other 
source. The source must only be clean, fresh and healthy! 1
Béla Bartók (1881-1945) wrote these words on January 10, 1931 in a letter to the 
Rumanian diplomat and music historian Octavian Beu. Bartók was an interna-
tionally renowned Hungarian composer, pianist, and ethnomusicologist. He was 
a man with a vision. He had an idea of what society should look like and thought 
this could be created via cultural expression like music. In his eyes, culture lay at 
the heart of society. Bartók recalled how his visions were born in a bar in 1904 
when he heard a Transylvanian-born barmaid singing. He immediately commit-
ted the song to paper. “Now I have a new plan: to collect the finest Hungarian 
folksongs and raise them, adding the best possible piano accompaniments, to the 
level of art-song.”2 In his letter to Beu, Bartók explicitly promoted the integration 
of original, and therefore “clean, fresh, and healthy” influences of ethnic groups, be 
they “Slovak, Romanian, Arabic, or from any other source” into musical composi-
tions. In his view, ethno-music and folk music in particular, should be part and 
parcel of the national canon, the national musical heritage. 
With such modernist views on music, Bartók distanced himself from the ma-
jority of composers in small countries who had created a single style national mu-
sical canon.3 Ideals and visions influenced music. As soon as a market developed 
1 János Demény, ed., “Bartók to Octavian Beu, January 10, 1931,” in Béla Bartók: Letters (London; 
Budapest: Faber and Faber Ltd.; Corvina Press, 1971), 201.
2 Malcolm Gillies, “Bartók, Béla,” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online, n.d., http://www.oxfordmu-
siconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40686pg3. Accessed July 1, 2009; “Notice sur le programme 
du concert européen hongrois, Budapest, le 4 novembre 1933,” Série 3871, oct. 1933, 5, box 85, Concerts 
européens [subdivisé par pays], IBU.
3 Modernism in music refers to the development of new experimental forms of music which devel-
oped during the first half of the twentieth century. In between 1910-1945 there developed several styles 
within modernism like futurism, expressionism and impressionism. Composers like Stravinsky and Bartók 
formed a category all by themselves since they had gained inspiration from almost all periods in western 
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for music in Europe in the course of the nineteenth century, these visions dif-
fused further and faster. Composers in several countries, as in Bartok’s mother-
land Hungary, had aimed to produce specific styles of music that best reflected 
their nation. As such, they developed very particular cultures of listening to and 
experiencing music. Single style musical canons formed the ultimate expression 
of national culture. They were a means of “catching up, of being among the most 
‘civilized’ nations, and of acquiring power in fields other than opera or music.”4 
Modernist compositions such as the works of Bartók, Leoš Janaček in the Czech 
lands or Karol Szymanowski in Poland actually destroyed such national canons 
from within since they progressively took account of ethnic diversity.5 The visions 
on musical culture varied so much between modernist composers like Bartók and 
the majority of the composers in their countries, that a man like Bartók temporar-
ily withdrew from public musical life in Hungary in 1912. 
music history, including folk music. For a discussion of modernism in music see: Leon Botstein, “Modern-
ism,” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online, n.d., http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com:80/subscriber/
article/grove/music/40625. Accessed September 5, 2011. 
4 Philipp Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” in The Oxford 
Handbook to the New Cultural History of Music, ed. Jane Fulcher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
198.
5 Ther, “The Genre of National Opera,” 197; Gillies, “Bartók, Béla.”
Figure 6.1 – Yugoslavian folk dance music
Source: “Ein glückliges neues Jahr 3.1.1937,” box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of 
the European Broadcasting Union.
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Internationally, his visions and his music found more resonance. Bartók trav-
eled Europe and the United States where he gave concerts and participated in live 
broadcasts.6 Moreover, Bartók wrote his words to Beu exactly three days before 
he started work as a member of the Committee of Letters & Arts, one of the sub-
committees of the League’s International Institute on Intellectual Co-Operation 
(OCI).7 In his letter, he positioned his interests beyond the nation-state into the 
heart of the ideals of the international cultural community and that of the League 
of Nations. He told Beu, that to the best of his abilities, he would try to serve the 
“brotherhood of peoples, brotherhood in spite of all wars and conflict.” Bartók 
could now pursue his plans via his work on the Committee of Letters & Arts. 
Bartók not only radically changed music itself, he also performed live before the 
microphone in many countries, and participated actively in defining international 
cultural standards for broadcasting. Bartók therefore changed Europe’s musical 
culture in many ways: through his music and his performance, as well as his inter-
national activities in international organizations. 
The example of Bartók shows that there were people who actively changed cul-
ture and related visions of society via musical compositions or international cul-
tural standards. Broadcasting developed at a time when a culture for music already 
existed in Europe, but where a tradition of listening to broadcasting was absent. 
By the turn of the century, listening to music had become a social experience that 
happened in one place, in a theater or at home, where people listened attentively 
to live performances or gramophone records together. As soon as broadcasters 
started to make programs, they found out that their medium did not fit these ex-
isting “standards,” these existing cultures of listening. In these early years, listen-
ing to the radio was not a social event that people could experience together for 
an evening in a place like a concert hall. As Bartók had done when integrating 
folk rhymes into what he called “art songs,” broadcasting experts tried to redefine 
music itself, adapting the music, the message, to their medium.8 By resolving the 
problem of discontinuity in listening traditions, broadcasting experts specifically 
aimed to renegotiate culture, the heart of civilization, of society, in a way they 
considered appropriate.
6 In 1923 and 1925 Bartók traveled from Czechoslovakia to the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland. In 
1929 he made a grand tour of three weeks in the Soviet Union, followed by a series of concerts in Switzer-
land, Denmark, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and Hungary. Gillies, “Bartók, 
Béla”; Malcolm Gillies, Bartók Remembered (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1990), 102-103, 225.
7 Though he would continue to hold this position for about five years, it is barely discussed in existing 
literature on his life and work. Gillies, “Bartók, Béla”; Gillies, Bartók Remembered; Kenneth Chalmers, Béla 
Bartók (London: Phaidon Press Ltd, 1995).
8 Brian Currid, A National Acoustics: Music and Mass Publicity in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 119-120.
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This chapter looks at the day-to-day programming side of broadcasting where 
visions of European culture were negotiated. In practice it was a continual process 
of trial and error. The question “What was a good program?” dominated policy ne-
gotiations until the outbreak of World War II and would remain unresolved. This 
chapter begins by showing how the IBU, the OCI, and the international cultural 
elite envisioned a different role for broadcasting in the creation of a European 
musical culture. They established a loosely coupled collaboration, but differed in 
opinion as to who was responsible for the content of these programs. They desired 
to create international programs and exchange. To make these programs a reality, 
experts had to resolve a number of issues. These included a lack of music supply 
for broadcasting, the technical and organizational construction of a social expe-
rience via live programs, as well as a suitable repertoire for broadcasting music. 
Through these efforts, they envisioned and shaped a European society, and with 
that a European identity.
A Cultural Policy for a New Medium
One pre-requisite was a suitable framework for programming. A cultural policy 
for broadcasting would establish an international program tradition that was ab-
sent. The IBU, OCI and international cultural elite built on their experience with 
the theater and the gramophone record. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
musical elites, artistic affiliations, traveling musical theater, and the opera had 
shaped listening cultures across borders in Europe.9 A core characteristic of these 
cultures was that listening to music had become a social experience. Broadcasting 
experts and intellectual elite alike considered such social experience a bench mark 
for broadcasting programs. They nevertheless had diverging opinions about the 
role that broadcasting should have in society-building. Moreover, they did not 
agree on what “quality” actually meant in this respect. International cultural elites 
in general considerably valued the impact of what they called “art music” on iden-
tity building. Yet, it would be 1931 before the OCI evaluated the influence of music 
and broadcasting on unification efforts in a positive light.10 
9 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Philipp Ther, Europe and Beyond: Transfers, Networks and Markets for 
Musical Theatre in Modern Europe, 1740-1960, Project proposal (Florence: European University Institute, 
2008). The ongoing research program “Europe and Beyond: Transfers, Networks and Markets for Musical 
Theatre in Modern Europe, 1740-1960” is based at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The 
research is supervised by Prof. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and coordinated by Prof. PhilippTher. The program 
links a large number of cultural research institutes from all over Europe.
10 “Radiodiffusion éducative: Collaboration avec la S.D.N., Rapporteur A.R. Burrows,” Série 2796, 25 
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Broadcasting experts did not hesitate to take up the challenge. They felt they 
could create a social experience among listeners through broadcasting programs. 
Forming a cultural policy accordingly proved no easy task. Broadcasting did not 
automatically create the kind of musical experience with which people were famil-
iar. Its technical peculiarities required a different approach. This envisioned social 
experience would immediately impact on the kind of society that was communi-
cated and shaped via programs. In creating their cultural policy, broadcasters in 
fact actively and “hidden” from official government-related activities, worked on 
what could be defined as a “hidden” cultural unification of society. 
IBU Council members discussed the problem at their first meetings already. 
They agreed that on admission, all members would have to agree to the “principle 
of cultural collaboration.”11 This was a commitment to exchange knowledge and 
technical information on programming. Moreover, members committed to help-
ing forward IBU’s ideal of international fellowship in the cultural area of program-
ming, suppressing all possible causes for friction.12 As such, the IBU directly related 
its programming activities to internationalist ideas of peace, understanding, and 
collaboration as pursued by the League of Nations. However, an IBU request to the 
League to collaborate on the issue did not find any resonance. Notwithstanding, 
in 1926 the IBU established the Committee on Intellectual, Social, and Artistic 
Rapprochement (from now on referred to as the Rapprochement Committee) to 
deal with this issue. The principle and the Rapprochement Committee provided 
the IBU with a practical means of giving cultural expression as it saw fit to these 
ideals. 
The committee’s core activity was to bring these visions into peoples’ homes 
and educate their minds. To do so, the Rapprochement Committee constructed 
an extensive cross-border exchange of programs and an extensive supply of what 
it called international programs. People would have to have a social experience 
when they listened to broadcasting. They would have to feel part of a society built 
on internationalist values by getting acquainted with the music of other countries. 
The realization of such a sense of belonging and mutual interdependency was not 
sept. 1931, 4, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section de Coopération Intellectuelle, Général, 1927-1932, 
IBU. For an exposé on German identity formation via music see: Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, eds., 
Music and German National Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). For an exposé on Ger-
man identity formation and broadcasting programs see: Currid, A National Acoustics.
11 “Procès-verbal de la Commission de rapprochement, intellectuel, artistique et social tenue à 
Ouchy,” Série 567, 17 juin 1927, 3, file P.V. Commission des Programmes [anciennement commissions de 
Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU. 
12 Antoine Dubois, “L’Activité de la radiodiffusion internationale dans le domaine du rapprochement,” 
Radiodiffusion, no. 1 (1935): 42; IBU, Twenty Years of Activity of the International Broadcasting Union 
(Geneva: IBU, 1945), 32.
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easy to accomplish via a medium like broadcasting. Listeners did not gather in 
public places like a theater to take part in a communal experience using all their 
senses. People listened in the privacy of their homes, initially via headsets, later via 
loudspeakers. It was far more difficult to create an international feeling of unity 
in an area as large as Europe and where such huge numbers of ethnicities lived 
alongside each other. An extensive international exchange and supply of live cross-
border programs would increase the amount of foreign music in broadcasts. In the 
eyes of the IBU, these activities would allow people to have the necessary commu-
nal experience via their radio sets. 
The committee members did not agree about the kind of communal experi-
ence programs should express. Whereas some stressed the importance of actuality 
or entertainment, others stressed the need for educating the public and cultivating 
their tastes and visions of society. The committee for instance discussed writing 
radio drama and radio theater in 1929.13 Several members felt that such plays 
should not focus on somber topics. Radio plays should lift listeners’ tastes and 
educate their minds. Apparently, these discussants considered “the uplifting of 
tastes” and “avoidance of somber aspects of life” in radio plays to be ingredients for 
building joie de vivre among listeners. Others nevertheless argued that these plays 
should deal with all aspects of life.14 Only by providing a full picture would people’s 
minds be truly educated, they found. Although their ideas for a “suitable” pro-
gram format differed, the committee members generally agreed that broadcasting 
served the education of society. Tastes would be raised, creating an international 
society based on peace and understanding. 
Regarding international programs, the IBU particularly valued the idea of air-
ing “live” events. It built on previous developments in the United States where 
broadcasters found airing so-called “live” programs an excellent way of giving lis-
teners the impression of participating in a communal live experience. The trans-
mission of live talent offered listeners a unique listening experience that they could 
not have elsewhere, neither by listening to records nor tuning into the channels 
of their competitors. Airing live talent in the United States had quickly become 
a quality standard for broadcasters. According to Michelle Hilmes, this standard 
would continue well into the 1960s.15 Although the IBU certainly valued the com-
petitive advantages and unique character of live events, it considered the cross-
border bonding effects of particular importance. Participating in a live event 
13 Since radio broadcasting by character differed from the printed arts, there was a need to rewrite 
existing plays or design new ones in order to come across clearly to audiences.
14 “Procès-verbaux de la réunion de la Commission de Rapprochement tenue à Londres, décembre 
1928,” Série 1171, 16 janvier 1929, 3-4, file P.V. Commissions des Programmes [anciennement commis-
sions de Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU.
15 Michele Hilmes, Only Connect: A Cultural History of Broadcasting in the United States (Belmont, CA: 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 43.
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became associated with high-quality broadcasting as well as communal participa-
tion in a “unique” experience.
Over the years the IBU experts designed a wide variety of programs. It started 
by coordinating series of international live programs to be organized in rotation by 
its member organizations (Table 6.1). In the course of the 1930s it would add a list 
of unique and one-off programs to the repertoire (Table 6.2). Daniel Dayan and 
Elihu Katz call such live performances “media events.”16 They state that if “festive 
viewing is to ordinary viewing what holidays are to the everyday, these events are 
the high holidays of mass communication.”17 Events that were broadcast only once 
could have a considerable impact because of their unique character. The series of 
events could impact because of their repetitiveness. This “routinization” of media 
rituals would make such events an integrated part of the lives of the listeners.18 
According to Nick Couldry, serial events each in their own way simulate mass 
participation and cement the idea that broadcasting has ritual authority. Given 
the technical and organizational limits of the time, the programs which the IBU 
designed more or less fulfilled the quality ideal of society-building.
The expertise to build such programs and resolve any problems rested with the 
program directors of the IBU member organizations. In 1927 the Rapprochement 
Committee for the first time expressed a desire to organize regular meetings be-
tween these program directors, chaired by the IBU. However, the committee im-
mediately rejected the idea due the lack of technical and organizational networks. 
Programming was mostly a national affair. The committee decided to consult its 
members when necessary, inviting the program directors to its meetings.19 There 
they exchanged knowledge, dealt with international problems resulting from differ-
ences in national approach, and discussed cross-border program exchange as well 
16 Andreas Fickers and Suzanne Lommers, “Eventing Europe: Broadcasting and the Mediated Perfor-
mances of Europe,” in Materializing Europe: Transnational Infrastructures and the Project of Europe, ed. 
Andreas Fickers and Alexander Badenoch (London: Palgrave, 2010), 225-251.
17 Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 1992), 1. The definition of media events by Dayan and Katz is generally criticized for 
being of too rigid a nature for its stress on “pre-planned and highly stereotyped forms of mediated social 
interaction.” Nick Couldry, instead wonders whether such events rather than telling something about 
social order tell us something about medial constructions of collective identities. Fickers and Lommers, 
“Eventing Europe”; Nick Couldry, Media Rituals: A Critical Approach (London; New York: Routledge, 
2003), 56. 
18 Couldry, Media Rituals, 55-74.
19 Over the years these directors regularly attended committee meetings. In 1935 the IBU decided to 
step up collaboration and organized its first meeting of program directors. “Procès-verbaux de la Com-
mission de Rapprochement: Séance du 26 septembre 1927,” Série 723, 13 oct. 1927, 7; “Procès-verbaux de 
la Réunion de la Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 2671, 7 juillet 1931, 4; “Procès-verbaux des Réu-
nions de la Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 2924, 25 nov. 1931, 1-2, “Procès-verbaux des Réunions 
de la Commission de Rapprochement tenue à Varsovie,” Série 5237, 2 août 1935, file P.V. Commissions des 
Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU. 
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as new international program formats. Consequently, forthright international col-
laboration and exchange of ideas developed between national broadcasting orga-
nizations through the intermediary of the IBU. Working in a reluctant interna-
tional climate, they shaped a cultural policy for broadcasting outside government 
legislation.
Differences in national legislation, vocabulary, and technological and orga-
nizational problems especially hindered their efforts. Several issues could not be 
dealt with beyond the realm of governmental regulation. Differences in national 
law with respect to authors’ rights, artists’ rights, and copyrights prevented an easy 
exchange of music across borders or international relay of live events. Moreover, 
radio reporters who had to travel for such programs experienced delays and prob-
lems at border control.20 In order to resolve these problems, the broadcasting ex-
pert community required the support of governments, international governmen-
tal organizations, the music industry, and the international cultural elite. 
The first signs that the cultural policy being formed would find resonance 
within a broader international community appeared in 1929. In February and 
November respectively, IIIC member Mr. Weiss and Director of the Information 
Section of the League Secretariat Mr. Pelt attended a Rapprochement Committee 
meeting.21 Shortly afterwards, with its reorganization in 1930, the League OCI put 
the medium of broadcasting and the activity of music on its agenda. 
Collaboration did not come about easily. Unlike the IBU, the OCI initially consid-
ered broadcasting an instrument for low culture expressions. Culture related ques-
tions were delicate since they directly expressed ideas of civilization, and touched 
at the heart of sentiments of identification. In their eyes, only expressions of high 
culture would be good enough to restore civilization. In response, the IBU invested 
years in building programs “with the aim of spreading the notion of radio’s useful-
ness and making the public understand that there exist certain manifestations of 
art that can unite all European listeners.”22 When the IBU convinced the OCI and 
20 LoN, Committee of Experts to draw up suggestions on the use of broadcasting. Provisional minutes, 
First meeting held on June 17th 1938, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.1, 4-5, box 86, file Relations inter-
nationales, Collaboration avec la S.D.N. & l’I.I.C.I., X, 1938, IBU.
21 “Procès-verbaux de la Commission de Rapprochement tenue à Ouchy-Lausanne,” Série 1411, 5 juin 
1929, 1; “Procès-verbaux des réunions de la Commission de Rapprochement tenue à Barcelone,” Série 
1672, 16 déc. 1929, 1, file P.V. Commissions des Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapproche-
ment et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU.
22 “dans le but de répandre l’idée de l’utilité de la radiodiffusion et de faire comprendre au public 
qu’il existe certaines manifestations de l’art qui doivent unir tous les écouteurs européens.” “Concerts 
EUROPEENS pour la saison 1931-1932, letter from Secretary General A.R. Burrows to IBU Members,” 
Série 2694, 22 July 1931, box 85, file Relais, Concerts Européens, Général 1931 à 1939, IBU.
TEHS7_handels.indd   244 5/9/2012   3:41:28 PM
 Broadcasting a Musical Culture 245
international musical elites to focus on broadcasting as a society-building instru-
ment, they were critical of IBU’s cultural policy. 
When the IBU first contacted the OCI in 1926, the OCI had little or no interest 
in focusing on music as an art form that might promote society-building practices. 
It had no committee members with a background in music. Only the sub-commit-
tee of Letters & Arts could draw on the expertise of one associate partner, Austrian 
composer, conductor, and author, Felix von Weingartner.23 His background was 
philosophy and he had forged an international career in the classical and opera 
scene in Germany and Austria. Weingarter also frequently traveled Europe, the 
United States, and Latin America as a guest composer.24 Two years later, Letters 
& Arts could count on another associate participant with a background in music, 
the British Edward Joseph Dent. Dent was a professor of music at Cambridge who 
translated many libretti, wrote on Handel, Mozart, and several English operas.25 If 
the occasion required, the committees representing other fields like literature and 
the sciences could consult Von Weingartner and Dent.
Applegate and Potter show that those who wrote about and debated music – 
musicians like Weingartner and Dent, but also writers, thinkers, statesmen and 
educators – were able to shape identity through music. Discussions about unity 
in taste and the effects of literary matters would “eventually spill over into musical 
matters.”26 This is exactly what happened in the OCI. Internationally renowned 
writers, thinkers, scientists, and educators joined hands in developing interna-
tional consciousness, peace, and understanding. In light of reorganization, the 
Committee of Letters & Arts successfully advised that the OCI “should endeavour 
to extend its activities in the sphere of artistic relations by dealing with music as it 
has hitherto done with the plastic arts.”27 The issue of music now followed previous 
and ongoing international discussions on literature and the plastic arts.
It was at this point on January 13, 1931 that Béla Bartók joined the now per-
manent Committee of Letters & Arts for about five years. His joining coincided 
with the moment music and radio broadcasting were placed on the OCI agenda. 
23 Associate partners were not an official committee member, but could be consulted if the occasion 
required. LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation. Minutes of the Eighth Session, held at 
Geneva, July 26th-29th, 1926, LoN doc. ser., C.462.M.181.1926.XII (Geneva: LoN, Aug. 1926), 5.
24 Edler von Münzberg, “Weingartner, (Paul) Felix,” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online, n.d., 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com:80/subscriber/article/grove/music/30042. Accessed April 21, 2011.
25 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation. Minutes of the Tenth Session, held at 
Geneva, July 25th-30th, 1928, LoN doc. ser., C.533.M.160.1928.XII (Geneva: LoN, Oct. 1928), 7.
26 Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter, “Germans as the ‘People of Music’: Genealogy of an Identity,” in 
Music and German National Identity, ed. Celia Applegate and Pamela Potter (Chicago; London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002), 3.
27 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation. Minutes of the Eleventh Session, held at 
Geneva, July 2nd-26th, 1929, LoN doc. ser., C.342.M.121.1929.XII (Geneva: LoN, Sept. 1929), 99.
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The OCI, and in particular its Committee of Letters & Arts, started to value music 
as an important means of achieving the aims of the League. An interesting point 
to note is that Bartók had a clearly more modernist and progressive view of music 
than the associate advisor of the initial ICIC, Weingartner. Whereas Bartók was 
despised by the Hungarian elites for his progressive and inclusive compositions, 
Weingartner has only been scarcely associated with progressive schools of music. 
He is remembered as “one of the most eminent classical conductors of his day,” 
and known “for the lack of exaggeration in his interpretations.”28 Bartók’s progres-
sive and modernist view of the use of music and broadcasting as instruments of 
society-building gave a new impetus to international efforts in the field. During 
his years with Letters & Arts, this committee would define how to influence the 
IBU’s cultural policy efforts, in particular its programming activities. 
Immediately after the reorganization of the OCI, well-known Czech author Karel 
Čapek proposed putting the creation of international broadcasting programs on the 
committee agenda. Čapek valued the possibilities of the medium for achieving mu-
tual understanding. It could acquaint the public with the musical choices of differ-
ent peoples. In his view, the OCI should study “the means to establish international 
radio broadcasting programs responding to this intention” in collaboration with 
the IBU and other interested organizations.29 The committee decided to send the 
IBU a questionnaire to get a feel for its efforts and plans for musical repertoires and 
international programs. Part of the questionnaire focused on the kind of musical 
repertoire, while another part dealt with the practical organization and distribution 
of music. The questionnaire, subsequent exploratory studies, and discussions on the 
use of broadcasting for illicit propaganda (as discussed in Chapter 5), informed the 
OCI on the state-of-the-art of broadcasting policies. The OCI seriously studied the 
relationship between broadcasting programs and shaping society.
Shortly after a first in-depth study in 1933, the OCI and members of the musi-
cal elite reasoned that previous and ongoing international program efforts fell short 
in communicating the aims of the League. In 1934, head of the committee, Gilbert 
Murray, pleaded for intellectuals to have more influence over those broadcasting ex-
perts involved in designing broadcasting programs.30 Moreover, a 1935 OCI study, in 
28 Weingartner seems to have had a relatively traditional view on music and therefore seems to have 
contributed to single style musical canons. It remains unclear what his visions on the relation between 
music and broadcasting technology was. In any case he had an interest in recording his music. Von Münz-
berg, “Weingartner, (Paul) Felix.” Accessed April 21, 2011.
29 “les moyens de faire établir des programmes internationaux de radiodiffusion répondant à ce dessein.” 
“Radiodiffusion éducative,” 5, Série 2796, box 92, file Société des Nations, Coopération Intellectuelle, IBU.
30 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Sixteenth Session, held at 
Geneva, July 17th, 1934, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./16th session/P.V.4, 9. 
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collaboration with external experts, concluded negatively on ongoing efforts. These 
efforts fell short in educating and raising the public’s cultural and civilized world 
view. One external expert was Franz Wilhelm Beidler-Wagner, doctor of letters and 
grandson of the master Richard Wagner. He had extensive knowledge of musicology. 
In his view, the current transmission of music via broadcasting was “already to some 
extent, condemned to remain deficient.”31 He recognized that broadcasting due to 
its technical nature could not transmit music in exactly the same way as people had 
known before. The ultimate specifics of the adaptations, he concluded mercilessly, 
had made the transmitted music of an inferior and popular quality. 
Rather than rejecting the medium altogether, Beidler-Wagner suggested that 
musicians and the international cultural elite should still embrace the medium. 
They could employ it to promote their music, and open up their high art music to 
the masses. This would not only overcome their artistic isolation, but also bring 
the medium to a higher level. As such, they would resolve the existing problems 
with the medium.32 Beidler-Wagner thus argued in favor of a growing influence of 
the musical elites in order to raise the content-side of program formats for broad-
casting to a higher level.
Director of the OCI Institute Henri Bonnet, shared Beidler-Wagner’s opinion. 
He felt that the IBU’s ongoing efforts were too shallow. They required additional 
input of intellectual material, and the organization was inadequate. Their prepara-
tion times were too long and should be replaced by new mechanisms. Only then 
could one start to think about suitable types of programs. These could be com-
memorations of exceptional events, speeches that gave national perspectives on 
international matters, daily radio reports, as well as the regular exchange of pro-
grams on peoples’ lives. Bonnet particularly valued the concept of broadcasting 
as a medium that aired live and current affairs, foreseeing that these would have 
an important impact on identity formation.33 Such broadcasts would educate the 
public by uplifting their musical tastes and their awareness of international events. 
Bonnet argued that the broadcasting community should be aided by the intellec-
tual elite to resolve the issue of low quality programs.
Bonnet envisioned a new central program committee. This could streamline 
the international coordination of programs, and improve their intellectual content 
more in line with the League’s aims. In order to be effective, the committee would 
31 “se trouve déjà, dans une certain mésure, condamné à démeurer deficiente.” F.W. Beidler-Wagner et 
al., Le rôle intellectuel et éducatif de la radiodiffusion, Cahiers, 2 (Paris: Institut International de Coopéra-
tion Intellectuelle, 1935), 215; Dieter Borchmeyer, Drama and the World of Richard Wagner (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 329.
32 Beidler-Wagner et al., Le rôle intellectuel et éducatif de la radiodiffusion, 210-215.
33 Ibid., 273, 275-276, 283-287.
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require a firm national basis. Where bilateral agreements were already in place, 
these could form the basis for international collaboration, Bonnet believed.34 
Nonetheless, each country should have its own program committee consisting of 
qualified representatives outside broadcasting like the social services, intellectual 
and artistic institutions, the press, and user organizations. Together with techni-
cians, these program groups would have to unite internationally and construct 
international programs that crossed borders. Although technical knowledge was 
necessary for their success, the intellectual elites should be responsible for content. 
Countries could speak to one another directly by means of programs in order to 
get to know, to understand, and to respect each other. What better route to pursue 
than music, which was a source of infinite joy, and provided the occasion for com-
munication because of its universal language?35 
Bonnet and Beidler-Wagner’s plans reveal a shift in thought among the inter-
national intellectual elite. Gradually a sense of awareness emerged of the role that 
music and the medium of broadcasting could play in shaping society across bor-
ders. Although Beidler-Wagner was more reserved than Bonnet, they both under-
stood that they could influence content and turn broadcasting into a medium that 
propagated their visions of society. What is more, Bonnet envisioned the use of 
such a medium and art to be an interaction between transnational developments 
without interfering with the sovereignty of national cultures. 
The OCI’s plan to streamline international programs immediately caused fric-
tion with the IBU. Bonnet had wondered whether an international committee would 
be a suitable foundation for giving people a feeling of brotherhood, of being part of 
a thriving civilization based on a common culture of nations. Bonnet questioned 
whether the IBU would be capable of developing the international organization of 
such programs. Previous experience had shown the multiple aspects one had to deal 
with internationally before an effective organization of international live programs 
could be put in place.36 The IBU felt offended. It had invested years in creating a type 
of program that corresponded to its ideals and those of international society in a 
proper manner. Their content had even been completed in collaboration with insti-
tutions like national PTTs and national artistic affiliations.37 The IBU had the feeling 
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 275, 283-287.
36 Ibid., 285.
37 IBU, P.V. Conseil Adminstrative 1926, 58; “Nuits Nationales, Rapporteur A.R. Burrows, Commission 
de Rapprochement, no. 6 de l’Ordre du Jour,” Série 1152, 4 déc. 1928, box 85, file Relais, Programmes 
Nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926-1931, IBU; “Conseils pour l’organisation de nuit nationale 
allemande prevue pour le 18 décembre 1929,” Série 1530, 10 oct. 1929, 1, box 85, file Nuits Nationales 
[subdivisé par pays], 1926-1931, IBU; Fickers and Lommers, “Eventing Europe,” 231, 233.
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that the OCI was trying to take over its role as the main developer of international 
broadcasting programs after all that it had done to make the OCI understand the 
importance of the medium.38 
In the following months the IBU and the OCI managed to come to a kind of 
collaboration with which the two parties were comfortable. The issue was delicate. 
After a firm lobby, the OCI recalled that it had “never wanted to create an organ-
ism that is a kind of super state.”39 The IBU was capable of solving international 
program problems.40 The IBU and the OCI developed a loosely coupled collabora-
tion that reached beyond their institutional boundaries, including experts from 
international musical and intellectual society and PTT Administrations, as well 
as national artistic affiliations. The question remains how frequent and straight-
forward these national and local efforts were.41 Via discussion and the exchange 
of knowledge, this widely diffused transnational collaboration below, at, and also 
beyond the national level impacted on the way quality standards for broadcasting 
have evolved. 
One of the main challenges during discussions was that the IBU and intellec-
tual elites had different definitions of high quality standards in international pro-
grams. By the early 1930s they valued equally their importance for society-building, 
in particular live broadcasting of high culture music. However they defined terms 
like “high quality” and “high culture” or “high art” music in a different way. What 
exactly did “high quality” mean when it came to educating the public with suitable 
visions of society via live program events? What kind of live broadcasts should be 
created to communicate feelings of belonging? And what caliber of music was of 
high enough cultural quality to truly reflect a feeling of international brotherhood? 
Then there was still the question whether the technology would be able to realize 
this sense of communal participation, and these quality standards. The discussions 
returned regularly when broadcasting experts worked on specific problems related 
to programming.
38 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Report of the Committee on the Work of its 
Seventeenth Plenary Session, LoN doc. ser., C.290.M.154.1935.XII (Geneva: LoN, 1935), 43.
39 “…celui-ci n’ayant jamais voulu créer un organe qui soit une sorte de super-état.” IBU, P.V. Conseil 
Administrative 1936, 9.
40 Arthur R. Burrows, “Les moyens modernes de diffusion utilisés dans l’intérêt de la paix,” Radiodiffu-
sion, no. 5 (November 1937): 88.
41 The whereabouts of the practical collaboration between these institutions happened nationally and 
locally. They therefore do not surface in the archives of international organizations like the IBU or the 
League of Nations. These collaborative efforts deserve further examination.
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Solutions to “Discothèque” and Copyright Problems 
A proper music supply was lacking. It was virtually impossible for broadcasting or-
ganizations to provide round-the-clock live programs. The IBU sought a solution 
with the help of the OCI. The IBU tried to get artists to perform before the micro-
phone and examined the possibility of an audio library especially for broadcasting. 
Both efforts immediately raised problems with the record industry. The diffusion 
of music across borders also caused legal problems. The OCI recognized it needed 
to help resolve those problems because they obstructed the airing of desirable high 
quality live events. Nevertheless it felt that for expressing European culture, other af-
filiations than broadcasters would be better equipped to envision the “just” musical 
choices that best expressed society.
In order to meet the demand for music, broadcasting organizations in particular 
tried to relay live performances of concerts, artists, and events. Over the years, they 
encountered considerable difficulty in attracting artists of worldwide fame to per-
form live. Many artists were accustomed to working with gramophone reproducers 
and hesitated to participate in live broadcasts.42 In 1926 Austrian Ravag for instance 
complained to the IBU. The organization had tried to relay a live opera from the 
Viennese Opera house to its audiences, but failed. The main opera singer contracted 
by the Viennese Opera for the evening, Mrs. Jeritza, refused to sing before the mi-
crophone that Austrian Ravag had installed in the theater. It transpired she had an 
American gramophone company contract that contained a clause stating that she 
could not participate in radiotelephony transmissions.43 The record industry feared 
that listeners at home would record such live performances of artists whom they had 
contracted. Such home recordings would reduce their profits. They preferred their 
artists to abstain from broadcasting performances. 
With an unparalleled growth in demand for music and a reluctance among musi-
cal artists to participate in broadcasting, the IBU envisioned a central musical library 
under the auspices of the IBU in Geneva. It imagined becoming a clearing house for 
music suitable for broadcasting. Such a central library should contain as complete 
a collection as possible of all the finest national music of its members. This should 
also include recordings of live concerts, of specific musical tunes as well as of entire 
broadcasting programs. The IBU would make and then distribute complete lists of 
the musical collection to its members, giving them a clear indication of the readily 
42 IBU, Union Internationale de Radiophonie (Geneva: IBU, 1926), 16.
43 “Commission juridique et Commission intellectuelle, artistique & social. Opposition des companies 
des gramophones aux radiodiffusions. Exposé,” 3 juillet 1926, 1, box 32, file Gramophones. Le dossier 
général I, à 1933, IBU.
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available musical repertoire. In February 1929 the IBU Council decided the idea 
would be too comprehensive and too costly.44 High customs-duties that were levied 
on records imported to Geneva as well as their re-dispatch at a later date would not 
only incur high expenses but also cause considerable delay. An international library 
containing a collection that was the sum total of the finest of national musical heri-
tages in Europe was a practical impossibility.
An exchange of music organized between broadcasting organizations would be 
more beneficial.45 Each would have to create its own library consisting of as com-
plete a collection of national music as possible. It should contain “songs, melodies, 
national and popular dance music in the form of sheet music, phonograph cylin-
ders, and mechanical reproduction of vocal and instrumental performances from 
their own respective countries.”46 Members would then have to keep adequate lists 
of the recordings and send these to the IBU on a regular monthly basis.47 The IBU 
44 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1929, 180.
45 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.1, 19. 
46 “chants, melodies et danses populaires et nationales sous forme de partitions, cylindres phonogra-
phiques, reproduction mécaniques d’exécutions instrumentales ou vocales propres à leurs pays respectifs.” 
“Procès-verbaux de la réunion de la Commission de Rapprochement,”  Série 1171, 10, file P.V. Commis-
sions des Programmes, IBU. 
47 “First list of records which members have ready to place at the disposal of other members of the 
Figure 6.2 – Audio archives of the RRG, Germany, 1936
Source: Box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
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in turn would redistribute the lists to all its members. In 1932 the IBU added that 
the actual exchange of records based on the distributed lists could take place bilat-
erally between members. In addition members should maintain and continue to 
complete their library collections. Over the years, these libraries would then provide 
an invaluable amount of added value to broadcasting.48 In spite of the decentralized 
organization of these audio libraries, the central distribution of the lists resulted in 
an intense cross-border exchange of recordings.
Both the employment of artists in front of the microphone as well as this in-
tense cross-border exchange forced broadcasters to deal with the established re-
cord industry. Rather than buying the gramophone records, people everywhere 
in Europe could now listen to the recordings for free. As a consequence, manu-
facturers, merchants, and hagglers (in particular composers and editors) tried to 
hamper the easy transmission of art music over the radio, and as such hampered 
the exchange of music or musical programs between broadcasters. Moreover, the 
record industry’s national legislation was not necessarily the same in every coun-
try. Whereas these activities had caused legal problems within borders already, the 
cross border exchange and transmission of live events further complicated mat-
ters. Both the IBU and the international musical elites considered such a state of 
affairs problematic and disadvantageous to their interests. Musicians and artists 
were hindered in using the medium to promote their work, and the record indus-
try regularly accused broadcasters of illegally using recorded music. On several 
occasions the industry even took legal steps to secure its economic interests.49
Initially the broadcasting organizations established relatively positive contacts 
with the record industry. They agreed to specify in their program guides the par-
ticulars of the recorded music by showing the name and reference number of the 
gramophone record. This meant listeners could easily trace the music and know 
where to buy it. Initially, the increase in sales of recordings went hand in hand 
with the broadcasting of these recordings. According to the IBU, matters were ar-
ranged to the satisfaction of all parties in spite of occasional accusations. By the 
early 1930s nonetheless, relations with the record industry deteriorated rapidly. 
In the eyes of IBU legal director Sourek, the general economic crisis had caused a 
devastating drop in record sales. The record industry however, argued differently. 
It claimed that the frequent broadcasting of their recordings had made the public 
stop buying the records.50 
Union,” Série 7476, July 1932, CA Document Series, IBU.
48 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1938, 228.
49 Beidler-Wagner et al., Le rôle intellectuel et éducatif de la radiodiffusion, 211.
50 “Revendications des sociétés de gramophone en europe centrale, Rapporteur: Mr. le Dr. Sourek,” 
Série 3193, 26 mai 1932, 1, box, 32, file La radio et l’Industrie du disque, IBU. 
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The IBU tried to resolve the friction with the music industry and with artists. 
It stimulated the fine-tuning of national legislation across borders for copyright, 
authors’ rights, artists’ rights, and performers’ rights. In this way it was trying to 
resolve border problems and at the same time protect artists and authors against 
the illicit reproduction of their work. The IBU wanted to show artists that despite 
their agreements with editors, they could freely accept radio work. Their partici-
pation, whether live or recorded, should be protected internationally “against the 
commercial use of broadcasts transmission of recordings and the right to broad-
cast recorded works.”51 To this end, the IBU prohibited its members from using 
recordings for other than the principle of cultural collaboration, assuring the re-
cord industry that their records would not be used for commercial purposes.52 Its 
moral codes could prevent irregularities between the record industry, editors, and 
broadcasting organizations. Over the years, international companies demanded 
large sums of money from the broadcasting organizations in their own countries. 
Already in 1932 a French company started to print on its records “radio broadcast-
ing prohibited.”53
A Committee of Letters & Arts proposal put forward by Bartók and Čapek cre-
ated unexpected opportunities for standardizing the international exchange and 
relaying of music. In 1931, they proposed studying international collaboration in 
collecting registered music, musique enrégistrée.54 Bartók and Čapek stressed the 
need for an extensive listing of existing national and international music as well as 
extensive documentation of these recordings. Bartók had a long history of collect-
ing recordings of “genuine” music. He had created a private library consisting of 
music recordings as well as specific folk and dance tunes, which he had recorded 
with the phonograph. In his view, a listing like this would complete what he then 
called the “actual existing collection,” nowadays known as “musical heritage.”55 
Such lists and collections would “modernize” music and inspire composers by 
provoking new musical compositions. This part of the proposal leaned heavily 
on the life and work of Bartók. However the two men also contended that such 
lists and collections would make a wide diversity of music more readily available 
51 IBU, Twenty Years, 41.
52 “Procès-verbal de la Commission de rapprochement,” Série 567, 3, file P.V. Commission des Pro-
grammes, IBU.
53 “Radiodiffusion interdite.” “La radio et l’industrie de disque,” Série 8793, 9 juin 1944, 2, box 32, file 
La radio et l’Industrie du disque, IBU. 
54 “Radiodiffusion éducative,” Série 2796, 4-5, box 92, file Société des Nations, Coopération Intellec-
tuelle, IBU.
55 Gillies, “Bartók, Béla.”
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to artistic institutions and broadcasting organizations alike. They envisioned an 
international “discothèque.”56
Both the problem and the charm of the resolution was that the proposal related 
to music beyond its use for broadcasting. The charm was that an incredible number 
of interested institutions and artistic affiliations would collaborate internationally 
in establishing an extensive and highly diversified collection of European music. 
Similar to the IBU’s audio library effort, this international “discothèque” should be 
decentralized within countries and connected via distributed lists. Local, national, 
and international artistic institutions would collaborate closely. The problem with 
this collection was that broadcasters would not be able to influence the process and 
its success would depend on whether others were willing to let them use the record-
ings. Such an international “discothèque” would only really benefit broadcasters if 
they themselves were able to influence and coordinate its collections.
Over the years the League would study in depth the plan for an international 
convention related to the recording, documentation, and cross-border exchange of 
music. The convention was a complicated idea. It meant organizing an international 
“discothèque,” as well as dealing with authors’ rights, artists’ rights, copyrights, and 
custom duties. The League formed a study group to examine the possible links be-
tween institutions in charge of sound and gramophone music along with broadcast-
ing organizations. Furthermore, the League’s Technical Committee on Economic 
and Financial questions would examine the aspect of custom duties on cross-border 
record exchange.57 The League’s efforts to create some kind of international conven-
tion in collaboration with a large number of stakeholders gave a new impetus to 
IBU’s initial dealings with the record industry. With the League directly involved, 
the chances of dealing successfully with differences in national legislation increased, 
establishing a sound basis for international live broadcasting events. 
Whereas the IBU was pleased to have governmental parties on board, it desired 
the control and security of a certain supply of music for broadcasting. The ques-
tion of broadcasting organizations’ participation was discussed. In 1938 the study 
group envisioned how to set up national documentation of recorded music. OCI 
member Laura Dreyfus-Barney, posed the question whether the national sound 
and gramophone institutions were willing to lend their material to broadcasting 
organizations in their own countries. Burrows, who had been invited to the meet-
ing, argued that years ago IBU members had already started developing their own 
56 “Bibliothèque de disques reproduissant des danses et chansons populaires (Rapporteur: A.R. Bur-
rows),” Série 3154, 19 mai 1932, 2, CA Document Series, IBU.
57 LoN, Intellectual Co-Operation Organisation, Modern Means of Spreading Information Utilised in the 
Cause of Peace, LoN doc. ser., A.19.1938.XII (Geneva: LoN, 1938), 6, box 86, file Relations internationales, 
Collaboration avec la S.D.N. & l’I.I.C.I., X, 1938, IBU.
TEHS7_handels.indd   254 5/9/2012   3:41:29 PM
 Broadcasting a Musical Culture 255
sound archives and so these were already being created. He gained the support of 
Murrow, European director of the American CBS. Murrow argued that broadcasting 
organizations would be best suited to collect musical repertoires. Already “through 
the system of exchange that had been organized, each broadcasting company could 
quite easily procure any records which it needed, but the establishment of richer and 
richer collections ought to be encouraged.”58 Their arguments did not help them. 
The final resolution favored the establishment of national sound and gramo-
phone repositories “with a view to international loans and exchange, which may 
prove to be invaluable auxiliaries to broadcasting.”59 National musical collections 
should be established separately from the broadcasting organizations’ existing 
sound archives, but be open to use for broadcasting. The League clearly desired 
that artistic affiliations and the international intellectual elite would have control 
over the creation of national musical repositories. These experts were better able to 
create and look after Europe’s musical repertoire, its musical heritage. 
The plan for an international convention did not make it through the 1930s. 
The convention had envisioned a European musical repertoire consisting of de-
centralized national collections, registrations and exchanged musical recordings. 
Heated debates on all aspects of this international exchange proceeded slowly to-
wards an agreement. They culminated in the organization of a conference to con-
clude the Berne Convention in 1939. Discussions were fruitful though difficult.60 
By the time of the outbreak of World War II, one of the IBU study group stated 
that there was resistance from the authors’ societies. The main bottleneck was their 
traditional approach to music, including the principles attached to copyright and 
their lack of knowledge of the medium. The plan for an international convention 
was halted by the outbreak of World War II.61 After the war, the international part-
ners would take up the discussion again.62 
A lack of clear agreements did not prevent an extensive cross-border flow of 
broadcasting programs and recorded music. While the international cultural elite 
discussed an international convention, the IBU continued coordinating the practi-
cal construction of decentralized sound libraries for broadcasting. Their collections 
of recorded music played an increasingly important role in daily broadcasting. 
58 LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R./P.V.1, 20-21, 24, 25.
59 LoN doc. ser., A.19.1938.XII, 6.
60 For in-depth study see: Box 32, gramophones, IBU; Box 86, Relations Internationales, IBU; C.I.C.I./
C.E.E.R.1-C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R.6, LoN; C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R/P.V.1 – C.I.C.I./C.E.E.R/P.V.3, LoN; registry file 5B, 
box R-2239 music, LoN; registry file 5B, box R-2258 Library of Sound films on folklore, LoN; registry file 
5B, box R-2259 Broadcasting and Peace, LoN; registry file 5B, box R-3998-3999 Broadcasting and Peace, 
LoN. 
61 Burrows, “Les moyens modernes de diffusion utilisés dans l’intérêt de la paix,” 86.
62 “La radio,” Série 8793, 2, box 32, file La radio et l’Industrie du disque, IBU.
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They not only enabled music exchange, but also created a feeling of international 
belonging among listeners. Moreover, gramophone recording technology would 
come to play an important part in creating an artificial sense of live participation 
in events. 
The International Live Program Constructed
Live programming was a complicated affair. An international study on the role of 
broadcasting in creating a feeling of community proposed: 
We could cite a group of listeners who have requested the transmitting sta-
tion to always transmit the audience’s applause after concerts in a public 
space: in that way they then felt more «present». It is quite characteristic. 
There is concern for these delicate problems, but no sufficient evidence to 
judge whether the efforts to provoke new forms of «community» via radio 
have already been successful.63
It was not easy to create a sense of belonging in broadcasting audiences. The study 
was dissatisfied with how live broadcasting events up to 1935 had been. There were 
various options and apparently not every option worked well. Broadcasters also 
struggled with this issue. The mere idea of having applause after a concert broad-
cast from a concert hall was not enough. Over the years, the IBU and its members 
designed unique and serial international events that in their own way tried to cre-
ate a sense of community. Endless technical innovations changed their options for 
designing these events and therefore changed their options for envisioning specific 
kinds of society. The IBU developed a growing awareness of those program for-
mats which it thought best expressed a feeling of international belonging.
The IBU community distinguished two main criteria that determined the qual-
ity of society-building via live broadcasting programs. In the first place, a live event 
would have to give listeners the feeling of participating in the event together with 
many other people. In the eyes of the IBU such a mutual experience could only 
happen if listeners were aware that they were hearing exactly the same program as 
someone else on the European continent listening in. Secondly, it considered that 
63 “On pourrait citer le cas d’un groupe d’auditeurs qui ont prié la station émettrice de transmettre 
toujours les applaudissements du public après la transmission des concerts donnés dans une salle publique: 
ils se sentaient ainsi plus « présents ». C’est tout à fait characteristique. On se préoccupe certes de ces 
problems délicats, mais nous ne possédons pas les éléments suffisants pour pouvoir juger si les tentatives 
de provoquer par la radiodiffusion de nouvelles formes de « communauté » ont déjà été couronnées de 
succès.” Beidler-Wagner et al., Le rôle intellectuel et éducatif de la radiodiffusion, 218-219.
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the ultimate expression of community depended on an as inclusive as possible 
participation of all broadcasting stations in Europe and beyond, the latter being 
significant for production. Not only would high participation in an event create a 
wider diffusion of the experience, it would ultimately express a sense of communal 
production, of unity in society. 
Initially broadcasters lacked the technology to create high quality live programs 
that would propagate a social experience among listeners. The quality of wireless 
was too low to ensure reception of the event across the entire European continent. 
The quality of a received wireless signal, if received at all, would be too low to 
ensure a pleasing experience of the live event for all listeners. Furthermore, in the 
1920s there was no international relay network that connected all broadcasting 
stations to therefore secure a Europe-wide diffusion of international live events. 
Consequently, when the IBU discussed international live events for the first time it 
had to find alternatives that would at least give the impression that their programs 
were broadcast live internationally. At the suggestion of the Spanish Radio SA., the 
IBU began the serial broadcasting of Nuits Nationales, National Nights in 1926.64 
The idea of the Nights was that each European IBU member organization in 
turn would organize a Night showcasing their country’s culture. With a lack of 
cross-border relaying options, the showcased country created a program script as 
well as additional promotional material which it sent to the IBU. The IBU would 
translate the program script into English, German, and French then redistribute 
it to all IBU members participating in the event. The program script gave every-
one the main outline of the Night. If there was space in the script for music and 
literature, broadcasters everywhere in Europe could choose from a list of pre-se-
lected repertoire. Now imagine a Night featuring the life and culture of Hungary. 
The Dutch broadcasting organization might have chosen the Hungarian music 
of Smetana while the BBC chose to broadcast Bartók. Consequently, each Night 
was broadcast on the same evening and at the same time in every participating 
European country.65 Nevertheless, it only approached the idea of communal listen-
ing to one unique broadcast. Each station broadcasted individually a Night based 
on its own national adaptation of the program script. 
The IBU considered such nationally appropriated program scripts an inferior 
quality standard when it came to achieving a community effect. Listeners did not 
participate in one unique live event and consequently could not optimally experi-
ence a shared sense of belonging with listeners in other countries. Although the 
64 “Letter from Secretary General Arthur Burrows to IBU members,” Série 203 and also see: 204, 18 May 
1926, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926, IBU.
65 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1926, 58; IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1927, 97, 109-110.
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Nights were broadcast live in each nation independently, they did give an impres-
sion of wider participation because the presenters announced all the participating 
countries. One could say that the Nights were an evening of nationally adapted 
international programs featuring a Europe of nation states. They did not live up to 
the idea of high quality international programs.
 After the first Night, the IBU considered the series a temporary solution until 
technology would allow for a true live experience.66 Already in 1927 when the 
Nights were still molded in their final format, Burrows dreamt of new program 
formats, the so-called Semaines européennes European weeks, or Jours européenns 
European days.67 Such live programs would have the advantage that “all European 
broadcasting organizations could transmit the programs of all countries, which 
from a psychological point of view would have a marvelous effect on the listeners.”68 
In the eyes of Burrows, the international relay network under construction would 
increase the effect of a communal experience since it would allow the live relay of 
a local event to all corners of Europe. The “best way to let foreign countries appre-
ciate the music and literature of your countries probably consists of relaying from 
your studios or another hall, by telephonic circuit, a typical national program per-
formed by your best artists.”69 By 1929 when parts of such a relay network were in 
place, several countries already began broadcasting the National Nights live. The 
new technological developments required a different type of program, veritable 
live events.
The first concerts the IBU designed after the National Nights were the con-
certs européens, the European concerts. Nationally adapted program scripts now 
belonged to the past.70 According to the various European program directors in-
volved in the process, the European concerts would be highly representative and 
were “an artistic event of European importance.”71 Whereas the preparations were 
66 “L’avenir des nuits nationales, rapporteur H. Giesecke,” Série 1592, 4 nov. 1929, box 85, file Relais, 
Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926-1931, IBU. 
67 “Commission de Rapprochement, Intellectuel, Social & Artistique: Procès-verbal de séances tenue à 
Vienne,” Série 502, 27 avril 1927, 2, file P.V. Commission des Programmes [anciennement commissions de 
Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU.
68 “…toutes les Sociétés radiophoniques européennes pourraient transmettre les programmes de tous 
les pays ce qui, au point de vue psychologique aurait un effet merveilleux sur les écouteurs.” “Commission 
de Rapprochement,” Série 502, 2, file P.V. Commissions des Programmes, 1926-1939, IBU. 
69 “La meilleure façon de faire apprécier à l’étranger la musique et la littérature de votre pays consiste 
probablement à relayer de votre studio ou d’une autre salle, par circuit téléphonique, un programme natio-
nal typique exécuté par vos meilleurs artistes.” “Nuits Nationales,” Série 1331, annexe à Série 1330, 29 avril 
1929, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationals), Général, 1926-1931, IBU.
70 In the course of the 1930s more and more stations would become linked to the international relay 
network. Consequently, less and less stations would have to use a program script.
71 “un évènement artistique d’importance européenne.” “Groupe des échanges de programmes de 
l’Europe Centrale et de l’Europe Occidentale, oct. 1930, Budapest, 1; Quote in the added document: “Deci-
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similar to the Nights series, the showcased country now organized a live concert 
itself either in a studio or in a concert hall. With the international relay network in 
place, the entire broadcast was exactly the same for all listeners in Europe.
To explain how this worked: At the prearranged time and date the showcased 
IBU member, Poland for example, linked the venue where the Polish perfor-
mance was taking place to the international relay network. The Polish PTT, in 
collaboration with the other European PTTs, then relayed the concert all across 
Europe, including countries like Denmark. Once the transmission arrived, the 
Danish PTT coupled the relay network to the national broadcasting network. The 
Danish broadcasting organization then transmitted the European Concert over 
the Danish home channel right into the homes of the Danish listeners. In their 
national radio schedules the Danes thus found a European program featuring 
Poland. First the Danes would hear the announcement in Danish, the language 
of the relaying country. Then they heard the same announcement in Polish, the 
language of the showcased country, and then in French, the main international 
language of the time.72 The presenters mentioned the names of all countries partici-
pating in the event in each language. Thus, in multiple languages, the presenters 
created the geographical society of European listeners for the Danish audience. 
The same procedure happened in all participating European countries. Apart from 
the first announcement in their own language, each listener in Europe heard the 
same entire program. 
Along similar lines the IBU would also coordinate the unique broadcast La 
jeunesse chante au-delà des frontières, Youth sings across the Frontiers, on October 
27, 1935, as well as a new series from 1935 onwards, the Concerts mondiaux, the 
World Concerts. For European program directors, such live events were an expres-
sion of the highest quality in cultural standards for broadcasting. The success of 
these series depended on the inclusive participation of broadcasting organizations 
in relaying the event. If participation was high, listeners would think they were 
taking part in a large European society of listeners. Vice versa, if participation was 
low, the European society effect would disappear. Participation was therefore of 
the utmost importance for achieving a sense of belonging. 
With the development of recording technology and the exchange of recorded 
music, European program directors could create international programs of higher 
complexity.73 The relay of Youth Sings in 1935 had revealed a technical problem. 
sions taken at a meeting in Varsovie 25 to 26 Sept. 1930,” 2, box 85, file Relais, Concerts Internationaux, 
1931 à 1939, Général, IBU. 
72 A little later the organization decided to change announcements and skip the introduction in the 
language of the showcased country. IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1935, 251, 260.
73 The archives do not specify which recording technologies were used or when and where. Innova-
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This concerned society-building programs including contributions from as many 
countries as possible. Unlike a European concert which each evening celebrated 
the culture of one European country, Youth Sings had aimed to broadcast from as 
many as thirty-one countries in one evening. Consequently the broadcast lasted 
for hours. Although successful from a production point of view, listeners lost in-
terest during the evening. The contribution per country was simply too long. Short 
contributions were technologically impossible. It took the operators of the interna-
tional relay network considerably longer than one minute to switch and establish 
a new connection between the contributing country and the rest of the network. 
In order to have many countries contributing to the content of a live program, the 
solution lay in recording technology.
Shortly before, and especially after the Youth Sings broadcast, the IBU designed 
a number of unique events that made use of recording technology. In 1928 already 
the IBU had been receiving complaints from Swedish broadcasters about the large 
preparation time and costs for the Nights. Each broadcasting station had to supply 
the music for the Night in question. It had to choose musical contributions from 
the list provided and find appropriate musical scores. It then had to find an or-
chestra and musicians of the highest quality who could practice and then perform 
the music during the Night. With the sound archives not yet in place, Burrows 
expressed his regret that there was not yet a follow-up on IBU ideas to facilitate 
the exchange of recordings that reproduced special forms of national music. Such 
use and exchange could reduce preparation time and costs substantially.74 From 
the mid-1930s onwards, the IBU started using recordings to resolve these organi-
zational and technical issues.
Initially, recording technologies served national live programs, but after the 
impressive relay of Youth Sings in 1935, the IBU used recordings to produce pro-
grams involving many countries. In 1934 and 1935 the Rapprochement Committee 
created the Christmas Hymns. These were unique events for which organizations 
produced their own broadcast consisting of hymns, carols and other forms of 
Christmas music from various countries in Europe. They sent the recordings to 
the IBU who then re-distributed them to all IBU members who could use the re-
cordings in their broadcast. The recordings allowed broadcasters to demonstrate 
live broadcasting from foreign countries in their own broadcast. 
As follow-up to Youth Sings, the IBU immediately decided to coordinate a new 
program Les chansons des Peuples, that finally became known as Une heureuse an-
née au monde entier, A Happy New Year to all of the World. In the eyes of the IBU, 
tions appeared in gramophone recording as well as for the phonograph.
74 “Nuits Nationales,” Série 1152, 1, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU. 
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Figure 6.3 – Live relay of Dvorák’s opera Rusulka from the Czech National Theater
For reasons of technical difficulties it had been impossible to transmit the opera from below the 
stage. As a consequence, the broadcaster had to transmit the music from on-stage.
Source: “National theater, opera Rusulka by Dvorák,” box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the 
courtesy of the European Broadcasting Union.
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a Happy New Year would have to include contributions from all European coun-
tries. Contributions could therefore be no longer than one minute. Rather than cre-
ate many nationally constructed broadcasts as had happened with the Christmas 
Hymns, the Happy New Year would be broadcast live from Berlin. During the live 
event the host for the evening, the German RRG, would then integrate live the 
pre-recorded one minute “pretending to be live” contributions from the various 
European nations.75 Gramophone recording technology enabled technically and 
organizationally impossible live programs. The importance of the inclusiveness of 
participation in program content outweighed the fact that in reality, the live events 
were partially recorded.
Besides such complex international live events, the IBU coordinated less de-
manding live programs as well. It designed for instance the series of Concerts inter-
nationaux, the International Concerts in 1932. The organization consisted of two 
countries reserving an evening to exchange programs and have live music from 
the interested nation. They celebrated the international courtesy between coun-
tries.76 Such bilateral collaboration would increase the number of foreign live mu-
sic broadcasts over home channels and became an important aspect of diffusing 
civilization via cultural routes. Though the quality of these broadcasts was high, 
due to their bilateral character, they did not meet the highest quality standard for 
international programs. 
The best international live program would not only have to reach as large a listen-
ing public as possible, but would also integrate as many participating countries in 
the production, whether in the relay or in the content. In some cases recording tech-
nology was a suitably practical solution to complex program formats. Nevertheless, 
it was genuinely viewed that events should be live at all times, giving the highest 
quality of communal experience. With changing organizational and technical op-
tions over time, the IBU created a wide variety of international programs that ex-
pressed a sense of unity in vastly different ways. The society-building effect of these 
international programs could in no way create a homogenous social experience.
Programs communicated geographical spaces. The standards for suitable feel-
ings of belonging had everything to do with the geographical reach of the pro-
grams and the geographical territory communicated via the program content. The 
75 IBU, Broadcasting: An Instrument for the Creation of a Better Understanding Between the Peoples (Ge-
neva: IBU, 1937); IBU, Conseil Administrative 1936, 51-52.
76 “Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 502, 2, file P.V. Commission des Programmes, IBU; 
“Concerts pouvant faire l’objet de relais internationaux, Réunion des directeurs de programmes, obser-
vations de M. K.B. Jirak, Radiojournal, Prague,” Série 4763, 11 févr. 1935, 2, box 85, Relais, Concerts 
européens, Général, 1931 à 1939, IBU. 
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IBU had always claimed to be an international organization rather than a purely 
European union of broadcasters. Consequently, its cultural policy, and as such its 
live programs, did not remain restricted to Europe. 
With the further diffusion of the international relay network and the develop-
ment of the short waves, the IBU managed to bring its series of concerts, as well 
as entirely new programs, beyond the boundaries of Europe. In the mid-1930s 
the IBU coordinated a series of global broadcasts. On October 27, 1935 the IBU 
coordinated the worldwide broadcasting of Youth Sings, and in 1936 it began 
broadcasting the World Concert series. The Youth Sings program featured “choirs 
of children and young people in thirty-one countries situated in five continents 
[who] sang to each other, and to the world at large, the songs they love.”77 Both 
the content of the event and its geographical reach made the program a unique 
event of worldwide importance. Preparations took place at IBU headquarters in 
Geneva, whereas the German RRG organized the relaying of the event on behalf 
of the IBU on the evening. Berlin not only had a key position in the European relay 
network, but also possessed a short wave station that could connect Europe with 
other continents. 
Youth Sings had to be organized internationally and was relayed via short wave 
beyond European borders all the way to Japan, North and South America, as well 
as some of the Colonies.78 Moreover, contributions for the event not only came 
from Europe, but also from Hawaii, Australia, Japan, Uruguay, the South African 
Union, and the United States. The technical realization of the broadcast was “an 
intricate piece of work requiring most precise collaboration on the part of the tel-
ephonic and radio-telephonic services in each participating country.”79 Two years 
later Youth Sings would already be termed the “most elaborate and impressive 
collective manifestation yet organised by the International Broadcasting Union.”80 
From the point of view of quality of production, the event created a sense of global 
union. It reached a worldwide audience and included an impressive number of 
contributions.
Unlike Youth Sings, the World Concerts followed the tradition of the European 
Concerts. Each concert showcased a country beyond Europe’s borders. The show-
cased country relayed its concert live via the short waves to a short wave station 
in Europe. On arrival of the program, the receiving short wave station was then 
coupled to the international relay network which disseminated the program in 
77 IBU, Broadcasting, 92.
78 Werner Schwipps, “Deutschland im Weltrundfunkverein 1933-1938,” Rundfunk und Fernsehen 19, 
no. 4 (1971): 436.
79 IBU, Broadcasting, 92.
80 Ibid.
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the same way as the European Concerts. The United States organized the first 
World Concert on September 20, 1936, followed by the Republic of Argentina in 
February 1937, and the Dutch East Indies in October 1937.81 These concerts were 
not meant to be one-directional from outside to inside Europe. The American 
concert was broadcast in most European countries, and relayed to Russia, which 
from the point of view of the material network, also formed part of Europe.82 In 
contrast, the third World Concert gained the interest of Australia (ABC), Ceylon, 
the United States (CBS and NBC), British India, the Dutch East Indies, and Hong 
Kong. Great divergences in longitude necessitated some of these stations to receive 
a recording of the World Concert and defer the broadcast to a more appropriate 
time. The IBU managed to coordinate two-directional broadcasts, with Europe as 
the relaying center.
Programs like Youth Sings and the World Concerts increasingly corresponded 
with the IBU’s aim to become an international worldwide organization of broad-
casters spreading a message of global union (see Chapter 2). The European con-
certs were the first series to radiate beyond Europe’s borders. The American NBC 
for instance broadcast the 1934 Swedish, 1935 Yugoslavian, 1935 Austrian and 
1935 Danish European Concert over its national network.83 These were followed 
by Youth Sings and the World Concerts. Live broadcasting consequently moved 
from a Europe of connected cultural nations to a globe connected by national 
cultures.
Considering the entirety of international programs designed by the IBU, 
these programs emphasized the idea of European unity more than global unity. 
Overall, some twenty-seven European countries organized one or more European 
Concerts compared to a total of six World Concerts.84 At all times, Europe re-
mained the center of program coordination. Those World Concerts relayed to 
other than European countries would diffuse globally from Europe. Perhaps 
81 Ibid., 91.
82 The American World Concert found its way to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Yu-
goslavia, the UK, and the USSR. NBC, “Survey of international programs arranged by the National Broad-
casting Company, 1924-1936,” June 15 1938, 77-101, registry file 5B, box R-3999, file 32583/1658, LoN.
83 Though there is no evidence that the European concerts were broadcast elsewhere outside Europe’s 
boundaries, the frequent relaying of these concerts by NBC suggests that they might have been relayed 
elsewhere as well. NBC, “Survey of international programs,” 48-49, 55, registry file 5B, box R-3999, file 
32583/1658, LoN.
84 Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Palestine, 
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. Turkey had also been an IBU 
member, but was suspended in exactly those years when the IBU broadcast its European Concerts, because 
of problems with the payment of membership fees.
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surprisingly, the European colonies were considered non-European territory. 
Europe was clearly distinguished from the rest of the world. With a vast increase 
and diversification of European live events relayed beyond Europe’s borders, the 
number of non-European events would remain far lower. Moreover, broadcasts 
like the International Concerts and A Happy New Year suggested global events, 
but were in fact European. Regarding geography, European unity thus dominated 
international program construction.
Translating Music for Radio
Music conveyed a sense of unification. In 1927, head of the IBU Rapprochement 
Committee, Oskar Czeija, asked: “Which programs do we have to relay abroad?”85 
The variety of expressions that could shape a culturally desirable society was nu-
merous. One could think of a wide range of musical genres, of radio plays, of con-
certs, literature, poetry, and discussions related to events. It was not easy to predict 
program content. Moreover, the medium of broadcasting had different character-
istics to all previous forms of listening to music. Kate Lacey argues that reality “was 
adjusted to the masses, and the masses to reality, with all that that implied for new 
modes of perception and for new ways of thinking.”86 Consequently, broadcasters 
tried to adapt music to their medium while upholding their cultural vision of a 
society that matched their preferred image of civilization. But broadcasters would 
have a hard time specifying which cultural characteristics created a suitable vision 
of society. 
Broadcasters favored the idea of attentive listening. By the end of the nineteenth 
century a tradition of attentive listening to music had developed in theaters.87 Both 
the IBU community and the cultural elites thought this was valuable. Attentive lis-
tening envisioned the idea of education, uplifting the mind to become a culturally 
and civilized individual. Broadcasters in particular thought up program formats 
that emphasized this notion.
85 “Quels programmes devons-nous relayer à l’étranger?” “Programmes nationaux, par Oscar Czeija,” 
Série 576, 22 juin 1927, 1, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationals), Général, 1926-
1931, IBU.
86 Kate Lacey, “Towards a Periodization of Listening: Radio and Modern Life,” International Journal of 
Cultural Studies 3, no. 2 (2000): 285.
87 James Johnson, Listening in Paris: A Cultural History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 
228-236; Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” 200.
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Not all kinds of music that the members usually broadcast in their own na-
tional programs met the standards for international series like the National 
Nights. Essential to educating the masses, was the premise that a musical culture 
for broadcasting should consist of high art and high-culture music, rather than 
popular entertainment music. When discussing culture at their first meetings, 
broadcasters immediately noticed that there was a lack of consistency among 
members on the definition of music genres. In order to fill programs with high-
culture music, they made sure that everyone understood exactly what this was. In 
the course of three years, the Rapprochement Committee therefore standardized 
the music genres (Table 6.3). These terms of reference facilitated international dis-
cussions and also ensured that the musical standards of the programs coordinated 
by the IBU would be entirely understood by the various IBU members’ program 
makers. By 1929 the committee had created consistency for musical discussions 
internationally, nationally, and locally. They had invented a categorized scale to 
measure which genres suited high culture music. 
Program formats for international events like the Nights and the European 
Concerts would have to be adapted substantially to keep audiences listening at-
tentively to high-culture music. There was a number of recurring problems every 
time the Rapprochement Committee proposed a new international event. One 
was integrating high-culture genres like (light) opera and serious music in relation 
to the wide diversity of languages in Europe. In the view of most members, the 
repertoire should consist of high-culture music without too much singing. Not be-
ing able to understand the lyrics, listeners would lose attention.88 Given these lan-
guage complications, the Rapprochement Committee preferred to use instrumen-
tal rather than vocal music. Not all international programs would have to adhere 
to this quality standard. Members were free to design the International Concerts 
as they pleased. Youth Sings concentrated on choirs. The majority of IBU’s inter-
national programs, nevertheless, envisioned for its listeners a musical canon of a 
highly instrumental caliber. Indirectly the IBU thus created the impression that 
high-culture music was mostly instrumental.
Another problem was bringing high-culture music live to listeners. Many mu-
sical scores were destined to be performed by large orchestras with a wide range of 
instruments. Broadcasting organizations adapted these scores for small chamber 
orchestras. They then hired a few artists to perform these adaptations live in their 
broadcasting studios (Figure 6.4). This reduced costs and solved the problem of 
space. It was much cheaper to organize live events with a limited number of artists. 
88 “Programmes nationaux,” Série 576, 1-2, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU.
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Light opera or musical comedy
Serious music excluding opera or children’s music; including religious music, 
symphonic music, chamber music, instrumental solos, vocal so-
los, choirs etc.
Light music excluding light opera or children’s music; including orchestras, 
choirs, solos, cabaret, revue, burlesque etc.
Dance music music especially designed for dancing
Other categories
Literature
Conferences humanities, sciences, social sciences, foreign language education
General critiques news or opinions about politics, artistic life, literature, scientific 
life, inventions, economics, social and domestic life or sports




Photodiffusion experiments with the transmission of pictures
Source: “Procès-verbaux de la Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 1274, 28 février 1929, 2-3; 
Annexe à Série 1271, “Notice explicative ayant trait au tableau statistique série 1272,” 1-2, file 
P.V. Commissions des Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 
1926-1939, IBU.
Moreover, broadcasting studios were usually not large enough to accommodate 
large orchestras. Equally important were the technological problems that hindered 
the broadcasting of music played by large groups of instruments of a sufficiently 
high quality. Symphony orchestras have instruments that can reach very high as 
well as very low frequencies at once. Initially, the existing technology could not 
relay these very high and low tones.89 Transmissions lost their quality. Small cham-
ber orchestras in which one could deliberately choose specific instruments resolved 
part of this technical shortcoming.90 Consequently, the IBU transmitted a much 
89 “Au Comité Consultatif International des Communications Téléphoniques à Grande Distance, Paris,” 
4 déc. 1925, 2-3, box 85, file Relais Général I, 1927 et précédents, IBU.
90 Over the years, with the development of the international relay network and the improvement of the 
quality of the cables which were used, the problems with the high and low tones gradually became things 
of the past.
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Figure 6.4 – German studio for the weekly Sunday Concerts at Köningswusterhausen
Source: “Studio for the weekly Sunday Concerts established by the Deutsche Reichspost at radio 
station Köningswusterhausen in 1923,” box 58 Photographies, IBU. Used by the courtesy of the 
European Broadcasting Union.
adapted high-culture repertoire to its audiences. It changed original musical formats 
into simpler versions, perhaps even with a specific choice of instrument. 
Other than the complexity of the scores, the length of most high-culture compo-
sitions such as operas or symphonies also formed an obstacle when it came to hold-
ing the listeners’ attention. In general, a National Night or European Concert lasted 
for one and a half to three hours. Besides, the individual items during such evenings 
were often too long. Audiences lost interest. The IBU regularly urged its members to 
shorten the length of the entire event as well as the musical contributions. Four-hour 
symphonies as performed in theaters outlasted every broadcasting program by far. 
Broadcasters circumvented this problem by deciding to transmit specific sections 
such as an opera scene, or the concert overture. These along with the broadcasting 
programs gave a relatively fragmented and random representation of original musi-
cal compositions. 
In practice there were many disruptions. In spite of regular warnings, discus-
sions in the IBU Council, and several recommendations, showcased countries often 
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continued to make their contributions too extensive.91 In 1928 and 1935 the IBU 
officially shortened the program format of National Nights and European Concerts 
respectively to a maximum of one hour. World Concerts should even last no longer 
than thirty minutes.92 Organizers nevertheless continued to struggle with the length 
of programs. In 1935 for instance, Youth Sings was widely criticized for its length, 
even though it was rewarded from the point of view of rapprochement.93 It was not 
that easy to change existing musical cultures to suitable program formats that held 
the listeners’ attention and uplifted their spirit.
In the meantime, broadcasters struggled to decide what high-culture music met 
their quality standards for educative and uplifting programs. National Nights was 
the Rapprochement Committee’s first attempt at fulfilling its cultural policy along 
the lines of high-culture and high-quality broadcasts of music and literature.94 The 
series consisted of classical music and short opera pieces as well as national folk mu-
sic. Genres like light operas were to be avoided as they would counteract the aim of 
creating understanding and rapprochement. Light operas often caricatured specifics 
and habits of nations, and therefore could possibly create disharmony and segrega-
tion.95 In 1929 the Rapprochement Committee discussed reformatting the program 
at the start of a new series of Nights. The committee decided not to change the musi-
cal format. For the time being, the committee had a good idea of what kind of music 
constituted high culture: classical music, short opera pieces, and national folklore. 
At the start of the European Concerts, the IBU community shifted its focus to 
what genres best suited high-culture music. Unlike the serious touch in most of 
the genres used for the Nights, the European Concerts favored a lighter yet highly 
creative genre. Light but artistic music would serve unifying aims better than sym-
phonic oeuvres which lasted too long and needed to be avoided.96 Since the light 
music would be of a highly artistic standard, it would still correspond with the IBU’s 
idea of high-culture music. In 1935 the program directors of the IBU member orga-
nizations went one step further. At a meeting organized by the IBU Rapprochement 
Committee, they decided to allow both classical and modern – contemporary classi-
cal – works of all genres. Massive symphonies, concerts or choral oeuvres still should 
91 “Soirées Nationales, Liste des dates de la première série des Nuits Nationales,” Série 875, 7 mars 
1928, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926-1931, IBU.
92 IBU, Broadcasting, 91.
93 Ibid., 92.
94 “Procès-verbaux de la Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 1274, 28 février 1929, 2-3; “Notice 
explicative ayant trait au tableau statistique série 1272,” Annexe à Série 1271, 1-2, file P.V. Commissions des 
Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU.
95 “Programmes nationaux,” Série 576, 1-2, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU; 
Fickers and Lommers, “Eventing Europe,” 232.
96 “Concerts européens,” box 85, Relais, Concerts européens, Général, 1931 à 1939, IBU.
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be avoided.97 The program directors gave the green light for a series of live events 
showcasing a musical heritage of widely diverse genres. They considered all genres 
suitable as long as they were of the highest quality and performed by artists of the 
highest standing.
This clear breach with the initially serious and traditional approach to the high- 
culture music of the Nights was not appreciated by the international intellectual elite. 
Especially in the 1930s when collaboration between the OCI, artistic affiliations, and 
broadcasting organizations increased, it became more difficult to estimate the kind 
of “high culture” music that could be used in broadcasting. Adjustments made to the 
music by the broadcasters met with fierce resistance. On the one hand, broadcasters 
were confronted with dissatisfied listeners who requested more popular and enter-
taining music. Their international programs attracted fewer and fewer listeners. On 
the other hand, around the same time the OCI and the international musical elite 
criticized broadcasting because the cultural level of the programs was too low and 
too popular. Around the mid-1930s, the IBU found itself in an uncomfortable posi-
tion.
The OCI and the international music elites objected strongly. Čapek and Bartók 
in their 1931 resolutions had explicitly stressed the importance of including popu-
lar and dance music in an international musical repertoire. Together dance and 
folk music formed “the true popular music.”98 Their idea, however, was that these 
popular influences would have to be raised to the level of art song. Fragments of 
popular music should be reworked into high art music rather than remain popu-
lar. This was a modernist approach, but still highlighted the importance of high art 
music. In 1935 the OCI conducted a study in collaboration with external musical 
experts. The study concluded that broadcasting programs in general failed to ap-
propriately meet their definition of high art music and educational broadcasting. 
The musical experts feared that broadcasting would turn on “an instant flow of 
music, not unlike a faucet or a light switch.”99 Radio broadcasts contained severe 
stylistic errors, and degraded art music to the level of inferior and (commercial) 
popular music. 
The objections stemmed from habit, from traditional cultures of listening to 
music. The thought that opera and operetta music were adapted for small orchestras 
97 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1935, 259-261.
98 “La vraie music populaire.” “Projet d’un questionnaire établi en collaboration avec L’I.I.C.I. devant 
être communiqué aux membres de l’Union Internationale de Radiodiffusion,” Série 2796, Annexe A, 25 
sept. 1931, 3, box 92, file Société des Nations, Section de Coopération Intellectuelle, Général, 1927-1932, 
IBU.
99 “le robinet à musique, comme le robinet à eau ou le commutateur de la lumière électrique.” Beidler-
Wagner et al., Le rôle intellectuel et éducatif de la radiodiffusion, 218.
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or even for two to three performers, according to Beidler-Wagner “often abuses 
the word ‘fantasy’.”100 It was unimaginable that such performances would uphold 
the original artistic value of a piece. The place of the performance and the choice of 
instruments further downgraded the music. Religious music, for instance, should 
be performed in churches, not in concert halls. Moreover, performing music with 
homogenous sets of instruments like brass bands or guitars by nature highlighted 
musicians from the popular (meaning commercial) scene. Music experts recog-
nized that broadcasting could not relay music in exactly the same way as people 
were accustomed. The music experts felt there was far too much adaptation of the 
music, making it of an inferior quality that did not express high culture. Short 
musical excerpts should be broadcast, giving people an impression of what a live 
experience of music in a theater or a concert hall was like.101 
By the 1930s the discussion on formats for international programs was gaining 
more ground in the OCI. With the increasing fear of a new world war, it became 
ever more urgent to stimulate international minds of peace, collaboration, and 
understanding. The route the OCI suggested did not correspond with the desires 
of listeners across Europe. In order to continue capturing the attention of listeners 
when broadcasting an international program, the IBU aimed to maintain the qual-
ity of performance, while making the music more accessible to listeners. Whereas 
the IBU thought it could achieve an internationalist mind with such adjustments, 
the OCI did not. Amid quickly deteriorating international relations, the OCI con-
sidered it more and more urgent to create quality high-culture music formatted in 
the best possible manner. 
Cultural expressions were an extremely important component of civilization, 
and became a frequent subject of debate before World War II. Civilization was 
in a deplorable state, Murray, the head of the OCI said at a meeting in 1935. “It 
seems as if civilization were caught in a net from which it was trying in vain to 
escape…civilization…seemed unable to save itself.”102 Discussions on culture and 
broadcasting programs in the second half of the 1930s were thus increasingly sur-
rounded by an aura of fear and defeat. The OCI’s plans for programming became 
a desperate attempt to give its view of civilization and culture a new and hopeful 
impetus. 
The OCI took matters in its own hands. Having expressed the importance of 
suitable international broadcasting programs at the International Convention for 
100 “abusent si souvent du mot “fantaisie’.” Ibid., 211-212.
101 Ibid., 209, 215.
102 LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the Seventeenth Session, held 
at Geneva, July 15th, 1935, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./17th session/P.V.1, 7-8.
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the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, the OCI organized a meeting to dis-
cuss program content in 1938.103 Although the IBU participated, these discussions 
would not influence program formats further in the remaining interwar years. 
International tensions mounted rapidly, and broadcasters experienced increasing 
difficulty keeping their programs independent of government influence. The IBU 
had a hard enough time satisfying its own members and audiences, let alone the 
international cultural elite.
By the time war broke out, broadcasters and cultural elites still had different 
opinions about what high-culture music was and how it should be formatted. In 
the end the IBU considered the interests of its members and audience more im-
portant than those of the international elite. Its program formats included light 
though highly artistic music from a wide range of genres and that were short, 
largely instrumental, and relatively simple impressions. According to the IBU, 
such an adapted version of high-culture music could equally well propagate the 
education and uplifting of the mind. These changes were justified. Their efforts 
would fail if people at home preferred to tune into national programs or other 
frequencies. 
Suitable music was a must. International live programs would achieve feelings of 
belonging that crossed national boundaries. Paradoxically, in order to serve in-
ternational and European unity, the IBU stressed the national aspect of its inter-
national program series like the Nights, and the European or World Concerts. 
In 1926, the IBU designed National Nights in such a way that each Night “the 
spirit of one country passes through all of Europe.”104 By the mid-1930s the World 
Concerts were still “…to include preference, performances by orchestras of a char-
acter peculiar to the country providing the concert, typically national music…”105 
Oddly enough, the IBU community envisioned a musical repertoire for interna-
tional broadcasting programs that focused on national cultures.
The national focus of these international programs was decided without deep 
discussions. In 1927 head of the Rapprochement Committee, Oskar Czeija, noted: 
It is highly likely that, as far as it concerns the scope and use of the re-
lays abroad of national programs, the whole world is of the same opin-
ion. Transmissions of this nature serve the cultural and practical scope of 
103 See amongst others: LoN, International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, Minutes of the 
Twentieth Session, held at Geneva, July 14th, 1938, LoN doc. ser., C.I.C.I./20th session/P.V.7, 57-67.
104 “l’âme d’un même pays passe sur toute l’Europe.” “Letter from Secretary General Arthur Burrows,” 
Série 203, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU.
105 IBU, Broadcasting, 91.
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broadcasting best. By acquainting foreign listeners with national creations 
of a country – musical works, literature and science – they bring together 
the countries of foreign listeners and revive mutual sympathy. Such pro-
cedures could awaken countries and peoples – encourage travels and de-
velop tourism – so nothing else than the circumstances can contribute to 
the rapprochement between nations and it is here that the great value of 
these transmissions lies.106 
Broadcasters intimately linked their idea of centralizing the national within their 
international programs to their plans for international collaboration, peace, and 
interconnectedness. International programs based on national cultures would 
make people understand one another, have an interest in one another’s culture, 
stimulating cross-border travelling and the like. The national nature of the pro-
grams was a prerequisite for people to really get to know one another. Only then 
could international fellowship truly evolve. Much in line with their other activities, 
broadcasters therefore in a natural way interconnected the national and the inter-
national in their programs. In their opinion, the emphasis on the national was an 
important quality standard for international programs.
The lack of discussion might give the false impression of a lack of tension be-
tween the national and international dimension. Broadcasters experienced diffi-
culties defining the exact commonalities in a shared European or international 
culture that transcended boundaries. More surprisingly perhaps, they would find 
it equally difficult to determine the typical features of their national cultures in 
such international programs. 
Although broadcasters had been gaining experience with national program-
ming, it appeared to be more difficult to broadcast national cultures as part of 
international programs. With the implementation of the Nights for instance, it 
was still impossible to relay a live broadcast across Europe. You could not get a real 
impression of other countries’ cultures. In the eyes of the IBU, artists would always 
appropriate foreign scores, because they made interpretations based on their own 
national cultures. The Nights featured national appropriations of the cultures of 
other European countries, rather than the original music. The IBU tried to avoid 
106 “Il est probable que, pour ce qui concerne le but et l’utilité du relais à l’étranger des programmes 
nationaux, tout le monde est du même avis. Ce sont des transmissions de cette nature qui sont le plus aptes 
à servir les buts culturels et pratiques de la radiodiffusion. En faisant connaître aux écouteurs étrangers les 
créations nationales d’un pays, – œuvres musicales, littéraires et scientifiques – elles rapprochent ce pays 
des écouteurs étrangers et réveillent en eux l’intérêt et la sympathie pour lui. Ce procédé peut faire naître 
les pays et les peuples – d’où encouragement aux voyages et développement du tourisme – donc rien que 
des circonstances pouvant contribuer au rapprochement des nations, et c’est en cela que réside la grande 
valeur de telles transmissions.” “Programmes nationaux,” Série 576, 1, box 85, file Relais, Programmes 
Nationaux, Général, IBU.
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this by stressing the need to invite artists of the highest national standing to per-
form. Only the finest artists were capable of approaching the original intention 
of the musical compositions.107 With the international relay network in place, na-
tional appropriations became a matter of the past. People in Europe and beyond 
could now experience the original and authentic national music of their neighbor-
ing countries.
Reality turned out to be less ideal than these program formats suggested. 
Whereas series like the European and World Concerts could now feature authentic 
national music, National Nights and International Concerts featured a combina-
tion of authentic and nationally appropriated music. The IBU repeatedly warned 
its members to focus on their own national music and avoid foreign compositions 
in their country’s contributions. Apparently the IBU considered it likely that its 
members would choose foreign music, and with reason. Broadcasting organiza-
tions made foreign compositions part of their national contributions.108 In 1934 
the French national broadcasting federation offered an International Concert re-
layed from the Théâtre National de l’Opéra-Comique. French artists performed the 
Italian work of Puccini, La Bohème, and Leoncavallo, Paillasse.109 Although broad-
casts increasingly featured authentic national music, thus raising the quality of the 
international programs, they did not entirely eradicate performances that in the 
tradition of nineteenth century opera interpreted foreign works. Consequently, 
the musical broadcasting repertoire would never be completely representative of 
national cultures. 
The visions of national cultures were also difficult to determine. The IBU en-
visioned that national cultures should consist of the diversity of musical styles 
within their boundaries. Already with the design of the National Nights in 1926 
the Rapprochement Committee encouraged IBU members to integrate explicitly 
folk and dance music into their program scripts. Over the years, the IBU valued 
highly the creation of programs that accounted for the ethnic diversity in Europe. 
Everybody would have to feel included in the IBU’s international programs. The 
IBU followed composers like Bartók, who by taking a modernist approach negated 
the existence of single style national canons.110 The IBU explicitly chose to include 
107 “Nuits Nationales,” Série 1331, annexe à Série 1330, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, 
Général, IBU; “Concerts pouvant faire l’objet de relais internationaux,” Série 4763, 1-2, box 85, file Relais, 
Concerts européens, Général, IBU.
108 The question remains of what the scale of such appropriated foreign music has been. The Interna-
tional Concerts have been one of the most popular and thriving series of the IBU, but its filing has been 
limited. Box 85, file Relais, Concerts internationaux 1931 à 1939, Général, IBU. 
109 Fédération Nationale de Radiodiffusion, “Retransmission depuis le Théâtre National de l’OPERA-
COMIQUE,” Paris le 28 avril 1934, box 85, file Relais, Concerts internationaux 1931 à 1939, Général, IBU.
110 Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” 197.
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the local. In a way, it thus envisioned a transnational kind of brotherhood of na-
tional cultures.
In practice, IBU members had a hard time living up to these music standards. 
Although the IBU encouraged the integration of folk and dance music, broad-
casting organizations often selected high culture, albeit relatively accessible, clas-
sical music like the overture to a concert. Instead of popular chansons they chose 
internationally renowned composers like Dvorák, Mozart, and Beethoven. They 
clung to the well-known, to the national musical canons. In 1928 IBU Secretary-
General Burrows stressed that the Nights had included very few popular chansons 
and dance music. He made it clear that these genres were allowed and should be 
encouraged once more.111
The live broadcast of the European Concerts moved IBU members further 
from their classical national musical canons. Broadcasting organizations increas-
ingly created their contributions in accordance with IBU repertoire standards, 
while giving their concerts an individual flavor. Germany mostly filled concerts 
with its greatest classical composers. The Netherlands and Norway broadcast more 
progressive modern classical oeuvres. And a country like Austria positioned itself 
with light classical music.112 Especially with the series of European concerts the 
broadcasters were able to live up to the musical repertoire standards set by the 
IBU. They communicated a more diversified repertoire to their audiences.
Over the years, folk music would also slowly find a place in the musical broad-
casting repertoire. Albeit relatively late, Czechoslovakia would include the work of 
Leoš Janaček in its third European concert in March 1936. Until then it preferred 
well-established and more classical composers like Dvorák and Smetana.113 Poland 
on the contrary integrated the work of Karol Szymanowski in each of its European 
concerts. It portrayed him as a modern and western European composer with 
Polish and Slavic influences in his compositions.114 In Hungary, the work of Bartók 
111 Polish and Czech section in: Box 85, file Concerts Européens [subdivisé par pays], IBU; “Nuits 
Nationales,” Série 1152, 1, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU.
112 My warm thanks go to Karin Bijsterveld for her comments on the musical content of the European 
concerts. Of course the responsibility for the use and interpretation of the findings is mine and mine alone. 
Further combined musicological and historical music research could give more detailed understanding of 
the factual visions that have been broadcast and the extent to which the musical content of the European 
concerts lived up to the IBU’s desired inclusion of folk and dance, and thus of the music of the minorities 
and different races inside the various countries. Attention should be paid to the extent to which western 
European concerts inserted a popularized and diverse vision of their cultures. See: Box 85, file Concerts 
Européens [subdivisé par pays], IBU.
113 Série 2912, 13 nov. 1931, IBU; Série 3971, 22 déc. 1933, IBU; Série 5613, 5 fév. 1936, Czech section in 
box 85, file Concerts Européens [subdivisé par pays], IBU.
114 Série 5438, 31 oct. 1935 on Karol Szymanowski; all documents in the Hungarian section, box 85, 
Concerts Européens [subdivisé par pays], IBU. 
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featured alongside that of Franz Liszt who was part of the Hungarian musical 
canon. Hungary introduced Bartók as a composer whose style was “the develop-
ment, and artistic burgeoning of the popular chanson.”115 The Rhapsody which 
the Hungarian broadcasters chose to broadcast was introduced as Bartók’s first 
work of romantic modern Hungary. Bartók described the piece as his first work 
in his new style and as such, a preparation for his later compositions. Folk music 
slowly found its way into international programs. Nevertheless, it continued to 
be outweighed by music chosen from the established national canon. Programs 
highlighted the national more than the local. 
With such choice for national music, broadcasters tended to prefer music of 
“their” best and most renowned “national” composers. Selecting “national” com-
posers turned out to be more difficult than anticipated and caused disagreements 
between broadcasters. In 1932 the IBU decided not to be party to these discus-
sions, because of the clear “sensibilities between countries in this domain” and its 
lack of moral authority on the issue.116 Could one really speak of national com-
posers? Like artists, composers had a tradition of travelling across Europe and 
sometimes even farther. Bartók for instance traveled from Czechoslovakia, to the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland in 1923 and 1925. In 1929 he would make a 
grand tour of three weeks in Russia, followed by a series of concerts in Switzerland, 
Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, and 
Hungary. During his travels he was receptive to a wide variety of western musical 
influences, notably the German school. He would become inspired by Debussy, 
Stravinsky, Schoenberg, Beethoven, and Bach.117 His own work in turn gained 
widespread recognition internationally as well. Composers in Turkey for instance 
started to seek ways of using folk material in their music.118 To what extent could 
one say that Bartók was representative of Hungarian culture alone?
Bartók was just one of many internationally known composers who traveled 
and sometimes lived abroad. When broadcasters made their international pro-
grams on the basis of their national culture they in fact tried to iconize “their 
115 “Le style de Bartok est le développement, l’épanouissement artistique de la chanson populaire.” 
“Notice sur le programme du concert européen hongrois,” Série 3871, 5-6, box 85, Concerts Européens, 
IBU. 
116 “tenant compte des sensibilités entre pays dans ce domaine.” “Procés-verbaux des réunions des 
commissions de rapprochement et de relais réunis,” Série 3246, 10 juin 1932, 4, file P.V. Commissions des 
Programmes [anciennement commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 1926-1939, IBU.
117 Gillies, “Bartók, Béla”; Gillies, Bartók Remembered, 102-103, 225.
118 Merih Erol, “Modernist and Nationalist Discourses on Music in Southeastern Europe (1900-1945): 
The Cases of Greece and Turkey.” Prepared for the CAS (Centre for Advanced Study, Sofıa) Fellowship 
program “Regimes of Historicity and Discourses of Modernity and Identity, 1900-1945, in East-Central, 
Southeastern and Northern Europe (2008-2010)” (forthcoming as a book chapter in an edited volume after 
completion of the program, 2009), 12-13.
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national” composers. Philipp Ther explains how a German composer like Richard 
Wagner became universalized during the nineteenth century rather than remain-
ing purely German as Wagner liked to stress himself.119 One could also ask how 
contemporaries viewed a composer like George Fridrich Handel who featured 
prominently in the European Concert organized by Germany in 1935. Handel was 
German by birth, but had lived his entire life in Great Britain.120 Was he then a 
German or a British composer? Positioning Ludwig von Beethoven as an example 
of one national culture was problematic as well. He was born a German and had 
lived there part of his life. However he spent thirty-five years in Vienna, Austria, 
where he had taken lessons with great Austrian composers like Joseph Haydn and 
Johan Schenk.121 Beethoven featured in the Austrian European Concert of 1935. 
Was he then a German or an Austrian composer? And to trigger the discussion: 
if a contemporary could not say with certainty whether Handel was German or 
British, or Beethoven was German or Austrian, would one then not have responded 
instead: Well in any case he is European? The problem remained unresolved, and 
broadcasters continued to have a free hand in iconizing “their” national composer.
There was some kind of universality attached to culture which flourished in 
the national diversity of the European Concerts. Composers could not always eas-
ily be “iconized” as the composer of one specific nation. Moreover, the national 
appropriations of foreign music continued, giving a touch of universality to the 
musical repertoire. Although the example of nationally appropriated music shows 
the desire to undermine other than authentic national music, the IBU also sought 
a certain degree of universality. Too much internationality, uniformity or gener-
alization in programs would be the death of the idea that people could begin to 
understand each other by showing each other their art and life. In turn, too much 
diversity would also alienate listeners from participating in the broadcasts. They 
would then be unable to relate to the program content anymore.122As a result, the 
IBU intentionally aimed to create a sense of unity in the diversity of soundscapes, 
music, and languages which the broadcasts offered together and individually.
An important prerequisite for the success of the serial broadcasts was a certain 
level of homogeneity. A series like the Traveling Microphone provided what we 
could term “soundscapes,” a sound experience of a particular national landscape 
integrating local as well as national festivals, ceremonies, or events. Although the 
119 Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” 198.
120 Anthony Hicks, “Handel, George Frideric,” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online, n.d., http://
www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40060. Accessed April 29, 2009.
121 Joseph Kerman et al., “Beethoven, Ludwig van,” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online, n.d., 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40026. Accessed April 29, 2009.
122 “Commission de Rapprochement, “ Série 502, 3, file P.V. Commissions des Programmes, IBU.
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experience centered on national and local cultural impressions from one coun-
try, all Travelling Microphone broadcasts provided a soundscape of similar events 
from many European cultures. Another example was the introductory talks to a 
series like National Nights. Each Night began by introducing the habits and char-
acteristics of European countries. The showcased countries not only highlighted 
their national characteristics, but also explicitly positioned themselves in the 
greater context of European society. 
Germany and Italy form a telling example. Germany stressed its moder-
nity, youth, technology, architecture, and dramatic arts like theater and mu-
sic. However it began its introduction with: “Germany, situated at the center of 
Europe.” Moreover, in its talk, it indirectly referred to its role during the Great 
War by stressing the recent redefining of its borders and the difficult situation 
in the country.123 With such a negative recent past, Germany tried to put itself 
in a positive light with a hopeful future in an interconnected Europe. Italy, on 
the contrary, gave a “romantic” impression of its country, geography, and life. It 
also emphasized its connection with Europe, technologically, culturally, as well 
as via tourism. People from all over Europe visited Italy and internationally well-
known Europeans like Goethe, Nietzsche, Shelley, and Keats liked to write about 
Italy. Other than social and artistic connections, Italy also stressed its material link 
with Europe, referring to the “great express, the international trains,” that passed 
through its stations.124 Both Germany and Italy had their specific characteristics, 
but they made it clear that they were part of European society, of European history, 
European relations, and European culture.
The homogeneity or universality in the serial broadcasts should not be boring. 
The IBU advised its members to contact one another when it was their turn to 
organize a European Concert. Countries should contact those who had organized 
a concert the year before. They could then exchange information on issues like the 
genres which had been used, or the most appropriate forms to give to a concert.125 
The IBU thus encouraged the exchange of knowledge and expertise in organizing 
an international event like the European Concerts. Members could harmonize and 
diversify their contributions, creating unity in the diversity of their programming.
Recent and ongoing research on the history of a European culture of music and 
musical theater supports these findings.126 Attempts to create a musical culture 
123 “Conseil,” Série 1530, 14-15, box 85, file Nuits Nationales, IBU. 
124 “Causerie devant servir d’introduction à la nuit nationale italienne du 15 octobre 1930,” Série 2060, 
16 sept. 1930, 1-3, box 85, file Nuits Nationales [subdivisé par pays], 1926-1931, IBU.
125 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1935, 261.
126 I base these findings mostly on the ongoing research program “Europe and Beyond: Transfers, Net-
works and Markets for Musical Theatre in Modern Europe, 1740-1960,” based at the European University 
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for broadcasting followed nineteenth century developments in European musical 
culture. The emphasis on national culture was nothing new. The universality that 
emerged in these national cultures in Europe was not new either. In the course of 
the nineteenth century the opera in Europe developed specific national identi-
ties, turning the Italian opera into one of many national variations. The creation 
of national operas depended on “the context of national movements, as well as 
their reception of music in general and opera in particular.”127 This process of dif-
ferentiation was accompanied by a process of convergence. The stages of explicitly 
nationalistic operas were often interchangeable, used for example for French as 
well as Czech nationalist operas. Moreover, “even composers who had a clear na-
tionalist mission still used a musical language that was compatible with European 
stylistic conventions of opera.”128 Opera consisted of different traditions, but “was 
perceived as a European art and thereby essentialized as European.”129 
A similar development took place with musical broadcasting repertoire. Broad-
casters had difficulty creating international and mostly European programs with a 
focus on national cultures. They designed their nationally diverse cultures integrat-
ing what was generally perceived as typical European musical culture. People were 
used to appropriating the music of foreign composers, or the literature and ideas 
of men like Nietzsche. The Italian broadcasters could therefore easily refer to the 
connection between the philosopher and their own beautiful country. Composers 
and compositions traveled around, creating a universal idea of European culture. 
The IBU has continued in this tradition, integrating contested visions of the lo-
cality, nationality, and internationality of the music. The organization integrated 
unity and diversity in the music. 
Success and Failure
The question remains whether the broadcasters succeeded. The aims of the IBU 
community and the OCI were to educate and uplift the minds of people to create 
international peace and understanding. They wanted to increase the amount of 
foreign programs and foreign music over listeners’ home channels by means of 
program exchange and international live events. The success of these programs 
Institute in Florence, Italy. See: Haupt and Ther, Europe and Beyond: Transfers, Networks and Markets for 
Musical Theatre in Modern Europe, 1740-1960; Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Com-
parative Perspective”; Erol, “Modernist and Nationalist Discourses on Music in Southeastern Europe.”
127 Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” 197.
128 Ibid., 198-199.
129 Ibid., 200.
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should not be overestimated nor underestimated. 
Organizing international serial broadcasts proved to be a process of trial and 
error. Several program formats failed to capture the attention of international au-
diences. They were either improved or replaced by another series. Although IBU 
members had agreed to the program formats of the Nights and European Concerts, 
in practice they showed little interest in participating. In 1928 Burrows presented 
a depressing report. No more than ten out of twenty members had participated 
in the last Night, which equaled some thirty out of 130 stations. Moreover, those 
countries that were highlighted also showed a lack of interest. One country had 
mistakenly provided advertizing material for another participant, resulting in a 
well-received journal publishing “a photo of Mont Blanc (which is in France) as 
one of the characteristics of Switzerland.”130 Members considered the organization 
of the Nights too complex and time consuming, having to collect scores, search for, 
and organize rehearsals with artists and orchestra in advance.131 There was a clear 
lack of interest among IBU members and listeners alike. Nonetheless, the IBU con-
tinued to relay the Nights until technical innovations allowed for live broadcasting 
across borders. It had no alternative. The IBU could in any case offer “to the masses a 
simple example and easy understanding of the work currently undertaken in various 
fields to create a better understanding between the peoples.”132
The subsequent series of European Concerts also attracted limited interest par-
ticularly in 1933-1934. Countries confirmed their participation too late and were 
therefore unable to join in the broadcasts. In contrast to the Nights, the IBU decided 
to stop the series, and replace it with new ones.133 Nonetheless, one successor, the 
National Concerts, would soon prove a complete failure. They were supposed to be 
half-hour broadcasts that could be relayed up to eight days after the original broad-
cast. But there were too many offers with a quality too poor to meet IBU standards. 
The IBU Council stopped the National Concerts and reintroduced the European 
Concerts with some adaptations to the program format. The Council also introduced 
obligatory participation for its member organizations. Members were strongly urged 
with an emphasis on moral behavior to participate in the European Concerts. This 
approach helped. It increased the success of the program substantially and created a 
130 “…la photographie du Mont-Blanc (qui est en France) comme une des particularités de la Suisse.” 
“Nuits Nationales,” Série 1152, 1, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU. 
131 “Avenir des Nuits Nationales, Rapporteur A.R. Burrows, Conseil no. 10 de l’Ordre du Jour,” Série 1842, 
25 avril 1930, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926-1931, IBU. 
132 “…donnent aux masses un exemple simple et facile à comprendre des efforts faits actuellement dans 
plusieurs domaines pour créer une compréhension meilleure entre les peuples.” IBU, P.V. Conseil Adminis-
trative 1930, 254.
133 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1934, 213.
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larger diffusion of the series across the European continent.134 
Developing these international series regularly interfered with efforts to create 
national listening cultures. Similar to their internationally oriented activities, broad-
casters were trying to create national broadcasting traditions. In 1936 the Norwegian 
delegate at the IBU complained on behalf of all Scandinavian countries about the 
time the European Concerts were scheduled. The concerts clashed with a long tradi-
tion of Scandinavian weather reports for many small fishermen. The Norwegian del-
egate proposed rescheduling the concerts. The IBU Council recognized the urgency 
of the weather reports but decided that the Scandinavian countries would have to 
record the live events, and broadcast them at a later time or date.135 The life-saving 
character of the weather reports and the habit of broadcasting these at a specific time 
and date outweighed the immediacy of sharing the European Concerts at the same 
time as other parts of Europe.
IBU’s cultural policy had always aimed to respect “the point of view that no trans-
mission station should be hindered in developing itself nationally and culturally.”136 
The National Nights and European Concerts drew the attention of a limited num-
ber of IBU member organizations. Although broadcasters attached considerable 
value to international programs, these interfered with the most important night 
of the week, Sunday evening. Since Sunday was the one evening that most people 
in Europe spent at home, the IBU thought it a suitable evening to broadcast in-
ternational programs. These would then have the widest possible psychological 
community-building impact on listeners. Sundays, however, had soon become 
evenings of national listening. As a result, several broadcasting organizations took 
the matter to the IBU.
In January 1928 Czeija discussed the matter in the Rapprochement Committee 
and outlined complaints from German and Austrian IBU members. Czeija, who 
was both head of the committee and director general of Austrian Ravag, explained 
the complaints made by Austrian listeners about scheduling the Nights on Sunday 
evenings. 
Us in Vienna, we estimate that it is inopportune to transmit a national 
program [National Night] on Sundays, as we have the custom of choosing 
an entertaining program for Sunday evening and our subscribers regret it 
134 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1935, 259-261. For an extensive discussion of the European con-
certs as serial event in the phase of European unification see: Fickers and Lommers, “Eventing Europe.”
135 IBU, P.V. Conseil Administrative 1936, 24, 52.
136 “le point de vue qu’aucune société d’émission ne doit être empêchée de se développer nationalement 
et culturellement.” “Commission de Rapprochement,” Série 502, 3, file P.V. Commissions des Programmes, 
IBU.
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if such a program is lacking. It is not at all certain, that our audience, ac-
customed to listening to an entertaining program on Sundays, is ready to 
receive a national program [National Night] which demands the listener’s 
sustained attention. It is rather to expect, that the enthusiasts do not lis-
ten to these programs at all, so that the aim of these programs will not be 
achieved.137
Sunday evenings in Austria had become national evenings of relaxation and enter-
tainment. The enduring character of a National Night that required attentive lis-
tening did not suit these national developments. Germany expressed similar com-
plaints. In Germany, Sunday evenings had a different program schedule from week 
days. This would change only a little over the years and acquired the status of a 
German tradition.138 
In the following years the IBU would respect these national developments in 
listening traditions, albeit with one small though important exception. Czeija had 
proposed to change the broadcasting date to the first day of the week. When the 
IBU communicated its list with the dates for the next series of Nights, they avoided 
Sunday evening.139 The following Nights as well as the entire series of European 
and International Concerts were broadcast during varying weekdays. The IBU had 
given up the idea of one fixed evening a week for international scheduling. In agree-
ment with the IBU and its member organizations, the unique character of the World 
Concerts as well as important unique events like Youth Sings would be celebrated 
by broadcasting them on a Sunday evening. The IBU had to give in to developing 
national listening traditions even though this reduced the impact of its international 
programs on the largest possible audience. The most impressive achievements none-
theless continued to reach all of Europe on the most important listening evening of 
the week. With a modest success rate and a less receptive audience than anticipated, 
the failure of the international live events was probably guaranteed. 
137 “Nous autres à Vienne, nous estimons qu’il est inopportune d’émettre un programme national le 
dimanche, car nous avons coutume de choisir un programme divertissant pour les soirées de dimanche et 
nos abonnés regretteraient si un tel programme venait à manquer. Il n’est pas du tout sûr que notre public, 
habitué d’écouter un programme divertissant le dimanche, soit disposé à recevoir un programme national 
qui exige l’attention soutenue de l’écouteur. Il est plutôt à supposer, que les amateurs n’écoutent pas du tout 
ces programmes, de sorte que le but serait pas atteint.” “Fixation des dates pour les programmes nationaux, 
no. 11 de l’ordre du jour de la Commission de Rapprochement (Série 817), Rapporteur M. O. Czeija,” Série 
843, 24 janv. 1928, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux (Nuits Nationales), Général, 1926-1931, IBU.
138 For an exposé on the development of Sunday as a national evening of listening in Germany see: 
Alexander Badenoch, “Making Sunday What it Actually Should Be: Sunday Radio Programming and the 
Re-Invention of Tradition in Occupied Germany 1945-1949,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Televi-
sion 25, no. 4 (2005): 577-598; Alexander Badenoch, Voices in Ruins: West German Radio across the 1945 
Divide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 190-195.
139 “Soirées Nationales,” Série 875, box 85, file Relais, Programmes Nationaux, Général, IBU.
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A brief exploratory study of two Dutch broadcasting organizations’ program 
guides suggests otherwise.140 Their look and feel, their categorization, as well as 
the music choices corresponded with international cultural policy efforts pro-
moting the education of the mind. The organizations divided the schedules into 
a national and an international section. The latter had foreign stations organized 
alphabetically rather than by country. The international clearly meant European 
stations only.141 Furthermore, the scheduled music was live programs alternated 
with time slots called Grammofoonmuziek, gramophone music. The IBU members 
and the record industry agreed that the guides should refer explicitly to music 
as recorded contributions. However they were inconsistent when it came to nu-
merical references to records. In 1931 the organization Vereeniging van Arbeiders 
Radio Amateurs (VARA) for instance referred to these numbers in its radio guide 
De Radiogids, but by 1935 it did not anymore.142 With some inconsistencies, the 
Dutch guides were presented in a similar language and with similar referencing 
to both the national, and the international that was interchangeable with Europe. 
The music in the guides gives a similar impression. About 90 percent of broad-
casting in the Netherlands consisted of foreign music.143 Articles discussed the 
life and work of well-known composers who were part of the European music 
tradition. The guides also promoted programs broadcast over foreign chan-
nels. The VARA integrated a feature in its foreign section entitled Europa zendt, 
Europe broadcasts, that summarized interesting foreign broadcasts every day. 
The Algemeene Vereeniging Radio Omroep (AVRO) regularly advertised live pro-
grams of high-culture music in its guide De Radiobode. The music varied from 
Corsican folk music broadcast by the Paris PTT to Richard Wagner’s Der Ring der 
Nibelungen broadcast via the station in Leipzig.144 The guides promoted foreign 
live music, both over their national channels as well as those of their foreign col-
leagues. The international live programs coordinated by the IBU found a special 
place in the guides. They regularly promoted international events in Europa zendt 
or with an explicit advertisement for a European Concert. The VARA devoted its 
140 I realize that there might be a theoretical discussion about ways to interpret cultural sources like 
program guides, but I will not enter such discussions. The examples only serve to show a certain consist-
ency between transnationally negotiated standards and nationally issued program guides that found their 
way into the homes of the actual listener. 
141 VARA, De Radiogids, (1931, 1932, 1935); AVRO, De Radiobode (1931, 1932, 1935). American music 
was relayed on occasion via British stations. The AVRO for instance regularly advertized the American 
program “Five hours back,” relayed via the British station in Droitwich. AVRO, De Radiobode 18, no. 46 
(16 nov. 1935), 106.
142 For an example see: VARA, De Radiogids 5, no. 47 (14 oct. 1931), 35; VARA, De Radiogids 9, no. 45 
(1935), 142.
143 IBU, Broadcasting, 16-17.
144 AVRO, De Radiobode 18, no. 45 (13 nov. 1935), 72; AVRO, De Radiobode 18, no. 46 (1935).
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Figure 6.5 – Europa zendt – IBU standards in Dutch program guides
Source: AVRO, De Radiobode 18, no. 45 (13 Nov. 1935), 72; AVRO, De Radiobode 18, no. 46 
(1935); VARA, De Radiogids 9 no. 50 (19 Oct. 1935), 37, 43; VARA, De Radiogids 9, no. 52 (26 
Oct. 1935), cover; Used by the courtesy of the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision.
front page to the unique Youth Sings, and integrated a two-page description of 
the event (Figure 6.5). Furthermore, the technical complexity of such broadcasts 
was occasionally featured.145 Overall, the guides were full of references to foreign 
music, to European musical repertoire and the IBU’s international programming 
145 For an example see: VARA, De Radiogids 5, no. 53 (31 Oct. 1931), 12.
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activities. These international standards were visible in the lay-out, the feel, pic-
tures, and advertisements. The language and choice of topic were consistent with 
the IBU and its members’ aims to educate listeners with an international mind.
Can we conclude that these transnational activities were fruitless attempts 
to educate and influence the European audiences and their listening cultures? 
According to Wintle, agreeing on ways to communicate group identity beyond 
borders is relatively easy. It is much more complex, however, to “concur on our 
representation of the group towards ourselves, our self-representation.”146 With 
their standardization activities, the IBU and its members were attempting to reach 
consensus about their cultural self-representation. Many transnational standard-
ization activities have found their way into the homes of people via the program 
guides and schedules. Broadcasters envisioned and shaped Europe’s musical cul-
tural heritage, seeking a basis for new listening cultures. They used different meth-
ods to determine the whereabouts of these cultural “rules,” Nonetheless, “used in 
its symbolically charged form,” Peter Odermatt argues, “the term culture [itself 
already] implies that there is such a thing as a homogeneous group, even though 
there need be no consensus throughout that group as to the actual content of that 
culture.”147
Conclusion
Programming was perhaps the most obvious and problematic locus for European 
unification. Intellectuals generally thought of culture as an important aspect of 
civilization. Consequently, the question of international live programs, in particu-
lar the discussed music programs, as well as a cross-border exchange, touched on 
the sensitive topic of shaping feelings of belonging. Creating a cultural policy for 
broadcasting and above all deciding what programs would best express a civilized 
society, proved to be complicated.
The standardization of a cultural policy for broadcasting remained a much 
more random affair. Many questions, such as copyrights, were firmly established 
in national legislation. In order to allow for cross-border flows of music, these na-
tional laws required comprehensive fine-tuning efforts. Furthermore, a successful 
146 Michael Wintle, “Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe,” in Culture and Identity in 
Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present, ed. Michael Wintle (Aldershot; Brookfield 
[Vt.] USA: Avebury, 1996), 6.
147 Wintle, “Introduction,” 6; Quoted from Peter Odermatt, “The Use of Symbols in the Drive for 
European Integration,” in Yearbook of European Studies: 4: National Identity, ed. Joep Leerssen and Menno 
Spiering (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1991), 219.
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policy had to facilitate the practical coordination of programs and their formats as 
well as standards for a repertoire for broadcasting music. With the wide variety of 
issues came a wide variety of stakeholders who operated locally, nationally, and/
or internationally. They had different opinions and different interdependencies. 
By the early 1930s, these stakeholders generally agreed that music united and 
that broadcasting could create unity among listeners. Music was a universal lan-
guage that could overcome the large differences in speech in Europe. In the early 
1930s they thought that speech could never achieve the same effect.148 Stakeholders 
did not necessarily agree on how to realize the unifying force of music organi-
zationally. For instance they had different opinions on program content and the 
responsibility for program construction. Besides, nobody had experience with the 
organization and coordination of programs that crossed borders. Defining a cul-
tural policy was therefore a case of learning by doing. Even when stakeholders 
agreed, the question remained whether the status quo of the technology allowed 
for the practical realization of their visions. 
Over the years, the IBU, and thus the European broadcasting organizations, 
managed to maintain control over the construction of programs for broadcasting. 
In particular, when the League’s Committee of Letters & Arts envisioned creating 
an international program committee, the IBU fiercely opposed the idea. The IBU 
community related its programming activities much more directly to a vision of 
Europe than its illicit propaganda activities. Moreover, the development of world-
wide live broadcasting events only began some five years before the outbreak of 
war. Consequently, Europe-oriented live programs by far outweighed these global 
broadcasts in number. Programs featured mostly European artists and European 
traditions of listening to music. 
Over the years stakeholders came up with numerous visions of Europe when 
negotiating their cultural policy standards. These differed from central clear-
ing houses for sound broadcasting to many visions fulfilling a European culture 
consisting of a brotherhood of national cultures. The international broadcasting 
community consisting of IBU experts, OCI members and external musical elites 
constructed a European culture that reflected a universalized idea of national 
diversity. The community contributed a relatively safe, generally accepted, high 
quality, and high-art image of European culture to Europe’s cultural heritage in 
the interwar years. Their musical repertoire had a slightly lower culture profile 
148 After ten years of experience with the construction of international programs the IBU concluded 
that not everything could be said with music. Sometimes speech was needed, because “music, although it 
has an important mission in social life, cannot express the innermost thoughts of one people to another.” 
As a consequence, the language issue remained a problem with respect to the negotiation of programs in 
relation to the unification of listeners. IBU, Broadcasting, 93.
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than pre-broadcasting era European canons of music. They increasingly directed 
their attention towards accessible high-art music consisting of fragmented pieces 
that were shorter and more instrumental. Even though these adaptations formed a 
break with the past, the nature of negotiations of musical culture in general contin-
ued in established traditions. Creating a European musical culture was a question 
of balancing universality and diversity.
Many programming issues remained unresolved at the time of the outbreak of 
World War II. In particular the question of what makes a good European program 
was still unclear. The OCI, the IBU, and international cultural elites had not re-
solved their disagreements on defining high-culture or high-quality broadcasting, 
nor were they able to conclude a binding international agreement on copyrights or 
artists’ rights. Nonetheless, the European community of broadcasting experts did 
arrange a considerable number of international live programs, a dynamic program 
exchange, and their standards based on European ideals of peace and understand-
ing clearly found their way into Dutch program guides. These repeated and unique 
efforts were all geared to making the international and the European a routine part 
of listeners’ everyday lives. To what extent did they actually succeed?
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
Internationalism in Practice
Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi had clear views on the role technology should 
play in the reconstruction of Europe after the Great War. He was the leader of the 
Pan European Movement, and a well-known lobbyist for European unification. 
Within a year of the establishment of the IBU, he remarked that technology had 
basically made Europe get lost in a universalizing world as a result of ever increas-
ing connections.1 No more than ten years later, the Austrian Oskar Czeija, in his 
role as director of the IBU Rapprochement Committee, would speak at one of the 
conferences of the Pan European Movement held in Vienna in 1935. Apparently 
Coudenhove-Kalergi had now developed an eye for the possibilities that broad-
casting offered to promote his European activities. 
Czeija’s speech made it clear that the IBU ultimately aimed to create a European 
union, but that it above all pursued “the tendency to contribute to the rapproche-
ment of nations…”[italics – s.l.].2 For the time being, it was more fruitful to practi-
cally relate to ongoing rapprochement activities of organizations like the League 
of Nations. Although Czeija did not undermine the importance of the idea of a 
European union, he was working on an initiative with a global vision. In his speech 
he thus gently drew attention away from the European towards the international, 
an entity that he considered of more interest. Europe – On Air has queried pre-
cisely this connection between broadcasting construction and the unification of 
Europe, questioning processes in which actors negotiated specific projects which 
they articulated in European terms. Europe – On Air asks the question how and 
why actors involved in transnational broadcasting contributed to European unifi-
cation in the interwar years. 
1 Count Richard Coudenhoven-Kalergi, Paneuropa (Wien: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1926), 16.
2 “la tendence de contribuer au rapprochement des nations…” “L’idée de Pan-Europe et la Radio-dif-
fusion,” 1, box 74, file Propagande de l’UIR et des membres, II, Général, 1932-1936, IBU. The speech in 
abbreviated form has also been referred to by Oskar Czeija, “Paneuropa – Idee und Rundfunk,” Paneuropa 
11, no. 6/8 (1935): 197-199.
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Dreams of Feasibility
People who developed broadcasting above all dreamt of feasibility. In the early 1920s, 
wireless experts and enthusiasts had only just started to develop broadcasting. They 
tried to build and promote a new tradition of listening to music. Soon they encoun-
tered problems which they could not resolve at the national level. They decided to 
join hands internationally. Together they managed to combine a striking variety of 
sensitive topics in all sorts of standards. Among others, they tried to resolve defi-
nition issues. What exactly was “good,” “high-culture,” “commercial” or “political” 
broadcasting? As the above example of Czeija shows, these experts were well aware 
of the fact that their choices contributed to specific European projects and to the 
desire not only to build strong national societies, but also forge ties across borders. 
The need to solve practical problems and the desire to shape a transnational sense of 
unity among listeners are the two major factors which fuelled the activities of those 
who were building broadcasting networks beyond national boundaries. 
Creating transnational broadcasting was a hard and far from linear process. The 
internationally active broadcasting experts never took a blue print approach. They 
organized ad hoc processes of trial and error agreeing that it was always better to 
pursue the achievable. They understood that contestations and errors were just part 
of the game of designing a system and a tradition that was absent.3 In their view, 
building broadcasting across borders was above all a matter of learning by doing, a 
matter of “practical internationalism.”4
The process was heavily influenced by new technological options. One of these 
was short waves. This development redefined the entire transnational broadcasting 
system that existed up to the early 1930s. It opened up the possibility of worldwide 
broadcasting, and therefore challenged the European standards that had only re-
cently been developed. Moreover, many new stations based their systems on this 
new and unregulated option, challenging the existing ones in all their facets from 
technical to programming standards. Innovations like the short waves created new 
problems and opportunities for the actors engaged in the process of building broad-
casting networks across borders. 
In order to deal with their challenges, the broadcasting experts organized them-
selves transnationally into a flexible expert community with an open organizational 
structure. This community consisted of experts who worked within and outside 
3 “Détails d’organisation des concerts pouvant faire l’objet d’une diffusion internationale, Réunion des 
directeurs de programmes, observationos de M. K.B. Jirak, Radiojournal, Prague,” Série 4762, 11 fév. 1935, 
2, box 85, file Relais Concerts européens, Général, 1931 à 1939, IBU.
4 IBU, Union Internationale de Radiophonie (Geneva: IBU, 1926), 15.
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government, in business, and with cultural affiliations at local, national, and inter-
national level. Open organization structures like those of the IBU, the ITU, and the 
League of Nations technical committees, were a way of dealing with high-speed, 
diverse, and interrelated developments. They allowed the expert community to cre-
ate different forms of collaborations for each of the problems it tackled, acquiring 
precisely the right kind of expertise required for the problem at hand. These collabo-
rations could be ad hoc, short, long, informal, formal, permanent, or official, involv-
ing large or small numbers of experts as the occasion required. However, there were 
always a small number of individual experts working in different organizations who 
formed a core community, tying together the various collaborations. 
It is interesting to note that the core community dominating these collaborations 
did not only include leading experts from the big European powers of Germany, 
Great Britain, and France. The group also consisted of experts from smaller coun-
tries and countries located more towards the east such as Austria, Norway, Poland, 
and Czechoslovakia. These countries in particular embraced a very rich musical cul-
ture, which they defined as an important tool for their domestic unification efforts.5 
Consequently, these north, central and east European experts frequently took the 
lead in solving the most complicated problems. They took the lead in creating an in-
ternational relay network for music, standards for propaganda broadcasting, as well 
as international programming and exchange, to name but a few. With the exception 
of southern Europe, the core community of experts thus reflected Europe in a much 
broader sense than media historians imply.
Over the years, the IBU in particular developed as a mediating arena where these 
experts could collaborate. Initially the organization was established to fill a regula-
tory gap left by other organizations who for the moment decided not to deal with the 
newly evolving medium. The IBU created a transnational practice and a culture, that 
by appealing to gentlemanly and civilized behavior tried to make its members and 
other interested stakeholders adhere to its non-binding recommendations. Over the 
years it established collaboration with the League of Nations and the International 
Telegraph Union who would recognize the Union as European expert in broadcast-
ing by the end of the 1920s. 
Relations between these organizations changed throughout the years, depend-
ing on which issue was being discussed. The IBU managed to employ these orga-
nizations as informal executors of its own plans. The League of Nations, as well 
5 Philipp Ther,  Philipp Ther, “The Genre of National Opera in a European Comparative Perspective,” in 
The Oxford Handbook to the New Cultural History of Music, ed. Jane Fulcher (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 182-208; Philipp Ther, In der Mitte der Gesellschaft: Operntheater in Zentraleuropa 1915-1914 
(Wien; München: Oldenbourg, 2006).
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as the International Telegraph Union, would fine-tune into their own international 
agreements, appropriately adapted IBU recommendations. A statute change in 1929 
meant that the IBU from then on also stood for the ITU and PTT administrations 
in relation to technical affairs. Consequently, its technical standards acquired a more 
official and powerful status. On occasions the relations between the IBU, ITU, and 
League of Nations shifted. From the mid-1930s onwards, the League of Nations for 
instance continued and then completed the international regulation of propaganda 
broadcasting, while the IBU had to drop this issue. As a result of internal political 
and ideological litigation, the IBU reluctantly chose to withdraw. The Union did not 
always manage to take a stand.
The transnational expert community thus discovered that the basis for collabo-
ration was fragile. Changing international relations influenced the development of 
transnational broadcasting in all its facets. Progress in relations signified progress in 
broadcasting construction. The signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 for in-
stance brought hope and improved relations. In its wake, the IBU obtained collabo-
ration from the League of Nations to take up all kinds of problems from propaganda 
to copyrights on cross-border flows of music. In addition, the USSR took action 
to develop closer and collaborative initiatives with the other European countries, 
whereas the League of Nations created its own station, Radio Nations. This flow of 
new broadcasting initiatives slowed down when international relations worsened 
again in the course of the 1930s with the rise of harsh nationalist sentiments. Fear of 
war and international quarrels made it increasingly difficult to accomplish progress 
in every aspect of transnational broadcasting construction. 
As a way of handling these fragile international relations, a number of IBU ex-
perts developed specific techno-political diplomatic skills. They emphasized the 
technological side of their work. The Union also claimed it did not interfere in po-
litical problems and international relations. Yet these experts managed to deal with 
all kinds of politically sensitive issues including fine-tuning systems with different 
politico-ideological purposes such as the IBU and Radio Moscow. When interna-
tional relations deteriorated during the 1930s, the increasing international tensions 
forced the IBU to withdraw from and reduce its overtly political work. The IBU 
techno-political diplomats managed to continue their politically neutral attitude in 
processes highlighting the technological side of their task. Inevitably, the changing 
international relations jeopardized and weakened IBU’s role as mediator in trans-
national broadcasting construction efforts. Other experts and organizations in the 
transnational community took over the responsibility for solving political problems. 
The underlying collaborative relationships nevertheless remained intact. Everything 
the broadcasting community undertook happened with an eye to achievability.
TEHS7_handels.indd   292 5/9/2012   3:41:32 PM
 Conclusion: Internationalism in Practice 293
Envisioning Europe on Air
Shaping relationships between people and creating identities always had top pri-
ority. This book has been an inquiry into the question of whether some sort of 
European agenda was part of the process. It is clear that the efforts described did 
not relate to a European project in a univocal way nor did they create a single, 
straightforward European broadcasting network. The one exception was Radio 
Luxembourg. Broadcasting experts in Europe mostly had global ambitions. They 
wanted to create international identities, not European ones per se. Europe, how-
ever, hovered somewhere in the background as a geographical focus or as a practi-
cal in-between solution.
The geographical focus of Europe, for instance, often remained implicit. 
Experts only defined Europe if their activities required clarification on boundary 
work. In the 1920s, the definition focused on the natural fringes of Europe with the 
North Sea in the west, the Ural Mountains in the east, and the Sahara in the south. 
By the time the short waves opened up the possibility of worldwide broadcast-
ing, an established system was already in place in Europe. A further development 
of this system beyond the European region needed to be fine-tuned with others. 
These fine-tuning processes renegotiated Europe in the light of the wider world, 
heading towards a transnational Eurocentric global space for broadcasting. In the 
entire process of building a broadcasting system beyond national borders, most of 
the time the geographical notion of Europe remained very vague. 
This was all happening as part of what the IBU called a practical international-
ist approach. The term flourished widely at the time, mostly referring to technical 
organizations like the International Telegraph Union or an organization such as 
the IBU.6 By using “internationalism” the IBU related to the ideals of collabora-
tion, rapprochement, and peace as pursued by the transnational elites and the aims 
of international organizations like the League of Nations. “Practical” referred to 
commerce, to making profit, as well as to efficiency and innovation instead of a 
political approach. Practical internationalism seems to relate closely to the ana-
lytic term technocratic internationalism as defined by Johan Schot and Vincent 
Lagendijk, which they see as the context philosophy for infrastructure construc-
tion in Europe in areas like electricity and transport.7 
6 Francis Paul Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 7.
7 Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building 
Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks,” Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 
196-217.
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Schot and Lagendijk do not explicitly link the idea of technocratic internation-
alism to traditions of European thought and culture. In contrast, the IBU commu-
nity on occasion consciously specified this relationship. In particular with respect 
to its program-related activities, Europe entered as a historically defined culture 
and set of behavioral manners which the IBU community viewed as deeply rooted 
in the ideology of internationalism. They felt that their program efforts should 
contribute to the shaping of Europe’s civilization and culture, in short to building 
European cultural unification. The IBU for instance explicitly sought to identify 
that one program which could give the best possible expression of European civi-
lization and culture. At times at the forefront, but mostly hidden, Europe hovered 
somewhere within the philosophy or newly developing tradition of practical in-
ternationalism.
Other actors outside the IBU designed inherently different kinds of broadcast-
ing systems, negotiating from an entirely or partially different viewpoint. The ini-
tial idea of Radio Luxembourg for instance adhered to this tradition, albeit from 
the point of view of European economic unity. In contrast, Radio Moscow was 
right from the start an explicit political tool for building a Socialist new world. It 
did not aim for understanding and collaboration between nations, but focused on 
one international socialist society. Consequently, not all promoters of broadcast-
ing systems between the wars can be said to fit the technocratic internationalist 
philosophy in its entirety or even partially. Similarly, most of these viewpoints did 
focus on the world as a whole, rather than specifically on Europe.
Opinions might differ about the success or failure of these interwar transna-
tional broadcasting communities. On the one hand, the transnational experts built 
a network, broadcast “international” programs, made arrangements for the use of 
broadcasting in the context of propaganda, war and peace, created an institutional 
network, and managed to have their ideas trickle down into national program 
guides. This was no mean performance during such turbulent interwar years. On 
the other hand, the international tensions of the 1930s, as well as the outbreak of 
World War II, prevented the final realization and effectiveness of the transnational 
broadcasting systems they envisioned. As a result, several initiatives were less ef-
fective than planned or met with less enthusiasm to participate than its designers 
had hoped. By the end of the 1930s many questions remained unresolved. 
One should not conclude on the basis of these developments that these ex-
perts’ efforts were in any way marginal or meaningless. They succeeded in creat-
ing a European space, a transnational broadcasting community, and some kind 
of European regulatory culture for broadcasting. After the war, these found a 
new start in the European Broadcasting Union as well as the East European 
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Organization for Radio and Television, continuing up to present-day television 
programs. In addition, the International Convention for the Use of Broadcasting 
in the Cause of Peace was taken up after the war by UNESCO, even though the 
effectiveness of the Convention remained dubious given the role of transnational 
broadcasting during the Cold War years.8 Interwar projects have thus influenced 
the direction of the agenda for broadcasting right up to the present day.
8 In 2005 UNESCO adopted a new Convention that directly built on the interwar year efforts to 
expand the idea of an all inclusive European culture of diversity. The convention affirms that “freedom 
of thought, expression and information, as well as diversity of the media, enable cultural expressions to 
flourish within societies.” See: UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (Paris: UNESCO, 2005), 2, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.
pdf. Accessed September 23, 2010. To date the EBU stays in close contact with UNESCO and seriously 
participates in its ideological work. The EBU has established a Cultural Diversity group and provides a 
Cultural Diversity Toolkit to all its members and interested parties. Its policy finds its way into all televi-
sion and radio program schedules of its member public broadcasters. Interview with Pierre Duret, Project 
manager EBU Eurovision TV, conducted in Geneva on February 12, 2008; http://www.ebu.ch/en/legal/
topical/leg_t_gats_top.php. Accessed September 23, 2010.
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Albania Enti Shqiptare Audicijoni Radiofonike I Tirana 25.VI.1941
Algeria Gouvernement général de l’Algérie, Service central des PTT, 
Alger
Joined as an associate member:
Joined as an active member:
6.VI.1932
13.V.1933
Austria *Oesterreichische Radio-Verkehrs- A.G. (RAVAG), Vienna
Incorporated in the RRG, Berlin in 1938.
5.IV.1925
Belgium * Radio Belgique S.A.
Since 1.II.1931: Institut national belge de Radiodiffusion
N.V. Radio-Louvain, Louvain
Since 1.II.1931: Institut national belge de Radiodiffusion




Bulgaria Radio-Sofia, Sofia 13.III.1937
Croatia Hrvatski Krugoval, Zagreb 4.VI.1942
Czechoslovakia * Radiojournal, Prague
Since 10.VI.1939: Cesky Rozhlas, Prague
18.III.1925
Danzig Danziger Rundfunk – Sendebetrieb der Post- und 
Telegraphen-Verwaltung, Danzig
Since 15.X.1935: 
Landespostdirektion der Freien Stadt Danzig, Danzig






Egypt Egyptian State Telegraphs and Telephones, Cairo
Collaboration suspended 23.V.1942.
4.X.1933
1 IBU, Twenty Years of Activity of the International Broadcasting Union (Geneva: IBU, 1945), 65-76.
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Finland Osakeyhtiö Suomen Yleisradio, Helsinki
Since 15.V.1934:
O.Y. Suomen Yleisradio A.B., Helsinki
Since 31.V.1944:
Oy. Yleisradio Ab., Helsinki
12.IX.1927
France * Le Petit Parisien, Paris
Afterwards:
Compagnie générale d’Energie radioélectrique, Poste 
Parisien, Paris
Collaboration suspended June 1940.
* Compagnie française de Radiophonie, Radio-Paris, Paris
Taken up again on 12.IX.1933 by
Service de la Radiodiffusion de l’Administration 
française des Postes et des Télégraphes, Paris
Became on 29.VII.1939:
Radiodiffusion Nationale, Paris (afterwards Vichy)
Became in October 1944:
Radiodiffusion Française, Paris
Radio-Toulouse, La Radiophonie du Midi, Toulouse
Collaboration suspended from 1929 onwards. 
Rejoined the Union under its new name:
S.A. La Radiophonie du Midi, Toulouse
Incorporated in the Radiodiffusion Française in October 
1944.
Syndicat de la Radiophonie lyonnaise, Lyon
Afterwards became:
Radio-Lyon Emissions S.A., Lyon
Collaboration ceased on 17.VI.1932. 
Rejoined the IBU under its new name:
S.A. Radio-Lyon, Lyon
Incorporated in the Radiodiffusion Française in October 
1944.
S.A. Radio-Méditerranée. Antibes
Incorporated in the Radiodifusion Française in October 
1944.
Société méridionale de Radiodiffusion, Nîmes










Germany * Reichs-Rundfunk-G.m.b.H., Berlin 18.III.1925
Great Britain British Broadcasting Company Ltd., London
Since 1.I.1927:
British Broadcasting Corporation, London
Collaboration suspended 18.III.1941.
18.III.1925
TEHS7_handels.indd   297 5/9/2012   3:41:32 PM
298 Europe – On Air
Greece Greek Broadcasting Service, Athens
Since December 1938:
Broadcasting Department of the State Under-Secretariat
for Press and Touring, Athens
Since 2.VI.1941:
Greek Broadcasting Society A.A. (AERE). Athens
l.VII.1938
26.XI.1941
Hungary Magyar Telefonhirmondo es Radio R.T., Budapest 24.III.1926
Ireland Broadcasting Service, Department of Posts and Telegraphs, 
Dublin
Since 29.XII.1937:
Direction of Broadcasting, General Post Office, Dublin
3.IX.1928
Italy Unione Radiofonica Italiana, Milan
Since 17.XI.1927:
Ente Iteliano per Ie Audizioni Radiofoniche (EIAR), Rome
Since the autumn 1944:
Radio Audizioni Italia (RAI), Rome
23.III.1926




Lithuania General Direction of Posts and Telegraphs, Kaunas 20.II.1935
Morocco Office chérifien des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones, Rabat
Joined as associate member:
Joined as active member:
11.II.1931
25.VI.1941
Netherlands * Nederlandsche Seintoestellen Fabriek (NSF), Hilversum
Afterwards acquired by another group.
N.V. Nederlandsche Draadlooze Omroep, Hilversum
Withdrawn from the IBU on 28.V.1929 because it did 
not fulfil the required conditions anymore.
Algemeene Vereeniging Radio-Omroep (AVRO), 
Amsterdam
Katholieke Radio-Omroep (KRO), Amsterdam
Nederlandsche Christelijke RadioVereeniging (NCRV),
Hilversum
Vereeniging van Arbeiders Radio Amateurs (VARA),
Hilversum
Vrijzinnig Protestantsche Radio Omroep (VPRO),
Amsterdam
Membership resigned 21.VI.1935. 
All these societies dissolved 27.XII.1940 and replaced by
the State organisation:











Palestine Palestine Broadcasting Service, Jerusalem
Collaboration suspended 8.VI.1941.
20.II.1936
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Poland Polskie Radjo S.A., Warsaw 11.V.1927
Portugal Administração geral dos Correios, Telegrafos e Telefones, 
Lisbon
Since 14.IX.1940:
Emissora nacional de Radiodifusão, Lisbon
23.V.1930
Rumania Societatea de Difuziune Radiotelefonica, Bucharest
Since 9.VII.1937:
Societatea romana de Radiodifuziune, Bucharest
1.VI.1928
Slovakia Slovensky Rozhlas, Bratislava 25.IV.1940
Spain * Asociación Nacional de Radiodifusión, Barcelona
On 1.II.1927 incorporated in the:
Union Radio S.A., Madrid
Became in 1942:
Societad Española de Radiodifusión, Madrid
Collaboration suspended Since the Spanish civil war.
Servicio de Radiodifusión de la Republica Española, 
Barcelona (before Madrid and Valencia)
Closed down as a result of changes brought about by
political events.
Sección Radiocomunicación, Dirección de Telegrafos, 
Comisión de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones, Burgos
(of the Franco Government)
At first as special member; afterwards:
Departamento Radio del Servicio Nacional de Propaganda, 
Burgos
Admitted as active member:
Afterwards:
Departamento Radio, Servicio de
Telecomunicación – Ingenieria – Ministerio de la





Sweden Aktiebolaget Radiotjänst, Stockholm 23.III.1926
Switzerland * Société des Emissions “Radio-Genève, Geneva
Radiogenossenschaft Bern, Berne
Société romande de Radiophonie (Radio-Lausanne), 
Lausanne
On 24.II.1931 all the Swiss broadcastings societies were
grouped under the name of:
Société suisse de Radiodiffusion (SSR), Berne
Since 29.VIII.1939:





Tunisia Office des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones, Tunis 25.IV.1940
Turkey Turkish Wireless Telephony Company, Stambul
Collaboration suspended 30.VI.1931.
Broadcasting Service of the Department of Posts and
Telegraphs, Ataturk
Since 1.VI.1940:
Radio -Ankara, Press Department, Ankara
28.IX.1927
27.II.1939
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Yugoslavia Wireless Telegraphy Company, Belgrade
Ceased functioning on the entry into service of:















Kenya British East African Broadcasting Company, Nairobi
Membership resigned 26.IX.1930.
1.VI.1928
South Africa African Broadcasting Company, Ltd., Johannesburg
Membership resigned 30.VII.1930. Rejoined
the IBU on 18.VI.1934.
Became on 1.VIII.1936:
South African Broadcasting Corporation, Johannesburg
30.V.1929
North and South America
Date of entry
Argentina Estación de Radiodifusión del Estado, Dirección general
de Correos y Telegrafos (Servicio de Radio-comunicaciones), 
Buenos Aires





Canada James Richardson and Sons, Ltd, Winnipeg
Membership resigned 30.III.1932 as a result of a pro-
jected re-organisation of the Canadian Radio.




Cuba Telephone Company, Havana
Dissolved 20.II.1935.
12.V.1927
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Haiti Radio-Haïti, Port-au-Prince
Not in the IBU since 3.VI.1942.
27.II.1939
Mexico Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad, Mexico
Membership resigned 12.II.1944.
29.VI.1938
Peru Administration of Posts and Telegraphs of Peru, Lima
Not in the IBU since 12.V.1933.
12.V.1927
Porto Rico Radio Corporation of Porto Rico, San Juan
Membership resigned 17.VII.1940.
20.II.1935
United States Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., New York
Membership suspended 16.XII.1941.
Mutual Broadcasting System, New York
National Association of Broadcasters, Washington
Membership resigned 6.III.1940.
National Broadcasting Company, New York
The Tribune Company, Chicago
Incorporated in the Mutual Broadcasting System
World Wide Broadcasting Foundation, New York
Membership resigned 12.VII.1940.
Northwestern Broadcasting, Inc., Minnesota
Acquired by the Columbia Broadcasting System in 1932.



















China The Central Broadcasting Station (XGOA), Nanking 
(afterwards Chungking)
30.VL1936
India (British) The Indian Broadcasting Service, Bombay
Membership resigned 30.VI.1932.
Rejoined under the name of:




Indies (Dutch) N.V. Nederlandsch-Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij
(NIROM), Amsterdam
20.II.1939
Iran Wireless Telegraphy Department, Pahlevi, at the Ministry of 
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, Teheran
1.VII.1939
Japan Nihon Hoso Kyokai (JOCK Broadcasting Station), Nagoya
Membership resigned 12.VI.1934 on account of its
incorporation in:




Manchukuo Mandshu Denshin Denwa Kabushiki Kaisha, Hsinking 24.VI.1943
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Date of entry
Netherlands N.V. Philip’s Omroep Holland-Indie (PHOHI), Eindhoven





Australia Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia), Ltd., Sydney
Central Broadcasting, Ltd., Adelaide
Membership resigned 13.IX.1928.
National Broadcasting Service, Melbourne
Collaboration suspended 30.IV.1941.
Australian Broadcasting Company, Ltd., Sydney
Closed down 30.VI.1932.







New Zealand New Zealand Broadcasting Board, Zealand Wellington
Since 1.VII.1936:
New Zealand National Broadcasting Service, Wellington
Collaboration suspended 10.X.1941.
12.VI.1934




European Broadcasting Union Archives, Geneva (EBU)
P1 Programme, “Notre Monde” Our World, 1967
International Broadcasting Union Archives, Geneva (IBU)
Box 02 Adhésions et démissions
Box 04 Amateurs, Association d’…
Box 13 Commission Technique 1937-1945 
Box 14 Conférences et conventions internationales
Box 15 Contrôle de la matière radiodiffusée
Box 17 Désarmement moral et propagande inadmissible
Box 31 Graphiques
Box 32 Gramophones
Box 33 Histoire de l’UIR
Box 53 Statut International de la radio, 1930-1941
Box 58 Photos
Box 59 Politique et Radio
Box 74 Propagande de l’Union des membres
Box 80ter Commission de Rapprochement, 1927-1950 
Box 85 Relais 1926-1950
Box 86 Relations Internationales
Box 92 Société des Nations 1925-1940
Box 94 Stations à ondes longues – moyennes – intermédiaires
Box 94bis Stations d’amateurs, privées et clandestines
Box 95bis Programmes
Conseil Administrative, Documentes “Séries”, 1927-1950
Commission des Programmes [anciennement Commissions de Rapprochement et Relais], 
1926-1939
Procès-verbaux, Assemblée Générale 1926-1945
Procès-verbaux, Conseil Administrative 1925-1945
Procès-verbaux, Commission Mixte, de Relais, Spéciale
Procès-verbaux, Commission Technique 1925-1940
Questionnaires, no. 1-869; no. 877-2278
85, Concerts européens [subdivisé par pays], 1931-1939
85, Concerts internationaux [mondiaux] [subdivisé par pays], crée en 1936
85, Nuits nationales [subdivisé par pays], 1926-1931
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International Telecommunication Union Library and Archives, Geneva (ITU)
Series 41 Z 11, Circulaires télégraphiques no. 849-1004 (1928-1933)
Series 41 Z 11, Circulaires télégraphiques no. 1171, 1196, 1257, 1275, 1278 (1947-1953)
Fonds de Berne, UIR docs, liasses no. 0907-0911, 1929-1938, 1945-1946
Fonds de Berne, OIR, liasses sans numéro, 1946-1947, 1951-1952
League of Nations Archives, Geneva (LoN)
Registry file 5B Intellectual Co-Operation
Registry file 9G Communications and Transit Section: Posts and Telegraphs 
Registry file 14 Transit
Broadcasting and Peace 1938 Expert Group, minutes of meetings
Commission of Enquiry for European Union, minutes of meetings
Committee of Letters & Arts, minutes of meetings
Committee for Moral Disarmament files
Communications and Transit Committee, minutes of meetings
International Committee on Intellectual Co-Operation, minutes of meetings
Personal Files Gijsbert Frans van Dissel
The Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision, Hilversum, the Netherlands
De Omroepgids, Nederlandsche Christelijke Radio-Vereeniging (NCRV), 1925-1940
De Katholieke Radio Gids, Katholieke Radio Omroep (KRO), 1925-1940
De Radiogids, Vereeniging van Arbeiders Radio Amateurs (VARA), 1927-1940
Vrije Geluiden, Vrijzinnig Protestantse Radio Omroep (VPRO), 1927-1974
De Radiobode, Algemeene Vereeniging Radio Omroep (AVRO), 1929-1958
Interviews
Formal
Raina Konstantinova, Director of EBU Radio Department, June 20, 2006
Werner Rumphorst, Director of EBU Legal Department, June 22, 2006
Pierre-Yves Tribolet, Head of Euroradio / Classics of the EBU Radio Department, June 21, 
2006
Pierre Duret, Project manager EBU Eurovision TV of the EBU Television Department, 
February 12, 2008
Informal 
Jean-Réveillon, Secretary-General of EBU, June 22, 2006
Raina Konstantinova, Director of EBU Radio Department, February 13, 2008 
Avril Mahon-Roberts, Director of EBU Communications Department, November 23, 
2006. (Many occasions since) 
David Wood, Head of New Media, EBU Technical Department, June 20, 2006
Georges Béry, Senior engineer Eurovision Technical Service / Eurovision Operations, EBU, 
January 27, 2006
Frans de Jong, Senior engineer Technical Department, EBU, November 23, 2006
Matthias Coinchon, Senior engineer Technical Department, EBU, November 23, 2006
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Summary
In the eyes of the ruling international elites, the Great War had been driven by a 
rising nationalism that left Europe’s civilization in shambles. The elites argued that 
a new modernism, combined with a world that was increasingly technologically 
interconnected, was to blame for the ruins, anguish, and hatred that dominated 
peoples’ minds after 1918. These intellectual elites tried to rebuild Europe’s civili-
zation and create awareness beyond national boundaries. In this context, broad-
casting experts in Europe built the first radio broadcasting infrastructures inside 
and beyond their borders. This book examines if, how, and why the promoters of 
broadcasting linked their activities in the interwar period to projects that aimed 
to unite Europe.
The book describes five cross-border issues that the emerging transnational com-
munity of broadcasting experts worked to resolve. These issues concerned the insti-
tutionalization of broadcasting; the construction of networks; the interactions be-
tween broadcasting systems such as Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, Vatican Radio, 
and Radio Luxembourg; the role of broadcasting within a broader international 
context of warfare and peace building; and international programming efforts. 
The book is mainly based on research in the archives of international organiza-
tions such as the International Broadcasting Union, the League of Nations, and the 
International Telegraph Union. These organizations could all be seen as European 
system builders. They functioned as arenas in which various actors simultaneously 
negotiated the futures of both transnational broadcasting and Europe. 
Chapter 2 examines the “birth of an idea.” Broadcasting was originally a private 
activity whereby states usually granted concessions to companies that would then 
operate (and sometimes construct) the stations. Several of the operational and 
construction problems mentioned above could not be resolved without a certain 
amount of international collaboration. However, international organizations such 
as the League of Nations and the International Telegraph Union (ITU) did not face 
such problems. They argued that the rapidly developing technology outpaced leg-
islative action. As a result, ten European broadcasting organizations established the 
International Broadcasting Union (IBU) in 1925. The IBU’s institutional structure 
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followed the European tradition of combining a technical approach with the ideals 
of international peace and rapprochement. A wave of nationalizing broadcasting 
in Europe challenged this structure. Eventually, shared European traditions, com-
bined with the central role of a small core group of experts in the IBU, ensured 
minimal state interference. The IBU was able to continue to seek cross-border col-
laboration and became the key player for interwar broadcasting in Europe.
Chapter 3 deals with the pressing problem of network construction. Radio sig-
nals traveled through the air freely, which caused interference with signals across 
borders and major inefficiencies in the network. The IBU, at first alone, but later 
in collaboration with national PTT administrations, the League of Nations’ 
Communication and Transit Committee, the ITU and its consultative commit-
tee for long-distance telephony, drafted plans to allocate frequencies in Europe. 
These activities secured efficient national wireless broadcasting. Furthermore, 
the gradually growing transnational community of broadcasting experts comple-
mented these wireless systems with an interconnected European relay network 
for broadcasting via wire and cable. This network, coupled to the national wire-
less networks, facilitated the exchange of music and broadcasting of international 
programs throughout Europe. The construction processes were contested along 
the way. Throughout the 1930s, the development of short waves challenged the 
recently established European frequency allocation standards. Attempts to stan-
dardize these short waves resulted in an unplanned global regionalization of 
broadcasting.
Chapter 4 challenges the IBU and ITU network efforts by focusing on their inter-
action with other structures, such as Radio Moscow, Radio Nations, Vatican Radio, 
and Radio Luxembourg. These stations, with the exception of Radio Moscow, were 
expanding at a time when the IBU and ITU efforts were well on their way to be-
coming the European standard. The ideas of the new stations’ promoters, which 
were mostly globally-oriented, did not necessarily coincide with the IBU’s vision 
of a Europe with national wireless broadcasting systems. Fine-tuning these stan-
dards with the structure of Radio Moscow, for instance, would redefine the eastern 
boundaries of the European network. Furthermore, the structure of Radio Nations 
and Radio Luxembourg threatened the very idea of a Europe made up of nation 
states. These systems favored a pan-national approach to the organization and 
network construction of broadcasting. International fine-tuning of these different 
systems in Europe could usually only take place via “technified” discussions that 
bridged ideological and political differences. 
TEHS7_handels.indd   321 5/9/2012   3:41:34 PM
322 Europe – On Air
Chapter 5 looks more closely at the role of broadcasting in the context of war 
and peace. Illicit propaganda broadcasting created serious problems on a conti-
nent with as many states as Europe and in an era of rapidly changing interna-
tional relations. Any attempt to solve this problem depended on how well inter-
national relations were progressing. In a reluctant international atmosphere, the 
IBU initially took a gentleman’s approach, requesting that its members broadcast 
in a civilized way without offending people in other countries. When international 
relations improved in the late 1920s, the League recognized the idea of positive 
propaganda. The subsequent close collaboration between the League and the IBU 
endorsed an international mindset based on European values of civilization and 
Enlightenment. The collaboration came to a halt when the rise in harsh national-
ism caused international relations to deteriorate in the 1930s, thereby disrupting a 
well-oiled European broadcasting system. Nazi Germany forced the IBU to cease 
any activity related to power politics. The IBU officially dropped out of propa-
ganda regulation, but a core of IBU experts continued to individually facilitate 
the League on this matter. Solutions came too late – a new world war broke out in 
1939.
Chapter 6 explores international programming. Programs and music touched the 
heart of culture and had a direct impact on feelings of belonging and identity. Any 
effort to standardize transnational cultural broadcasting policy, build international 
programs, and compile a musical repertoire suitable for broadcasting became an 
intricate matter. IBU experts and intellectual elites, both within and outside the 
League of Nations, disagreed substantially on what constituted a “high quality,” 
“high culture,” or “suitable” program. Consequently, many programming issues 
remained unresolved in 1939. Over the years, the various promoters of broadcast-
ing expressed different concepts of the kind of unity that international programs 
should convey to listeners. They related programming more directly to the cre-
ation of European unity than their other broadcasting activities. Ultimately, their 
programs communicated a European culture that reflected a universal idea of na-
tional diversity. The promoters contributed a relatively safe, generally accepted, 
high-quality, and high-art image of European culture to Europe’s cultural heritage 
in the interwar years. They balanced the local and national diversity of Europe 
with the international unity of Europe.
Europe – On Air concludes that interwar promoters of broadcasting did indeed 
connect their activities to projects for European unification. To most of these 
promoters, broadcasting was a matter of practical internationalism. In the first 
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instance, this meant resolving practical problems from a technical standpoint. The 
promoters formed a cross-organizational and flexible transnational expert com-
munity that could adapt to the problems at hand. Diffuse personal networks of-
fered a way out when official routes failed. Secondly, practical internationalism 
meant that the promoters’ ultimate goal was to contribute to the international-
ist ideals of peace and rapprochement worldwide. With the exception of Radio 
Luxembourg, systems such as Radio Moscow, Radio Nations and Vatican Radio 
had global aims, albeit for different reasons. As always, Europe was shimmering 
somewhere in the background, whether entering into construction efforts and in-
terests for a practical in-between solution, as a geographical space, as a tradition 
of commerce and organization, or as an explicit goal for cultural unification and 
civilization. 
Opinions vary regarding the success or failure of these interwar efforts. On one 
hand, the promoters of broadcasting created suitable international institutions, 
material networks, a great variety of “international” programs, and managed to 
let their vision trickle down into European program guides. On the other hand, 
increasing tension during the 1930s and the outbreak of the Second World War 
hindered the implementation and effective employment of their efforts. Many is-
sues remained unresolved. Europe – On Air argues that the efforts of these promot-
ers were not in vain. They have managed to create a European space, a community, 
and a kind of European regulatory culture for broadcasting. Equally important, 
their efforts have found a new start in post-Second World War organizations like 
the European Broadcasting Union and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization. In this way, interwar projects have influenced the 
broadcasting agenda right through to today.
TEHS7_handels.indd   323 5/9/2012   3:41:34 PM
324 Europe – On Air
TEHS7_handels.indd   324 5/9/2012   3:41:34 PM
 Summary 325
Foundation for the History of Technology & Aksant Academic Publishers
Technology and European History Series
Ruth Oldenziel and Johan Schot 
(Eindhoven University of Technology)
Series Editors
The Technology and European History series seeks to present scholarship about the 
role of technology in European history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
series focuses on how technical communities, nation-states, businesses, social groups, 
and other actors have contested, projected, performed, and reproduced multiple rep-
resentations of Europe while constructing and using a range of technologies. The series 
understands Europe both as an intellectual construct and material practice in relation 
to spaces inside as well as outside Europe. In particular, the series invites studies focus-
ing on Europe’s (former) colonies and on the two new superpowers of the twentieth 
century: the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Interdisciplinary work 
is welcomed. The series will offer a platform for scholarly works associated with the 
Tensions of Europe Network to find their way to a broader audience. For more infor-
mation on the network and the series see: www.tensionsofeurope.eu 
Books in series
1. Judith Schueler, Materialising identity. The co-construction of the Gotthard Railway 
and Swiss national identity (Amsterdam, June 2008)
2. Vincent Lagendijk, Electrifying Europe. The power of Europe in the construction of 
electricity networks (Amsterdam, August 2008)
3. Frank Schipper, Driving Europe. Building Europe on roads in the twentieth century 
(Amsterdam, September 2008)
4. Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel (editors), Manufacturing Technology, 
Manufacturing Consumers. The Making of Dutch Consumer Society (Amsterdam, 
January 2009)
5. Irene Anastasiadou, Constructing Iron Europe. Transnationalism and Railways in 
the Interbellum (Amsterdam, March 2012).
6. Milena Veenis, Material Fantasies. Expectations of the Western Consumer World 
among East Germans (Amsterdam, March 2012)
7. Suzanne Lommers, Europe – On Air, Interwar Projects for Radio Broadcasting 
(Amsterdam, April 2012)
Foundation for the History of Technology
The Foundation for the History of Technology (SHT) aims to develop and commu-
nicate knowledge that increases our understanding of the critical role of technology 
in the history of the Western world. Since 1988 the foundation has been supporting 
scholarly research in the history of technology. This has included large-scale national 
and international research programs and numerous individual projects, many in col-
laboration with Eindhoven University of Technology. SHT also coordinates the inter-
national research network Tensions of Europe: Technology and the Making of Europe. 
For more information see: www.histech.nl 
TEHS7_handels.indd   325 5/9/2012   3:41:34 PM
326 Europe – On Air
TEHS7_handels.indd   326 5/9/2012   3:41:34 PM
